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1. Helping the Afghan Allies America Left Behind

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In February 2020, President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By September 11, 2021, the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. During the chaotic retreat, the US left an estimated $7 billion in military equipment in Afghanistan, most of which has now fallen into the hands of the Taliban or ended up on the black market around the region. However, this hefty price tag pales in comparison to the moral cost of leaving behind tens of thousands of Afghan allies who sacrificed so much for the United States over 20 years. In the weeks leading up to the final withdrawal, the US and its international partners attempted to evacuate Afghans who helped the international coalition over the years. By any objective measurement, this effort was a failure. The evidence of this failure was clear for the world to see during the final chaotic weeks at Kabul International Airport.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Taliban, and Refugees
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. CTC Sentinel: August 2023 Issue

Author:
Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, Abdul Sayed, Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, Lucas Webber, and Alec Bertina
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
As we enter a new era of calibrated counterterrorism 22 years after 9/11, in this month’s feature article senior analysts at the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center provide a unique window into the U.S. government’s continuing efforts to suppress international terrorism. NCTC director Christine Abizaid writes: “It is clear to me that Americans at home and abroad would be confronted with a more severe terrorism threat if it were not for the sustained and focused efforts of the entire U.S. CT community over the past 22 years. As we approach another 9/11 anniversary, I asked senior analysts from NCTC to share more with the public and academic community about the constant, behind-the-scenes work of CT professionals across the government. It is my hope that, through this product, others can gain a greater degree of insight into what this community regularly confronts in its mission to protect innocent civilians from persistent terrorist adversaries.” In the second feature article, Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, and Abdul Sayed examine the enduring threat posed by Islamic State Khorasan (ISK). They write: “An analysis of ISK’s operations, outreach, and clashes with the Taliban indicate that the organization remains capable of strategic adaptation and is only broadening and deepening its influence in the region, posturing to become a truly regional organization. And while the Taliban have demonstrated some capacity in targeting ISK commanders, any security gains are unlikely to hold in the absence of sustained counter-ISK operations.” With the Islamic State earlier this month announcing the appointment of its fifth caliph, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, Aymenn Al-Tamimi examines what little is known about the group’s recent paramount leaders. He writes: “Despite the fact that the group’s caliphs are now very much ‘men of the shadows,’ there is little evidence pointing to the prospect of the group’s fragmentation in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere around the world, with the group’s affiliates seemingly willing to accept successor caliphs about whom little or nothing is publicly known.” Lucas Webber and Alec Bertina profile the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and its paramilitary wing, the Russian Imperial Legion (RIL), tracing their involvement in the Ukraine conflict since 2014. They write: “With the Wagner Group’s resources waning, there may be an opportunity for RIM/RIL to deepen its involvement in Russia’s efforts in Ukraine. This could bolster the group’s recruitment, paramilitary capabilities, and thus increase the broader threat it poses. However, the organization may face sanctions in the future from the Russian state if the Kremlin continues to clamp down on Russian pro-war ultra-nationalist elements.”
Topic:
Security, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, 9/11, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Syria, North America, and United States of America

3. CTC Sentinel: May 2023 Issue

Author:
Paul Cruickshank, Abdul Sayed, Tore Hamming, Colin Clarke, and Mollie Saltskog
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
With Pakistan engulfed by political and economic turmoil, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—better known as the Pakistani Taliban—is again growing as a threat. In our feature article, Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming write: “With the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan, the TTP has obtained new more sophisticated weapons and relocated fighters from Afghanistan to Pakistan and is now turning its focus back to its war against the Pakistani state. Over the past two years, the group has gone through a series of mergers, strengthened its media and operational activities, moved away from the indiscriminate targeting of civilians in suicide attacks, implemented a range of new internal policies centralizing its organizational structure, and settled on a localized strategy. With a solid organizational foundation and its eyes set on the Pakistani state, the TTP appears ready to follow in the footsteps of the Afghan Taliban and take control of territory in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The Taliban victory in Afghanistan has emboldened and strengthened the TTP. With the Taliban in control of Afghanistan and sympathetic to the TTP, the TTP now enjoys a level of ‘strategic depth’ that is arguably unparalleled in its history.” Our interview is with Robin Simcox, the United Kingdom’s Commissioner for Countering Extremism. He talks about tackling violent and non-violent extremism across the ideological spectrum and the findings of the recent independent review of the United Kingdom’s “Prevent” counter-extremism pillar. Wassim Nasr recounts his journey through Idlib in late April and early May 2023 on a reporting assignment for France24. He met with senior leaders of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, including its leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who told him they have definitively turned away from global jihad. In Nasr’s words: “You have a core jihadi group with core leaders saying, ‘OK, we don’t want anything to do with international jihad anymore.’ This is unique. It’s never happened before.” Colin Clarke, Mollie Saltskog, Michaela Millender, and Naureen Fink examine the recent targeting of infrastructure by America’s violent far-right. They write that “the increased focus and attacks on critical infrastructure by far-right extremists has the potential to wreak extensive, multifaceted societal disruption and damage, impacting communications, the economy, mobility, and basic human necessities.”
Topic:
Infrastructure, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Far Right, Jihad, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Political Extremism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United Kingdom, South Asia, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

4. US Has an Opportunity to Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Just over one year ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan. Leading up to this takeover, in February 2020 President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2021, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued the fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. While the US does not have many good policy options in Afghanistan because of the Biden administration’s actions, the US and international community need to consider how to support the NRF at this perilous time. This assistance can include establishing formal contact with the NRF leadership and inviting Ahmad Massoud to Washington, DC; refusing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan; providing the NRF with winter gear; allocating a certain percentage of all frozen Afghan central bank funds to the NRF’s political wing, and consulting and coordinating privately with Tajikistan, which harbors sympathies for the ethnic Tajik minority that comprises much of the NRF.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Taliban
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Afghanistan: The Fog at the End of the Tunnel

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
What is causing the uncertainty about when US ground forces will exit Afghanistan. The Biden administration insists that logistical factors explain its breach of the 2020 US-Taliban agreement, which reset the exit date from May to September. Logistical factors are also supposed to explain why the date may now be walked back to July. Actually, logistical issues explain neither. Using current data and historical precedent, this short analysis shows why. An alternative explanation for the delay is that it gave Washington more time to pursue some of its unfinished goals regarding Afghanistan. In this, the lingering troop presence serves as leverage. What goals? Improve Kabul’s military posture, polish plans and preparations for US forces to “fight from afar,” and pursue dramatic new international initiatives aiming to lock the Taliban into a cease-fire, peace settlement, and government reform plan substantially defined by the USA. This high risk-gambit won’t succeed, but it might prolong the conflict and America’s involvement in it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, War, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. Afghanistan: Conflict & Crisis

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
Many of the underlying causes and drivers of instability and conflict in Afghanistan have existed for a long time and have been well recorded in IEP indices and registers, and these causes and drivers had shown exacerbation recently, making instability and conflict more likely. There is a long history of resource degradation leading to conflict and conflict further degrading the resources – a vicious cycle. Our analysis is that these underlying causes and drivers of instability are likely to continue to frustrate efforts for peace and federalised governance in Afghanistan into the future with the Taliban likely to struggle with its own challenges to peace. For the United States and its coalition partners, recent events in Afghanistan may be the closing of a chapter, but for the people of Afghanistan this is part of a continuum of conflict and crisis that will likely continue.
Topic:
Governance, Taliban, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. Taking al Qaeda Seriously in Afghanistan: Policy Options for the United States

Author:
Hannan Hussain
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Despite limited numerical strength, al Qaeda exercises sufficient leverage over contending Taliban factions and continues to cultivate an enduring interest in attacking U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan. To break the al Qaeda-Taliban nexus, Washington must upgrade its verification metrics, and initiate COVID-19 recovery assistance that limits al Qaeda’s influence-building in Afghanistan.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Terrorism, Taliban, Al Qaeda, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future

Author:
Andrew Watkins
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The U.S. and Afghan governments have, at various times, intentionally pursued strategies of “divide and defeat” in an attempt to fragment and weaken the Taliban. These approaches have proved ineffective and, as long as peace efforts are being pursued, should be discontinued. Contrary to lingering narratives from earlier eras of the Afghan conflict, the Taliban today are a relatively cohesive insurgent group and are unlikely to fragment in the near term. This has not happened by accident: the Taliban’s leadership has consistently, at times ruthlessly, worked to retain and strengthen its organizational cohesion. To this day, the group is unwilling to cross internal “red lines” that might threaten that cohesion. The literature on insurgency and negotiated peace suggests that only cohesive movements are capable of following through and enforcing peace agreements. Many of the feared scenarios of Taliban fragmentation, including the defection of “hard-liners” or mass recruitment by the Islamic State, do not correspond to current realities on the ground. Fragmentation of the Taliban is not impossible, and the group is certainly far from monolithic, but ideological rifts are not a sufficient explanation of why this has taken place in the past—or might again. By studying what makes the Taliban cohesive and what has caused instances of its fragmentation, all parties invested in an Afghan peace process might be better equipped to negotiate with the Taliban under terms the movement would be willing to accept, even if it has not defined those terms publicly. This report examines the phenomenon of insurgent fragmentation within Afghanistan’s Taliban and implications for the Afghan peace process. This study, which the author undertook as an independent researcher supported by the Asia Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace, is based on a survey of the academic literature on insurgency, civil war, and negotiated peace, as well as on interviews the author conducted in Afghanistan in 2019 and 2020.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Taliban, Conflict, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. War on Terror: Repercussions for Pakistan

Author:
Muhammad Shamshad, Amjad Abbas Khan, and Muhammad Hassan
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The US-Taliban peace agreement has rekindled hopes for peace in Afghanistan. After fighting for almost two decades, the US has agreed to enter into a peace deal with its one time worst enemy i.e. Taliban. Pakistan has been a facilitator in bringing a peace deal to Afghanistan. Its role has been well recognised by both US and Taliban. Pakistan has long been associated with this issue; first as US partner in the war against Taliban and now as a facilitator to bring US and Taliban to a peace deal. It seems quite pertinent to re-evaluate Pakistan„s role in war against terrorism and its repercussions for Pakistan. The present research has explored the effects that Pakistan has faced after becoming the partner of war on terror initiated by the then American President George Walker Bush in 2001 soon after the incident of 9/11. It has explained how this participation of Pakistan has caused a colossal damage to the social, economic, religious and political domains of Pakistan and how the partnership has tarnished the image of Pakistan in the comity of nations. Additionally, impact of war on terror has been judged through examining the current status of internal and external security threats, soaring poverty, restrained development policies, increased hatred against the Americans and national disintegration. The methods of describing the facts and figures in the existing body of knowledge i.e published books, research articles, newspapers and published theses and then comparing and analysing them on the basis of personal opinion and other data, have been used to conclude the topic.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Taliban, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

10. Peace Talks on Afghanistan. A Last Opportunity for Peace? / Conversaciones de paz sobre Afganis-tán ¿Una última oportunidad para la paz?

Author:
Javier Ruiz Arévalo
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
When it has been more than 17 years since the fall of the Taliban regime, the Afghan conflict is far from being over. The country continues to experience a kind of resilient civil war in which neither the legitimate government of Kabul, supported by a large part of the international community, nor the Taliban have managed to impose themselves in a clear and lasting manner. To date, it seems that none of the contenders considers it feasible that the conflict will end with a military victory. This reality has ended up addressing all the direct actors (the government of Kabul, the US and the Taliban) and the indirect actors (NATO, Russia, Pakistan, Iran...) to seek a negotiated end. The task is not easy given the difficulty to find an acceptable definition for everyone on the Afghanistan that should arise from the agreement. Reconciling the Islamic Republic that some advocate, with the Democratic State designed by the current Constitution is not an easy task. Perhaps for this reason, more than a decade of talks has not been enough to illuminate a peace agreement acceptable to all. At first, one might think that nothing has changed and that the talks currently undegoing are hopelessly doomed to failure, as they face the same problem as all previous attempts: the impossibility of reconciling the interests of the Afghan government, the Taliban and the US and its allies. However, it seems that the ongoing talks have been addressed by the US and the Taliban with a different spirit. The fatigue after so many years of conflict and the evidence, eventually assumed, of the impossibility of a military victory seems to have made a dent in both, making them see that there are only two possible options: accept an imperfect agreement or be doomed to an endless war.
Topic:
Taliban, Political stability, Conflict, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America