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11. Striking Back: Iran and the Rise of Asymmetric Drone Warfare in the Middle East

Author:
Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Iranian drone strikes, as exemplified by the September 2019 attack against Saudi Aramco facilities, have jolted Middle East leaders and revealed Tehran’s long-range precision strike capabilities. The regime’s large and growing drone force, which can be used for reconnaissance or strike missions, now poses an existential threat to the Gulf states and a direct threat to Israel, as does its formidable missile force. Moreover, Iranian drones transferred to Russia have had a significant impact on Moscow’s war against Ukraine. In the bigger picture, advances in drone technology have produced an inflection point in aerial warfare—comparable to the introduction of manned flight more than a century ago—that has ended the guarantee of U.S. air superiority over its forces and bases. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. explores the contours and consequences of Iran’s drone activities in this timely Policy Note. To counter the Islamic Republic, the former CENTCOM commander recommends an approach centered on clearer U.S. communication about its goals for the region, tighter collaboration with partners and allies, and enhanced efforts to counter Iran’s drone fleet, along with its ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Drones, Military, and Asymmetric Warfare
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

12. Countering “ISIS at Large” in Syria

Author:
Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In U.S. Central Command’s 2022 “year in review” statement on the current status of the fight against the Islamic State, commanding general Michael Kurilla highlighted three categories: (1) “ISIS in detention,” meaning the thousands of men and boys affiliated with the group and held in Iraqi and Syrian prisons; (2) the “potential next generation of ISIS,” meaning the approximately 55,000 women and minors held in camps; and (3) “ISIS at large,” meaning the leaders and operatives that the United States and its partners “are currently fighting in Iraq and Syria.” Although Gen. Kurilla praised the ongoing effort to militarily degrade ISIS, he also noted that the group’s ideology persists, and that “partnered operations” are needed to keep up the pressure. This view aligns with the pivot in U.S. strategy in Syria over the past year and a half, from a military mission to “advising, assisting, and enabling” local partners. At the same time, however, U.S. forces have continued launching unilateral strikes against ISIS leaders in Syria as recently as this month.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

13. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East

Author:
Nathan P. Olsen
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

14. Iran’s Misunderstood Nuclear Law

Author:
Henry Rome
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
This summer, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered his most detailed remarks in years on Iran’s nuclear trajectory. While his comments on a potential agreement with the West drew the most attention, he also called on Iranian officials to follow a controversial 2020 law that ordered rapid steps to escalate the nuclear program and reduce international monitoring. “Some people think that this law creates problems for the country,” he stated. “They are wrong. This law is a good law...And it must be followed.” Indeed, the 2020 legislation has played a prominent role in Iranian debates about nuclear advances, and Khamenei’s comments suggest this will remain the case. Yet the law is widely misunderstood; more important, it has not been the primary driver of Iran’s actual nuclear activity over the past three years. The governments of Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi each sidestepped key provisions of the legislation while also escalating the program in ways the law does not require. Despite Khamenei’s sentiment, neither the existing law nor potential successor legislation is likely to compel escalation or constrain diplomacy.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Legislation, Nuclear Energy, and Military
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

15. Systemic Operational Design – a study in failed concept

Author:
Łukasz Przybyło
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
One of the many reasons for the failure of the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) in the Second Lebanon War was the concept of Systemic Operational Design (SOD), translated into de facto military doctrine. The story of the rise and fall of the SOD idea is a warning sign for all militaries faced with “modern” and “fashionable” ideas. The purpose of this paper is therefore to describe and evaluate the Systemic Operational Design created and introduced into the IDF by Brigadier General Shimon Naveh and the Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI). The study is based on the literature created by the State of Israel, the IDF, and its main proponent Shimon Naveh, as well as other militaries (mainly the US Army). This theoretical background is confronted with the IDF’s operations during the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and their effects on the war’s outcome. The over intellectualised, ambiguous, and not properly structured concept of the SOD, introduced as the IDF’s doctrine and approach to operations, led to military failure (which also had more root causes) in Lebanon. A study of the SOD failure should lead to a careful approach being taken to all new military concepts and ideas. Both change and continuation need to be properly balanced and evaluated, while enhanced military effectiveness could be of great value. At the same time, the impact of concepts which are not well anchored in military science/history and untested, like the SOD, could be devastating for militaries.
Topic:
International Security, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Military, and 2006 Lebanon War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

16. Emile Bustani Seminar: "The Egyptian army in the 1967 Six-Day War: Lessons for the present"

Author:
Khaled Fahmy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Few events in modern Middle Eastern history were as central as the Six-Day War of 1967. Surpassed in its significance probably only by the Nakba of 1948, the Naksa, or “setback,” as the 1967 war was euphemistically called, saw Israel inflicting a decisive defeat on three of its Arab neighbors combined. Of all the belligerent countries, Egypt was the most deeply affected. Its army was obliterated; its territory occupied; its leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, once the undisputed leader of Egypt and the Arab World, was a broken man; and Nasserism was dealt a death blow. This talk looks closely into the performance of the Egyptian army in Sinai over the 36 hours of combat. It argues that while the defeat was inevitable, given Israel’s military, diplomatic and economic superiority, the scale, speed and depth of the Egyptian army’s defeat requires a close look at civil-military relations. Specifically, it looks at how the Egyptian army, starting from 1961, had deviated from its military mandate and encroached on all aspects of the economy, creating what was termed “a state within a state”. The paper also tracks the fatal steps undertaken by Abdel-Hakim Amir, the Army’s Commander-in-Chief, to snatch control of the army from Nasser, so much so that by the outbreak of the war in June 1967 Nasser was ignorant of his army’s true capabilities. The talk concludes by drawing comparisons with the present-day army under President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi and asks to what degree the current army’s preoccupation running its economic empire has affected its fighting capabilitie
Topic:
History, Armed Conflict, Military, and Six-Day War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North Africa, and Egypt

17. Israel and the United States Did Not See the 1973 War Coming

Author:
Zaki Shalom
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Israel’s mistaken pre-war assumptions about the 1973 War caused it to fail to foresee the potential outbreak of a war with Egypt and Syria. What were these calculations based on and why did the United States follow suit? In early October 1973, Israeli intelligence agencies began to receive information regarding Egypt’s (and Syria’s) intention to launch a war against Israel in the coming days. The timing of the expected offensive was not yet known. Only in the early morning of October 6, 1973, would a highly reliable intelligence agent of the Mossad inform Israeli authorities that war would begin in the late afternoon hours. The exact time was not mentioned, but for one reason or another the Israelis believed the Egyptian military offensive would begin at 6:00 pm. Concurrently, Egypt began to deploy massive military power along the Suez Canal, very close to Israel’s military forces on the other side of the canal. The war broke out at 2:00 pm—four hours before the expected time.
Topic:
Intelligence, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Armed Conflict, Military, and 1973 War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Syria, Egypt, and United States of America

18. Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos: ¿una potencia militar emergente en Oriente Medio?

Author:
Santiago Ott
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
En el año 2014, el periódico norteamericano The Washington Post publicó un artículo que versaba en torno a las capacidades militares y el rol desempeñado por las fuerzas armadas de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos (EAU) en diversas operaciones de combate en Medio Oriente. Según reza la nota, el por entonces general retirado del Cuerpo de Marines, James Mattis, junto con otros oficiales de los servicios armados de los Estados Unidos, habían comenzado a dirigirse al pequeño estado del Golfo Pérsico bajo el apodo "little Sparta," en clara referencia a la antigua ciudad-estado griega conocida por sus destacadas tradiciones marciales. Mientras que para algunos esta etiqueta puede resultar exagerada, la misma refleja en buena medida el espíritu que ha tenido la política exterior y de seguridad internacional llevada a cabo por la federación en los últimos años.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East and UAE

19. The Egyptian Army’s Counterinsurgency: History, Past Operations, and the Sinai Campaign

Author:
Hossam el-Hamalawy
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Why did the Egyptian military, which had long avoided serious involvement in the police-led 1990s domestic War on Terror and the later fight against armed militants in Sinai, embark on a major counterinsurgency in Sinai following the 2013 coup? Why did it take the Egyptian military almost a decade to pacify the peninsula at a very high cost for Sinai residents and the military itself, despite the small size of the insurgent force and the relatively confined terrain where it operated? This paper will attempt to answer those questions, but first, it examines some catastrophic precedents where the army deployed its personnel in counterinsurgency operations, before delving into the recent Sinai war and what it tells us about the military’s mindset.
Topic:
Security, Counterinsurgency, History, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, Egypt, and Sinai Peninsula

20. Retain, Restructure, or Divest? Policy Options for Egypt’s Military Economy

Author:
Yezid Sayigh
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The Egyptian military has been on a dramatic expansionary trajectory since seizing power in July 2013. Having previously been an economic backwater, the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and other military agencies have spearheaded the enormous state-led investment strategy that President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has pursued since he came to office in 2014. The military controls a vast economic portfolio. It manages a significant share of the overall volume of publicly contracted infrastructure and housing. It builds industrial zones and produces capital goods, consumer durables, transport and heavy goods vehicles and parts, and information technology equipment. It undertakes associated retail, owns commercial media companies and hotels, and is rapidly increasing its stake in agriculture, fisheries, and mineral extraction. As of September 2021, the military even has a monopoly on the production of school meals. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) has formally controlled the use of state land by any civilian individual or entity, whether private or public, since 2001. The Ministry of Military Production (MOMP) is now one of two bodies that approves the import of foreign goods or services by government agencies. Military representatives sit on national boards, including for planning and sustainable development; feed into policy direction in several sectors, including the manufacturing industry, telecommunications, digital transformation, market development for electric vehicles, and rural development; and head major presidential initiatives, including the Long Live Egypt (Tahya Misr) development fund and the company responsible for constructing Egypt’s new administrative capital. Plans are underway to increase the capitalization of military companies by inviting private investment through the Egyptian sovereign wealth fund. What I have called an “officers’ republic”—comprising thousands of senior EAF retirees embedded in government ministries and agencies, regulatory and operational economic authorities, local government, and state-owned enterprises—complements the formal military economy. Military agencies and companies provide significant economic benefits. Military-managed public investment in transport infrastructure, for example, facilitates the movement of people and goods and expands access to external markets and investment opportunities. The construction of social housing for low-income groups addresses a serious shortage and assists government efforts to regenerate the informal settlements and slums where approximately one in seven Egyptians live. New industrial zones and extensive agricultural greenhouse projects attract investors, both domestic and foreign, contributing to economic growth and employment. And lower middle–class customers benefit from the expanding range of locally made consumer goods at affordable prices, alongside cheap meat and poultry imports, subsidized health services, and free food baskets for the poor. Why, then, should Egypt reconsider the military’s role in the economy?
Topic:
Armed Forces, Economy, Business, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt