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61. Making the Case: Dismissing the Major Critiques of Syria's Chemical Weapons Destruction

Author:
Mieke Eoyang, Ben Freeman, Aki Peritz, and Faris Alikhan
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Our deal with Russia to destroy Syrian chemical weapons (CW) is a huge win for the United States because it will help keep those arms out of the hands of terrorists. Nevertheless, skeptics claim: We can't trust the Russians or the Syrians—despite America's history of reaching arms reduction deals with the Soviets and the Russians; We can't eliminate CW during a civil war—despite our experience with CW destruction; We will pay too much to implement this plan—even though it is far less than what we would spend on strikes. So far, the skeptics are wrong. While the destruction of Syria's CW will be a challenge, it is one that we can and should meet.
Topic:
Civil War, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, International Security, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
America and Middle East

62. Beyond Spillover: Syria's Role in Lebanon's Drift Toward Political Violence

Author:
Faysal Itani and Sarah Grebowkski
Publication Date:
07-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
To describe the increase in violence and instability in Lebanon since the civil war in Syria began as simply a spillover is misleading. it risks casting Lebanon as a victim to negative externalities divorced from its own political dysfunction. in truth, Lebanon's troubles long preceded the war in Syria, and the conflict's more complex and pernicious effect on Lebanon has been the exposure and deepening of pre-existing rifts among Lebanese.
Topic:
Political Violence, Human Rights, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Refugee Issues
Political Geography:
Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

63. Syria's War Threatens Lebanon's Fragile Economy

Author:
Faysal Itani
Publication Date:
07-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The Syrian civil war is accelerating Lebanon's political and institutional decline and poses a serious long-term threat to its economy. Lebanon has largely been spared the political upheavals of the Arab Spring, its fractious political system is intact, and the weakness of its central government means there is no authoritarian order to revolt against. However, Lebanon's own political dysfunction, the regional powers' stakes in Lebanese politics, and their anxieties over the geopolitical challenges that the Arab uprisings pose magnify the economic dangers of Syria's disintegration.
Topic:
Economics and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

64. NATO and the Arab League: The Importance of Being Earnest

Author:
Mona El-Kouedi
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
With the situation in Syria continuing to deteriorate and a death tally of more than 70,000, the Arab League (AL) reached out to representatives of the Syrian opposition. Arab leaders offered the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) the seat of Syria in the AL's 24th Summit in Doha, which took place on 26 March 2013. In his address on that occasion, SNC leader Moaz Al-Khatib asked the US and NATO to extend "the umbrella of the Patriot missiles to cover the Syrian North". Al-Khatib added: "We are still waiting for a decision from NATO to protect people's lives, not to fight but to protect lives". NATO was quick in responding to Al-Khatib, but gave him the answer that he least wanted to hear. The Alliance's Secretary General Andres Fogh Rasmussen confirmed: "(W)e have no plans to change the purpose of, and coverage of the deployed Patriot missiles".
Topic:
Security and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, and Syria

65. How to Stop Doing Business with Russia's Arm Exporter

Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Human Rights First
Abstract:
As part of the United States plan to begin military withdrawals from Afghanistan in 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) contracted with the Russian state owned arms dealer, Rosoboronexport, to provide helicopters to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). DOD has continued and expanded its purchases from Rosoboronexport even while acknowledging that the Russian arms dealer has enabled mass atrocities by supplying Syria's Bashar al-Assad with weapons that have been used to murder Syrian civilians.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, Human Rights, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Asia

66. The Geopolitics of the Sunni-Shi'i Divide in the Middle East

Author:
Samuel Helfont
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
In 2006, during the heart of the Global War on Terrorism, a New York Times reporter went to Washington in an attempt to ascertain the extent that American officials understood the ideologies underpinning Islamist terrorism. The reporter began with a simple question: could senior counterterrorism officials identify which groups were Sunnis and which were Shi'is? Remarkably senior officials and lawmakers – including the Chief of the F.B.I.‟s national security branch, and members of the U.S. House of Representatives‟ committees on intelligence and counter terrorism – had “no clue” whether actors such as Iran, Hezbollah, or al-Qaida were Sunnis or Shi„is. A number of questions emerged from this encounter. First, who are the Sunnis and Shi„is? Second, where are they located? And, finally, does it matter?
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Islam, Religion, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Counterinsurgency, and Sectarianism
Political Geography:
Middle East

67. Whack-a-Mole or Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan

Author:
Austin Long
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
War is fundamentally a clash of organizations. Organizations provide the vital mechanisms that mobilize and convert resources into combat power as well as applying that combat power against the enemy. This is true not only of conventional militaries, but also of insurgent and terrorist groups. Organizational capacity is thus a crucial determinant of success in conflict. Stephen Biddle, for example, attributes heavy causal weight for success in modern conventional military conflict to the relative capacity of military organizations to employ a set of techniques he terms “the modern system.” Philip Selznick argues that organization is equally crucial for success in political combat, where subversion of other organizations is as important as brute force.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

68. Middle East Security Report : Syria's Armed Opposition

Author:
Joseph Holliday
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The rebels will have to rely on external lines of supply to replenish their arms and ammunition if they are to continue eroding the regime's control. The emergence of al-Qaeda-linked terrorist cells working against the regime poses risks to the United States and a challenge to those calling for material support of the armed opposition. As the militias continue to face overwhelming regime firepower the likelihood of their radicalization may increase. Moreover, the indigenous rebels may turn to al-Qaeda for high-end weaponry and spectacular tactics as the regime's escalation leaves the rebels with no proportionate response, as occurred in Iraq in 2005-2006. Developing relations with armed opposition leaders and recognizing specific rebel organizations may help to deter this dangerous trend. It is imperative that the United States distinguish between the expatriate political opposition and the armed opposition against the Assad regime on the ground in Syria. American objectives in Syria are to hasten the fall of the Assad regime; to contain the regional spillover generated by the ongoing conflict; and to gain influence over the state and armed forces that emerge in Assad's wake. Therefore, the United States must consider developing relations with critical elements of Syria's armed opposition movement in order to achieve shared objectives, and to manage the consequences should the Assad regime fall or the conflict protract.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, United States, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Germany, and Syria

69. Syria's Political Opposition

Author:
Elizabeth O'Bagy
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
Policymakers must identify and understand Syria's political opposition, both in exile and on the ground, in order to develop a clear vision of their aims and a better strategy for support. Any successful U.S. policy in Syria should focus on constructing a viable alternative to Assad's government. This report provides detailed information on the diverse groupings of the Syrian political opposition in order to inform the international community's response to the conflict. It distinguishes between the expatriate political opposition and the grassroots protest movement operating on the ground in Syria. Policymakers must come to the understanding that they may not get the chance to sit across the table from a single opposition party, but rather will have to work directly with the nascent political-military structures that have formed at a local level. The key to creating an effective national opposition lies in connecting the established national coalitions with the grassroots political movement. The most well-known and widely recognized established political opposition coalition is the Syrian National Council (SNC ). The SNC is based in Istanbul and functions as a loosely-aligned umbrella organization comprised of seven different blocs: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Damascus Declaration, the National Bloc, the Local Coordination Committee (as representatives of the grassroots movement), the Kurdish Bloc, the Assyrian Bloc, and Independents. The SNC has not meaningfully engaged with local opposition forces, and is losing credibility and influence within Syria as the conflict grows more militarized. The other significant established political opposition coalition is the National Coordination Committee (NCC ). The NCC is based in Damascus and favors a negotiated political settlement and dialogue with the regime. This stance has made the NCC less popular amongst the grassroots opposition movement. The grassroots movement functions at a local and regional level through coordination between the local coordinating committees and revolutionary councils. This movement has become tactically adept, better organized, and more cohesive, developing nascent political structures. The local coordinating committees, called the tansiqiyyat, form the base unit of organization. As the movement has grown, urban centers have developed oversight councils called the revolutionary councils to manage the committees within specific districts. The revolutionary councils are the main organizational structure for the grassroots political opposition. They manage the activities of the tansiqiyyat, organize protests, and coordinate with the armed opposition. The Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC) is the largest grassroots coalition. It represents roughly seventy percent of the revolutionary councils and the majority of the local coordinating committees. armed opposition cooperates with the grassroots political opposition and a number of insurgent groups have shown a willingness to work under the guidance of the revolutionary councils. The lack of secure communications equipment has hindered the grassroots opposition's ability to coordinate above the local level because the government retains the overwhelming capacity to monitor, track and suppress greater organization at a national level. The established political coalitions such as the SNC have articulated a national vision for a post-Assad future and have received nominal support from the international community, yet they lack strong networks and popular legitimacy inside Syria. On the other hand, the grassroots political opposition has gained the support of the people, but it lacks a national vision and united front as the basis for international support. The United States must consider adopting a bottom-up strategy that provides better support to the grassroots movement operating within Syria. This entails developing better relations with critical elements of the grassroots movement and working with key individuals who have deep networks of supporters within Syria but also maintain ties to the SNC or the NCC . A bottom-up strategy would provide an avenue for U.S. support that incorporates both national and local opposition groups and encourages the emergence of a legitimate national political leadership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Armed Struggle, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Syria

70. Syria's Maturing Insurgency

Author:
Joseph Holliday
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
This report examines the increasing effectiveness of Syria's armed opposition, explains how responsible provincial-level military structures have emerged, and considers how uncoordinated external support could compound existing fractures within the opposition.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Security, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, Bilateral Relations, and Border Control
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria