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61. May/June 2019 Issue

Author:
Amarnath Amarasingam, Brian Michael Jenkins, Paul Cruickshank, Mitchell D. Silber, Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, and Charlie Winter
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The Easter Sunday attacks in Sri Lanka took the terrorism studies community by surprise because there had been no known history of jihadi violence inside the country and very little to indicate that local groups had the wherewithal to carry out such a large-scale coordinated operation. There is much that remains unclear about the links between the Sri Lankan cell and the Islamic State, but nearly 18 years after 9/11, the suicide bombings were a reminder that clandestine terrorist groups can, at any moment, strike in unexpected places and ways. In our cover article, Amarnath Amarasingam, whose research has focused on both Sri Lanka and global terrorism, outlines what is known about the network that carried out the Easter attacks and situates the attacks in the broader context of evolving intercommunal tensions in the country. Brian Michael Jenkins examines the options for dealing with the significant numbers of Islamic State foreign fighters currently detained in Syria, warning that “endless delay” risks creating a serious threat to international security. Our interview is with Vidhya Ramalingam, the co-founder of Moonshot CVE, a company using technology to disrupt and counter violent extremism globally. Mitchell Silber examines how the terrorist threat against Jews in the West has evolved by examining attacks between 2012 and the present day. He notes that “what may be the most striking findings from this case study analysis are that first, Europe has become the focal point of the jihadi terror threat to Jews in the West and second, the United States has become a new, emerging focal point of the extreme right-wing terror threat to Jews in the West.” Last month, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared for the first time on camera since the Islamic State heralded its ‘caliphate’ in Mosul’s al-Nuri mosque five years ago. Haroro Ingram, Craig Whiteside, and Charlie Winter explain how the video underlined the group’s strategic transformation with the Islamic State’s leader now portraying himself as “the guerrilla ‘caliph’ of a global insurgency.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Judaism, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Europe, South Asia, Middle East, Sri Lanka, Syria, and United States of America

62. July 2019 Issue

Author:
Matt Bryden, Premdeep Bahra, Paul Cruickshank, Graham Macklin, Joana Cook, Gina Vale, and Robin Simcox
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In our cover article, Matt Bryden and Premdeep Bahra trace the evolution of the jihadi terrorist threat in East Africa over the last three decades. They argue that al-Shabaab’s January 2019 attack on the Dusit D2 luxury hotel compound in Nairobi, Kenya, “brought together three strands of al-Shabaab’s organizational DNA: its Somali provenance, its ideological affiliation with al-Qa`ida, and its growing cohort of trained, experienced East African fighters. The successful combination of these traits in a single operation suggests that al-Shabaab’s longstanding ambition to transcend its Somali origins and become a truly regional organization is becoming a reality, representing a new and dangerous phase in the group’s evolution and the threat that it poses to the region.” Our interview is with Catherine De Bolle, the Executive Director of Europol, who previously served as Commissioner General of the Belgian Federal Police between 2012 and 2018. Graham Macklin outlines what is now known about the Christchurch terrorist attacks. He writes: “In the space of 36 minutes on March 15, 2019, it is alleged that Brenton Tarrant, an Australian far-right extremist, fatally shot 51 people in two mosques in Christchurch in the deadliest terrorist attack in New Zealand’s history. What was unique about Tarrant’s attack—at least insofar as extreme-right terrorism is concerned—is that he livestreamed his atrocity on Facebook and in doing so, highlighted the Achilles heel of such platforms when faced with the viral dissemination of extremely violent content.” Joana Cook and Gina Vale provide an updated assessment of the numbers of foreign men, women, and minors who traveled to or were born in the Islamic State, examine the proportion that have returned ‘home,’ and outline the continuing challenges foreign women and minors affiliated with the Islamic State pose to the international community. Robin Simcox assesses the terrorist threat from “frustrated travelers” in Europe by examining the 25 plots (eight of which resulted in attacks) by such individuals since January 2014.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Terrorism, History, Counter-terrorism, Women, Internet, Islamic State, Youth, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, New Zealand, and East Africa

63. September 2019 Issue

Author:
Daniel Byman, Paul Cruickshank, Brian Dodwell, Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, Julie Chernov Hwang, Aaron Y. Zelin, and Katherine Bauer
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This September 11th, a new generation is taking up the mantle in the fight against terrorism. “Later this year, a U.S. service member is likely to be deployed to Afghanistan who was not yet born on September 11, 2001,” Daniel Byman notes in our feature article on the jihadi terror threat facing the United States 18 years later. He assesses “although the operational freedom of jihadi groups is constricted by U.S. and allied counterterrorism efforts, the jihadi cause as a whole has far more local and regional influence than it did in the years before 9/11, it is better able to inspire individuals in the West to act on its behalf, and groups have proven resilient despite the fierce U.S.-led onslaught.” Our interview is with Joseph Maguire, the United States’ Acting Director of National Intelligence. He says that “since the catastrophic attacks on 9/11, we have significantly diminished the ability of jihadists to strike the U.S. by removing hundreds of leaders and operatives, disrupting dozens of networks and plots, and degrading safe havens. But some jihadist groups still have that intent, not only to target the homeland but also our interests overseas. They are continually adapting to setbacks by modifying their tactics, seeking out alternative safe havens, and using new and emerging technologies to communicate, recruit, and conduct attacks. This makes for an increasingly diverse and unpredictable threat.” As the terror threat evolves, Acting Director Maguire stresses the importance of addressing the still-significant security challenges posed by the Islamic State in Syria, Iraq, and beyond given the group still poses a “tremendous threat” and has “all the recipes” for a resurgence. Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines examine Islamic State Khorasan’s leadership losses between 2015 and 2018 by leadership tier, year, and geography. Their findings highlight “the group’s tenacious presence in Nangarhar (Afghanistan) and Baluchistan (Pakistan), despite declines in overall number of attacks. An important factor contributing to ISK’s resiliency appears to be rooted in its steady recruitment of experienced Pakistani militants that sustain its leadership ranks.” Two years after the Marawi siege in the Philippines, Julie Chernov Hwang outlines the motivations for joining the Maute Group based on her interviews with 25 former members of the jihadi group and a related faction. Aaron Zelin and Katherine Bauer outline the significant progress Tunisia has made over the past two years in developing domestic counter-terrorism finance capabilities.
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Khorasan Group
Political Geography:
Middle East and Tunisia

64. October 2019 Issue

Author:
Seth G. Jones, Paul Cruickshank, Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, Julia Lodoen, Ryan O'Farrell, Seth Loertscher, Damien Spleeters, Michael Shkolnik, and Alexander Corbeil
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In our cover article, Seth Jones examines the Russian military campaign in Syria. He writes: “Russia has done what many thought was impossible in Syria. It has helped Syrian President Bashar al-Assad reconquer most of the country’s major cities and nearly two-thirds of its population. Moscow adopted a military approach that combined well-directed fires and ground maneuver to overwhelm a divided enemy. But it also used extraordinary violence against civilians and provided diplomatic cover when Syrian forces used chemical weapons. Moving forward, Russia faces considerable challenges ahead. Syria is a fractured country with an unpopular regime and massive economic problems; terrorist groups like the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida persist; and Israel and Iran remain locked in a proxy war in Syria.” Our interview is with Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan. He discusses DHS’ recently published new Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence and how DHS is intensifying efforts to counter the threat of far-right terror. Daniel Milton, Julia Lodoen, Ryan O’Farrell, and Seth Loertscher examine a recently declassified collection of 27 personnel records for Islamic State fighters, both local and foreign. The forms were acquired by the Department of Defence in Syria in 2016 and are now available to view on the Combating Terrorism Center’s website. According to Milton and his co-authors, the forms “demonstrate how extensive the breadth of information collected was in some cases … [and] show that the Islamic State acquired information useful for understanding the radicalization process, encouraging accountability among its fighters, managing the talent in the organization, and vetting members for potential security concerns.” Damien Spleeters outlines how his organization Conflict Armament Research helped prosecutors secure a guilty plea in the prosecution of Haisem Zahab, an Australian extremist with contacts into the Islamic State and whose research in Australia into rockets “indicates [according to the prosecution] significant commonality” with the Islamic State’s weapon production program in Iraq and Syria. Michael Shkolnik and Alexander Corbeil examine how Hezbollah “virtual entrepreneurs” have in recent years used social media to recruit Israeli Arabs and West Bank-based Palestinians to attack Israelis.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Homeland Security, Syrian War, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria

65. The Power of the Words: Discourse in Turkish Foreign Policy | Kelimelerin Gücü: Türk Dış Politikasında Söylem

Author:
Gökhan Koçer
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
Institution:
Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
Abstract:
Language is one of the essential tools in politics. In this context, as for people, the importance of language is very high for states to express themselves politically. The language that states use to carry out their foreign policies has original qualities or at least is believed it should have. For this reason, the language used by the state in its foreign policy is different from the others. If it is not different, it is sometimes differentiated, or new meanings are assigned to the words in line with this purpose. It is a common practice that states produce and implement foreign policy by utilising the language and especially words. However, this can sometimes lead to various problems in foreign policy. Similar practices and problems exist in Turkish foreign policy as well. Naming, changing the name, naming it differently, labelling it in a negative manner, pronouncing the name differently, not-to-mention the name are of the tactics in this regard. In this study, two main topics on Turkish foreign policy are discussed. The first is the debate in Turkey on the last name of Syrian President "Bashar al-Assad" within the framework of what it is or how to pronounce it. Once the relationship between Turkey and Syria began to deteriorate, "Esed" instead of "Esad" has chosen to be used by some politicians, particularly Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The second one is the name of the terrorist organisation "ISIS“(Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham). The terrorist organisation formerly known as ISIS started to be named "DEAŞ", "DAİŞ", "DAEŞ" by a great number of people, especially Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The main reason for this is that the word of Islam takes place in the name of this terrorist organisation. Two inferences can be made on the subject. First, the language debates that took place inside Turkey are more frequent than the debates done between Turkey and its counterparts in the international arena and made by the outside world without Turkey's involvement. Secondly, the interventions in language and playing with words did not give the desired results. | Dil, siyasetin en önemli araçlarından biridir. Bu bağlamda kişilerin olduğu gibi, devletlerin de kendilerini siyaseten ifade etmelerinde dilin önemi çok yüksektir. Devletlerin dış politikalarını gerçekleştirmek için kullandıkları dil, özgün niteliklere sahiptir ya da en azından öyle olması gerektiğine inanılır. Bu nedenle de, devletin dış politikada kullandığı dil başkalarınınkinden farklıdır, değilse bazen farklılaştırılır ya da kelimelere farklı anlamlar yüklenir. Dili ve özelde de kelimeleri kullanarak dış politika üretmeye ve uygulamaya çalışmak, rastlanılan bir durumdur. Ancak, bu durum, bazen çeşitli dış politika sorunlarına da neden olabilmektedir. Türk dış politikasında da benzer uygulamalar ve sorunların varlığı, zaman zaman söz konusudur. Adlandırma, ad değiştirme, farklı adlandırma, olumsuz adlandırma, adını farklı telaffuz etme, adını anmama, bu konuda taktiklere örnektirler. Bu çalışmada, esas olarak, Türk dış politikasında yakın zamanda gündemde yer almış iki tartışma konusu ele alınmıştır. Bunlardan birincisi Suriye Devlet Başkanı “Beşir Esad”ın soyadının ne olduğu ya da nasıl telaffuz edileceği konusunda Türkiye’de yaşanan çok ciddi tartışmadır. Türkiye ile Suriye arasındaki ilişkiler bozulmaya başladıktan sonra, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan başta olmak üzere bir kesim, “Esad” yerine “Esed” kelimesini kullanmayı tercih etmiştir. İkincisi ise, terör örgütü “IŞİD”in (Irak Şam İslam Devleti) adı konusunda olmuştur. Daha önce IŞİD adıyla anılan örgüt, sonraları Recep Tayyip Erdoğan başta olmak üzere, büyük bir kesim tarafından DEAŞ, DAİŞ, DAEŞ gibi adlarla ifade edilmeye başlanmıştır. Bu yaklaşımın temel nedeni, terör örgütünün adında yer alan “İslam” kelimesinin kullanılmak istenmemesi olmuştur. Konu hakkında, iki saptama yapılabilir. Birinci olarak, Türkiye’de yapılan tartışmalar, Türkiye dışında yapılanlardan ve Türkiye’nin dışarıyla yaptıklarından daha fazladır. İkinci olarak ise, dile yapılan müdahaleler, kelimelerle oynamalar, istenilen sonuçları vermemiştir.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Islamic State, and Language
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

66. The Red Geopolitics of the Middle East ISIS as a Religious Terrorist Organization | Orta Doğu’nun Kırmızı Jeopolitiği Bir Dini Terör Organizasyonu Olarak DAEŞ

Author:
Bora İyiat
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
Institution:
Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
Abstract:
An organization that emerged in the Middle East in recent years with the claim of being a state and it rapidly and surprisingly captured territories in Iraq and Syria, attracting the attention of the whole world. This organization calls itself the “Islamic State” although its movement style and ideological foundations have no connection whatsoever to Islam. And, there is a possibility that it can be an actor like every global project again even though it seems to be out of play in regional developments. This article aims to take a close look at the geopolitics of the Middle East, where similar organizations frequently emerge, and to get to know the organization which calls itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Damascus. | Sadece medeniyetlerin değil, çatışmalarında merkezi olarak algılanan Ortadoğu’da yakın zamanda devlet iddiasıyla ortaya çıkan bir örgüt süratle ve şaşırtıcı bir biçimde Irak ve Suriye topraklarında ilerleyerek tüm dünyanın dikkatini üzerinde toplamıştır. Hareket tarzı ve ideolojik temelleri uzaktan, yakından İslamiyet ile alakası olmadığı halde kendisine “İslam Devleti” adı veren bu örgüt her ne kadar son zamanda bölgesel gelişmelerde oyun dışı kalmış gibi görülse de her küresel proje gibi yeniden bir aktör olabileceğine dair ciddi kuşkular barındırmaktadır. İşte bu makale benzer organizasyonların sıklıkla duyulduğu Ortadoğu’nun jeopolitiğine yakından bakmak ve kendisine Irak ve Şam İslam Devleti adını veren örgütü yakından tanımak amacıyla yazılmıştır.
Topic:
Terrorism, Geopolitics, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

67. Displacement-Emigration-Return: Understanding Uncertainty in Iraq

Author:
Kamaran Palani
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Following the Islamic State’s (IS) occupation of Iraqi territories in June 2014 more than 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) fled their homes in search for a secure place. Of these, around 1,3 million found refuge in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). In parallel to new waves of displacement, Iraqis were also choosing to migrate abroad. In 2015, Iraqis were among the top three nationalities reaching Europe through the Mediterranean routes, after Syrians and Afghans (UNHCR 2016b, 34). Besides displacement and emigration, a large number of IDPs have returned to their place of origin since 2017. As the process intensifies, the security, political and economic conditions of the liberated areas still remain unstable and unpredictable. This report provides policy recommendations based on the results of the research study titled “Drivers for onward migration: the case of Iraqi IDPs in the Kurdistan Region leaving Iraq”, which was conducted between May and November 2017. In it, we addressed the questions: what mechanisms are responsible for explaining why IDPs living in the KRI want to either stay, emigrate or return to their places of origin? and what are the relationships between displacement, emigration and return in the context of Iraq? To address these questions, we employed both quantitative and qualitative analyses methods including: (a) evaluating 500 questionnaires distributed among IDPs in the KRI (Erbil, Duhok and Suleimaniyah governorates) between May and June 2017; (b) conducting 30 semi-structured interviews with IDPs in the KRI between June and July 2017, and (c) discussing preliminary results of the study during a workshop in Erbil on 23 July 2017 with local, national and international actors, including governmental and non-governmental organizations. The data indicates that, although slightly more than half of the sample wish/plan to leave Iraq (55%), only a minority of the subjects (23%) actually developed a concrete plan to do so. Emigration was most appealing to those ages 26–35 and among those with no or low levels of education. Moreover, Yazidis and Christians were more represented among those who wished or planned to leave Iraq. In addition, the most important pull factors point to the presence of family/relatives and friends along with the confidence of receiving refugee status upon arrival. Ultimately, IDPs perceptions of insecurity and lack of economic opportunities appear to be the most compelling reasons driving their wish/plan to emigrate. The data also suggests that IDPs’ perceptions towards the future political, economic and security situations in Iraq (expressed in the next five years) is the most relevant factor determining people’s emigration decision: within an overall negative assessment of the future of Iraq, IDPs wishing or planning to emigrate held a more pessimistic view compared to those who wanted to return or stay in displacement. Conversely, the study finds that socio-political (i.e., relations between IDPs and hosting communities) and socio-economic (i.e., income level and employment status) factors are less significant in determining IDPs’ wish/plan to leave the country. Where socio-political and socio-economic factors do not directly influence IDPs’ intentions, they however, contribute to a distressing sense of uncertainty prevalent among IDPs. Political, social and economic uncertainty overarchingly influences displacement, emigration and return in and from Iraq. Additionally, the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have not been capable of (or willing to) address such uncertainty. Rather, they have contributed to a governance of uncertainty best illustrated by the absence of a comprehensive framework for managing displacement and return in both the KRI and greater federal Iraq. In response, this study calls for the development of robust policies at the international, national and local levels which: a. Consider displacement in Iraq as a chronic condition versus a sudden crisis; b. Recognize how recurrent, protracted and unresolved displacement waves destabilize the region; c. Appreciate displacement as a diversified phenomenon. These findings stress the destabilizing and traumatic effects of displacement and the urgency of addressing them, thus, we recommend the following prioritized policy areas through which international, regional, national and local actors can contribute to solve, or at least mitigate, the negative impact of displacement: 1. Elaborate and implement a national policy framework for displacement capable of addressing its multiple manifestations; 2. Adopt facilitation (without active encouragement) measures that can decrease the prevalent uncertainty among the population; 3. Include displacement in the broader physical and social reconstruction plan for Iraq. The data for this report was collected in Spring/Summer 2017, and thus, describes a scenario that has changed following the events that took place in September and October 2017 (see Section 3). However, the findings and recommendations that the study identified appear as relevant today as they were pre- Referendum. Although the situation has changed, they support policy-recommendations that are urgently needed. The research project “Drivers for onward migration: t
Topic:
Migration, Islamic State, Displacement, and NGOs
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

68. Post-Crises Prospects for Reconciliation in Iraq: A Kurdish-Shi’ite Debate in Najaf

Author:
Khogir Wirya
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
With the military defeat of Islamic State (IS) militants in Mosul and other Iraqi territories, the Government of Iraq (GoI) is moving ahead with plans to stabilize violent environments, rebuild war-ravaged physical infrastructure, and restore vital services. Equally important is the need for developing a feasible national reconciliation strategy among the country’s various ethnic, religious, and social groups, through dialogue and trust-building mechanisms. In light of warm historical relations and significant political influence between Iraqi Kurds and Shi’ites, reconciliation between them is of paramount importance for lasting stability in the country. Indeed, in the absence of Erbil-Baghdad rapprochement, overcoming future political challenges will be very difficult. Towards that end, the Middle East Research Institute (MERI) and Al-Rafidain Centre for Dialogue (RCD) jointly organized a series of unofficial meetings involving representatives of Shi’ite political parties and a MERI-led Kurdish delegation between 28 February and 01 March 2018. Religious leaders, academics, political party representatives, members of parliament from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Baghdad and Najaf attended the meetings, organized under the themes of “The Future of Governance in Iraq: Crises and Partnership Opportunities” and “The Role of Decision-makers and Political Elites in Building Confidence Among the Components of Iraqi Society.” The MERI-led delegation also visited the Marja’iya (Shi’ite religious authority) in al-Najaf city.
Topic:
Religion, Islamic State, Political stability, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Kurdistan, and Mosul

69. Contemporary Jihadi Militancy in Yemen

Author:
Elisabeth Kendall
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Regional conflict and internal chaos have allowed militant jihadi groups to rise and flourish in Yemen. This paper analyzes two of the most prominent such groups, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State in Yemen (ISY), by scrutinizing the factors that led to their respective ascents and examining the challenges and pressures that have caused their respective declines. By comparing and contrasting their operations, respective styles of leadership, and varying levels of community integration, this paper charts the path of jihadi militancy in Yemen and assesses its future in Yemeni politics and society.
Topic:
Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

70. Jihadist propaganda, offline: Strategic communications in modern warfare

Author:
Haid Haid and Charlie Winter
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Insurgent strategic communication has rarely posed as great a threat to regional and international security as it does today in Syria, where jihadists are using it to aggressively advance their short- and long-term interests. Using a qualitative mixed-methods approach incorporating semi-structured interviews with activists and journalists operating inside Syria and in-depth, longitudinal content analysis, this paper compares and contrasts the in-theater outreach strategies of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, tracking how each has used propaganda and censorship to entrench its rule over local constituents in recent years. It demonstrates that, notwithstanding the fact that both organizations share the same ideology, there are significant tactical and strategic disparities between their respective approaches toward public diplomacy, disparities that run right to the heart of what drives their enmity for each other.
Topic:
Media, Islamic State, Propaganda, Jihad, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria