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2. Competing in Artificial Intelligence Chips: China’s Challenge amid Technology War
- Author:
- Dieter Ernst
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for International Governance Innovation
- Abstract:
- This special report assesses the challenges that China is facing in developing its artificial intelligence (AI) industry due to unprecedented US technology export restrictions. A central proposition is that China’s achievements in AI lack a robust foundation in leading-edge AI chips, and thus the country is vulnerable to externally imposed supply disruptions. The COVID-19 pandemic has further decoupled China from international trade and technology flows. Success in AI requires mastery of data, algorithms and computing power, which, in turn, is determined by the performance of AI chips. Increasing computing power that is cost-effective and energy-saving is the indispensable third component of this magic AI triangle. Research on China’s AI strategy has emphasized China’s huge data sets as a primary advantage. It was assumed that China could always purchase the necessary AI chips from global semiconductor industry leaders. Until recently, AI applications run by leading-edge major Chinese technology firms were powered by foreign chips, mostly designed by a small group of top US semiconductor firms. The outbreak of the technology war, however, is disrupting China’s access to advanced AI chips from the United States. Drawing on field research conducted in 2019, this report contributes to the literature by addressing China’s arguably most immediate and difficult AI challenges. The report highlights China’s challenge of competing in AI, and contrasts America’s and China’s different AI development trajectories. Capabilities and challenges are assessed, both for the large players (Huawei, Alibaba and Baidu) and for a small group of AI chip “unicorns.” The report concludes with implications for China’s future AI chip development.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Science and Technology, Sanctions, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, Asia, and North America
3. A Fragile Anti-US Alliance: Russia Accuses China of Technology Theft
- Author:
- James M Dorsey
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
- Abstract:
- The relationship between Russia and China is based on shared short-term strategic interests, but their differences lie just beneath the surface. Occasionally they erupt into the public eye, as occurred when Russia recently accused China of technology theft. The dynamic of the Russian-Chinese alliance is similar to that of Moscow’s alliances with Turkey and Iran, which also function by focusing on immediate interests and putting off serious differences as long as possible.
- Topic:
- Crime, Science and Technology, and Arms Trade
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America
4. Catching Up: China’s Developing Military Power
- Author:
- Ian Williams
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- For decades, China has engaged in a fervent game of “catch-up” with U.S. military capabilities. This effort, which has ballooned China’s defense spending to 620 percent of its 1990 level, is beginning to bear real fruit. While still far from achieving military parity, China’s military technology and doctrine are quickly coalescing into a coherent form of warfare, tailored to overpowering the U.S. military in a short, sharp conflict in the Eastern Pacific. This strategy of “informationized” warfare focuses first on eroding U.S. situational awareness, communications, and precision targeting capabilities.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Weapons, Military Spending, Conflict, and Surveillance
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
5. An affordable defense of Asia
- Author:
- T. X. Hammes
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- For the last two decades, China has studied the US military, identified its key weaknesses, and developed the tactics and forces best suited to exploit those vulnerabilities. These challenges are compounded by significant deficiencies in today’s US joint force across all domains of conflict—sea, air, land, space, electronic warfare, and cyber. Proposed budgets cannot overcome those deficiencies using legacy systems. Therefore, the current US military strategy for the defense of Asia—a conventional defense of the first island chain from Japan to the Philippines, built on current air and sea platforms supported by major air and sea bases—needs to be adapted. The United States and its allies have two major advantages they can exploit—geography and emerging technologies. In Forward Defense’s inaugural report, An Affordable Defense of Asia, T.X. Hammes crafts a strategy for leveraging these advantages. Hammes makes the case that by developing novel operational concepts that take advantage of emerging technologies, while integrating these concepts into a broader Offshore Control Strategy which seeks to hold geostrategic chokepoints, the United States can improve its warfighting posture and bolster conventional deterrence. This paper advances the following arguments and recommendations. 1. The geography of the Pacific provides significant strategic, operational, and tactical advantages to a defender. 2. New operational concepts that employ emerging, relatively inexpensive technologies—including multimodal missiles, long-range air drones, smart sea mines, and unmanned naval vessels—can support an affordable defense of Asia. 3. These new technologies can and should be manufactured and fielded by US allies in the region in order to strengthen alliance relationships and improve their ability to defend themselves. 4. Autonomous weapons will be essential to an affordable defense of Asia.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, and Science and Technology
- Political Geography:
- China, East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America
6. Emerging technologies and the future of US-Japan defense collaboration
- Author:
- Tate Nurkin and Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Geopolitical and security dynamics are shifting in the Indo-Pacific as states across the region adjust to China’s growing influence and the era of great-power competition between the United States and China. These geopolitical shifts are also intersecting with the accelerating rate of innovation in technologies associated with the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) to reshape the future of military-technological competition and emerging military operations. This report, Emerging Technologies and the Future of US-Japan Defense Collaboration, by Tate Nurkin and Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, explores the drivers, tensions, and constraints shaping US-Japan collaboration on emerging defense technologies while providing concrete recommendations for the US-Japan alliance to accelerate and intensify long-standing military and defense-focused coordination and collaboration.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Science and Technology
- Political Geography:
- Japan, East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America
7. Normalization by Other Means—Technological Infrastructure and Political Commitment in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
- Author:
- Christopher Lawrence
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Security
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-production complex in exchange for civilian light water reactors (LWRs) and the promise of political normalization with the United States. Today, scholars look back at the Agreed Framework as a U.S. offer of “carrots” to bribe the regime, but this framing overlooks the credibility challenges of normalization and the distinctive technical challenges of building LWRs in North Korea. Political and technical analysis reveals how the LWR project helped build credibility for the political changes promised in the Agreed Framework.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Science and Technology, History, Infrastructure, Crisis Management, and Normalization
- Political Geography:
- Asia, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America
8. Between the Chinese Dragon and American Eagle: 5G Development in the Baltic States
- Author:
- Maya Guzdar and Tomas Jermalavicius
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- In the course of 2018-20, development of Fifth Generation (5G) communication networks has been increasingly influenced by the considerations of national security and geopolitics. The largest provider of 5G equipment, the Chinese mobile telecom giant Huawei, has come under fire from the U.S., Czechia, Poland, and other nations in recent years for attempted espionage, theft of intellectual property and other nefarious activities; in the past month, UK decided to ban Huawei technology from its networks. All this comes into sharp focus as the geopolitical confrontation between Washington and Beijing reaches new heights. However, China is one of the EU’s largest trading partners and has worked to establish its economic, political, and cultural influence in various Member States. The EU and NATO have both released standards for member states must use when gauging the security of potential 5G networks. Yet, the EU in particular has not enacted a blanket ban or sweeping restrictions on the Chinese 5G equipment providers, leaving the tradeoffs between national security, technological progress and cost-efficiency to individual states. Although the Baltic states are well-versed in dealing with cybersecurity challenges, their road to 5G development is going to be complex. Whole-of-society awareness, political diligence, technical competence, regional cooperation, and resilience to Beijing’s influence operations are needed in forging a clear path to 5G that is aligned with their key geopolitical interest—maintaining their close strategic alliance with the United States. This brief aims to explore the geopolitical factors at play in determining the Baltic states’ 5G policy and regulations, with a particular focus on the EU, U.S., and China’s influence. It also provides a short of overview of the state of current 5G networks and regulations in the Baltic states while identifying challenges that the region will face in the coming years.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, Resilience, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Baltic States
9. Productivity and Adaptability: Why COVID-19 Has Not Overrun American Hospitals
- Author:
- Hanns Kuttner
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Early in the COVID-19 epidemic, many gloomy images emerged of what might be ahead. In one, hospitals would be overrun by more COVID-19 patients than they could treat. Models developed at the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) provided numbers that supported the image. For the most part, overrun hospitals did not happen. Things turned out better because America’s hospitals did better than the IHME model thought they could. Hospital productivity has proved to be greater than anticipated in the IHME model. Productivity determines how many patients hospitals can serve. Productivity reflects how many beds a hospital has and how many days each patient stays in a bed. The most common pattern in hospitals, patients who are discharged alive and do not require time in an intensive care unit (ICU), provide an example. Length of stay for that group has been a third shorter than assumed in the IHME model. The data required to tell the adaptability story in detail is not yet available. Only a qualitative assessment is possible at this point. Hospitals adapted in ways not anticipated in the IHME model. For example, they delayed elective surgical procedures, freeing up beds. The story will become more detailed as data about hospital admissions and the clinical course of COVID-19 patients becomes available.
- Topic:
- Health, Science and Technology, Health Care Policy, COVID-19, and Pharmaceuticals
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
10. Next Steps for US Trade, Manufacturing, and Supply Chains After COVID-19
- Author:
- Thomas J. Duesterberg
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- The imperative to return supply chains to the United States for products important to national defense, medical security, and competitiveness in key industrial and technology sectors is not new. The explosive growth of the Chinese manufacturing sector, its mercantilist challenge to the world trading system, and its impact on jobs and industrial leadership in the United States is well known and well documented. This challenge has prompted new research and policies to help reverse the erosion of US supply chains. US technology leadership has been undermined by China’s forced technology transfer, theft of intellectual property, and subsidization of traditional and new higher technology sectors. In turn, the loss of global markets and US manufacturing jobs have resulted in social problems of increasing devastation to communities in industrial areas. China’s economic growth depends, in a historically unprecedented way, on its export model and the suppression of domestic consumption. This results in a cycle of overproduction, expansion of external spheres of economic influence, and dumping of products abroad. In recent years, the United States has begun to challenge the Chinese model. However, much work remains to be done to accomplish the goal of ending mercantilist practices, establishing a level playing field for US producers, and reinvigorating domestic production. Critical supply chains for US national defense and high technology leadership have become overly dependent on China and other foreign sources. The vulnerability of supply chains has been demonstrated by interruptions in supply of key materials by both natural disasters and political decisions such as Beijing’s cutoff of rare earth metals a decade ago. More recently, in July 2020, the production of critical personal protective equipment was interrupted by massive flooding in the interior of China. Beyond Beijing’s unfair practices, China is a continental economy with the ambition to displace the United States as the leader in the global economy of the 21st century and has the economies of scale to represent a serious, long term threat to US leadership and markets. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated these preexisting trends and underscores the importance of bringing industrial supply chains, including medical products, back to the United States. First, the cut-off of medical supplies, not just from China but from Europe and other allies, brought the vulnerabilities of relying on outside sourcing into clearer and more immediate focus. Ninety countries blocked the exports of medical products during the early months of the pandemic. Second, border closures around the world, even within the European Union (EU), added to the worries about supply chain interruptions, including for workers and logistics. Seventy percent of the world’s points of entry restricted foreign travelers at some point as the pandemic grew. Third, border closures and supply chain interruptions increased tensions between nations, especially between the United States and China, which was criticized for its suppression of information at the start of the pandemic. Beijing’s brazen imposition of a new security law in Hong Kong while the world was preoccupied by the pandemic further eroded its global standing, especially in Europe. Fourth, the economic collapse due to the pandemic response again focused attention on the need to create more domestic jobs, including those in the hard-hit industrial sector. Finally, all these developments led allies such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and the EU to advance new policies meant to bring production back to home territories. These trends support initiatives to increase the resiliency of domestic production, even beyond the parameters of defense and medical security.
- Topic:
- Economics, Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Trade, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America