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41. Countering Adverse Tribunal Ruling

Author:
Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Tensions over South China Sea territorial disputes dominated relations throughout the summer months of 2016. Fearing that the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal case would go against China, Beijing took remedial steps in the lead-up to the July 12 ruling to show resolve to domestic Chinese constituencies and to counter international pressures. With the Tribunal’s award even more negative for China than most anticipated, Beijing’s attacks on the arbitral panel and warnings to neighbors and the US intensified. They were accompanied by shows of force in the South China Sea. Given the restraint of others, after a few weeks registering intense indignation, Chinese officials and commentary also moderated their rhetoric. Whether the Chinese shift to moderation was tactical or strategic remains to be seen. The Chinese onslaught was met with restraint and moderation in the region and on the part of other concerned powers. In contrast to the high tempo of large-scale US and US led-naval exercises and other military maneuvers in the South China Sea prior to the decision, there were no military actions signaling pressure on China in the weeks following the decision. Japan and Australia joined the US in restricting reactions mainly to official statements approving of the tribunal’s decision. The Philippines, the initiator of the case, inaugurated a new government on June 30 that was much more interested in seeking common ground with China. Given the restraint of others, after a few weeks registering intense indignation, Chinese officials and commentary also moderated their rhetoric. Whether the Chinese shift to moderation was tactical or strategic remains to be seen. Construction of hangers that could be used by military as well as civilian aircraft continued on the newly created land features now hosting modern aircraft landing strips on Chinese-controlled rocks and reefs in the Spratly Islands. Other infrastructure for Chinese occupation continued to be built. Chinese leaders from President Xi Jinping on down strongly reaffirmed China’s determination to defend its territorial claims, with China’s most senior foreign policy spokesperson, State Councilor Yang Jiechi telling Chinese media on July 14 that China “cannot lose one centimeter of inheritance left by ancestors.”
Topic:
Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

42. Turnbull, TPP, and Trump

Author:
Graeme Dobell
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
While Malcolm Turnbull’s coalition government was narrowly returned to office in Australia’s 2016 election, Australia’s thinking about Asia’s future hinges on another election. Concern about the US presidential race has joined worries about Asia’s “rules-based order” and growing competition between the US and China. Not least of Australia’s fears is what US politics will do to the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal. Meanwhile, there were a few “surprises” between Australia, the US, and Japan that shaped relations over the summer months and will likely continue to influence them in the coming year.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Australia, North America, and United States of America

43. Progress on Defense while Economic Issues Lag

Author:
Satu Limaye
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Since relations were reset following President Obama’s visit to India in January 2015, there have been three visits to the US by Prime Minister Modi. The US and India have also conducted two iterations of the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue (S&CD), exchanged multiple Cabinet-level visits, and announced new initiatives to broaden and deepen dialogue and produce outcomes. Over the past year and a half, the absence of drama has allowed for notable progress in the area of defense relations, but just as notably little progress on key trade and investment issues even as bilateral trade and investment grows. After three decades and three US presidents with strong commitments to the bilateral relationship, it remains to be seen whether a new US president will reciprocate Modi’s expressed and demonstrated interest in strong US-India relations. Since then, there have been three further visits to the US by Prime Minister Modi – in September 2015 for meetings at the United Nations as well as outreach to the Indian-American community and US business community, in April 2016 to attend the Nuclear Security Summit, and in June 2016 for a final summit with President Obama and a speech to a joint session of Congress. The US and India have also conducted two iterations of the newly-launched Strategic and Commercial Dialogue (S&CD) modeled on the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, exchanged multiple Cabinet-level and senior officials visits, and announced new initiatives (e.g., upgraded UN and Multilateral Dialogue, Maritime Security Dialogue, consultations on Africa) to broaden and deepen dialogue and produce outcomes. During the period under review (March 2015 to September 2016), there have been no dramatic events similar to PM Modi being “unbanned” from visiting the US. The absence of drama has allowed for notable progress in the area of defense relations, but just as notably little progress on key trade and investment issues even as bilateral trade and investment grows. After three decades and three US presidents with strong personal and policy commitments to the bilateral relationship, it remains to be seen whether a new US president will reciprocate Prime Minister Modi’s expressed and demonstrated interest in strong US-India relations. Unlike divergences between the current two US presidential candidates on a host of foreign policy issues and in particular relations with the Asia-Pacific, statements and indications by the Clinton and Trump campaigns suggest a strong commitment to continued improvements in US-India relations. Both party platforms specifically address the importance of India, though it is noteworthy that the Republican platform raises issues about India’s commercial openness and the country’s treatment of religious minorities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

44. A Frustrating Start to 2015 for the US

Author:
Brad Glosserman and Ralph A. Cossa
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
President Obama initiated his long-awaited (and long overdue) quest for “fast track” or Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) from the US Congress, understanding that final negotiations and eventual passage (or not) of his Asian “rebalance” economic centerpiece, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement, rests upon achieving TPA. Without TPP, Obama’s already tarnished leadership image will be severely damaged, his “lame duck” status will be solidified at home and abroad, and his Asian pivot will be seen not as the multidimensional strategy it was intended to be but largely a unidimensional (security) single-focused (China) strategy. Meanwhile, China continued to tarnish US and ASEAN leadership through its accelerated island-building projects in the South China Sea, while Washington’s badly managed response to China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank initiative provided another (self-inflicted) wound. Washington’s questions were the right ones, but its seemingly “choose between us and China” approach resulted in most US partners and allies choosing Beijing. Finally, US-DPRK and North-South relations went through cycles of hope and despair with no real progress in sight, as speculation runs rampant as to why Kim Jong-Un decided not to go to Moscow.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, and Free Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

45. US-Japan Relations: Strategic Alignment

Author:
Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Benefiting from a window of political stability, the Abe government continued to focus on the twin pillars of economic strategy and defense policy reform. Bilateral engagement on security, trade, and regional and global issues informed the agenda for the prime minister’s official visit to Washington in late April, the first by a Japanese leader in nine years. Abe also became the first Japanese leader to address a joint session of Congress and relayed the main themes from his summit with President Obama by reflecting on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, celebrating the evolution of the US-Japan alliance, and outlining a strategic vision for the future.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Governance, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

46. DPRK Nuclear and Missile Threat Looms

Author:
Stephen Noerper
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The early months of 2015 saw little change in US-DPRK relations while there were several positive developments in US-ROK relations. There were new US sanctions on North Korea over the Sony Pictures cyber-hacking incident and increased concern about North Korean advances in nuclear and missile technology as the US and others continued to criticize the DPRK’s human rights record. Meanwhile, South Korea and the US held their annual military exercises and concluded a new civilian nuclear agreement. Distractions from the positive trajectory in US-ROK relations included the debate over the value of deploying the THAAD system in South Korea and the unfortunate attack on US Ambassador Mark Lippert.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

47. South China Sea Wariness

Author:
Sheldon Simon
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In the first four months of 2015, senior State and Defense Department officials as well as flag-rank military officers visited Southeast Asia, all emphasizing ASEAN’s importance for the Obama administration’s rebalance policy. The US is building a rotational force deployment capacity in the region along with military assistance to allies and partners, especially for increasing their maritime security capabilities. Washington and Manila await a Supreme Court decision regarding the constitutionality of the April 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which will permit better access for US forces. Washington has also emphasized Vietnam’s importance to the rebalance, currently concentrating on improving coast guard relations. However, the US was dismayed that Hanoi permitted Russian tanker aircraft to fly out of Cam Ranh Bay to refuel bombers that flew near US bases in Guam. The Indonesian Navy has shown interest in more naval exercises with the US around the Natuna Islands. Problems persist in US-Thai relations as the military consolidates its rule. Although the annual Cobra Gold exercise took place in February, Washington scaled back US participation and significantly reduced the kinetic component. Planning for next year’s exercise is in limbo. Finally, Japan and India have shown support for maritime security buildups and an enhanced naval presence in the South China Sea.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

48. Back in the Same Orbit and Back on Earth

Author:
Satu Limaye
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Given the drift and depths to which the US-India relationship has succumbed throughout much of 2013 and the early part of 2014, visits by the two heads of government in the span of a few months constituted something of a return to the same orbit, symbolized by the fact that the two countries’ Mars orbiters (Mangalyaan and Maven) had entered the planet’s orbit within a couple of days of each other. Prime Minister Modi visited Washington in late September 2014, just four months after taking office. President Obama followed up with an important visit to India in January 2015 as the “Chief Guest” for India’s Republic Day, the first US president to be accorded this honor. But as always with US-India relations, positive symbols are suffused with caution. In the event, there were no major run-ins during the period of US-India relations covered by this article. Though, there were few major breakthroughs either. The relationship did recover very soon after the resounding election victory of Narendra Modi following India’s national elections in May 2014. The pace at which high-level US-India ties were reestablished under a Modi administration was something of a surprise given the unusual situation of his being barred from traveling to the US due to allegations about his role in the communal riots between Hindus and Muslims in the Indian state of Gujarat that he once led as chief minister. The improbable dilemma of the US government banning an official visit by a democratically elected leader, who had not been convicted of illegal acts by his own country or any international body, was finessed by simply removing the ban and issuing a message of warm welcome by President Obama himself. Prime Minister Modi thus visited Washington in late September 2014, just four months after taking office and on the back of an appearance at the annual UN General Assembly meeting in New York. President Obama followed up with an important visit to India in January 2015 as the “Chief Guest” for India’s Republic Day, the first US president to be accorded this honor. Obama also became the first US president to visit India twice while in office. Another first was the appointment in December 2014 of a US ambassador to India of Indian origin, Richard Rahul Verma. Given the drift and depths to which the bilateral relationship has succumbed throughout much of 2013 and the early part of 2014, the two heads of government visits constituted something of a return to the same orbit, symbolized by the fact that the Indian Space Research Organization’s (ISRO) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) respective Mars orbiters (Mangalyaan and Maven) had entered the planet’s orbit within a couple of days of each other. Indeed, PM Modi alluded to the connection at a joint media conference with President Obama in September saying “I’m happy that we are meeting here just a few days after the Indian and the U.S. missions reached Mars around the same time. So after the India-U.S. summit on Mars, we are meeting here on Earth. This happy coincidence captures the potential of our relationship.” But as always with US-India relations, positive symbols are suffused with caution. While also noting the “pleasant coincidence” of the two orbiters proximate trip to Mars, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Frank Rose suggested to an Indian audience in March 2015 that the time might be right for a “Space Situational Awareness” information sharing agreement, implying to listeners the need to avoid accidental collisions. In the event, there were no major run-ins during the period of US-India relations covered by this article. Though, as will become clear, there were few major breakthroughs either.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Elections
Political Geography:
India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

49. The Rebalance Picks up Steam

Author:
Brad Glosserman and Ralph A. Cossa
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The big news over the summer is the granting of “fast track” Trade Promotion Authority to President Obama by the US Congress. This keeps hopes alive for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the economic centerpiece of the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia. The political and military legs of this multidimensional strategy got a boost as Secretary of State John Kerry attended the annual ASEAN Regional Forum ministerial meeting and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter headlined the show at the Shangri-La Dialogue. China continues to make its presence felt in regional affairs as well; President Xi Jinping attended meetings in Ufa, Russia with other BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization leaders and hosted a Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) Special Working Group and Senior Officials Committee Meeting and first CICA Youth Council Conference in Beijing, while continuing to pursue his Silk Road and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank initiatives, even as China’s economy took a significant hit. Meanwhile, Pyongyang engaged in another round of Russian roulette but backed down when it became apparent Seoul was prepared to pull the trigger. Finally, the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II put history on the front pages. That opened the door to the next round of negotiations among TPP representatives in July in Maui, but they couldn’t close the deal. Post-mortems blamed disputes between Japan and North America over cars (Mexico was particularly incensed over “rules of origin” that would impact its access to the US market), New Zealand recalcitrance over trade in dairy items (pique inspired by Canada’s refusal to open its market, which prompted the US and Japan to low-ball their offers), a split between Australia and the US over sugar markets, and US resistance to any cuts in the duration of intellectual property rights monopoly periods for next-generation drugs. US Trade Representative Michael Froman said the talks made “significant progress” – Australian Trade Minister Andrew Robb agreed, adding that “98 percent is concluded” – but the tough issues remained, well, hard to resolve. In his analysis for The Oriental Economist, Rick Katz argued that deals negotiated with Congress to secure TPA reduced Froman’s negotiating room. There is fear now that the failure to reach agreement means that no deal will be concluded for at least another year and a half. Canada holds an election in October and the conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper needs to hold the line on agriculture imports to avoid losing votes. That means that he cannot negotiate a deal until after that ballot – assuming he wins; an opposition victory will raise the bar to any deal – which then pushes any final agreement to 2016 and the midst of a US presidential campaign, which is no time for bold legislative action. If that assessment is correct, then there is the possibility that a final deal won’t be concluded until 2017 or 2018.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, and United States of America

50. History and Other Alliance Constraints

Author:
Charles McClean and Sheila A. Smith
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In the wake of a highly successful April visit by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo to Washington, the US-Japan relationship seemed poised for a celebration of success in revamping the alliance. Two focal points of alliance policymakers were the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). But over the summer, both of these initiatives came under political scrutiny. Beyond alliance priorities, the US and Japan faced additional dilemmas in how to deal with a more assertive and sensitive China. Artificial island building by China in the South China Sea brought the US and Japan into closer dialogue over regional maritime cooperation. At the end of the summer, the much-anticipated commemorations of the end of World War II in Japan and China brought heightened sensitivity to the region. Beyond bilateral alliance priorities, the US and Japan faced additional dilemmas, both related to dealing with a more assertive and sensitive China. Artificial island building in the Spratlys and a cyber attack on the US Office of Personnel Management rattled US-China relations, which brought the US and Japan into closer dialogue over regional maritime cooperation. Senior Japanese military leaders began to speak publicly about the possibility of a larger Japanese role in the South China Sea. At the end of the summer, the much-anticipated commemorations of the end of World War II in Japan and China brought heightened sensitivity to the region. The Aug. 14 Abe Statement and Xi Jinping’s speech at the national military parade on Sept. 3, the day of Japanese surrender in China, demonstrated the distance between the two neighbors. Each revealed a new revisionist gaze on their war legacy, and it was hard to ignore the undertones of contemporary bilateral tensions in both leaders’ remarks. Abe chose not to travel to China, although he did not announce his decision until just days before.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America