After seven years of the peace process, catastrophic remarks about the end of the State of Israel are much more frequent than they were before the Oslo agreements. Judaism has a long tradition of religious apocalyptic thought; in the secular end-of-days fantasies of the last few months, however, no salvation is offered the community.
Recently, Israel Television asked Shimon Peres, the architect of the Oslo process, whether he still believed in the efficacy of that process, to which he replied that the question should be put to Yasser Arafat. This answer appears to be symptomatic of a widespread refusal by Israel's political leadership to think about the current situation in a systematic, analytical fashion, giving rise to a suspicion that Israeli society, as a collective, has a basic difficulty with thinking about our relationship with the Palestinian Authority, in general, and about the recent violent confrontations with it, in particular. We appear to be bewildered by it all. The director general of the Foreign Ministry, Alon Liel, stated more than once in a recent television interview that he was baffled by Arafat's behavior, saying that Arafat appeared to have made an inexplicable U-turn. He had assumed that Arafat had resolved to make peace, and he could make no sense of Arafat's recent behavior. In addition, Shimon Peres has stated several times in recent weeks that we must make Arafat understand that his policy is detrimental to the true interests of his own people. This notion was echoed by Ha'aretz columnist Joel Marcus, quoting former Foreign Minister Abba Eban who said years ago that Arafat never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity. Knesset Speaker Avraham Burg also stated that he found it impossible to decipher Arafat's conduct.
Since its independence in 1948, and indeed even in prior times, Israel's rights to sovereignty in Jerusalem have been firmly grounded in history and international law. The aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War only reinforced the strength of Israel's claims. Seven years after the implementation of the 1993 Oslo Agreements, Prime Minister Ehud Barak became the first Israeli prime minister to consider re-dividing Jerusalem in response to an American proposal at the July 2000 Camp David Summit. The December 2000 Clinton Plan attempted to codify Barak's possible concessions on Jerusalem. Yet they proved to be insufficient for PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, leading to a breakdown in the peace process and an outburst of Palestinian violence with regional implications. At least the failed Clinton Plan did not bind future Israeli governments or U.S. administrations, leaving open the possibility of new diplomatic alternatives. Only by avoiding premature negotiation over an unbridgeable issue such as Jerusalem can the U.S., Israel, and the Palestinians stabilize the volatile situation that has emerged and restore hope that a political process can be resumed in the future.
Topic:
Security, Government, International Law, Religion, and Sovereignty
There are two clashing myths on the political power of American Jewry. One claims that the community is too small to affect national elections; Jews make up less than 3 percent of the U.S. population. A contrasting view holds that U.S. Jews play a disproportionately large role in national politics thanks to their campaign donations and media influence.
As events that accompanied the establishment of the State of Israel receded into the history books, the extraordinary accomplishments of the Zionist movement also began to fade. For many Israelis growing up after 1948, Zionism became a negative term, satirized and trivialized, and the details of its achievements were rarely taught in the Israeli schools.
This week's piece focuses on the economic prospects for the euro-area in 2002. The euro-area economy has shown increasing signs of cyclical weakness since the beginning of 2001. These signs, compounded by the effects of accelerated decline in the United States since the September 11 terrorist attacks, indicate continuing stagnation into 2002 and growing difficulties for states to maintain their fiscal positions. SGP requirements are reducing the fiscal room for manoeuvre of euro-area states to respond to the current economic downturn. The absence of concerted intervention represents a considerable risk, particularly if global demand fails to pick up in 2002.
This week's piece examines the prospects for the al-Qaida group and Osama bin Laden's wider terrorist network following the fall of the Taliban and the loss of many of its facilities in Afghanistan. Key elements of bin Laden's network have been seriously damaged. Some operational cells are likely to survive but most are likely to remain inactive for the foreseeable future in order to avoid detection. Al-Qaida is likely to remain active but less effective than hitherto. As long as the reasons for bin Laden's appeal to certain Islamist constituencies remains, new cells and entirely new groups will be formed within migrant communities and among those engaged in regional conflicts around the world.
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) met on Wednesday, September 26, in Vienna. The uncertainties associated with the international oil market have been greatly compounded by the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.
Israel's Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz met senior Turkish defence officials on July 27 to discuss defence cooperation. Israel and Turkey, facing similar strategic problems based on shared interests and fears, are in the process of building the most powerful alliance in the Middle East. They are doing so in the face of opposition from the Arab and Muslim worlds as well wider concerns, notably on the part of Russia. The Turkish-Israeli alliance now appears sufficiently robust, at least for the moment, to withstand opposition from the Arab and Muslim world. Moreover, US support for the entente may grow owing to concerns about terrorism and stability in the eastern Mediterranean basin, as well as the administration's renewed emphasis on stability in the Gulf.
Israel last week launched an air raid against a Syrian radar station in Lebanon. The air raid has raised the stakes in the low-level military confrontation between Hizbollah and Israel. It has also exacerbated Lebanese internal divisions and exposed the lack of a national consensus on Hizbollah's cross-border operations. The Israeli raid has set a precedent and raised the stakes in Tel Aviv's confrontation with Hizbollah along the Lebanese border. Although neither Syria nor Israel is interested in a military confrontation, there are no guarantees that the situation will not spin out of control and lead to a limited regional conflict.