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31. The Uncertain Iraqi Election: The Need for a New U.S. Strategy

Author:
Anthony H Cordesman
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Iraqi election in May 2018 has both highlighted Iraq's political uncertainties and the security challenges the United States now faces in Iraq and the Middle East. What initially appeared to be a relative honest election gradually emerged to have involved massive potential fraud, and forced a manual recount of the results of a failed electronic voting system. Its results have cast Iraq's ability to form an effective post-ISIS government into serious doubt, along with its ability to carry our follow-up provincial and local elections in October. At the same time, even the initial results of the election raised serious concerns over the level of future U.S. confrontation with Iran. The United States faced grave uncertainties regarding Iran's influence in Iraq even when it seemed that Iraq's existing Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, was likely to win the election. The election's uncertain results, and U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA nuclear agreement, now virtually ensure that a far more intense struggle for influence will take place in Iraq and the rest of the region.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, ISIS, Election watch, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

32. The Lebanese Legislative Elections: Fragmentation and Polarization

Author:
Nayla Moussa
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
On 6 May 2018, Lebanon had its first legislative elections in nine years. But what was celebrated as a “victory for democracy” may have been merely a game of musical chairs between existing political actors. The elections may even be seen as a setback, with the return of major figures from the era under Syrian presence. For Lebanon, simply holding the elections – considered routine in most democracies – was seen as a victory. Parliament had extended its mandate three times since the last elections in 2009. Many obstacles had prevented the elections from taking place including the fragile security balance; the war in Syria and its polarization of Lebanese politics support for the Assad regime; the direct involvement of Hezbollah in Syria; and finally, a lack of consensus between major political parties and figures on a new electoral law. This last issue was the most crucial as the 2018 law emerged as a mix of elements designed to please all parties. Its key tenets were proportional representation and a division of electoral districts that satisfied most political actors. This paper explores the lessons learned from these elections and analyzes specific points such as the electoral law, political debate, and post-election perspectives.
Topic:
Religion, Social Movement, Elections, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Lebanon, Syria, and Beirut

33. From coup to constitution: The impact of Turkey’s attempted coup on the constitutional referendum – a series on Turkish constitutionalism, part 2

Author:
Mason Hill
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
This is the second in a three part series on Turkish constitutionalism one year after the 2017 constitutional referendum. At Erdoğan’s election in 2002, he appeared to be the latest in a line of populists elected to office. Initially, his success seemed the result of an ability as an Islamist to appease the concerns of the secular establishment. This was bolstered by his stated commitment to Turkey’s accession to the European Union. While in the 1990s Islamist reformers failed to pass institutional reforms aimed at decreasing military control of Turkish politics, the military allowed Erdoğan the space to pursue institutional reform that would enhance Turkey’s chances of becoming a member of the European Union. This attempt by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to reimagine Turkish democracy for the 21st century took the form of a general push for constitutional reform.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Law, Elections, Constitution, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Coup
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

34. Turkey’s constitutional referendum, one year later – a series on Turkish constitutionalism, part 3

Author:
Mason Hill
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
This is the third in a three part series on Turkish constitutionalism one year after the 2017 constitutional referendum. the 2017 Constitutional Referendum have only entrenched that reality. Erdogan’s dominance in Turkish politics should not obscure the fact that the individual office holder rather than an ideologically-grounded bloc is now the fulcrum upon which Turkish politics shifts. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) that came to power promising reform, religious pluralism and market-friendly economic policies has become a vehicle for Erdoğan’s personal ambition. After the Gezi Park protests and amid allegations of his son’s corruption, Erdogan became an increasingly polarizing personality in Turkish politics who weighed down the AKP brand in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Yet Erdoğan’s popularity returned during the pivotal moment of the 2016 coup attempt, when he appeared in a live interview with a reporter via Facetime. By the time 2017 referendum campaign, Erdoğan personally rather than AKP parliamentarians was the medium around which responses were polarized. The extension of Erdoğan’s personal control over the levers of power was particularly apparent in the referendum’s changes to the structure of the legislative and judicial branches of the Turkish government, granting legal justification to Erdoğan’s de facto force of personality regime. Developments over the past year have made clear that Turks are increasingly casting votes for and against candidates rather than parties.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, Constitution, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Coup
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Middle East

35. From deadlock to deadline: Iraq’s new government faces pressure to reform

Author:
James Aird
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Five months after Iraq’s May 2018 parliamentary elections, rival political blocs have broken deadlock and are set to form a new government. On October 2nd, the Iraqi parliament selected Barham Salih, a career politician from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), for the Iraqi presidency. Shortly after his election, Salih named Adil Abdul Mahdi, Iraq’s former oil minister, as prime minister. Iraqis and international observers applauded the selection of these politicians who have eschewed sectarian rhetoric as a victory for political compromise, but Salih and Abdul Mahdi face the challenge of answering popular calls for government reform after a summer marked by violent protests.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Politics, Water, Elections, Employment, Protests, and State
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

36. Iraq 2018 Elections: Between Sectarianism and the Nation

Author:
Isam al Khafaji
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The 12 May Iraqi elections – the fourth since the 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein – provided several surprises and contradictions for Iraq’s political landscape. Primary among them was the unprecedented objections to and questioning of the results as announced by the Independent High Electoral Commission – a central focus of this paper. Previous election cycles witnessed objections and complaints, yet none reached an extent that would damaging the clean bill issued by national and international organizations or the Federal Court’s validation of the results. Criticism of electoral transparency reached a point where the Council of Ministers was obliged to create a “higher security committee” to investigate accusations sent to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), and the United Nations representative in Iraq to send a letter calling on the IHEC to do a manual ballot counting of an arbitrary number of ballot boxes to ensure conformity with electronic ballot counting adopted for the first time this year. This multi-stage drama has reached the point where the Parliament decided, in an extraordinary session, to freeze the IHEC and assign a committee of nine judges to replace it, as well as to cancel the votes of internally displaced persons (approximately 3 million) and of Iraqis abroad (around 1.5 million). Therefore, any interpretation of the current election results must be cautioned with the knowledge that they are subject to change. The results most in question are from several predominantly Sunni governorates (such as Anbar and Salaheddin), Kurdish governorates (such as Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and Dohuk), or ethnically mixed regions (such as Kirkuk) – where Arabs, Turks, and Kurds are in multiple ongoing disputes. However, the final decisions taken with regards to these appeals will not change the overall results as there is no serious questioning of the accuracy of the results in predominantly Shia governorates, which constitute the majority of Iraq’s population. That most of Iraq’s post-2003 prominent political movements resorted to unprecedented election rigging in 2018 is a tacit acknowledgement of the loss of trust they incurred before massive sectors of their electorates, a trend that has been observed by many for quite some time. Similarly, the public’s loss of confidence in the political class is also manifest in the alarming decline in voting rates, despite the high stakes of this year’s elections. Out of 24.5 million Iraqis eligible to vote, less than 11 million (44.5%) voted. Participation rates in all previous elections – except for governorate council elections – exceeded 60%. This low turnout translates the frustration of many voters at the possibility of changing the political establishment, despite changes in the political parties’ formation and election lists. Contrary to previous elections, where forces of Shia political Islam led by the Islamic Dawa Party were guaranteed to win, the 2018 elections involved bitter conflict among different political visions, each with serious consequences regarding Iraq’s future, and the form of the state to be rebuilt after the destruction wrought by the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and the policies of previous governments. However, most voters saw the fierce electoral competition as merely a repetition of the same faces, stances, and policies.
Topic:
Islam, Elections, Geopolitics, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Baghdad, and Kurdistan

37. Budget Transparency for Democratic Governance at the Local Level

Author:
Emre Koyuncu
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
We are getting in the mood of the March 2019 local elections just as the general election has ended, and it looks as if the boat will be pushed out once again. Really, we do have a budget, right? At present, it remains an uncertainty how the central budget, our shared pool of resources, will be managed. Yet, we shall see how changes in the relations between the actors responsible for the tools, if not in the tools themselves, are reflected in practice. Hoping that they are at least transparent, we will examine budget transparency for democratic governance mainly through the lens of local government.
Topic:
Governance, Budget, Elections, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

38. ‘On the Deck of the Titanic’: Arab Politics in Israel and the 2019 Elections

Author:
Itamar Radai
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
“On the deck of the Titanic,” thus sailed the members of the Joint List of Arab parties on the eve of the 2015 Knesset (parliamentary) elections, according to senior journalist Wadea Awawdy.[1] Four years later, in light of the results of the 2019 elections, it seems that this prophecy has almost materialized, even though the ships have narrowly escaped the iceberg, at least for the time being. The Hadash-Taʿal list attained 193,293 votes, equivalent to six seats in the Knesset, while Raʿam-Balad barely crossed the electoral threshold of 3.25 percent with 143,863 votes, giving them four seats. Arab voters’ turnout declined to a historic low of about 50 percent, as opposed to the overall turnout of around 68 percent.[2] The sharp drop in Arab voter turnout led to Arab parties’ political representation declining from 13 seats in 2015 to 10. Israeli Hebrew-language media coverage explained this change in terms of Arab alienation and marginalization. However, the mainstream Hebrew media outlets tend to neglect the coverage of Arab politics, including the election campaigns,[3] hence ignoring at large an important internal factor: the collapse of the Joint List on the eve of the 2019 elections, and its implications. This article will focus on the rise and dramatic fall of the Joint List, and its repercussions.
Topic:
International Relations, International Affairs, and Elections
Political Geography:
Middle East

39. President el-Sisi's Second Term: The Challenge of Legitimacy

Author:
Ofir Winter and Khander Sawaed
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
As expected, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was reelected Egyptian president in late March 2018, this time, with 97.08 percent of the vote. More than affording an electoral mandate, the recent elections highlighted the incumbent president's challenge of legitimacy, which is reflected in two spheres. The first is the exacerbation of the internal splits within the ruling military establishment. The second is growing alienation between the ruling establishment and the general Egyptian public and civilian elements. The precarious state of the regime's legitimacy is a cause for regional and international concern. It may detract from the regime's ability to carry out the next stages of the economic reform sponsored by the International Monetary Fund, and will complicate efforts to obtain the cooperation in the war against terrorism by the local civilian population in the Sinai Peninsula. In the medium and long terms, the enhanced internal friction in the military and tension between the ruling establishment and civilian forces may jeopardize the country's stability. The legitimacy challenge also affects Egypt's relations with Israel. The regime needs broad public legitimacy in order to incur political risks, such as controversial decisions in favor of bilateral or regional cooperation with Israel. In addition, a regime with unsteady legitimacy might be tempted to adopt a populist anti-Israel line in order to strengthen its public standing. At the same time, the political situation in Egypt also provides an opportunity for increasing bilateral cooperation with Israel in areas contributing to the regime's legitimacy: the economy, security, energy, water, agriculture, and tourism.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Legitimacy, and IMF
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Israel, and Egypt

40. The Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon: Hezbollah’s Victory within the Political Status Quo

Author:
Eldad Shavit
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
In the May 6, 2018 elections in Lebanon, the Shia bloc led by Hezbollah succeeded in increasing its power in the parliament at the expense of Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri’s party. Nevertheless, due to the country’s electoral system, the political status quo achieved in December 2016 will likely be maintained. The process of forming the government will once again reignite the power battle between Hezbollah and Iran on the one hand and al-Hariri and his supporters in Saudi Arabia and in the international community, mainly France and the United States, on the other hand. The election results will encourage Hezbollah to continue to consolidate its power and its ability to wield influence in the Lebanese political arena. The drive to promote this objective may also act as a restraining factor in the organization’s conduct vis-à-vis Israel. Therefore, at the present time, Hezbollah will presumably opt to continue to use Syria as its preferred theater for action against Israel.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Elections, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon