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1. Peace and illicit drugs at the margins: A borderland view of Afghanistan’s SDG 16

Author:
Orzala Nemat
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
Abstract:
Afghanistan is in the process of developing its national goals and targets in relation to the global sustainable development goals (SDGs). There are 17 SDGs which have been broken down into a total of 169 targets. But how are these globally agreed goals being addressed in Afghanistan? In what ways do they specifically address the particular political challenges that Afghanistan faces, and the geographical divisions of the country? Drawing from long-term research on the drug economy and the more recent research of the Drugs & (dis)order project in three borderland provinces in Afghanistan – Badakhshan, Nangarhar and Nimroz – this briefing paper argues that the current A-SDG 16 fails both to identify the challenges that these borderlands pose to the achievement of SDG 16, and to recognise the opportunities that they might offer for peace building.
Topic:
Development, Borders, Drugs, Illegal Trade, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Middle East

2. Levant Illicit Tobacco 2019

Author:
Oxford Economics
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
This report provides an overview of the nature of illicit trade in cigarettes across three markets in the Levant region: Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. It establishes estimates of Illicit Consumption in each market and the impact it has on government tax revenue.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Finance, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan

3. The Sun Cannot be Hidden by Two fingers: Illicit Drugs and the Discussions on a Political Settlement in Afghanistan

Author:
David Mansfield
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
Abstract:
An issue largely ignored in the current debates on peace and reconciliation is that of illegal drugs production. Drawing on the authors long term research in Afghanistan the paper analyses the role that illicit drugs and the monies they generate play in the conflict. It should not be forgotten that illicit drugs production and trade is currently the largest single economic sector in Afghanistan. Opium poppy is the country’s most valuable cash crop worth US$863 million4 and employs more people than any other industry in Afghanistan, over 500,000 Full Time Equivalent. The crop occupied an estimated 263,000 hectares of land in 2018; three times more land than it did in 2000 when the Taliban imposed an outright ban. Conservative estimates suggest that opiates alone made up more than 10 percent of Gross Domestic Product in 2018 and that over US$ 40 million in taxes were earned by different armed groups along the value-chain. Given the economic and political importance of the illicit drugs economy in Afghanistan it is unwise to assume the problem away or look to resolve it with wishful and simplistic policy responses - or as the Afghan proverb says the sun cannot be hidden by two fingers.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Conflict, Peace, Drugs, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Middle East

4. Case Study: Fake Defense Contractor Indicted for Exporting Military Related Drawings to Turkey

Author:
Hanah Joudi and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On September 5, 2018, the owner of a New Jersey defense contracting firm, Ferdi Murat Gul, was indicted by a grand jury in the United States District Court in the District of New Jersey on charges of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, violating the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and conspiracy to violate the AECA. Gul, a Turkish citizen, is the principal owner, chief executive officer, and general manager of two U.S.-based businesses: an alleged defense contracting company, Bright Machinery Manufacturing Group Inc. (BMM), and an alleged manufacturing company, FMG Machinery Group (FMG), and also holds ownership interests in a manufacturing company in Turkey, HFMG Insaat (HFMG). From October 2010 to June 2015, BMM was awarded approximately $7 million in 346 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) contracts to manufacture military parts in the United States and provide them to DOD customers, such as the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. But according to the indictment, in reality, BMM was a front company set up with the purpose of defrauding the United States. The parts it manufactured included those “for torpedoes for the U.S. Navy, bomb ejector racks and armament utilized in U.S. Air Force aircraft, and firearms and mine clearance systems used by U.S. military personnel abroad.” Allegedly, Gul and two unnamed, un-indicted co-conspirators falsely claimed that BMM manufactured these parts in the United States. However, the indictment alleges that BMM illegally exported technical military drawings to manufacture the parts in Turkey, and then sold the parts – some of which had “design flaws and non-conformities and were unusable” – to U.S. customers.
Topic:
Crime, Illegal Trade, and Military Contractors
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

5. Strengthening the Counter-Illicit Nuclear Trade Regime in the Face of New Threats: A Two-Year Review of Proliferation Threats Associated with the Middle East

Author:
David Albright, Andrea Stricker, Sarah Burkhard, and Erica Wenig
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The United States’ and associated global export control regime is losing ground due to several global events and trends underway in the United States and the Middle East. The developments at home and abroad are reducing controls and oversight over the flow of commodities vital to the development of nuclear weapons. Unless these trends are reversed, U.S. efforts to stem and stop nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and elsewhere will weaken. Events contributing to this greater proliferation danger include: 1) relaxed U.S. export control regulations and greater emphasis on global trade with streamlined exchange of intellectual property and commodities, including nuclear commodities; 2) on-going questions over the strong regulation of sensitive trade to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs; and 3) the expected actions of additional states to obtain nuclear capabilities to counterbalance Iran. This report provides findings from four studies that were part of a two-year Institute for Science and International Security review which identified threats to the United States’ and interconnected global export control regime and actions to take now to mitigate damages. The review found that U.S. policy goals should include strong efforts to restrict the flow of sensitive technologies to the Middle East where proliferation and security concerns are currently high. This includes examining its own export control reforms and repairing new or ongoing deficiencies that contribute to the spread of sensitive military or other technologies. It should work to negotiate or otherwise impose the extension of limitations on Iran’s nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), since the legitimization of Iran’s advanced nuclear program exacerbates proliferation concerns. It should counter illicit nuclear and missile trade in the Middle East and elsewhere, which could support nuclear weapons development. The United States should affirm its strong defensive commitment to allies such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Egypt, while working against their development or import of advanced fuel cycle capabilities. The United States should also support the implementation of strong controls and transparency measures in the Middle East to ensure that burgeoning civilian nuclear programs remain peaceful, such as commitments not to enrich or reprocess, implementation of the Additional Protocol, and provision of secure, lifetime fuel supplies for nuclear reactors. It should monitor via national intelligence capabilities any concerning research or imports by Middle East nations that could signify proliferation intentions, and use all available diplomatic or coercive means to prevent additional nuclear proliferation. Finally, the United States and its allies should work to reduce Middle East security tensions and develop threat reduction efforts more broadly.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Middle East

6. Additional Taiwan-Based Element of Iranian Military Goods Procurement Network Exposed

Author:
David Albright, Andrea Stricker, David Schnur, and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On June 25, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas announced that Kunlin Hsieh (or Xia) of Taiwan pled guilty to conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws and transshipment of dual-use military equipment from the United States to Iran.1 The goods had uses in missile guidance systems, secure tactical radio communications, and military radar networks. According to court documents, between 2007 and 2014, Hsieh, a Taiwanese national and sales manager of JunBon Enterprises of Taiwan, along with his associate Agris Indricevs, who was charged in the same indictment, procured and brokered the purchase of U.S. goods and transshipped them to Iran. They also worked with Ryan Surrena, another employee of JunBon, who was charged in a separate indictment. Hsieh will face up to twenty years in prison at a sentencing hearing scheduled for September 25, 2015. Indricevs’ case was scheduled to go to trial on August 10, 2015. Surrena was arrested in Texas in 2013 and worked with U.S. officials to further their case. He pled guilty to reduced charges in July 2014 under a sealed plea agreement, which likely takes into consideration his believed assistance, and is due to face sentencing in October 2015. This network represents another element of an already known procurement network operating among entities in Taiwan and Iran and targeting goods made in the United States. The network sent U.S. dual-use military equipment to several companies owned by Mehrdad Foomanie in Iran, such as Sazgan Ertebat Co and Moravid Sanant Co, Ltd.2 Foomanie, who remains at large, was indicted by the Texas court in 2011. Another Taiwanese national operating in the United States, Susan Yip, was arrested and sentenced in Texas. ISIS documented the case of Yip and Foomanie here. Yip used her Taiwan based company Hivocal Technology Co to procure goods for Foomanie in Iran.3 She pled guilty in July 2012 to charges and was sentenced to two years in prison. It appears that U.S. officials gathered additional evidence for charges before seeking to indict the other participants in the network.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Military Spending, Trade, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, and Asia

7. Countering Nuclear Commodity Smuggling: A System of Systems

Author:
Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
A comprehensive Center for Nonproliferation Studies report calls on the United States and other concerned countries to adopt tighter controls to stem the flow of nuclear-related goods to Iran, North Korea, and other states of proliferation concern. Even modest improvements across the spectrum of today’s nuclear technology controls could greatly strengthen overall international efforts to constrain illicit nuclear procurement networks, the study found. The now available report, Countering Nuclear Commodity Smuggling: A System of Systems, was prepared by Leonard S. Spector and Egle Murauskaite. The study was supported by the US Department of Defense.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North Korea

8. Eyes Wide Shut: Counter-Narcotics in Transition

Author:
David Mansfield and Paul Fishstein
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
Abstract:
It is now clear that the production and trade of opiates will have a significant influence on not only the economic, political and security landscape, but even the physical terrain of post-Transition Afghanistan. Levels of opium poppy cultivation are already rising; estimated cultivated area rose by 18 percent in 2012 and is likely to rise significantly over the next few years. And this trend may intensify further as politico-military actors make deals and form coalitions in response to the 2014 handover of security responsibility from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
Topic:
NATO, International Cooperation, Drugs, Trade, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Middle East

9. Afghanistan’s Hidden Drug Problem: The Misuse of Psychotropics

Author:
David MacDonald
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, Afghanistan has gained notoriety as the world’s leading producer of opium and heroin. What is less well known is that, according to available evidence, the country itself also has an increasing number of problem drug users. Apart from dependency, addiction and other health-related problems, problem drug use can lead to a wide range of social, economic and legal problems that affect individuals, families and communities. It is not only the use of illicit substances that leads to problem drug use. It also results from the use of psychotropics — pharmaceutical drugs like painkillers and tranquillisers that have a psychoactive effect — in ways not recommended by a qualified doctor or the manufacturer.
Topic:
Drugs, Illegal Trade, Medicine, and Trade Deficit
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Middle East

10. Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan?

Author:
David Mansfield and Adam Pain
Publication Date:
10-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
Abstract:
This briefing paper examines what is needed to effectively pursue alternative livelihoods as a goal of counter-narcotics, and argues for conventional development interventions to be viewed through a counter-narcotics lens to establish how they impact on opium poppy cultivation.
Topic:
Agriculture, Drugs, Illegal Trade, and Farming
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Middle East