Search

Begin New Search Topic Security Political Geography Nigeria

11. Curbing Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the Niger Delta

Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Violence in the Niger Delta may soon increase unless the Nigerian government acts quickly and decisively to address long-simmering grievances. With the costly Presidential Amnesty Program for ex-insurgents due to end in a few months, there are increasingly bitter complaints in the region that chronic poverty and catastrophic oil pollution, which fuelled the earlier rebellion, remain largely unaddressed. Since Goodluck Jonathan, the first president from the Delta, lost re-election in March, some activists have resumed agitation for greater resource control and self-determination, and a number of ex-militant leaders are threatening to resume fighting (“return to the creeks”). While the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East is the paramount security challenge, President Muhammadu Buhari rightly identifies the Delta as a priority. He needs to act firmly but carefully to wind down the amnesty program gradually, revamp development and environmental programs, facilitate passage of the long-stalled Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and improve security and rule of law across the region.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Development, Environment, Oil, and Poverty
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

12. Money and War: Corruption as the Hidden Enemy of Mission Success

Author:
Emily Knowles and Karolina MacLachlan
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Corruption, instability, and conflict tend to go hand in hand. Twelve of the fifteen lowest-ranking countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index are currently experiencing violent insurgencies, extremist activity, or other signs of deep-seated instability. [1] Systemic, embedded corruption is a thread that runs through such seemingly disparate events as the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the conflict in Ukraine, the failure of the Malian army in 2012, the growth of Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the retreat of the Iraqi security forces in the face of ISIS. However, the effects of corruption are not limited to exacerbating the risk of conflict; corruption also makes it more difficult for states to respond to threats and for international institutions and other actors to offer effective assistance.[2] Assistance to fragile and failing states tends to include two types of engagement: international peacekeeping and/or stabilization operations and defense capacity building (i.e. assistance to the recipient states’ security forces). But without anticipating and mitigating the risks that corruption poses, the international community risks the intent of security assistance being subverted, the assistance wasted, and the success rate of stabilization operations being severely impaired. In particular, misappropriation of funds, vanishing resources, and a reliance on malign power-brokers can irreparably damage the operational success of a mission. This article is based on the research investigating the international community’s approach (or lack thereof) to tackling corruption in Afghanistan carried out by Transparency International UK’s global Defence and Security Programme (TI-DSP) and based on over 75 interviews with civilian and military officials. This work is supported by insights from TI-DSP’s long-term engagement in the Building Integrity training for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.[3] In the resulting report, we argue that corruption has had a significant impact on ISAF mission success and that the international community’s reaction to corrupt practices was too little, too late. We point to three main ways in which corruption and uncontrolled money flows can diminish the effectiveness of the mission and offer a planning and risk assessment framework as the first step toward addressing corruption risks on operations...
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Peacekeeping, Arab Spring, Conflict, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Middle East, Nigeria, and Mali

13. Why do Youth Join Boko Haram?

Author:
Freedom C. Onuoha
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Since Nigeria's return to democracy in May 1999, armed nonstate groups have significantly undermined the country's internal security environment, largely using young men as foot soldiers. Among these groups, Boko Haram has grown to become a serious national, regional, and international concern. Estimates of the death toll from Boko Haram attacks since 2009 range as high as ten thousand fatalities. With Boko Haram and other groups seemingly gaining in strength, questions arise as to why young men join them in the first place and what the government and other actors can do to prevent it. Surveys, interviews, and focus groups conducted in Nigeria in 2013 suggest that poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures make or contribute to making young men vulnerable to radicalization. Itinerant preachers capitalize on the situation by preaching an extreme version of religious teachings and conveying a narrative of the government as weak and corrupt. Armed groups such as Boko Haram can then recruit and train youth for activities ranging from errand running to suicide bombings. To weaken the armed groups' abilities to radicalize and recruit young men, the Nigerian government at all levels, perhaps with support from interested international actors, could institute monitoring and regulation of religious preaching; strengthen education, job training, and job creation programs; design robust programs to aid destitute children; promote peace education; and embark on an anticorruption campaign. Addressing the conditions that make it possible for insurgents to recruit young men in Nigeria can significantly diminish the strength of the insurgency, if not eliminate it altogether.
Topic:
Security, Islam, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

14. Nigeria's Dangerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Nigeria's presidential, parliamentary and state gubernatorial and assembly elections, scheduled for February 2015, will be more contentious than usual. Tensions within and between the two major political parties, competing claims to the presidency between northern and Niger Delta politicians and along religious lines, the grim radical Islamist Boko Haram insurgency and increasing communal violence in several northern states, along with inadequate preparations by the electoral commission and apparent bias by security agencies, suggest the country is heading toward a very volatile and vicious electoral contest. If this violent trend continues, and particularly if the vote is close, marred or followed by widespread violence, it would deepen Nigeria's already grave security and governance crises. The government, its agencies and all other national figures must work urgently to ensure that the vote is not conducted in an explosive situation as this could further destabilise the country.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Ethnic Government, Governance, Sectarian violence, and Self Determination
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

15. Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria

Author:
Michael Olufemi Sodipo
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Northern Nigeria has been the locus of an upsurge in youth radicalization and virulent militant Islamist groups in Nigeria since 2009. Nigeria's ranking on the Global Terrorism Index rose from 16 th out of 158 countries in 2008 to 6 th (tied with Somalia) by the end of 2011. There were 168 officially recorded terrorist attacks in 2011 alone. Bombings across the northeast prompted President Goodluck Jonathan in May 2013 to declare a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States. Many Nigerians have come to question whether the country is on the brink of a civil war.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Economics, Islam, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Africa, Nigeria, Somalia, Yobe State, Borno State, and Adamawa State

16. New Meeting Note: Security and Development in the Sahel-Sahara

Author:
Mireille Affa'a-Mindzie
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
After the severe twin crises that nearly brought Mali to its knees in January 2012, the country is gradually recovering from their debilitating consequences. In August 2013, Mali successfully elected its new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, thus putting an end to an eighteen-month-long transitional government that was put in place following the March 2012 coup. Even though the violence has abated and renewed hope seems to be in the air, the structural causes of the Malian conflict are still stubbornly present and their consequences are still being felt by neighboring Sahel countries that suffer from similar underlying ills. The situation in Mali and other concerned states in the region generated a renewed interest in the Sahel-Sahara region and in efforts to stabilize this region. This prompted the International Peace Institute, the Executive Secretariat of the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel-Saharan Areas of Niger (SDS Sahel Niger), and the Centre for Strategies and Security for the Sahel Sahara (Centre 4S) to convene an international seminar on security and development in the Sahel-Sahara on February 15 and 16, 2013, in Niamey, Niger.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Development, Economics, Peace Studies, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

17. Domestic and Regional Challenges in Mali after the French Intervention

Author:
Gerald Hainzl
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
On 11 January 2013, France initiated an intervention in Mali in order to stop rebel and Islamist fighters marching towards the capital Bamako. Exactly one month later, on 11 February, French President François Hollande claimed victory against Islamist insurgents. On 18 February, a group of seven tourists was kidnapped in Cameroon, near the Nigerian border, by Ansaru, a militant group loosely affiliated to the Nigerian group Boko Haram. One day later, a French soldier was killed in a clash with Islamist fighters in the mountainous region in Northern Mali. France originally planned to leave Mali in March 2013, but has since extended its commitment.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
France, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Northern Mali

18. What Is Boko Haram?

Author:
Andrew Walker
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Boko Haram is an Islamic sect that believes politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. It wants to wage a war against them, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a “pure” Islamic state ruled by sharia law. Since August 2011 Boko Haram has planted bombs almost weekly in public or in churches in Nigeria's northeast. The group has also broadened its targets to include setting fire to schools. In March 2012, some twelve public schools in Maiduguri were burned down during the night, and as many as 10,000 pupils were forced out of education. Boko Haram is not in the same global jihadist bracket as Algeria's al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or Somalia's al Shabab. Despite its successful attack on the UN compound in Abuja in August 2011, Boko Haram is not bent on attacking Western interests. There have been no further attacks on international interests since that time. Following the failed rescue of hostages Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara in north¬eastern Nigeria in March 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan played up the connections between the group and international terrorism. However, links between Boko Haram and the kidnappers are questionable. It is difficult to see how there can be meaningful dialogue between the government and the group. The group's cell-like structure is open for factions and splits, and there would be no guarantee that someone speaking for the group is speaking for all of the members. Tactics employed by government security agencies against Boko Haram have been consis-tently brutal and counterproductive. Their reliance on extrajudicial execution as a tactic in “dealing” with any problem in Nigeria not only created Boko Haram as it is known today, but also sustains it and gives it fuel to expand. The group will continue to attack softer targets in the northeast rather than international targets inside or outside Nigeria. It is also likely to become increasingly involved in the Jos crisis, where it will attack Christian indigenes of the north and try to push them out. Such a move would further threaten to destabilize the country's stability and unity.Now that the group has expanded beyond a small number of mosques, radical reforms in policing strategy are necessary if there is to be any progress in countering the group. Wide¬spread radical reform of the police is also long overdue throughout Nigeria. As a first step, jailing a number of police officers responsible for ordering human rights abuses might go some way to removing a key objection of the group.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Islam, Religion, United Nations, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, and Somalia

19. Beyond Turf Wars in Coup-Hit Guinea-Bissau

Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Guinea-Bissau took another dangerous turn on 12 April 2012, when the army arrested Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior, who was about to be elected president. A military junta accused him of conspiring with Angola to curtail the military's power and quickly installed transitional authorities, before officially stepping aside on 22 May. International condemnation was swift, but differences developed between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). The former, pushed by Nigeria, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, supports a year's transition, the latter, especially Portugal and Angola, immediate resumption of the presidential vote. Coup and transition may have opened a way for vital reforms, which must go beyond changes in the army and combating the drugs trade. But for that to happen, ECOWAS and CPLP must reach a consensus on working with international partners to mobilise resources for security, judicial and electoral reforms and refusing to validate Gomes Júnior's illegal exclusion from political life.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Post Colonialism, Power Politics, and Regime Change
Political Geography:
Africa, Senegal, Nigeria, Portugal, and Angola

20. Armed Conflicts and Security of Oil and Gas Supplies

Author:
Giacomo Luciani
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
The paper offers a systematic analysis of the impact of international or civil wars and violent non-state groups on global oil and gas supplies. Statistical evidence points to the fact that international wars are becoming increasingly rare, while civil wars remain frequent. The paper discusses the cases of the Iraq-Iran war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, showing the limits to the damage that belligerents were able to inflict on oil installations and illustrating how the world was able to compensate for this damage. The Iraqi insurgency following international intervention to replace the Saddam Hussein regime is discussed together with other cases of civil wars in Nigeria, Angola and Sudan. The analysis supports the conclusion that oil and gas installations appear to be much more resilient to armed conflict than is normally acknowledged. History shows that civil wars have caused limited damage to existing installations, but they have hindered the desired investment in new development and attainment of target production levels. However, it is very obvious that government's inability to overcome or reabsorb violent opposition discourages international oil company investment even if the violence does not affect the areas around oil and gas installations.
Topic:
Security, Civil War, Oil, Insurgency, Natural Resources, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Kuwait and Nigeria