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11. A Comparative Analysis of Imperial Japan's Predicament in China and U.S. Quagmire in Post-Saddam Iraq: Similarities, Lessons and Implications

Author:
Matsahiro Matsumura
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
This study will first present a series of striking similarities between the imperial Japanese predicament in China and the contemporary U.S. quagmire in post-Saddam Iraq. Second, the study will provide a theoretical perspective on why the two cases share such commonalities. Third, the study will explore the implications of the perspective to international politics, with a focus on the future of the U.S. hegemony. The study is based on the basic understanding that the developing world across regions today has continued to suffer the ongoing single macro-historical process consequent upon the breakdowns of empires as the once-predominant organizational mode of human societies. The analysis argues for the central importance of a stable national identity for modernization and development as well as freedom and democracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Imperialism, Nationalism, Military Intervention, and Modernization
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

12. The Middle East in Conflict: The Empires Strike Back

Author:
Dov S. Zakheim
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
ARI Movement
Abstract:
In consideration of the general instability in the Middle East – the bloody Syrian civil war and its mounting refugee crisis, the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the emergence of ISIL and ongoing fighting in Iraq, and the war in Yemen – the author argues that the geographical map of the region based on the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement is disintegrating. Furthermore, the author argues that the region’s turmoil has to some extent had a spillover effect on the three non-Arab states – Turkey, Iran, and Israel, which further adds troubles to the region. While Israel is largely an outlier, the author posits that Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia will be embroiled in the “increasingly bitter contest for dominance of the Muslim Middle East.”
Topic:
Civil War, Imperialism, Regional Cooperation, and Refugee Crisis
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Syria, and Egypt

13. Russia’s policy in the Middle East imperilled by the Syrian intervention

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
The military intervention launched by Russia in Syria in September 2015 has altered the character of this protracted civil war and – quite remarkably – has both advanced and jeopardised Russia’s positions in the Middle East. This risky experiment in power projection constitutes a continuation of traditional Russian policy in this rapidly transforming region, but is also a departure from the strategy of careful manoeuvring aimed at exploiting the confusion in U.S. and European policies. Quite possibly the main drivers for this proactive move were either domestic factors or issues related to the confrontation with the West caused by Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. The present analysis, however, deals only with the Middle Eastern contexts, aims and consequences of this enterprise.
Topic:
Civil War, Imperialism, Military Strategy, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Syria

14. Examining China’s Assertiveness through the Eyes of Chinese IR Scholars

Author:
Huiyun Feng and Kai He
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
Abstract:
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, China‟s diplomacy has moved towards a more confident or even assertive direction in international politics. Economically, the Chinese Premier refused to re-value the Chinese currency as the United States requested and instead started to lecture about U.S. economic mismanagement during the 2008 financial meltdown (Pomfret, 2010). Diplomatically, China responded furiously to Obama‟s decision of arms sales to Taiwan and meeting the Dalai Lama in early 2010, threatening to place sanctions on American companies. Politically, China reluctantly cooperated with Western countries, especially the United States, to punish either North Korean or Iranian provocations to the international order. Many other examples, from the Copenhagen Conference to the diplomatic standoffs between China and its neighbours, have also been listed as indications of China‟s assertive behaviour since 2008 (Swaine, 2010, 2011; Swaine and Fravel 2011; Perlez 2012; Ross 2012; He and Feng 2012). In particular, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis with the Philippines, the still on-going flare-ups with Japan on the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes, and the recently intensified tension with Vietnam in the South China Sea seemingly have further intensified regional concerns over China‟s rise. It is worth noting that some scholars have started to question the validity of the discourse regarding China‟s assertiveness in diplomacy. For example, through critically examining the “assertiveness” meme in the U.S. pundit and academic circles, Johnston questions: “How new and assertive is China‟s new assertiveness?” (Johnston, 2013). Although the extent and the nature of the assertiveness are still debatable, it is clear that China‟s foreign policy has shifted to a new direction, albeit temporarily. The goal of this paper is not to debate the temporal origins or intensity of China‟s assertiveness. Instead, it focuses on examining the perceptual roots of China‟s policy changes. As David Shambaugh (1991) points out, behaviour is principally a function of perception. In order to make sense of Chinese behaviour, we need to dig into the mindset of Chinese leaders. However, it is difficult to gauge what political leaders really perceive due to the political hierarchy and the complex nature of the decision-making process in any state system, especially China. In this research we examine Chinese leaders‟ perceptions and attitudes regarding Chinese foreign policy through the eyes of China‟s International Relations (IR) scholars. We use Chinese IR scholars as a “proxy measure” to make sense of Chinese leaders‟ perceptions because Chinese IR scholars serve as the mediator between the Chinese leadership and the general public (Shambaugh, 1991; Saunders, 2000). Based on an original opinion survey of Chinese IR scholars at the annual conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies (CCPSIS) in Beijing in July 2013, we empirically test the perceptual roots of Chinese scholars‟ preference for an assertive diplomacy. In particular, we examine two competing arguments about China‟s assertiveness. Some scholars suggest a “power perception” argument in which China‟s assertiveness is rooted in Chinese leaders‟ changing perceptions regarding its power status versus the United States. In other words, as the 1 United States and other Western countries were troubled by their economic downturn, Chinese leaders became overly confident with China‟s rise and thereby started to say “no” to the United States as well as show its “teeth” to its neighbours (Nye, 2010; Green, 2010). Others advocate a “policy reaction” argument, which attributes China‟s assertiveness to a nationalist reaction to unfriendly international forces, especially from the West, which threatened to block China‟s rise. Continuous economic growth also instigated the rise of nationalism in Chinese society, which in turn pushed the Chinese government to react to Western criticisms and “plots” with more fury and toughness (Carr, 2010; Small, 2010; Swaine, 2011; Ross, 2012). In other words, China‟s assertiveness in diplomacy grew from an intentional reaction to the strategic pressure from the United States and the outside world. There are three parts in the paper. First, we briefly introduce our original survey conducted in the summer of 2013. Second, we develop two hypotheses based on the current debate about China‟s assertive diplomacy and test them by using the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. We suggest that both the “power perception” and “policy reaction” arguments make sense in explaining China‟s assertiveness in diplomacy. However, our findings suggest that a more pessimistic perception regarding Chinese power is more likely to be associated with a preference for an assertive foreign policy. In other words, it is not a confident or an overly confident China but a lack of confidence instead, which is more likely to trigger an assertive foreign policy in China. In the conclusion section we discuss the implications of our findings for China‟s future international relations
Topic:
Diplomacy, Imperialism, International Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States, China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North Korea

15. Russia and the Arab Spring

Author:
Alexander Vysotsky
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
The Russian attitude to the Arab Spring—a mixture of skepticism, caution and mis-trust—was for a long time poorly understood outside the country. In the West, which initially saw in the Arab Spring the familiar battle between “democracy from below” and “dictatorship from above,” many accused Moscow of sympathizing with outdated au-thoritarian regimes, even facilitating their behavior, and of being incapable of keeping up with the times. Later, the situation changed. As democratic revolutions were replaced by civil con-flicts (some more peaceful, others more bloody, all exacerbated by ethnic or religious differences) Russia’s conservative position started to find support, both within the Mid-dle East and beyond. The breakthrough Russo-American agreement on Syrian chemical weapons opened the door to the Geneva II talks, bringing factions within Syria to the same talks table, and also helping regulate the Iranian nuclear issue. To understand the factors that shaped the Russian attitude to the Arab Spring, we need to review recent Russian history and how the situation has changed Russia’s bor-ders. In this article, we will attempt to circumscribe these factors, and offer insights into their true nature.
Topic:
Imperialism, Social Movement, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Arab Spring, and Protests
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

16. Return to Babel: The Race to Integration in the Southern Caucasus

Author:
Heidemaria Gurer
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
When talking or writing about the (Southern) Caucasus, I usually like to start by illustrating the diversity of its three countries when it comes to their cultural, linguistic, historical, economic and religious composition. This is due to the heavy migration in the region and the century-long influence of surrounding regional powers and to the fact that it is located in a strategic triangle between Iran, Russia and Turkey, with additional geopolitical interest coming from the European Union and the United States. There is a significant background of existing conflicts to take into account. For those who know the region this may seem redundant; however, for “newcomers” it is a good start in describing the (Southern) Caucasian Babel.
Topic:
Imperialism, Migration, Regional Cooperation, and Diversity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and South Caucasus

17. The Coming Turkish-Iranian Competition In

Author:
Sean Kane
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The two rising powers in the Middle East—Turkey and Iran—are neighbors to Iraq, its leading trading partners, and rapidly becoming the most influential external actors inside the country as the U.S. troop withdrawal proceeds. Although there is concern in Washington about bilateral cooperation between Turkey and Iran, their differing visions for the broader Middle East region are particularly evident in Iraq, where a renewal of the historical Ottoman-Persian rivalry in Mesopotamia is likely as the dominant American presence fades. Turkey aims for a robust Iraqi political process in which no single group dominates, sees a strong Iraq as contributing to both its own security and regional stability, and is actively investing in efforts to expand Iraqi oil and gas production to help meet its own energy needs and fulfill its goal of becoming the energy conduit from the Middle East to Europe. Iran prefers a passive neighbor with an explicitly sectarian political architecture that ensures friendly Shiite-led governments; sees a strong Iraq as an inherent obstacle to its own broader influence in the region and, in the nightmare scenario, once again possibly a direct conventional military threat; and looks askance at increased Iraqi hydrocarbon production as possible competition for its own oil exports. Baghdad meanwhile believes that it can become a leader in the Middle East but is still struggling to define an inclusive national identity and develop a foreign policy based on consensus. In its current fractured state, Iraq tends to invites external interference and is subsumed into the wider regional confrontation between the Sunni Arab defenders of the status quo and the “resistance axis” led by Shiite Iran. Turkey has an opening in Iraq because it is somewhat removed from this toxic Arab-Persian divide, welcomes a strong Iraq, and offers the Iraqi economy integration with international markets. Ankara could now allay Iraqi Shiite suspicions that it intends to act as a Sunni power in the country and not allow issues on which Turkish and Iraqi interests deviate to set the tone for their relationship. The U.S. conceptualization of an increased Turkish influence in Iraq as a balance to Iran's is limited and could undermine Turkey's core advantages by steering it towards a counterproductive sectarian approach. A more productive U.S. understanding is of Turkey as a regional power with the greatest alignment of interests in a strong, stable, and selfsufficient country that the Iraqis want and that the Obama administration has articulated as the goal of its Iraq policy. On the regional level, a strong and stable Iraq is a possible pivot for Turkish and Iranian ambitions, enabling Ankara and hindering Tehran. Washington may well have its differences with Turkey's new foreign policy of zero problems with its neighbors, but the Turkish blend of Islam, democracy, and soft power is a far more attractive regional template than the Iranian narrative of Islamic theocracy and hard power resistance. The United States should therefore continue to welcome increased Turkish-Iraqi economic, trade, and energy ties and where possible support their development as a key part of its post-2011 strategy for Iraq and the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Imperialism, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

18. Dashed Hopes: Continuation of the Gaza blockade

Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
on June 20, 2010, following concerted international pressure, the Government of Israel announced a set of measures to 'ease' its illegal blockade of the Gaza strip. This included: publishing a list of items not permitted into Gaza and allowing all other items to enter; expanding and accelerating the inflow of construction materials for international projects; expanding operations at the crossings and opening more crossings as more processing capacity becomes necessary and security conditions allow; streamlining entry/exit permits for medical and humanitarian reasons and for aid workers; Facilitating the movement of people in additional ways as conditions and security allow.
Topic:
Government, Imperialism, Terrorism, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, and Gaza

19. Five years of illegality: Time to dismantle the Wall and respect the rights of Palestinians

Author:
Valérie Féron
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
The Green Line: Term used following Israel's occupation of the West Bank and GazaStrip in 1967 to refer to the post-1948 war ceasefire line (Armistice Line of 1949). The demarcation line (laid down in the cease fire agreements of 1949) is the internationally recognised border between Israel and the occupied Palestinian Territory (Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jerusalem).
Topic:
Imperialism, International Law, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, Arabia, and Gaza

20. The Challenges of Israeli Military Action in Gaza

Author:
Jeffrey White
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
This PolicyWatch is the first in a two-part series examining the situation in Gaza as the December 19 expiration date of the Israeli-Hamas ceasefire approaches. The first focused on the challenges the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would face in undertaking any large-scale action; the second looks at the IDF's choices, and their implications, regarding the scope and duration of a potential incursion.
Topic:
Imperialism, Islam, and War
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel