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82. A Confluence of Crises: On Water, Climate and Security in the Middle East and North Africa
- Author:
- Johan Schaar
- Publication Date:
- 07-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- The Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) faces simultaneous crises of security, water scarcity and climate change. They are interlinked—the water crisis is exacerbated by climate change and may fuel conflict, while insecurity is an obstacle to dealing with other pressing issues. Together, the three constitute a confluence of crises that need to be addressed together. Authoritarian and militarized governments in MENA countries repress public discourse and action related to water and climate crises, viewing critics as threats to national security. But the elite’s own economic interests and role in the political economy make them vulnerable to the new risks and threats. The water and climate crises are mostly transboundary and require states to act together. But by prioritizing narrow security interests, states accord weak mandates to regional institutions, preventing agreements on shared challenges. A regional security framework is needed, encompassing water, climate and the current conflicts.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Water, Disarmament, and Risk
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and North Africa
83. Daesh: The archetype of hybrid terrorist organizations
- Author:
- Triandafyllos Karatrantos
- Publication Date:
- 04-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- The rise and evolution of Daesh (al-Dawlah al-Islamīyah fī l-ʻIrāq wa-sh-Shām) marked a new and very interesting debate about the labeling of violent groups that are not traditional terrorist organizations and they are also acting with different roles and using alternate tactics and modus operandi, such as insurgency, within civil and regional conflicts. Furthermore, the establishment of the so called “Caliphate” includes a new parameter in the scientific debate, the quasi state dimension. Daesh is a modern archetype of this vivid scientific debate, but the difficulties in labeling, especially in cases were terrorist groups are taking part in civil conflicts, is not new. Labeling is not only a matter of “name and blame”, is important in order to design an effective and holistic counter terrorism strategy. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the different approaches about labeling nontraditional terrorist groups and to present the terrorist activity of Daesh.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Non State Actors, and Islamic State
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Middle East
84. Post-Hegemonic (Dis)order and Regional Balancing Strategies in the Middle East
- Author:
- Kostas Ifantis
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- Following the so-called Arab Spring, the strategic situation in the Middle East has been one of disorder. A series of critical, complex and interrelated security failures have resulted in chaos and bloodshed unprecedented even for a region with Middle East’s history and legacy. The demand for intervention has been high but the response has been very low. In such an unchartered and rapidly deteriorating regional security setting, this paper argues that the conspicuous absence of US hegemonic engagement has allowed for the return to overt regional balance of power strategies and proxy conflicts. Our hypothesis is that a regional balance of power and the resulting order (or disorder) heavily depends on the type of great power regional engagement. In such a context, the “hands off” or non-hegemonic approach that characterizes US strategy since the Arab Spring eruption has heavily contributed to a highly disorderly regional balance of power landscape. In the absence of US hegemonic involvement, revisionist threats emerge and local rivalries intensify.
- Topic:
- Security, Power Politics, Hegemony, Political stability, Arab Spring, and Regional Integration
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and United States of America
85. Escalation or Negotiation? Conclusions of a Tabletop Exercise on the Future of U.S.-Iran Relations
- Author:
- Elisa Catalano Ewers, Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas Heras, and Kaleigh Thomas
- Publication Date:
- 06-2019
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security
- Abstract:
- On May 21, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) hosted an all-day tabletop exercise (TTX) in Washington, D.C., to game out three scenarios related to the crisis surrounding U.S.-Iran tensions over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and destabilizing regional policies. The intent was to understand how key players would respond and act in these potential scenarios. The TTX included seven teams: the United States, Iran, Europe (representing primarily France, Germany, and the United Kingdom but also the European Union), China, Russia, Israel, and the Gulf Arab States (one player as Saudi Arabia/UAE and the other player as Oman). Teams featured American and foreign regional and functional experts with a deep experience in their respective areas. Players were asked to play the most realistic version of their government.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
86. Turkey and the European Union: Conflicting Policies and Opportunities for Cohesion and Cooperation In Iraq and Syria
- Author:
- Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, Susan Cersosimo, and Kamaran Palani
- Publication Date:
- 04-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
- Abstract:
- There are major security events, issues and trends within Iraq since 2003 and Syria since 2011, that have influenced and impacted Turkey-European Union (EU) relations. In this policy paper we deconstruct the causal mechanisms that act as the primary drivers impacting bilateral relations. We then compare and contrast Ankara’s and Brussels’ current security interests, priorities and perceptions toward security threats originating in this troubled neighbourhood. Finally, we classify opportunities as culminating in three possible discrete or combined security policy scenarios: conflict, cooperation and/or convergence and make recommendations to improve Turkey-EU relations. To address how Iraq’s and Syria’s security environment evolved to its current state and predict the subsequent outcomes and impacts on EU-Turkey relations, we look back and critically analyse Ankara’s and Brussels’ views on the following key events, issues and trends: security and political dynamics following the second term of al-Maliki, the withdrawal of the US forces in 2011, the 2011 Syrian revolution, the war against the Islamic state (IS), The Global Coalition against Daesh (GCD) backing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northern Syria, the rise of Kurdish nationalism and aspirations for statehood in Iraq and autonomy in Syria, the enhanced influence of Iran in Iraq and the growth of IS with subsequent mass displacement of person across both Iraq and Syria. Iraq is now largely free of IS reign, yet is still threatened by terrorism, mass population displacement and weak governance, among other ills. In parallel, now that the Syrian civil war enters its seventh bloody year, generating large numbers of casualties and millions of displaced persons, Brussels and Ankara are strongly incented to converge and/or cooperate on security policies which mitigate the escalating humanitarian crisis and ease the path to a durable peace agreement. However, finding durable solutions to address high value, high impact problems stemming from Iraq and Syria requires identifying and mitigating the causes vs symptoms of these countries’ instability and insecurity affecting Ankara’s and Brussels’ own security interests, priorities and threat perceptions. Central security priorities for the EU in post-IS Iraq include stabilization, the return of internally displaced people and refugees and eliminating violent jihadist organizations and ideologies. While Turkey shares these objectives in principle, Ankara’s security interests concentrate primarily on neutralizing the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and its affiliates’ presence and influence. Since 2014, Ankara and Brussels have mostly bifurcated on how they perceive security threats in Syria. Turkey-EU leaders continue to disagree on the Kurd’s role in the Syrian war and how Turkey should control its borders to cut flows of foreign fighters into Syria. As the IS invaded parts of Iraq and Syria in 2014, European states began providing PKK affiliated Kurdish groups in Syria with both intelligence and military support. Alternately, since the Kurdistan Region of Iraq held its referendum for independence on 25 September 2017, EU and Turkish leaders have mostly converged on how they perceive security threats in Iraq with both staunchly supporting the country’s territorial integrity, thus, both refused to recognize the referendum’s legitimacy. We consider the issue of terrorism as a highly relevant driver of EU and Turkish security policies, perceptions and priorities. Though we see both countries as highly concerned with this issue, they diverge on which organizations pose the greatest threat. Ankara places the PKK at the top of its terrorist list – both within its borders and across the region – while Brussels prioritizes neutralizing jihadi terrorist threats on its soil, thus, the probability of convergence and cooperation and positive impact on EU-Turkey relations is moderate for this issue. Moreover, the IS is not given the same degree of priority by the two sides in the neighbourhood, including Iraq and Syria. Unlike the EU, Turkey considers the threat posed by the IS equal to the one posed by the PKK, but not as strategic. Here, the two sides diverge. In sum, dissent between Brussels and Ankara is highly likely given the Turkish Armed Forces’ broad kinetic engagement in both Iraq and Syria which negatively impacts EU and US efforts to roll back terrorism, stabilise the region, deliver humanitarian aid and help displaced persons return to their homes. Thus, regardless of whether Baghdad and/or Damascus formally grant Ankara permission to launch assaults, the EU views these actions as bellicose destabilizers competing with its own interests, thus, degrades EU-Turkey relations. Ultimately, this study calls for the EU and Turkey to prioritize mending cracks and fissures in their relationship and focus on the gains to be made through rapprochement on security issues originating in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, the EU can use its tremendous mediating capacity as an honest broker to settle entrenched disputes between warring parties in Iraq and Syria and for Turkey restart the peace process at home. More than ever, both must develop a long-term strategic security framework to ensure that bilateral security interests, priorities and interventions do not derail current stabilisation and reconstruction procedures in Iraq and/or progress toward a durable peace in Syria.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and Syria
87. The Tiger Forces: Pro-Assad fighters backed by Russia
- Author:
- Gregory Waters
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- The Tiger Forces is a Syrian Air Intelligence-affiliated militia fighting for the Syrian government and backed by Russia. While often described as the Syrian government’s elite fighting force, this research portrays a starkly different picture. The Tiger Forces are the largest single fighting force on the Syrian battlefield, with approximately 24 groups comprised of some 4,000 offensive infantry units as well as a dedicated artillery regiment and armor unit of unknown size. Beyond these fighters are thousands of additional so-called flex units, affiliated militiamen who remain largely garrisoned in their hometowns along the north Hama and Homs borders until called on to join offensives as needed. Despite a decentralized command structure, the Tiger Forces' capabilities far exceed any other unit currently fighting in the Syrian civil war. The main source of the unit’s success stems from its two full-strength infantry brigades with dedicated logistical support and the ability to call on the Syrian air force—and after September 2015 the Russian air force—at will. While there is likely some degree of higher-than-average competence among the Tiger Forces’ officer corps, this research demonstrates that the true power of the unit does not come from their alleged status as elite fighters but instead from their large size, supply lines, and Russian support.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Syrian War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Middle East, and Syria
88. Beyond the proxy powder keg: The specter of war between Saudi Arabia and Iran
- Author:
- Bilal Y. Saab
- Publication Date:
- 05-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- An Iran-Saudi Arabia war is unlikely, but it is now more likely than ever before. A military confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran should command respect and inspire concern because it could cause tremendous harm to an already volatile Middle East and possibly to the global economy. Iran seems to have an upper hand in a direct military confrontation with Saudi Arabia because of its combat experience, geography, manpower, strategic depth, and greater cost tolerance. However, none of these attributes give Iran any decisive advantages in a contest with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is neither helpless nor without military options. While it is easy to start a war with Iran, it is anything but to finish it. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would have to think hard about the capabilities of the Saudi military and the resilience of Saudi society before embarking on such a risky course. In any war dynamic between Iran and Saudi Arabia, U.S. military intervention or support would be the most decisive exogenous factor for both Riyadh and Tehran. The United States has a security commitment to Saudi Arabia, but the extent to which Washington can tolerate subtle Iranian aggression against the kingdom that falls below the threshold of conventional warfare, while potentially upending Saudi stability, is unclear.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Proxy War
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America
89. Yemen's Path Forward
- Author:
- Gerald Feierstein, Sama'a al-Hamdani, Timothy Lenderking, Bruce Abrams, Abdulrahman al-Eryani, and Latifa Jamel
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Middle East Institute (MEI)
- Abstract:
- Three years into Yemen’s civil war, the country continues to see severe humanitarian devastation, widespread food insecurity, and lack of economic access, against the backdrop of an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. An intensification of fighting in Hodeidah and elsewhere in the country has added to the human costs of the conflict and threatens to become catastrophic. Increasingly, Yemenis are war-weary and anxious to see progress on the UN-led negotiating process intended to end the fighting and restore the peaceful transition interrupted three years ago. The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted a half-day conference to assess the priorities for ending the conflict and scenarios to move forward. This conference convened two panels and a keynote address to assess urgent priorities and potential pathways forward for Yemen.
- Topic:
- Security, Civil War, Reconstruction, Political stability, Conflict, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Yemen
90. PeSCo – Anything There for European Defence?
- Author:
- Sandro Knezović
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
- Abstract:
- The European strategic landscape has changed dramatically over the course of the last decade. The post-Cold War mantra about the obsolescence of conventional threats in the wider European space proved to be short-sighted with developments at its eastern �lanks, while security dysfunctions in the MENA region and their immanent consequences for the safety of European citizens have loaded a heavy burden on compromise-building and decision-making in the �ield of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU. Furthermore, the approach of the new US administration to European security and the strategic consequences of Brexit have changed the wider framework in which security of 'the Old Continent' is to be determined, hence stimulating European leaders to rethink European security in a strive for strategic autonomy of their own. The very ambitiously phrased EU Global Strategy that came out in June 2016, served as both catalyst and umbrella document for such an endeavour. However, in order to achieve measurable progress in responding to contemporary security challenges, it was clear that the EU needs to develop a structural way for member states to do jointly what they were not capable of doing at the national level. This is so especially in the environment in which China, Russia and Saudi Arabia are championing the defence spending, right after the US, while European states are signi�icantly trailing behind. The fact that the EU collectively is the second largest military investor and yet far from being among the dominant military powers only emphasises the burning issue of ef�iciency of military spending and the level of interoperability among member states’ armies. High-level fragmentation of the European defence market and the fact that defence industries are kept in national clusters is clearly contributing to that. The reality on the ground is obviously challenging traditional methods of co-operation that operate mainly in ‘national boxes’ and calling for a paradigm change in the wider policy context of CSDP. However, it remains to be seen to which extent will this new security environment actually be able to push the European defence policy context over the strict national boundaries.
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, Military Strategy, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, Europe, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia