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871. Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector: Turkey and the World

Author:
Volkan Aytar
Publication Date:
03-2006
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
The longitudinal political and social “weight” of the Turkish Armed Forces, and the imbalances ensued, are considered among the most important and complex issues in Turkish history. Recently, the need for further harmonization of the Turkish Civilian-Military Relations (CMR) with the democratic standards was underlined at the European Commission’s (EC) successive Annual Progress Reports on Turkey. The issue will no doubt be among the most important issues in Turkey’s EU accession process. One could claim this can best be achieved by a healthy cooperation between the government, parliament and security sector institutions (the armed forces, the police department, the gendarmerie, and others) with the assistance of expert opinion, and by taking into consideration the demands stemming from civil society. Moreover, apart from the issue of harmonization of the Turkish CMR with the EU standards and universal democratic norms, the vitally important problem of implementing a substantive Security Sector and Bureaucracy Reform (SSBR) would certainly be on the top of Turkey’s agenda for years (even decades) to come. SSBR shall cover not only CMR-related issues but also involve the establishment of democratic control and oversight mechanisms on all domestic security institutions by taking a citizen-centered approach. Placed at a context going far beyond the narrow and somewhat misleading confines of a mere CMR issue, the problem needs to be addressed in its diversity and complexity. Since the very concepts of “reform” and “control of the armed forces” still remain controversial in Turkey, TESEV aims to contribute to this (potentially divisive and politicized) process by helping 6 “normalize” the debates on the issue, in a cool-headed, objective and scientific manner. In this context, the fruitful past collaboration between the Geneva-based Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF – the Republic of Turkey is a founding member since November 20th, 2003) and TESEV seems to be becoming even more crucial in helping shape the ongoing process (indeed, the EC’s 2005 Turkey Progress Report lauded TESEV & DCAF’s work). TESEV strives to further the agenda of democratic and civilian oversight of the security sector by taking as its target audience, legislators, media professionals and civil society at large. National and international symposia, presentations at the Special Commissions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, as well as documentary and critical studies on the Security Sector are among the interlocking project activities and outputs.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Democracy, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

872. Rumsfeld's Revolution at Defense

Author:
Paul C. Light
Publication Date:
07-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
Whatever his legacy as an architect of the war in Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has already earned a place in American bureaucratic history as one of its most ambitious organizational reformers. Rumsfeld is determined to complete a top-to-bottom overhaul of his department before he leaves office. Rumsfeld may be one of history's most ambitious reformers, but his actual impact is far from assured. He still faces intense resistance from the armed services, especially the Army, which has the most to lose in the movement to a much lighter military. And many of his proposals are either still under consideration in Congress or only in the early stages of implementation in the department.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Government
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

873. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring into the causes, circumstances and consequences of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri

Author:
Peter FitzGerald
Publication Date:
03-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
On 14 February 2005, an explosion in downtown Beirut killed twenty persons, among them the former Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri. The United Nations' Secretary-General dispatched a Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut to inquire into the causes, the circumstances and the consequences of this assassination. Since it arrived in Beirut on 25 February, the Mission met with a large number of Lebanese officials and representatives of different political groups, performed a thorough review of the Lebanese investigation and legal proceedings, examined the crime scene and the evidence collected by the local police, collected and analyzed samples from the crime scene, and interviewed some witnesses in relation to the crime. The specific 'causes' for the assassination of Mr. Hariri cannot be reliably asserted until after the perpetrators of this crime are brought to justice. However, it is clear that the assassination took place in a political and security context marked by an acute polarization around the Syrian influence in Lebanon and a failure of the Lebanese State to provide adequate protection for its citizens. Regarding the circumstances, the Mission is of the view that the explosion was caused by a TNT charge of about 1000 KG placed most likely above the ground. The review of the investigation indicates that there was a distinct lack of commitment on the part of the Lebanese authorities to investigate the crime effectively, and that this investigation was not carried out in accordance with acceptable international standards. The Mission is also of the view that the Lebanese investigation lacks the confidence of the population necessary for its results to be accepted. The consequences of the assassination could be far-reaching. It seems to have unlocked the gates of political upheavals that were simmering throughout the last year. Accusations and counter-accusations are rife and aggravate the ongoing political polarization. Some accuse the Syrian security services and leadership of assassinating Mr. Hariri because he became an insurmountable obstacle to their influence in Lebanon. Syrian supporters maintain that he was assassinated by "the enemies of Syria"; those who wanted to create international pressure on the Syrian leadership in order to accelerate the demise of its influence in Lebanon and/or start a chain of reactions that would eventually force a 'regime change' inside Syria itself. Lebanese politicians from different backgrounds expressed to the Mission their fear that Lebanon could be caught in a possible showdown between Syria and the international community, with devastating consequences for Lebanese peace and security. After gathering the available facts, the Mission concluded that the Lebanese security services and the Syrian Military Intelligence bear the primary responsibility for the lack of security, protection, law and order in Lebanon. The Lebanese security services have demonstrated serious and systematic negligence in carrying out the duties usually performed by a professional national security apparatus. In doing so, they have severely failed to provide the citizens of Lebanon with an acceptable level of security and, therefore, have contributed to the propagation of a culture of intimidation and impunity. The Syrian Military Intelligence shares this responsibility to the extent of its involvement in running the security services in Lebanon. It is also the Mission's conclusion that the Government of Syria bears primary responsibility for the political tension that preceded the assassination of former Prime Minister Mr. Hariri. The Government of Syria clearly exerted influence that goes beyond the reasonable exercise of cooperative or neighborly relations. It interfered with the details of governance in Lebanon in a heavy-handed and inflexible manner that was the primary reason for the political polarization that ensued. Without prejudice to the results of the investigation, it is obvious that this atmosphere provided the backdrop for the assassination of Mr. Hariri. It became clear to the Mission that the Lebanese investigation process suffers from serious flaws and has neither the capacity nor the commitment to reach a satisfactory and credible conclusion. To find the truth, it would be necessary to entrust the investigation to an international independent commission, comprising the different fields of expertise that are usually involved in carrying out similarly large investigations in national systems, with the necessary executive authority to carry out interrogations, searches, and other relevant tasks. Furthermore, it is more than doubtful that such an international commission could carry out its tasks satisfactorily - and receives the necessary active cooperation from local authorities - while the current leadership of the Lebanese security services remains in office. It is the Mission's conclusion that the restoration of the integrity and credibility of the Lebanese security apparatus is of vital importance to the security and stability of the country. A sustained effort to restructure, reform and retrain the Lebanese security services will be necessary to achieve this end, and will certainly require assistance and active engagement on the part of the international community. Finally, it is the Mission's view that international and regional political support will be necessary to safeguard Lebanon's national unity and to shield its fragile polity from unwarranted pressure. Improving the prospects of peace and security in the region would offer a more solid ground for restoring normalcy in Lebanon.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Government
Political Geography:
Middle East

874. Evaluating Palestinian Reform

Author:
Nathan J. Brown
Publication Date:
06-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
IN PALESTINE, CITIZENS HAVE RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH and free assembly. The most independent judiciary in the Arab world adjudicates their disputes. Palestinians select their leaders freely in competitive elections overseen by an independent electoral commission. A representative assembly monitors the executive, granting and withholding confidence from ministers and reviewing the state budget in detailed public discussions. Elected councils manage local governments that are fiscally autonomous of the center.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Government
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and Arabia

875. After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies - From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership

Author:
Anja H. Ebnöther and Philipp H. Fluri
Publication Date:
08-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian National Defence Academy
Abstract:
The transition from interventionist (military) peace-keeping to local (civilian) ownership of public security management has proved not only to be a severe challenge for most peace-keeping operations and their civilian administrators, but also a reason for such operations being prolonged at tremendous cost. In many cases, peace-keeping operations and/or other international agents rapidly became part of the local economy, and thus contributed to the preservation of the status quo rather than to a sustainable process leading toward local governance; meanwhile local police organs - often remnants of the winning force in the antecedent conflict - remained tribal or clannish in their approaches and interests. They could thus hardly be seen as enforcement agencies of a law which remains equally applied to all citizens.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Security, Development, International Organization, and War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Balkans

876. Iran's Security Challenges and the Region

Publication Date:
09-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The following summary addresses key aspects that emerged from the discussion at the Ninth Liechtenstein Colloquium on European and International Affairs held in Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein on March 17-20, 2005. The colloquium focused on Iran and included an in-depth discussion of the nuclear issue. Since the LCM is conducted under strict off-the-record rules, no attribution is provided. Attending participants included high-level Iranian offi cials involved in the ongoing negotiations with the EU, as well as representatives and experts from the United States, the EU, Russia, and India.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and India

877. The Iraqi election "bait and switch": Faulty poll will not bring peace or US withdrawal

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
01-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
President Bush was correct when he asserted on 2 December 2004 that it was "time for the Iraqi citizens to go to the polls." Indeed, it is long past time. Elections should have occurred a year or so after the fall of the Hussein regime. But the fact that they are overdue does not mean that an adequate foundation for meaningfully democratic elections has been laid. It has not. Unfortunately, the balloting due to take place on 30 January will not fulfill the promise of democracy nor satisfy the Iraqi passion for selfdetermination. For these reasons, it cannot bring peace. It is more likely to exacerbate civil strife.
Topic:
Security, Democratization, and Government
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

878. The Terrorist Threat and the Policy Response in Pakistan

Author:
Aarish Ullah Khan
Publication Date:
09-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Terrorists manipulate fear through the use of violence to achieve their objectives. An understanding of what motivates terrorists to employ mindless violence against civilian or non-combatant targets is essential for assessing the phenomenon. The current discussion of 'root causes' often focuses on finding the causes of antagonism towards civilization in the mind of a fanatic terrorist at the individual level. The debate about what motivates a terrorist, however, overlooks the factors that enable a terrorist to conduct terrorist activities. As argued by Walter Laqueur, even if better control can be achieved over the extremist motivation for terrorism, there will still be a few isolated individuals for whom the temptation to employ terrorism—if the opportunity remains—will be hard to resist.
Topic:
Security, Religion, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Middle East

879. Iran: Rogue State?

Author:
Ali Mostashari
Publication Date:
09-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Iran is now an important focal point for U.S. foreign policy. Yet many have argued that the United States lacks a coherent foreign policy on Iran, amounting to no more than an enormous list of “evils”: namely, that Iran exports its radical Islamist revolution, supports Hezbollah and Hamas and actively opposes the Middle East peace process, is building nuclear and biological weapons capacity, was involved in the bombings of the Jewish center in Buenos Aires and the Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia, provides Al-Qaeda with safe passage and refuge, helps insurgents in Iraq, assassinates its own dissidents and oppresses its people, and so on.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

880. Filling the Army's Ranks for the Iraq War

Author:
Cindy Williams
Publication Date:
07-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Some two years into the occupation in Iraq, the U.S. Army faces a serious staffing challenge. As of May 30, 2005, the active-duty Army had missed its recruiting goals for four months in a row. If things do not improve substantially, the service will have only 10 percent of needed enlistees pre-signed for basic training at the beginning of 2006; normally it begins the year with about one-third of its trainees already committed to contracts.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East