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101. The Assad Regime Winning by Inches?

Author:
Jeffrey White
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The regime's recent military successes are by no means sweeping, but its incremental gains in Aleppo and Damascus belie perceptions of stalemate and could shift the war's direction in its favor. The fighting in Syria is frequently described as either a stalemate or a war of attrition -- there are few dramatic movements and no decisive actions, even though both sides repeatedly declare that they are winning and the other side is losing. And some have suggested that there is "no military solution."
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Struggle, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

102. The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East

Author:
Marc Lynch
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Columbia University Press
Abstract:
Why did Tunisian protests following the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi lead to a massive wave of uprisings across the entire Arab world? Who participated in those protests, and what did they hope to achieve? Why did some leaders fall in the face of popular mobilization while others found ways to survive? And what have been the lasting results of the contentious politics of 2011 and 2012? The Arab uprisings pose stark challenges to the political science of the Middle East, which for decades had focused upon the resilience of entrenched authoritarianism, the relative weakness of civil society, and what seemed to be the largely contained diffusion of new norms and ideas through new information technologies. In this volume, leading scholars in the field take a sharp look at the causes, dynamics, and effects of the Arab uprisings. Compiled by one of the foremost experts on Middle East politics and society, The Arab Uprisings Explained offers a fresh rethinking of established theories and presents a new framework through which scholars and general readers can better grasp the fast-developing events remaking the region. These essays not only advance the study of political science in the Middle East but also integrate the subject seamlessly into the wider political science literature. Deeply committed to the study of this region and working out the kinks of the discipline, the contributors to this volume help scholars and policymakers across the world approach this unprecedented historical period smartly and effectively.
Topic:
Democratization, Political Economy, Insurgency, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa
Publication Identifier:
9780231158848
Publication Identifier Type:
ISBN

103. Reflections on the Arab Uprisings

Author:
Nathan Brown, Daniel Brumberg, Clement M. Henry, Vickie Langohr, and Ellen Lust
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:
'Tis the season to reflect upon the course of the Arab uprisings. Over the last few weeks I have participated in three major workshops including nearly 50 scholars – and had to miss yet another in favor of a quick trip to Tunisia. It is not difficult to understand this intense urge to take stock, given the sorry state of the region and catastrophic results of virtually every one of the 2011 uprisings. The overblown criticisms of the field of Middle East political science over its failure to predict the uprisings have been thoroughly aired by this point. But what about the field’s performance during the Arab uprisings? Academics have written an unprecedented amount of real-time analysis and commentary over the last few years. What did we miss, misinterpret, exaggerate or rush to premature judgments about along the way? The first of the workshops focused explicitly on this question. I asked a group of the authors from my edited volume The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East to write short memos assessing their contributions critically after having another year to reflect. Those memos have been published as POMEPS Studies 10 Reflections on the Arab Uprisings. Their auto-critique is full of worthy observations: We paid too much attention to the activists and not enough to the authoritarians; we understated the importance of identity politics; we assumed too quickly that successful popular uprisings would lead to a democratic transition; we under-estimated the key role of international and regional factors in domestic outcomes; we took for granted a second wave of uprisings, which thus far has yet to materialize; we under-stated the risk of state failure and over-stated the possibility of democratic consensus.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Arab Spring, and Identity
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

104. Faltering Authority: Sisi’s Rule in the Face of Polarisation

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Starting July 2013, Egypt began to experience unprecedented polarisation and civil strife. The country has not experienced this level of violence, arbitrary detention and even killing in recent history, and Field Marshal Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has responded by imposing an increasingly tightening security strategy. In the short term, this strategy will strengthen his opponents and increase his isolation – his policy of indiscriminate repression has widened the coalition of those opposed to his authority. The opposition, then, is no longer limited to the Muslim Brotherhood and now includes revolutionary youth groups as well as labourers, students and others. Furthermore, Sisi’s isolation of those who helped him overthrow Morsi has cost him political capital needed to extend his authority and isolate his opponents.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, Polarization, and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt

105. Saudi Arabia and the export of religious ideologies

Author:
Laurent Bonnefoy
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
Saudi Arabia's history since the mid-18th century has to a large extent been shaped by the relationship between the royal family, the Al Sa'ud, and religious clerics, in particular those from the Al al-Shaykh clan. This relationship has been structural and has played a central role in maintaining conservative religious policies inside the country. It has also been instrumental in legitimising the monarchy both at the national level and abroad. The fact that the two holiest sites of Islam (Mecca and Medina) are on Saudi soil has further strengthened the relationship that exists between the state and religious actors, the role that Islam plays in defining Saudi foreign policy, and the image of the country at the international level. This policy brief discusses the impact of this connection between state institutions and religion. It will first stress the diversity of the various ideologies and relationships that structure the politics-religion nexus in Saudi Arabia. In doing so it will stress the importance of not limiting one's understanding of this nexus to Wahhabism. It will then present the various instruments and mechanisms that contribute to the dissemination or export of religious ideologies beyond Saudi Arabia's borders. Finally, it will conclude by showing the extent to which Islam is one among many determinants of Saudi foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Middle East and Saudi Arabia

106. Maliki's Authoritarian Regime

Author:
Marisa Sullivan
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
Today, political and military power in Iraq is highly centralized in the Prime Minister Maliki's personal office. The national unity government that was formed in the wake of the 2010 parliamentary elections has given way to a de-facto majoritarian government in which Maliki has a monopoly on the institutions of the state. This will have important implications for the future of Iraq and the trajectory and durability of its democratic transition. Maliki is the dominant force over Iraq's conventional military forces, special operations units, intelligence apparatus, and civilian ministries. Maliki began his security consolidation not long after taking office in mid-2006. Maliki's security consolidation enables the prime minister to prevent any coup attempts, to aggressively target Sunni terrorist groups, and to check political rivals through the implicit or explicit threat of force. Since 2007, Maliki has used the creation of extra-constitutional security bodies to bypass the defense and interior ministries and create an informal chain of command that runs directly from his office to the commanders in the field, allowing him to exert direct influence over the both the targeting of individuals and the conduct of operations. Chief among these are the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC) and provincial-level operations commands. OCINC reports directly to the prime minister and is staffed by Maliki loyalists. The extra-constitutional body has no legal framework to govern its existence and therefore no accountability or oversight, yet it has significant powers and resources. Maliki has also attached Iraq's most elite units to his military office, and has used them for political purposes. Maliki relies on the operations commands to coordinate government responses to security challenges. He maintains direct control over these headquarters through OCINC and through the appointment of trusted commanders. The lack of oversight on military appointments has allowed Maliki to choose his preferred officers (nearly all Shi'a) to head the most significant command positions in Iraq—those of the Iraqi Army Divisions and Operations Commands. Maliki has appointed these senior military officers in acting capacities to bypass requisite parliamentary approval and oversight. The individuals who benefit from these appointments become, in turn, invested in Maliki's success and continuation as prime minister. After the 2010 election, Maliki greatly expanded his control over many of Iraq's civilian institutions, including the judiciary and independent bodies such as the elections commission, central bank, and the anti-corruption watchdog. Through his consolidation of power, Maliki has subverted the system of checks and balances that was intended in the Iraqi constitution. His growing influence over and limitations on supposedly independent institutions have tarnished the legitimacy and efficacy of these bodies, particularly the judiciary and the parliament. Politicization at the national level has effectively compromised the role of the judiciary as an independent check on the other branches of government. The judiciary has been an accomplice to the centralization of power by Prime Minister Maliki through a series of controversial rulings that have empowered the executive and restrained or removed his political rivals. Maliki has used his parliamentary allies and favorable judicial rulings to remove key personnel deemed obstacles to his control of Iraq's independent bodies, the most important of which are the Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC), the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), and the Integrity Commission. The prime minister has also used his influence over these bodies to check his political rivals and shield his political allies. Free and fair elections will be nearly impossible in the current political environment without an impartial and independent IHEC. Thus, Maliki's efforts to influence, if not control, IHEC are particularly concerning because it suggests his effort to subvert Iraq's electoral process. The Council of Representatives (CoR) has not been an effective check on executive authorities. The parliament's internal dysfunction, combined with Maliki's own efforts to undermine the body, has limited its oversight ability. Maliki has adopted a strategy meant to keep his parliamentary opposition fragmented and prevent the coalescing of a broad anti-Maliki bloc. This has proved largely successful, aided by the opposition's own internal divisions. Maliki's requests have prompted judicial rulings that have curbed the legislating and accountability powers of the parliament, namely by preventing the CoR from initiating legislation and limiting its ability to question ministers. Maliki uses his control over the security and civil institutions mentioned above in various ways to advance his interests. One objective is to dismantle Iraqiyya's senior leadership, while another is to expand his control over Iraq's financial institutions. Maliki has also used his control over the security forces and judiciary to defuse a federalism challenge from several Iraqi provinces. De-Ba'athification, along with accusations of terrorism and corruption, have become convenient political tools to discredit and even remove opponents. Maliki is not the only politician in Iraq to use these tools, but he has the most latitude in doing so on account of his growing executive authority. Maliki still faces some challenges to his power that he will likely have to face in the near future. The first stems from his rivalry with the Sadrists for political dominance among Iraqi Shi'a. The second comes from the growing Sunni discontent with the status quo. While the demonstrations have thus far remained largely peaceful, they have mobilized a significant number of Sunnis in opposition to the government, something that Maliki has sought to avoid. There is also the danger that Sunni discontent and the instability in Syria may translate into a resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Any security crackdown or further actions seen as disenfranchising the Sunni participation might actually exacerbate the drivers of instability that could fuel a regeneration of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Maliki will seek to keep the Sunni fragmented by alienating or removing leaders from rival political parties (such as Nujaifi, Issawi, and Allawi), while cultivating allied Sunni politicians and political groups. The promise of patronage that participation in the Maliki government affords is often a strong motivator for politicians. The upcoming provincial and parliamentary elections present an important political test for Maliki. If the status quo prevails in the coming months, Maliki will emerge from these next elections in a better political position. A strong electoral showing in the provinces would allow him to increase his number of seats in the parliament, to regain the premiership, and to make the parliament even more of a rubber stamp, ideally by installing amore pliable speaker to accelerate the move toward majoritarianism. The United States has largely stayed quiet on the issue of Maliki's consolidation. This silence gives the perception of consent, even if the United States harbors reservations about Maliki's authoritarian behaviors and intentions. U.S. engagement with Iraq in recent years has focused more on the need for preserving stability and providing Iraq with security assistance. Such assistance has ignored the political context that is helping to fuel security challenges and has only strengthened the hand of the prime minister, especially given Maliki's tight control of the security forces. Maliki—in his willingness to support the Assad regime in Syria and unwillingness to abide by U.S. sanctions on Iran—is pursuing a regional policy that is much closer to Iran's than that of the United States. The U.S. does retain leverage within Iraq, but it must use it more effectively. In light of these factors, the United States should reevaluate its relationship with Maliki and be more vocal in rejecting any actions that undermine the democratic process in Iraq. The United States should seek a better understanding of how power is exercised within the Iraqi state. Additionally, American officials should engage more broadly in the political sphere and not simply focus on security cooperation. Greater attention to the timing and means of engagement will also be necessary to break the perception of unwavering U.S. support for Maliki's actions. The United States and other international actors can play a vital role in enabling (or inhibiting) Iraq's exit from Chapter VII. A willingness to speed, slow, or stop weapons sales under the Foreign Military Sales program may also serve as a vehicle to exert influence. Supporting an authoritarian leader in the name of stability will have the opposite outcome and only exacerbate tensions and divisions within Iraq. Ultimately, the United States must recognize that stability in Iraq will only come through an inclusive, representative, and fair political system that protects the rights of all Iraqis—goals that run counter to Maliki's current aims, policies, and behaviors.
Topic:
Security, Armed Struggle, Governance, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Middle East

107. Iraq's Sunnis in Crisis

Author:
Stephen Wicken
Publication Date:
05-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The political participation of the Sunni Arab minority in Iraq is critical to the security and stability of the state. At present, they are functionally excluded from government, with those that do participate coopted by the increasingly authoritarian Shi'a Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Without effective political representation, the Sunni in Iraq are left with few alternatives to address their grievances against the Maliki government. The important decisions lie ahead on whether to pursue their goals via political compromise, federalism, or insurgency.
Topic:
Security, Islam, Insurgency, and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

108. Russia's Arab Spring Policy

Author:
Muharrem Erenler
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
BILGESAM (Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies)
Abstract:
One of the regions where Russia‟s interests are constant and historic is the Middle East, which has been being shaken by revolutions and insurgencies since January 2011. Being hesitant between supporting the desire of protestors to overthrow their long-ruling leaders and aligning with the stable authoritarian regimes of the Middle East, Russia has so far failed to adopt a consistent policy. Moreover, by following a low profile policy, Moscow seems indifferent to using the regimes changes as an opportunity to penetrate the region and revive its wading influence in the Middle East. Russia‟s inflexible foreign policy mentality, secondary importance of the Middle East in Russian foreign policy, perception of Arab Spring as a tool of outside powers, and the unrest it could arouse in motherland (as well as near abroad) could account for Moscow‟s reluctance to adopt a proactive role in reorganization of the Middle East.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, Geopolitics, Arab Spring, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Arab Countries

109. What Can Arab Countries Learn From Post-communist Transition?

Author:
Marek Dabrowski
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
More than a year has passed since the beginning of the political uprising against the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. But, as demonstrated by the recent dramatic developments in Syria, the process is far from over. Meanwhile nations which have already freed themselves from their authoritarian rulers (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen), must decide where to go and how to manage their political and economic changes. To a lesser extent, a similar challenge is being faced by those constitutional monarchies (like Morocco or Jordan) which accelerated reforms in order to avoid political destabilization. Many politicians and experts, especially those from Central and Eastern Europe, suggest their Arab colleagues learn from the experience of the postcommunist transition of the early 1990s. However, while learning from others is always a useful exercise, the geopolitical and socio-economic context of the Arab revolution seems to be different, in many respects, from that of former Soviet bloc countries more than twenty years ago.
Topic:
Development, Authoritarianism, Arab Spring, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Arab Countries

110. EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean. Cooperation against All Odds?

Author:
Vera van Hüllen
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG)
Abstract:
Focusing on the Euro-Mediterranean relations since the early 1990s, this paper investigates in how far the EU has been able to shape its relations with third countries according to its democracy promotion policy. The paper traces the evolution of the EU's provisions for democracy promotion and compares the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with seven (semi-)authoritarian regimes (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) since the early 1990s. A clear regional trend to more intensive cooperation lends credibility to the claim that the EU possesses a certain agenda setting power in international relations. A systematic comparison across countries and over time explores the explanatory power of interdependence, political liberalisation, and statehood for the remaining country variation. The paper finds that the degree of political liberalisation in target countries is the most important scope condition for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion and points to the need of further investigating (domestic) factors to account for the EU's differential 'normative power' in international relations.
Topic:
Democratization and Authoritarianism
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Arabia, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia