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31. Charting a Transatlantic Course to Address China

Author:
Julianne Smith, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Carisa Nietsche, and Ellison Laskowski
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Mounting competition between China and liberal democracies will shape the course of the 21st century. The gravity and scope of the challenges that China poses have permeated the transatlantic policy agenda and become a focal point in U.S.-Europe relations. Whereas China has long been a source of disagreement and even tension between the transatlantic partners, in the past two years views have converged. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) assertive actions—its “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, aggressive influence operations, human rights violations at home, and elimination of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong—have increased concerns in both the United States and Europe. There is now fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation on everything from reducing dependency on Chinese trade and investment to setting global norms and standards for the future. Yet, despite this convergence of views and interests, there is still no roadmap for how such cooperation should progress. This report outlines such an approach. It is based on the premise that the time is ripe for greater transatlantic cooperation on China. It also recognizes the comprehensive nature of the task at hand. Today’s controversies with China over trade, investment, technology, and global governance are all part of a larger competition between political systems and worldviews. The breadth of the challenge means that the United States and Europe must compete with China across multiple domains. This report lays out a roadmap for doing so, outlining concrete recommendations across the four sectors of technology, investment, trade, and global governance. By working together, the United States and Europe can pool the resources and leverage needed to push back against the CCP in these areas and develop preferred alternatives that advance strategic priorities for both sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, the strategies outlined in this report will also serve a second purpose: re-energizing the ailing relationship between Europe and the United States.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

32. Sanctions by the Numbers: Spotlight on Iran

Author:
Abigail Eineman
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The June edition of “Sanctions by the Numbers” illustrated a decade of U.S. sanctions policy by using heat maps to show the countries with the largest number of designations. Across both the Trump and Obama administrations, Iran was always at the top of the list. This edition of Sanctions by the Numbers explores Iran sanctions further, tracking how designations and delistings have evolved over time, the dozens of countries affected by Iran-related sanctions programs, and the top types of U.S. designations. The data add to the existing consensus that sanctions have an inverse relationship with Iran’s economic health, and designations have far outpaced delistings in the last three years as part of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

33. Congress’s Hidden Strengths: Wielding Informal Tools of National Security Oversight

Author:
Richard Fontaine and Loren DeJonge Schulman
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
On matters of peace and war, virtually no one seems satisfied with Congress. Constitutionally coequal to the executive, the Congress often appears more an uneasy junior partner. During the past two decades, the executive branch has expanded its authority to launch, conduct, and conceal military activity. In response, Congress—despite its formal powers to declare war, appropriate funds, and organize the armed forces—has largely deferred, putting up more of a rhetorical fight than engaging in a deliberative effort to shape American wars. Congress, even lawmakers complain, postures more than it prescribes, overlooks more than it oversees, and passes time more than it passes laws. Conventional wisdom and political consultants offer congressmen good rationale: foreign policy does not typically drive elections, Americans are increasingly disconnected from both their military and the costs of war, and there are few political incentives to dig deeply into matters of war and peace. Today the “imperial presidency” is accepted as a given division of labor rather than seen as a counter-constitutional anomaly. And yet with the nation involved in military operations across multiple countries, and with debates about possible military interventions in Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela reaching the White House, congressional attention to the use of force should today be at a premium. The Founders were correct to vest national security decisionmaking in not only one branch of government, and history shows numerous examples of Congress positively influencing matters of war and peace. An inactive or indifferent legislature leaves power overconcentrated in the executive, while an engaged Congress may not just check presidential reach but can actively improve the conduct of American conflicts.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

34. Reengaging Iran: A New Strategy for the United States

Author:
Ilan Goldenberg, Elisa Catalano Ewers, and Kaleigh Thomas
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
It appears unlikely that Iran will engage in diplomatic negotiations with President Donald Trump’s administration before the U.S. elections. However, the international community may find Iran ready to consider a return to negotiations in 2021—regardless of the results in November—either because of Iran’s interest in engaging a Biden administration or in an effort to avoid four more years of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign. This report lays out potential options for a new U.S. administration to engage Iran in 2021. Many of the ideas also can be adapted for a second term Trump administration as described at the end of this report.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

35. Reforming the Department of Homeland Security Through Enhanced Oversight & Accountability

Author:
Carrie Cordero
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
In November 2002, 14 months after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or the department) was created by Congress to make America safer from terrorism.1 At the time, the policy focus was on international terrorism, in particular al Qaeda. Since then, not only has the terrorism landscape evolved—from al Qaeda and its affiliates to ISIS to the present increased attention to domestic terrorism linked to white supremacist violence2—but the scope and complexity of national security threats have evolved. The new department centralized border security, immigration enforcement, transportation security, emergency management, and critical infrastructure protection, plus additional functions, with an intent to protect against future terrorist attack. The fundamental activities of the department, however, have always been broader than terrorism. And over the years, attention to the department has quickly shifted depending on the critical events of the time, whether a natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005, or persistent cyberattacks and other malign cyberactivity since the mid-2000s, or the emergence of a global pandemic.3 Meanwhile, due to a variety of factors, the size and complexity of DHS’s law enforcement functions have grown, while recent attention has focused primarily on the border and immigration functions. The department is arguably the most operational agency in the federal government in terms of its routine activities that affect and directly touch millions of people each day. These varying and disparate missions across the department are focused domestically and therefore require substantial attention to whether and how they are carried out in accordance with law and respect for constitutional protections. This report, issued as part of a Center for a New American Security (CNAS) project4 on enhancing DHS oversight and accountability, posits that 18 years into the department’s existence, the functions of border security and immigration enforcement, as well as the law enforcement functions of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in particular, have grown disproportionately large in size and broad in scope, without the necessary oversight and accountability structures that must accompany such activities.5 And DHS’s border and immigration functions are under tremendous strain as they are tasked with increased policy directives, humanitarian challenges on the southern border, intense political pressure, and growing public scrutiny about these functions. The department is in severe need of legislative attention and policy coordination. If it does not reform to address the issues identified in this report, it is likely the department will face calls for partial or full dismantlement under a future administration.6 Such a result would undo nearly 20 years of effort to better protect the nation from terrorism and emerging homeland threats, and risk returning to a pre-9/11 era of dis-jointed homeland security coordination.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Homeland Security, Accountability, and Oversight
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

36. A New Arsenal for Competition: Coercive Economic Measures in the U.S.-China Relationship

Author:
Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter Harrell, and Ashley Feng
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The United States and China have long used coercive economic measures to advance both economic and foreign policy objectives. In recent years, however, both countries have turned to coercive economic measures as mainstream instruments of foreign policy and national security policy, and increasingly have deployed coercive economic measures against each other. For the United States, China’s economic scale and global interconnections make it a fundamentally different type of target for coercive economic measures than the comparatively smaller and less sophisticated economies that have been primary targets of U.S. economic coercion in the past. The United States cannot simply isolate China from the global economy. Instead, it must adopt a more strategic focus on limiting Chinese actions in areas significant to U.S. national security and shoring up economic and technology arenas where the United States maintains lasting leverage. Over the past several years, the United States has deployed an array of coercive economic measures against China. The most prominent of these have been the tariffs on approximately two-thirds of U.S. imports from China. The tariffs remain largely in place despite implementation of the Phase One trade deal that the United States and China signed in January 2020. But the United States also has developed and deployed an increasingly sophisticated set of other coercive economic tools that will play a prominent role in U.S.-China relations over the years ahead, regardless of whether the United States and China fully implement the Phase One deal and reach a broader Phase Two trade agreement. Those other coercive economic tools include export controls, restrictions on U.S. imports to secure U.S. supply chains, heightened scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States, sanctions, and stepped-up law enforcement measures against Chinese intellectual property (IP) theft and other Chinese activities in the United States. This expanding set of measures serves a broadening array of U.S. policy goals, including economic objectives, foreign policy goals, and the maintenance of America’s technological edge. The U.S. record of success in the use of these coercive economic measures has been mixed. While tariffs and other measures have succeeded in putting some macroeconomic pressure on China, they have not extracted fundamental concessions from Beijing. Targeted sanctions and law enforcement measures similarly have had economic impacts on some Chinese companies, but other Chinese companies have demonstrated an ability to weather U.S. economic coercion. To be effective in translating economic coercion into policy change by China, the United States needs to better integrate its coercive measures with each other and with other policies, better signal intentions and escalation, more rigorously assess impacts and costs, and galvanize allied support and coordinated action. For its part, China appears to recognize a balancing act between limiting economic ties with foreign partners in some domains and maintaining them in others. China has sought to distance certain Chinese economic sectors, particularly high-tech manufacturing, from the United States in some areas, investing heavily in domestic capacity development. In other areas where China must rely on foreign partners for technology, IP, or manufacturing, or where China does not appear to see a clear interest in severing trade, Beijing has sought to keep trade and investment flows moving in an unencumbered fashion. As for the United States, this is a dynamic policy environment.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

37. Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Ely Ratner, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, Rush Doshi, Chris Dougherty, Richard Fontaine, Peter Harrell, Martijn Rasser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Eric Sayers, Daleep Singh, Paul Scharre, Loren DeJonge Schulman, ​Neil Bhatiya, Ashley Feng, Joshua Fitt, Megan Lamberth, Kristine Lee, and Ainikki Riikonen
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The United States and China are locked in strategic competition over the future of the Indo-Pacific—the most populous, dynamic, and consequential region in the world. At stake are competing visions for the rules, norms, and institutions that will govern international relations in the decades to come.1 The U.S. government aspires toward a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, defined by respect for sovereignty and the independence of nations, peaceful resolution of disputes, free and fair trade, adherence to international law, and greater transparency and good governance.2 For the United States, successful realization of this regional order would include strong U.S. alliances and security partnerships; a military able to operate throughout the region, consistent with international law; U.S. firms with access to leading markets, and benefiting from updated technology standards, investment rules, and trade agreements; U.S. participation in effective regional and international institutions; and the spread of democracy and individual freedoms in the context of an open information environment and vibrant civil society.3 By contrast, China is driving toward a more closed and illiberal future for the Indo-Pacific, core aspects of which would undermine vital U.S. interests.4 Key features of China-led order would include the People’s Liberation Army controlling the South and East China Seas; regional countries sufficiently coerced into acquiescing to China’s preferences on military, economic, and diplomatic matters; an economic order in which Beijing sets trade and investment rules in its favor, with dominance over leading technologies, data, and standards; and Beijing with de facto rule over Taiwan and agenda-setting power over regional institutions. The order would be further characterized by weak civil society, a dearth of independent media, and the gradual spread of authoritarianism, reinforced by the proliferation of China’s high-tech surveillance state. The net result would be a less secure, less prosperous United States that is less able to exert power and influence in the world.5 Ultimately, the competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific is a contest over which of these futures will come closer to fruition, even as neither is likely to attain in its entirety. In the two years since the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy aptly identified this competition over the regional order in Asia, the U.S. government has taken initial steps toward its goal of a free and open region. On balance, however, critical areas of U.S. policy remain inconsistent, uncoordinated, underresourced, and—to be blunt—uncompetitive and counterproductive to advancing U.S. values and interests. This independent assessment—mandated by the U.S. Congress in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act—is intended to help close the considerable gap between the current administration’s stated aspirations for a free and open Indo-Pacific and the actual implementation of policies to advance that vision. Specifically, Congress called for “an assessment of the geopolitical conditions in the Indo-Pacific region that are necessary for the successful implementation of the National Defense Strategy,” with a particular focus on how to “support United States military requirements for forward defense, assured access, extensive forward basing, and alliance and partnership formation and strengthening in such region.”6 This report examines how the U.S. government as a whole, not just the Department of Defense, can realize these outcomes. Although the focus of this assessment is on the Indo-Pacific, it is critical to underscore that the China challenge is a global phenomenon, and many of the actions recommended in this report should be taken to bolster U.S. competitiveness beyond the region. Consistent with the bipartisan mission of the Center for a New American Security, the report’s authors have collectively served on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump at the White House, State Department, Defense Department, Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Included herein are nearly a hundred specific and actionable policy recommendations across critical vectors of American competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Before turning to these recommendations, the remainder of this section describes six core principles that undergird the assessment and should form the foundations of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

38. Strong Foundations: Financial Security Starts with Affordable, Stable Housing

Author:
Aspen Institute and EPIC
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
One in three US households—nearly 100 million people—struggle with housing costs that jeopardize their financial security. The problem is acute for virtually all low-income families and for the 1 in 4 renters who spend 50% or more of their income on housing—and its effects ripple throughout our communities and economy. In 2019, Aspen EPIC recognized rising housing costs and instability as critical threats to the financial security of American families and created a comprehensive research primer on the topic. Drawing on extensive review of the research literature, engagement with more than 100 experts, and analysis of federal survey data, we have prepared a research brief and primer, “Strong Foundations: Financial security starts with affordable, stable housing.”
Topic:
Security, Financial Stability, and Housing
Political Geography:
United States of America and North America

39. China's Rise as a Global Security Actor: Implications for NATO

Author:
Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In December 2019, for the first time, NATO leaders recognised China as a new strategic point of focus for the Alliance. This reflects growing concern among NATO members surrounding China’s geopolitical rise and its growing power-projection capabilities, as well as the impact that these may have on the global balance of power. Today, China is not only taking a central role in Indo-Pacific security affairs but is also becoming an increasingly visible security actor in Europe’s periphery. As such, the question of how to deal with an increasingly global China has been an important part of Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s NATO 2030 reflection process. China poses a wide range of challenges to NATO. Beijing sees the Alliance as a United States-centric outfit that may be used by Washington to contain China, and has therefore tried to influence individual NATO members’ decisions in order to weaken the Alliance’s unity. Close ties between China and Russia, especially in the security and military spheres, have also been a source of concern for NATO allies. Besides the Chinese and Russian navies’ joint exercises in the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, there is also the potential for the two sides to further coordinate – or at least align their behaviour – on issues of relevance to the Alliance, including hybrid warfare and cyber espionage, arms-control issues, and their approach to Arctic governance, among others. China’s defence spending and military-modernisation process, along with the growing strength of its defence industry, have led to the proliferation of more advanced military platforms around the world. Beijing is also expanding its stockpile of missiles, some of which have the range to reach NATO countries. China’s military-power-projection capabilities have likewise edged towards Europe as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded its international presence over the last few years. While NATO allies may have agreed that China presents a number of challenges to the Alliance’s security, they have yet to achieve consensus on how to address them. Some of these issues lie beyond NATO’s traditional areas of competence and will require expertise best provided by partners of the Alliance rather than the Alliance itself. NATO allies will need to prioritise how, when, where and with which partners to use their combined resources to deal with them. At the same time, the Alliance acknowledges that China is not its adversary. NATO thus must find areas of common interest where it can continue to cooperate with China, albeit with a more clear-eyed approach than it has done in the past. Addressing the opportunities and problems posed by China as a cohesive alliance will be more important than ever.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

40. Crime in the Northern Triangle

Author:
Mark L Schneider
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Violence and crime in the Northern Triangle Countries (NTC) of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras continue to endanger citizen security in those countries, as well as in Mexico and in the United States. The extent, conditions, and policy responses are important in and of themselves, but also because this violence constitutes one of the significant factors driving migration toward the United States.
Topic:
Security, Crime, Human Rights, and Migration
Political Geography:
Central America, North America, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador