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11. Yemen's Path Forward

Author:
Gerald Feierstein, Sama'a al-Hamdani, Timothy Lenderking, Bruce Abrams, Abdulrahman al-Eryani, and Latifa Jamel
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Three years into Yemen’s civil war, the country continues to see severe humanitarian devastation, widespread food insecurity, and lack of economic access, against the backdrop of an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. An intensification of fighting in Hodeidah and elsewhere in the country has added to the human costs of the conflict and threatens to become catastrophic. Increasingly, Yemenis are war-weary and anxious to see progress on the UN-led negotiating process intended to end the fighting and restore the peaceful transition interrupted three years ago. The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted a half-day conference to assess the priorities for ending the conflict and scenarios to move forward. This conference convened two panels and a keynote address to assess urgent priorities and potential pathways forward for Yemen.
Topic:
Security, Civil War, Reconstruction, Political stability, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

12. Endgame in Syria

Author:
Janko Bekić
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
After seven years the war in Syria is nearing its completion, even though the result will almost certainly not be a decisive victory by either side, but rather a frozen con�lict and unstable peace dictated by the regional and global powers embroiled in the con�lict. From a political scientist’s point of view, the most interesting feature of the war in Syria has been its gradual transformation from a failed revolution to oust president Bashar al-Assad and introduce democratic rule to a civil war between regime loyalists and a myriad of local as well as foreign islamist factions, and from there to a war on terrorism concentrated on eradicating Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s murderous and enslaving Islamic State. In its last phase, starting in late 2017, the war in Syria has mutated into a textbook example of proxy warfare in which the exhausted belligerents are fully dependent on their external sponsors and �ight mainly to accomplish geopolitical interests and goals of outside actors.
Topic:
Civil War, Terrorism, Conflict, and Repression
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

13. Squaring the Circle Connecting Current Operations to Policy Ambition in Syria

Author:
Melissa Dalton
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
2017 marked a significant shift in the two wars in Syria. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Coalition forces drove ISIS from its self-proclaimed caliphate capital in Raqqa, across northern Syria, and down the Euphrates River Valley. Meanwhile, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, backed by Russia and Iran, secured key population areas and strategic locations in the center and coast, and stretched to the eastern border to facilitate logistics and communications for Iranian-backed militias. In both wars, Syrian civilians have lost profoundly. They also have shown incredible resilience. Still, the outcome of both wars is inconclusive. Although major areas have been cleared of ISIS, SDF and Coalition forces are fighting the bitter remnants of ISIS in the Middle Euphrates River Valley. Enduring security in ISIS-cleared areas now depends on governance and restoration of services. Turkey’s intervention into Syrian Kurdish-controlled Afrin risks pulling the sympathetic Kurdish components of the SDF away from the counterterrorism and stabilization efforts in Syria’s east in order to fight Turkey, a U.S. ally. With a rumbling Sunni insurgency in pockets of Syria’s heartland, Assad and his supporters continue to pummel Eastern Ghouta outside Damascus and threaten Idlib. They are unleashing both conventional and chemical weapons on the remnants of Syrian opposition fighters and indiscriminately targeting civilians. The Trump administration now is attempting to connect the outcome of these two wars. The Obama administration tried similarly but ultimately prioritized the counter-ISIS mission. The drivers of the Syrian civil war and the ISIS war are rooted in the same problem: bad governance. Thus, a sensible resolution of both wars must address Syria’s governance. However, squaring U.S. policy goals with current operations and resources the United States has employed in Syria will require a degree of calibration, stitching together several lines of effort, and committing additional U.S. and international resources. Orchestrating this level of U.S. effort has proven elusive over the last six years.
Topic:
Civil War, Violent Extremism, ISIS, and Civilians
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

14. Developing a Containment Strategy in Syria

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Issue Some U.S. policymakers have argued that the United States should withdraw its military forces from Syria. But the United States has several interests in Syria: Balancing against Iran, including deterring Iranian forces and militias from pushing close to the Israeli border, disrupting Iranian lines of communication through Syria, preventing substantial military escalation between Israel and Iran, and weakening Shia proxy forces. Balancing against Russia, including deterring further Russian expansion in the Middle East from Syrian territory and raising the costs—including political costs—of Russian operations in Syria. Preventing a terrorist resurgence, including targeting Salafi-jihadist groups like the Islamic State and al Qaeda that threaten the United States and its allies. Our Recommendations: Based on U.S. interests in Syria, Washington should establish a containment strategy that includes the following components: Retain a small military and intelligence footprint that includes working with—and providing limited training, funding, and equipment to—groups in eastern, northern, and southern Syria, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Coordinate with regional allies such as Jordan and Israel to balance against Iran and Russia and to prevent the resurgence of Salafi-jihadists. Pressure outside states to end support to Salafi-jihadists, including Turkey and several Gulf states. As the war in Syria moves into its seventh year, U.S. policymakers have struggled to agree on a clear Syria strategy. Some U.S. policymakers have argued that the United States needs to withdraw its military forces from Syria. “I want to get out,” President Trump said of the United States’ military engagement in Syria. “I want to bring our troops back home.”1 Others have urged caution, warning that a precipitous withdrawal could contribute to a resurgence of terrorism or allow U.S. competitors like Iran and Russia—along with their proxies—to fill the vacuum.2 In addition, some administration officials have argued that the Islamic State has been decimated in Syria and Iraq. The National Security Strategy notes that “we crushed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorists on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq.”3 But between 5,000 and 12,000 Islamic State fighters remain in Syria and continue to conduct guerrilla attacks, along with between 40,000 and 70,000 Salafi-jihadist fighters in Syria overall.4
Topic:
Civil War, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

15. Don’t Give Up Yet: There’s Still a Chance to Salvage Eastern Syria

Author:
Melissa Dalton
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton assemble their own senior Middle East teams, a number of U.S. interests hang in the balance in Syria: the enduring defeat of ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Levant; the vulnerability of neighboring Iraq to extremist disruption; the return of Syrian refugees; the mitigation of Iranian influence; the need to both compete and cooperate with Russia to end the civil war; and the security of regional partners and allies. U.S. values are also at stake: the conflict has precipitated a humanitarian catastrophe of epic proportions, with over 500,000 civilians dead and 12 million displaced. The U.S. ability to shape high-level outcomes in Syria is limited. Russia and Iran have outmaneuvered the United States there. With their backing, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is extending his control throughout Syrian territory—most recently via an offensive on southwestern Syria, previously the site of a “de-escalation zone” agreed between the United States, Russia, and Jordan, precipitating immense civilian displacement. Assad’s consolidation of extremists in Idlib amongst civilians raises the specter of another slaughter like Aleppo in 2016. The UN-backed Geneva process is moribund, though still worth supporting, while the United States has limited influence in the Astana and Sochi processes, which are also demonstrating limited returns. More broadly, Assad is already also brutally shaping the facts on the ground regarding “reconstruction” through forcible movement of populations, demographic engineering, constricting property rights, and predatory governance that favors loyalists. In his meeting with President Putin, President Trump reportedly discussed Syria, although there was no official joint summary of the summit. The discussion may have included options for drawing down U.S. forces in Syria in exchange for Russia convincing Iran to minimize its presence in Syria. However, Russia lacks the will and leverage over Iran to fulfill such a bargain. The national picture is bleak. Zooming into the Syrian map more closely, one subnational enclave currently outside of Assad’s control has taken some steps towards stability. Eastern Syria still offers leverage to salvage a marginally but meaningfully better outcome for U.S. interests and the Syrian population. In the weeks ahead, the United States should: take stock of the sources of leverage in eastern Syria; articulate its goal for translating these sources of leverage into a defined political endstate; develop this stated goal into a broader stabilization operational framework; and then execute “the art of deal” in developing a burden-sharing plan to support these objectives.
Topic:
Civil War, Fragile/Failed State, Al Qaeda, Refugees, ISIS, and Displacement
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

16. Islamic Terrorism and the US Policy for the Resettlement of Syrian Refugees

Author:
Igor Henriques Sabino de Farlas, Alexandre Cesar Cunha Leite, and Andrea Maria Calazans Pacheo Pacifico
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
This article addresses the refusal of US policy, between 2016 and 2017, to resettle Syrian refugees from the Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011 and has forced millions of Syrians to migrate to neighboring countries or to the West. Thus, the hypothesis defended is that the terrorist attacks by Islamic radicals in the US contributed to the increase of prejudice and generalization regarding Arabs and Muslims and, therefore, the Syrian refugees would be conceived as probable threats to the national security. In order to verify this, we present a bibliographical review confirmed by some secondary descriptive data on the perception of the American society on the Syrian and Muslim refugees. The work of Said (1993) on Orientalism, as well as the writings of Huntington (1993, 1997) on the Clash of Civilizations, are used as theoretical reference. Finally, it is concluded that the US refusal to resettle Syrian refugees is mainly due to traumas related to Arabs and Muslims, as well as national security concerns, albeit unfounded.
Topic:
Civil War, Refugee Crisis, Militant Islam, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Syria

17. Russian Weapons in the Syrian Conflict

Author:
Douglas Barrie and Howard Gethin
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In September 2015, the Russian military, predominantly though not exclusively through the use of air power, intervened in Syria’s civil war. Moscow’s aim appears to have been to bolster the Bashar al-Assad regime with even a comparatively modest Russian force, to allow it to prevail against the disparate array for opposition forces reined against the Baath administration. As 2017 drew to a close this appeared to be paying off, with the Syrian regime in an increasingly strong position, and the Russian political and military leadership effectively proclaiming success and the end of substantive hostilities. Russia’s credibility as an ally has been enhanced in the region and beyond.
Topic:
Civil War, Imperialism, Military Strategy, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

18. Local Actors in the Syrian Coastal Area: Characteristics and Prospects

Author:
Alimar Lazkani
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
By monopolizing political, economic and social life in Syria, the Assad regime has barred the emergence and growth of independent, popular or influential local leaders and equated voicing reservations or being neutral towards its policies to opposition. With the outbreak of the revolution, the rules of loyalty to the regime have not changed for fear of reprisal or loss of opportunity. The opening of the market to large businesses have fed the ambitions of small entrepreneurs, making them more loyal. Neutrality and reservations have come from opponents who are waiting for the opportunity to organize, and from some cultural and artistic actors. This paper draws a rich map of the political, economic, cultural and religious elites of the Syrian coastal area and the extent to which they can become an actor able to build a national inclusive project for post-war Syria.
Topic:
Civil War, Social Movement, Revolution, and Dictatorship
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Damascus

19. Blessed Investors and Cursed Refugees: A Reading of Syrian Presence in Jordan

Author:
Hana Jaber
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
This paper addresses the dynamics generated, since 2011, by the influx of 673000 people who have fled the repression of the Syrian regime, and the deterioration of living and security conditions in Syria. By focusing on the new representation of Syrians in Jordan as situation deteriorated into a civil war, the study targets three main topics: 1) the rooted presence of Damascene presence in Transjordan, and its historical role in the Jordanian administration, polity, and economy; 2) the emergence of “Syrian refugees” as a new social category, stigmatized by public policies and discourses, that plays an significant role in the political and social equations of host countries; 3) the vital input of Syrian investors, skilled and/ or qualified people, and manpower, in transforming Syrian tragedy into dynamic opportunities that impacts positively both host and newcomer societies, these opportunities being meant to play an key role when the conflict in Syria will come to an end.
Topic:
Civil War, Refugee Issues, Immigration, and Repression
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, Jordan, and Damascus

20. Syrians in Turkey: Groupings, Fractures and a Floundering Civil Society

Author:
Sasha Al-Alou
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
This paper describes Syrian emigration to Turkey since 2011, and the forms of organization in which Syrian refugees have engaged. It provides figures on the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey inside and outside the camps and the places of their distribution in Turkey, by province. The paper also studies this distribution according to three factors: the nature of asylum (individual/group), the ethnic factors for the groupings, and investment associations. It examines the fissures in the relations between the Syrians in Turkey (based on the region, class, or profession within the Syrian institutions). In addition, it addresses forms of solidarity within Syrian communities in Turkey and inside Syria. These forms of solidarity are classified into three categories: economic, relief, and cultural and political. The paper concludes that the Syrian elite, with its various specializations, was not immune from the situation in Syria; rather the elite also continues to provide support within Syria, and looks forward to the post-conflict phase, in which it can participate in all aspects of reconstruction.
Topic:
Civil War, Immigration, Refugees, and Revolution
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Damascus