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61. How Verbal Threats to Close Oil Transit Chokepoints Lead to Military Conflict

Author:
John Bowlus
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center
Abstract:
On December 26, 2011, in response to US, European, and potential Asian sanctions on Iranian oil exports, the government in Tehran issued a threat to “cut off the Strait of Hormuz.” The US Defense Department responded that any blockade of the strait would be met with force. On first read, it is easy to dismiss such saber rattling as another chapter in the new Cold War in the Middle East between Iran and its allies – including Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah – and the US, Israel, and the Sunni Gulf States, mostly notably Saudi Arabia. Iran has since backed away from its threat, but the event still carries importance because it is unclear how both the US and Iran will continue to respond, particularly as the diplomatic and economic pressures grow more acute while Iran's controversial nuclear program advances. Could such a verbal threat by Iran to cut off the Strait of Hormuzignite a military conflagration in the region? The relationship between military conflict and oil supply disruptions is well established; however, policymakers and analysts tend to focus on the incidents in which military conflict causes disruptions in oil supplies and sharp increases in prices. The first and most obvious example of this dynamic was the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. The subsequent oil embargo by the Arab members of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) against the United States and the Netherlands for their support of Israel caused prices to soar as oil-consuming nations endured supply shortages. The Iranian Revolution from 1978 to 1979 was another event that curtailed Western nations' access to oil and caused prices to spike. When thinking about the relationship between military conflict and oil supply disruptions, however, policymakers and analysts should also recognize that the competition over oil – and even verbal threats to disrupt oil supplies by closing oil transit chokepoints – have either led directly to military conflict or have provided a useful cover under which countries have initiated military conflict. By examining past episodes when countries issued threats to close oil transit chokepoints, this Policy Brief helps illuminate the dangers associated with the current crisis over the Strait of Hormuz.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Middle East, Asia, and Arabia

62. Using US Strategic Reserves to Moderate Potential Oil Price Increases from Sanctions on Iran

Author:
Philip K. Verleger
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The United States has initiated new sanctions against Iran aimed at preventing it from collecting revenue from exports of crude oil. The European Union has followed, embargoing all imports of Iranian crude from July 1, 2012 and preventing any firms from entering into new contracts to import Iranian oil after January 23, 2012. The new US and EU sanctions could be the most draconian in many years. If implemented fully, US sanctions would force trading partners to choose between the United States and Iran. EU sanctions would cut Iran off from an important market. These sanctions, while reducing Iranian income, could pose a very serious economic threat to countries that have significant trade with the United States and/or import significant quantities of oil from Iran.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Oil, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

63. Congress Considers New Sanctions on Iran - But Why

Author:
Paul Nadeau
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
It is not surprising that Congress can take a more aggressive stance on foreign policy issues than the Executive: Congress rarely bears the loss in foreign policy mistakes (consider where foreign policy issues rank on voters’ lists of priorities) and that consequently gives Congress an opportunity to demonstrate leadership, since high profile issues in most other issue areas carry considerably more risk. The result is that Congress will often take a position that is contrary to that of the Executive, most frequently by adopting a more extreme position, and then either assailing the Executive for a lack of leadership when the Executive does not follow or by taking credit when the Executive adopts Congress’s position. The most recent example is the issue of Iran’s nuclear program—which is likely the only current issue where there is genuine bipartisan support, famously evidenced in the Senate’s December 2011 100-0 passage of legislation sanctioning Iran’s financial sector. So far, international sanctions, and particularly the European Union’s sanctions of Iran’s oil sector, seem to have succeeded in damaging Iran’s economy and possibly even encouraging them to negotiate, though a breakthrough has been elusive. The problem is that while the sanctions may have succeeded in crippling Iran’s (already weak) economy so far, the goal of the sanctions program is supposed to have been to convince Iran to terminate its nuclear program. On that score, it’s unclear that additional sanctions may help the American cause and it might even undermine it.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

64. Israel and Iran's Nuclear Weapon Programme: Roll Back or Containment?

Author:
Massimiliano Fiore
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The latest IAEA Report suggests that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon capability. Preventing the Islamic Republic from becoming nuclear is the most important issue on Israel's agenda, and Jerusalem will do everything it can to prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear capability. Considering the limited impact of international sanctions and covert operations, it is therefore possible that at some point in the next 12-15 months Israel's policy-makers and military officials will decide whether or not to act militarily to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities. Though the probability of successfully destroying all of Iran's nuclear targets is not very high, Israeli policy-makers and military officials would nevertheless still be extremely satisfied with delaying Iran's nuclear programme. But would it be worth all the trouble it would inevitably unleash? While Israeli fears are understandable, given the heavy costs and poor chances for success of the military option, containment still represents the most sensible policy for Israel.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel

65. Iran Turns to China, Barter to Survive Sanctions

Author:
Barbara Slavin
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Sanctions and China's growing economic clout have altered Iran's trading patterns in ways that are reducing Iran's access to hard currency but may also be insulating the Iranian government and political elite from further US unilateral pressures.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

66. Saudi Public Backs Iran Sanctions but Split on Military Action

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A highly unusual and credible private poll of Saudi citizens taken in late November 2009 by a reputable regional firm shows solid popular support for tough measures against Iran, even though domestic economic issues loom larger in the public's perception. Conducted in partnership with Pechter Middle East Polls, a new, Princeton-based research organization, the survey involved face-to-face interviews with a representative sample of 1,000 Saudi citizens in the major metropolitan areas of Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dammam/al-Khobar. A comparable poll was conducted in Egypt during the same period, with a representative national sample of 1,000.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Arabia, and Saudi Arabia

67. Betting on Perseverance Why the Double Track Approach is Still the Best Way to Deal with the Iranian Nuclear Conundrum

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The standoff over Iran's nuclear programme, suspected of harbouring secret military ends, is widely considered a major flashpoint. A nuclear Iran – as the argument goes – would dramatically alter the regional balance in the Gulf, providing the Islamic Republic with a formidable deterrent against external aggression, while augmenting its ability to exert influence on its neighbours and eliminating the strategic advantage of its rival Israel, the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East. An Iranian bomb could also trigger a regional nuclear arms race since such countries as Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, might feel compelled to emulate Iran. This would in turn result in the eventual collapse of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Given the stakes, it comes as no surprise that curbing Iran's nuclear programme has rapidly become a foreign policy priority for western powers, Israel, and the majority of Arab states, which have a history of rivalry with and mistrust of Persian and Shia-dominated Iran.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt

68. The End of the Post-Gulf War Era

Author:
Dore Gold
Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Abstract:
Three basic conditions prevailed when the Arab-Israeli peace process began in 1991 in Madrid and accelerated in 1993 at Oslo. First, the Soviet Union crumbled and eventually collapsed, removing what had since 1955 been the strategic backbone of the Arab military option against the State of Israel. Second, Iraq was militarily crushed and under both UN sanctions and monitoring, and was therefore removed from the political and military calculus of relations between Israel and the Arab world. Third, Iran was still recovering from its eight-year war with Iraq and was far from ready to have an impact in the Middle East. Together, these three conditions created a unique moment of Pax Americana, maintained not just by virtue of American power, but by the consent of its potential rivals.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, War, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Soviet Union