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21. US-EU dispute over auto trade could get worse

Author:
Dong Yan and Xu Tingting
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
The dispute over auto trade between the United States and the European Union is becoming more heated and uncertain. US President Donald Trump has threatened to slap additional tariffs of 25 percent on autos imported from the EU if the bloc doesn't agree to a trade agreement favorable to the US. Although Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte told CNBC on Monday that there's a lot happening behind the scenes to ensure the US and the EU reach a trade deal, Bloomberg, citing a senior EU official, reported on Friday that the EU is ready to target Caterpillar and Xerox if Trump hits cars.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

22. Berlin’s Preliminary 5G Decision: Limiting Damage and Learning Lessons

Author:
Kaan Sahin and Didi Kirsten Tatlow
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Despite the security concerns of the US, EU, and Australia, Germany plans not to exclude any telecom equipment vendors, including Chinese companies such as Huawei, from its 5G network. This stance reflects a narrow view of the issue that prioritizes short-term economic interests and fails to uphold national security and democratic values. Widespread criticism, including from within the government, shows that political decision-makers in Germany need a more sophisticated, forward-looking approach to 5G.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, European Union, and Internet
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Germany, Australia, North America, and United States of America

23. Both Russian and American Publics Sense a Transatlantic Rift

Author:
Dina Smeltz and Lily Wojtowicz
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Building over the last few years, disputes between the United States and Europe over trade, climate change, and nuclear weapons were on full display at the annual Munich Security Conference last month. Russian leaders have tried to exploit these strains between the United States and its allies. In Munich, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov of Russia suggested that the European Union and Russia build a “shared European home.”[1] Sidelining the United States through deepened ties with Europe has long been a strategy of the Kremlin to weaken the West’s united front against Russia’s regional and international aggression.[2] Findings from a new US-Russia binational survey, conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Analytical Center, reveal that publics in both countries have noticed cracks in the US-EU relationship.[3] While Americans have long expressed support for NATO, a majority say that unity among NATO allies is weakening. At the same time, Russians’ impressions that transatlantic security links are weakening contribute to their sense that the United States is now in a weaker global position.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, Public Opinion, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

24. Countdown for Brexit: What to Expect for UK, EU and Turkey?

Author:
Burak Cop
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center
Abstract:
As the most divisive issue of the British politics since 2016, the Brexit phenomenon continues to shake the two biggest mainstream parties, Conservatives and Labour. The Conservative Party is affected by the tension between the Soft and Hard Brexiters, but the divisiveness Brexit brings about hits Labour even worse. A No Deal or Hard Brexit is likely to strengthen Scotland’s bid for independence. Scotland’s probable departure from the UK will surely be encouraging for other secessionist movements in Europe, however it should be noted that the window of opportunity Brexit opens for Scottish nationalists constitutes a rather exceptional case in Europe. One could argue that the “Norway model” for post-Brexit UK could be valid for Turkey too, but that model aims to bring about a deeper integration than what the proponents of “EU-Turkey exclusive partnership” prescribe for Turkey.
Topic:
European Union, Brexit, Political Parties, and Secession
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, North America, Scotland, and European Union

25. Fighting for Europe. European Strategic Autonomy and the Use of Force

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Strategic autonomy: yes! But to do what exactly? To protect ourselves, or to protect others, outside Europe, as well? To protect ourselves by defeating the enemy on his own ground, in Europe’s neighbourhood or further afield? Or only by making sure he doesn’t breach the walls of Europe? To protect us from all enemies, or only from some? Who is the “enemy” anyway? The June 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) for the first time explicitly mentions strategic autonomy as an objective for the Union, and that raises a lot of questions. Sven Biscop argues that the EU’s priorities should be: (1) In the short term, to further strengthen its strategic autonomy in protecting our domestic security, and to achieve full strategic autonomy in crisis response, across the whole spectrum of operations, in our broad neighbourhood. (2) In the medium term, to achieve a significant degree of autonomy in securing Europe’s “connectivity” with the world, in space, air space and cyberspace and on the seas. (3) In the long term, to achieve a significant degree of autonomy for the European Allies and partners of NATO (who, pace Cyprus, happen to constitute the EU), to deter and defend against threats against our territory, in case the attention of our main non-EU allies is pulled away by contingencies outside the North Atlantic area.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

26. Meeting the challenge of secondary sanctions

Author:
Ellie Geranmayeh and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council On Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Secondary sanctions have become a critical challenge for Europe, due to the Trump administration’s maximalist policy on Iran and its aggressive economic statecraft. Europe’s vulnerabilities mostly result from asymmetric interdependence with the US economy, due to the size of US markets and the global role of the US dollar. In future, states will likely weaponise economic interdependence with the EU to target countries that are more important to the European economy than Iran, such as China and Russia. European countries should demonstrate that, despite their economic interdependence with the US, they control EU foreign policy. The EU and its member states should strengthen their sanctions policy, begin to build up their deterrence and resilience against secondary sanctions, and prepare to adopt asymmetric countermeasures against any country that harms European interests through secondary sanctions. They should also attempt to bolster the global role of the euro and lead a robust international dialogue on the role of sanctions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, European Union, Economy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, North America, and United States of America

27. Europe in a multipolar missile world – Why the EU and NATO should not try to salvage the INF Treaty

Author:
Bruno Hellendorff
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 1 February 2019, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that his country had suspended its compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty, and would withdraw from it within six months. The INF Treaty, little known outside of arms control and disarmament circles, was a landmark Cold War agreement between the United States of America and the USSR – the first to ban an entire category of weapons (ground-based medium- and intermediate-range missiles). The US withdrawal, announced in dramatic terms by President Donald Trump in October 2018, followed the claim that Russia had recently developed and fielded a missile with performances forbidden by the INF Treaty. The end of this little-known treaty is not anecdotal. Not only will it further strain the US-Russia relationship and antagonise allies, it will also contribute to the erosion of what is left of the global arms-control architecture and incentivise arms-race behav- iours among great powers. In a world where security is increasingly less a question of multilateral deliberation and rules-based interactions, the end of the INF Treaty is a further signal that missile technologies are again becoming a venue for competition between great powers: only this time, at least three are playing the game (United States, China and Russia) rather than two (United States and USSR). Additionally, missile technology proliferation has turned into a major dimension of contemporary battlefield realities, and missile programmes of countries such as Iran and North Korea continue to pose important diplomatic and non-proliferation challenges. Meanwhile, Europe is, by and large, left watching as its regional security architecture erodes. Welcome to what US National Security Advisor John Bolton recently termed ‘a multipolar missile world’. The EU should not try to salvage the INF Treaty. Its diplomatic capital might be better spent in areas where it could potentially make a difference, rather than in a treaty to which it is not even party. Existing multilateral regimes and agreements with the EU or its Member States as parties are already in dire need of reinforcement in the face of technological progress, a volatile diplomatic environment and self-centred, competitive political narratives. These include, inter alia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) framework (including its Structured Dialogue), multilateral export control regimes (MECR) like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), transparency and trust-building mechanisms like the Hague Code of Conduct against missile proliferation (HCoC), and nuclear-related frame- works like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or ‘Iran deal’) or the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Process. These, however, may simply fail to meet the challenge of a multipolar missile world. Renewed efforts, both conceptual and in the realm of capabilities, are needed in a NATO framework to reinforce the linkage between deterrence and diplomacy. NATO-EU dialogue and cooperation on defence issues could be further enhanced, and European countries should work more with like-minded partners at both bilat- eral or multilateral levels on the challenges of non-proliferation and disarmament in the twenty-first century. The demise of the INF Treaty should therefore re-energise the debate on European strategic autonomy, help support collective capability building – not least in NATO – and prompt new discussions on stronger multilateral rules on missile development, use and proliferation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

28. Egypt, a future gas supplier to the European Union?

Author:
Jan Mazač and Lukáš Tichý
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:
The main objective of the external dimension of the EU energy policy in line with the Energy Union strategy is primarily to ensure energy security by diversifying external energy supplies, transport routes and suppliers, mainly in the gas domain. Egypt’s recent offshore and onshore gas discoveries increased its natural gas reserves estimate. Its natural gas production is thus expected to double in 2020 and transform the country back into a gas supplier in the eastern Mediterranean region. The European Union (EU) should thus strengthen its relations with Egypt to allow its gas production to reach European markets.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Markets, Oil, European Union, and Gas
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, North America, and Egypt

29. European Strategic Autonomy and Brexit

Author:
Peter Round, Bastain Giegerich, and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom is among the few European Union member states with full-spectrum military and defence-industrial capabilities. Through Brexit, the EU could lose 20% of its military and 40% of its defence-industrial capabilities, and thereby its influence and credibility as a security actor. The pertinent question is how to arrange the UK’s future participation in European defence.  Decision-making on defence matters in the international arena requires skilled diplomacy and the momentum to carry plans through the scrutiny of multiple parliaments. The EU risks inaction through inertia without the UK’s soft powers, placing strategic decision-making at risk. The Union needs the UK’s military enablers, but only until it can deliver its own. In addition, with the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States suffering, London’s influence is on the wane.  More autonomy for the EU is possible within a framework of political partners that reaches beyond the EU, incorporating actors such as the UK, and also Norway.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and North America

30. European defence: what impact for NATO?

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The story of the EU’s efforts to acquire some kind of autonomy in the security domain has al- ways been told with reference to NATO. Back in Saint-Malo in 1998, French President Chirac and UK Prime Minister Blair framed the idea of a Eu- ropean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), part- ly in response to NATO’s primacy in handling the Yugoslav conflicts. The objective at the time was for the Union to be given the “capacity for auton- omous action”,1 with “autonomous” referring to freedom from NATO and the United States. In this endeavour, the perception in NATO has always oscillated between indifference vis-à-vis a process that did not seem credible, and concern that an increased EU role in defence could under- mine NATO’s centrality and the transatlantic link. Over the last few years, the EU has embarked upon a process of beefing up its defence profile, raising anxieties in NATO circles. Most recently, references to the need for Europe to acquire stra- tegic autonomy or to move towards a European army, have added to the concerns. But are there reasons for NATO to worry about what the EU and its member states are doing? Is the EU aspira- tion in defence threatening the transatlantic link? Does the EU have the power to unsettle NATO?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, North Atlantic, France, and North America