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1. Keeping Up with the US: Why Europe’s Productivity Is Falling Behind

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The European Union stands at a crossroads. For decades, the EU’s productivity growth has consistently lagged the United States, leading to slower growth in living standards and decline in global economic power. While short-term factors like the strong US fiscal expansion have widened the gap in nominal GDP growth in recent years, the fact is that Europe has trailed the US economic development for several decades and the root of the problem lies in deeper structural issues within the European economy. Four major forces fuel this productivity divide. Firstly, the EU’s investment in research and development (R&D) pales in comparison to the U.S., leading to fewer patents and a slower pace of technology-fuelled innovation. Secondly, Europe trails America in the stock and growth of intangible capital investments, which are crucial for adopting and diffusing new technologies that drive productivity. Thirdly, the EU market exhibits slower business creation and destruction compared to the US. This rigidity hinders the flow of resources towards the most productive firms. Lastly, despite boasting higher levels of trade openness, the EU attracts less Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) than the US, curbing its access to cutting-edge global technologies and expertise. To close the gap, European policymakers should implement a comprehensive strategy for faster productivity growth. The first step is turning up the dial on R&D spending, targeting 4-5 percent of GDP by 2040. Next, Europe should prioritise investments in intangible assets and lay down the digital infrastructure that will underpin future growth. Revitalising the single market is also crucial: reducing internal and external market barriers for services, the primary vehicle for trading intangible assets. Moreover, the EU should foster a market environment that encourages entrepreneurship and facilitate the entry and exit of firms so resources cascade towards the most productive sectors. By harnessing the strengths of the single market and implementing these recommendations, European policymakers can propel the EU towards a more competitive and prosperous future.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Productivity, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

2. United States–China semiconductor standoff: A supply chain under stress

Author:
Jeremy Mark and Dexter Tiff Roberts
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In August 2022, the US Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, a law that approves subsidies and tax breaks to help jump-start the renewed production on American soil of advanced semiconductors.1 Just two months later, the Joe Biden administration issued wide-ranging restrictions on the export to China of chips and chip-making technology to undercut that country’s ability to manufacture the same class of integrated circuits.2 Taken together with a steady stream of Biden administration prohibitions on technology sales to key Chinese companies, the US initiatives represent a profound turn toward competition with China in the high-tech realm.3 They also highlight an effort to restructure the complex, multinational supply chains centered on East Asia that manufacture hundreds of billions of dollars of semiconductors a year. As such, the Biden administration has set in motion a process that could alter the business strategies—and fortunes—of homegrown and foreign-invested semiconductor companies based in China, world-leading chipmakers in Taiwan and South Korea, and suppliers around the world that provide the industry with the machinery and myriad inputs that fuel chip production. The Biden administration insists that its restrictions on sales to China are intended only to limit China’s ability to produce the cutting-edge chips that can feed into the development of weapons and other strategically important technologies—and not to cripple its semiconductor industry. But the current state of play of sanctions and support for US-based semiconductor production, including by Taiwanese and Korean chipmakers, is not the endpoint in this process. Rather, the momentum to constrain Beijing’s semiconductor program is likely to continue in the coming months, at the very least with additional restrictions on Chinese companies and government-linked entities, and unprecedented bureaucratic scrutiny of American venture-capital and equity-financing flows to China. That amounts to more bad news for corporate leaders in Asia, North America, and Europe who have spent the past generation building a globe-spanning semiconductor industry that has faced few barriers to expansion. As US restrictions mount, and sales of certain technologies to China flag, the once-unimaginable process of reorienting semiconductor supply chains will become an ever-present reality. The CHIPS and Science Act already is becoming an important factor in corporate strategy, providing incentives for Taiwanese, Korean, and American companies to make big bets on new factories in places like New York, Ohio, Texas, and Arizona—witness Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC’s) recent decision to build a second factory in Phoenix.4 This paper explores the potential implications of US semiconductor policy for the global semiconductor supply chains and the competition for primacy in an industry that is constantly changing the face of the global economy and one that has implications for global security in all its dimensions. It begins by examining the policies put in place by the Biden administration, and then discusses the changes taking place across the industry, with a focus on Asia.
Topic:
Economy, Business, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Plurilateral Controls and a New Export Control Regime are Needed to Make Export Controls More Effective and Less Counterproductive

Author:
Kevin Wolf
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
If the first rule of export control regulation is to define clearly the problem to be solved, the second, with some exceptions, is to ensure that the rule is both effective and not counterproductive. By “effective,” I mean that the rule actually stops or hinders the end users of concern from getting the items at issue from any source. My reference to “not counterproductive” means ensuring that foreign competitors of U.S. companies do not gain outsized advantages in markets to which U.S. firms no longer have access thanks to export controls. The income gained in these instances could allow the foreign competitors to out-innovate, out-compete, or even displace entirely the U.S. company. The exceptions pertain to situations where the U.S. should impose a unilateral control to express objection to and not otherwise support human rights violations or move quickly when the issue to be addressed is urgent, particularly if there is a threat to the warfighter. In both cases, the point remains that the eventual adoption of multilateral or plurilateral controls will make them more effective.
Topic:
Regulation, Exports, Unilateralism, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

4. Fair Competition for an Evolving Economy

Author:
Keldon Bester
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Fair competition is essential to economic growth. Without it, corporate concentration takes over. Canada’s permissive merger law has allowed a small number of big corporations to dominate key sectors of the Canadian economy, resulting in limited consumer choice. Although Canada’s competition laws are currently under review, its global peers are taking steps to protect competition in their own economies. This paper recommends that Canada should focus on the role of fair competition in its competition law framework, specifically differentiating beneficial and harmful competition. Canada’s abuse of dominance provision protects against anti-competitive conduct, but it does little to protect new and emerging competitors. This paper suggests that Canada should look to international peers such as the European Union, Germany and the United States for cues to reform its own system.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Legislation, Corporations, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, Germany, North America, and United States of America