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51. Ambiguous endings: Middle East regional security in the wake of the Arab Uprisings and the Syrian civil war

Author:
Helle Malmvig
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
The Middle East regional security order is under rapid transformation. The Arab Uprisings and the Syrian War are changing not only the relationship between state and societies, but also some of the region's core norms and historical divisions. This report analyses key changes in regional security order the Middle East in the period after 2010. It identifies five key issues where regional order is changing: State-society relations Relations with the West and foreign policy posturing The impact of the Iran-Syria –Hezbollah Axis (the Resistance Front) and radical-moderate divide The Sunni-Shia rift and the rise of identity politics The Saudi-Qatar rivaling, and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Civil War, Islam, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, Syria, and Qatar

52. Cooperation from Crisis? Regional Responses to Humanitarian Emergencies

Author:
Walter Kemp, Jérémie Labbé, and Lilianne Fan
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
As the situation in Syria continues to deteriorate, could the humanitarian crisis afflicting the country and its neighbors provide an entryway for regional cooperation? This policy paper examines how regional responses to humanitarian crises have succeeded or failed to meet humanitarian objectives in order to inform approaches to contemporary crises. It also assesses whether such regional responses contributed to strengthening regional integration and cooperation, paving the way for increased regional stability and an improved capacity to respond to emergencies. The report explores two different humanitarian crises: the war in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008. Examining the ways in which countries in each region and regional organizations addressed humanitarian needs, it draws a number of lessons that could be applied in contemporary crises: Regional ownership over the response is crucial, but not necessarily spontaneous. External actors can usefully contribute through a balanced mix of pressure and technical support. Preexisting regional organizations can provide a valuable institutional framework on which to build the response. An approach that focuses on the specific needs of the most vulnerable individuals can help to depoliticize discussions while strengthening trust among regional stakeholders. Complementary policy-level and expert-level processes can equip the response with both political commitment and regular working relationships for addressing tangible needs.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Humanitarian Aid, Islam, Regional Cooperation, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, Yugoslavia, Syria, and Myanmar

53. Somalia Redux? Assessing the New Somali Federal Government

Author:
Matt Bryden
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Somalia marked a milestone in September 2012 with the establishment of a new federal government that has since won the support and recognition of the international community. After more than 20 years of conflict, crisis, and statelessness and 12 years of ineffectual transitional authorities, the Somali federal government (SFG) has been widely welcomed as Somalia's first “post-transition” government. It has been greeted with such a groundswell of optimism that many observers, including British Prime Minister David Cameron, have drawn parallels with the “Arab Spring” that has transformed parts of the Middle East. It is tempting to imagine that Somalia is finally on the path to recovery.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Development, Islam, Fragile/Failed State, and Governance
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Arabia, and Somalia

54. The Free Syrian Army

Author:
Elizabeth O'Bagy
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
Fragmentation and disorganization have plagued Syria's armed opposition since peaceful protestors took up arms in December 2011 and began forming rebel groups under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army. A lack of unity has made cooperation and coordination difficult on the battlefield and has limited the effectiveness of rebel operations. Since the summer of 2012, rebel commanders on the ground in Syria have begun to coordinate tactically in order to plan operations and combine resources. This cooperation has facilitated many important offensives and rebels have taken control of the majority of the eastern portion of the country, overrunning their first provincial capital in March 2013 with the capture of al-Raqqa city. However, rebels have been unable to capitalize on these successes, and fighting has largely stalemated along current battle fronts particularly in the key areas of Aleppo, Homs and Damascus. In order to overcome the current military stalemate, the opposition needs to develop an operational level headquarters that can designate campaign priorities, task units to support priority missions, and resource these units with the proper equipment to execute their missions. Recently, the opposition has established a new national military structure that may grow to serve this purpose. On December 7, 2012, rebel leaders from across Syria announced the election of a new 30-member unified command structure called the Supreme Joint Military Command Council, known as the Supreme Military Command (SMC). The Supreme Military Command improves upon previous attempts at armed opposition unification through higher integration of disparate rebel groups and enhanced communication, which suggest that it could prove to be an enduring security institution. The SMC includes all of Syria's most important opposition field commanders, and its authority is based on the power and influence of these rebel leaders. Its legitimacy is derived from the bottomup, rather than top-down, and it has no institutional legitimacy apart from the legitimacy of the commanders associated with the council. Thus, the SMC is not structurally cohesive, and its ability to enforce command and control is dependent on the cooperation of each of its members. The incorporation of rebel networks has resulted in chains of command that are not uniform across the five fronts, with each sub-unit retaining their own unique authority structures. The SMC's primary function to date has been to serve as a platform for coordination. Regardless of the limits of its current command and control, the SMC has played an important role in syncing rebel operations with several notable successes. It has allowed for greater opportunities for collaboration and coordination among the disparate rebel groups operating in Syria. As the SMC develops its institutional capacity, its ability to assert greater authority will likely depend on its transactional legitimacy and its ability to distribute critical resources to rebel-held communities. To date, disparate sources of funding have significantly handicapped the rebels' ability to unite and consolidate authority on a national level. Although private sources of funding will likely continue outside the parameters of the SMC, uniting the support channels of rebels' main state sponsors will be fundamental to ensuring the legitimacy of the new organization. The ability to provide resources and material support to its sub-units is the determining factor in whether or not the SMC will be able to unite rebel forces under its command and establish a level of command and control. The SMC has the potential to serve as a check on radicalization and help to assert a moderate authority in Syria. If the SMC can create enough incentives for moderation it will likely be able to marginalize the most radical elements within its structure. To this end, the SMC has recognized the importance of the inclusion of some of the more radical forces, while still drawing a red line at the inclusion of forces that seek the destruction of a Syrian state, such as jihadist groups like Jabhat Nusra. Ultimately, even if the SMC only serves as a mechanism for greater cooperation and coordination, it is a significant development in that it has united the efforts of rebel commanders across Syria. It is the first attempt at unity that incorporates important commanders from all Syrian provinces and has enough legitimacy on the ground to even begin the process of building a structure capable of providing a national-level chain of command. Syria's state security apparatus will collapse as the Assad regime finishes its transformation into a militia-like entity. The Supreme Military Command is currently the only organization that could serve to fill the security vacuum left by this transformation. As the Syrian opposition begins to build a transitional government, the SMC could create a framework for rebuilding Syria's security and governing institutions if properly supported. The SMC's ability to act as a basis for a national defense institution will be an important component in filling the power vacuum left by Assad's fall and will aid in a secure and stable Syria. There remain a number of critical obstacles ahead for the SMC. They include the incorporation of existing command networks, which will have an impact on command and control and resource allocation; mitigating the strength of extremist groups; and managing disparate sources of financing. Overcoming these obstacles will be difficult, especially as the nature of the conflict transforms and the sectarian polarization makes it more challenging to create a strong military institution and professional armed force. Although the SMC must do its part internally to overcome these obstacles, its success will largely depend on greater international support and access to more resources. The goal behind U.S. support to the opposition should be to build a force on the ground that is committed to building a nonsectarian, stable Syria, with a government more likely to respect American interests. Working with the SMC could enhance America's position vis-à-vis Syria's armed opposition and provide a mechanism for stability should the Assad regime fall.
Topic:
Security, Civil War, Military Strategy, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

55. Making the Case: Dismissing the Major Critiques of Syria's Chemical Weapons Destruction

Author:
Mieke Eoyang, Ben Freeman, Aki Peritz, and Faris Alikhan
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Our deal with Russia to destroy Syrian chemical weapons (CW) is a huge win for the United States because it will help keep those arms out of the hands of terrorists. Nevertheless, skeptics claim: We can't trust the Russians or the Syrians—despite America's history of reaching arms reduction deals with the Soviets and the Russians; We can't eliminate CW during a civil war—despite our experience with CW destruction; We will pay too much to implement this plan—even though it is far less than what we would spend on strikes. So far, the skeptics are wrong. While the destruction of Syria's CW will be a challenge, it is one that we can and should meet.
Topic:
Civil War, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, International Security, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
America and Middle East

56. Post-Asad Syria: Opportunity or Quagmire?

Author:
Patrick Clawson
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
U.S. policy toward the continued rule of Syrian President Bashar al- Asad is partly based on the impact his rule has had in Syria. Asad's fall might not bring improvement for the Syrian people. But the argument that Asad, odious as he may be, provides stability now looks less and less convincing. Whether Asad stays or falls, the current Syrian unrest could have profound implications on the Middle East in at least four ways: the impact on Iran, Asad's closest strategic partner; the perception of the power of the United States and its allies; the stability of neighboring states; and the impact on Israel. The more Asad falls on hard times, the more Tehran has to scramble to prevent damage to its image with the “Arab street” and to its close ally, Lebanese Hizballah. Asad's overthrow is by no means assured, and U.S. instruments to advance that objective are limited. The U.S. Government decision to call for his overthrow seems to have rested on a judgment that the prospects for success were good and the payoff in the event of success would be high.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Civil War, Government, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Arabia, and Syria

57. When Domestic Factors Prevail Upon Foreign Ambitions: Russia\'s Strategic Game in Syria

Author:
Camilla Committeri
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Syrian crisis is dividing the international community like no other Arab uprising has done so far. While the United States and the European Union stand squarely against the Syrian regime, Russia remains a staunch defender of state sovereignty and the Al-Assad regime. There are three main factors that explain this position: Moscow's historical relations with Damascus; Russia's traditional opposition to US presence in the Middle East; and the surge in domestic opposition in Russia itself. This last factor, and the recent evolution of Russian domestic politics, is crucial to grasp Moscow's foreign policy towards Syria and the Middle East, a s well as towards the United States and Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil War, Bilateral Relations, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Middle East, Arabia, Moscow, and Syria

58. Europe and the Arab Revolutions. From a Weak to a Proactive Response to a Changing Neighborhood

Author:
Sally Khalifa Isaac
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG)
Abstract:
This research paper attempts to assess European responses to the Arab uprisings and, in particular, the introduced change in the EU policy towards its Southern Neighborhood. In specific terms, to what extent do security and strategic considerations still constitute the basis in the EU's “fundamental revision” of its policy in the Southern Neighborhood? And to what extent is the need to safeguard security and strategic interests undermining an authentic EU role in building deep democracy in the region? The presented analyses provide a profound scrutiny and assessment of the new version of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), an empirical evidence of persisting security considerations post-2011 in Euro-Arab relations, and a more elaborated vision of future Euro-Arab relations, attempting to balance between three considerations: security, democracy, and governance. The paper argues that the EU response to revolutionary events in the Arab region has been weak and that the new version of the ENP results hollow. Wide disagreements among European capitals on how to react to Arab uprisings, the sudden influx of illegal migrants and refugees, increased energy concerns, and the rise of political Islam, especially in radical forms, appears to be the key reasons behind this weak response. The study advocates that a proactive and agile EU role in the Arab region post-2011 should not be considered as derived from a moral stance. Rather, it is urgently required as it is in Europe's own interest. The historic events in the Arab region suggest that the EU should not merely revise its own ENP with the Southern Mediterranean. However, it should develop a comprehensive vision and an all-encompassing approach to the entire Arab region, from the West Mediterranean to the Gulf. Finally, this paper provides a number of policy recommendations, attempting to offer a frame for such a vision.
Topic:
Civil Society, Civil War, Development, Regime Change, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, and North Africa

59. The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations

Author:
Ahmet T. Kuru
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Insight Turkey
Institution:
SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
Abstract:
One may argue three law-like generalizations in political science: “no bourgeois, no democracy,” “democracies do not go to war with each other,” and “natural resources are a curse.” Although each of these highly contested arguments is important, the last one has the broadest impact—the negative effects of oil, natural gas, and mineral production go beyond authoritarianism and have economic, military, and societal consequences. Recently, some important publications have challenged the “resource curse” argument, creating doubts about these negative effects. In this regard, Michael Ross's book is an extremely timely work. It not only responds to these critiques but also provides a consistent set of explanations about oil and its effects on authoritarianism, patriarchy, inter-state and civil wars, and economic underdevelopment. Ross has already written path-breaking articles on these issues and this magnum opus brings together his previous contributions with updated data, revised arguments, and fresh perspectives. Unlike his earlier publications, Ross's analysis focuses on oil and natural gas, sometimes referring to both as only “oil,” and consistently leaves mineral production aside. His data show how the importance of oil will persist, if not increase, in the near future: “the global market for oil and other liquid fuels will rise from 86.1 million barrels a day in 2007 to 110 million barrel a day in 2035; the market for natural gas will rise from 108 to 156 trillion cubic feet” (p. 251).
Topic:
Civil War, Development, Economics, and Oil
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

60. The Moral Enigma of an Intervention in Syria: A Just War Analysis

Author:
Niamh Maria O'Sullivan
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Few issues in international politics have sparked more debate this year than the events unfolding in Syria. What began 17 months ago as peaceful marches seeking reform has brought Syria to the brink of a civil war that threatens to stop the Arab Spring dead in its tracks. As the death toll rises and accusations of crimes against humanity mount against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his ruling Ba'ath Party, many are calling for an armed intervention to put an end to the Assad regime's widespread human rights abuses. Finding the right way forward for Syria, however, is proving elusive and so we turn to philosophy and, in particular, to Just War theory for guidance. Though often criticized as a soft or unrealistic approach to foreign policy, principles like just cause and proportionality guide our way through the moral enigma that has confounded the international community since the uprising began. The answers are far from easy. As the battle for Syria rages on, the most ethical, and difficult, thing to do might just be to stay out.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Human Rights, and Regime Change
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, and Syria