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4391. From Tenet to Powell: Assessing a Policy in Flux

Author:
Robert Satloff
Publication Date:
06-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
With Secretary of State Colin Powell's trip to the Middle East this week, following on Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon's visit to Washington, U.S. diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli arena will reach its most intensive level since the advent of the Bush administration. The rationale for this heightened diplomacy is, in the words of President Bush's spokesman, "to help secure efforts to preserve the ceasefire and to build upon it, to build to a greater peace in the Middle East, and try to get all the parties to continue to do their part to secure the Mitchell committee recommendations." Given that there is little ceasefire to "preserve," it is unclear whether — on a larger scale — the Bush administration has fully internalized the profound impact that the post-Camp David intifada has had on the prospects for "building a greater peace."
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States and Middle East

4392. Special Policy Forum Report: Challenges Facing Israel Abroad and At Home

Author:
Avraham Burg
Publication Date:
06-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Avraham Burg, Speaker of the Israeli Knesset and a leading candidate in the upcoming September 4 primary for Labor Party chairman, addressed The Washington Institute's Policy Forum on June 19, 2001. The following is a rapporteur's summary of his remarks. Despite the violence and terror of the past months, 60 percent of Israelis are still ready to make painful compromises in order to achieve peace-if they see that they have a viable partner. The Israelis have already decided that in order to live in peace they will need to make a compromise with their history. The kind of restrained leadership Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has shown since the formation of this government indicates that the message of painful compromises for real peace is the policy of the State of Israel. Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Yasir Arafat has not yet come to the same point. He is not yet ready to make a compromise with his own Palestinian or Islamic history in order to live respectfully in peace alongside Israel. It will be virtually impossible to restart negotiations without understanding what happened in the negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. Only knowing what occurred will allow the parties to avoid the mistakes of the past — and there were real mistakes on both sides. Abba Eban once said that the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity, and the Palestinians have lived up to this expectation. They did not understand the greatness of the moment that Camp David presented and therefore approached the talks with a negative, aggressive, and violent energy-which quickly replaced the dynamic of the past six to eight years. To understand what this means, consider how Arafat reacted to Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount last September. Arafat had two options: he could have greeted Sharon, showing his people and the world that the PA would guarantee freedom of access and of worship, and therefore could be counted on to provide all the benefits of peace; or he could exploit the visit in order to ignite the region. Arafat chose the second option.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Israel

4393. Special Policy Forum Report: Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority: Impressions from a Regional Tour

Author:
Robert Satloff and David Brooks
Publication Date:
06-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
At Camp David/Taba, the Palestinians left the Israeli bride at the altar, so to speak, by turning down the agreement. Regional actors have responded differently. Some Arab leaders, especially Egyptians, are in denial, arguing that former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak's proposals are still valid and that the peace process is still salvageable. Many Arabs blame the failure of Camp David/Taba on the "arrangements" — technical problems, miscommunication, or poor timing of proposals that caused the talks to fizzle. If only these problems were fixed, they argue, an agreement could be worked out.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arabia, and Jordan

4394. The Mitchell Commission Report: Many Problems, Few Solutions

Author:
David Schenker
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
This morning, the text of the long-awaited Mitchell Commission Report, an account of the past seven months of Israeli-Palestinian violence written by a five-member committee headed by former Senate majority leader George Mitchell, was made publicly available. Conceived as a "committee of fact finding" at the October 17, 2000 Sharm al Shaykh conference, its stated goal was to answer "What happened," "why it happened," and how the "recurrence of violence [could] be prevented."
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arabia

4395. The Saudi Fatwah Against Suicide Terrorism

Author:
Reuven Paz
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On April 21, the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz bin Abdallah Aal al-Shaykh, said that Islam forbids suicide terrorist attacks. This has raised a storm of criticism from supporters of the Palestinian intifada against Israel. However, the mufti may have been thinking more about Osama bin Ladin than recent Palestinian actions.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arab Countries, and Saudi Arabia

4396. The State Department's Annual Terrorism Report: Politics As Usual

Author:
David Schenker
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On April 30, the Department of State issued its comprehensive annual report Patterns of Global Terrorism, describing incidents and trends in international terrorism in the year 2000. This year's report covers the first three months of accelerated Palestinian-Israeli violence. It is also marks the first time the Bush administration State Department has been compelled to publicly comment on the nature of Lebanese Hizballah attacks against Israel in the post-withdrawal era.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Politics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arab Countries

4397. Special Soref Symposium Report: Israel's Search for Security and Peace

Author:
Limor Livnat
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
" . . . The political road that brought us to the crossroads we are now at was one replete with navigational errors, steering miscalculations, and poor vision, traveled by fatigue-driven guides driving under the influence of reckless idealism and senseless naïveté . . . On February 6 of this year, the people of Israel made it eminently clear that they know it, and have left the road that led from Oslo to chaos and bloodshed in their homes and on their streets. The best of Israel's political pundits could not have imagined that Ariel Sharon would ever be elected prime minister of Israel, let alone with a plurality unprecedented in democratic nations. But they did not understand the people of Israel, and probably still don't. It was the most potent statement imaginable in favor of a new road and a more promising future."
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Security
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Middle East, Israel, and Arab Countries

4398. Iran: More Fuel on the Israeli-Palestinian Fire

Author:
Reuven Paz
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The last two days have witnessed "The International Conference on the Palestinian Intifada" in Tehran. The conference was a major step in Iran's drive to accelerate terrorist attacks on Israel. Delegates to the conference came from thirty-four countries, including Syrian vice president Muhammad Zahir Mosahareqa, Lebanese National Assembly Speaker Nabih Berri, and representatives from many parliaments (e.g., Irish Senator Mick Lanigan). Palestinian participants included Palestinian Authority (PA) minister in charge of Jerusalem affairs Faisal Husseini and Palestinian National Council head Salim Za'noun (Abu Adib), one of the founding generation of Fatah and for many years the main link between Yasir Arafat and Islamic fundamentalist circles.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Tehran, Palestine, Arab Countries, and Syria

4399. Special Policy Forum Report: Palestinian Attitudes During the Bush/Sharon Era

Author:
Khalil Shikaki
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Among the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, there are three perspectives as to why violent confrontations began in September: The Camp David II negotiations uncovered underlying differences in Israeli and Palestinian interests that are simply unbridgeable. Recent confrontations are basically the product of these differences. In this scenario, no return to negotiations is going to improve the situation. The current situation reflects domestic political constraints in both societies. Weak leaders, populations that are not prepared for the compromises needed for a final settlement, coalition politics, and questions of legitimacy are working against a solution. In this scenario, a permanent settlement is possible but certainly not easy. The two negotiating teams could have wrapped up the talks if they had had more time; indeed, they came very close to a compromise at Taba in January. According to this scenario, a matter of procedural difficulty — a miscalculation, misperception, or simply a lack of time — probably impeded the finalization of an agreement at Taba, while violence was still flaring in the territories. Most Palestinians are of the second school of thought. They did not believe that a deal was imminent at Camp David II or at Taba. Indeed, the belief that a comprehensive deal is imminent has eroded over time. Yet most Palestinians continue to hope that strong leaders in Israel and among the Palestinians can make essential compromises. Recently, a prominent perception among the Palestinian public was that Israel's weak government initiated the violence after Camp David II because Israel wanted the Palestinians to accept something that they had rejected. This perception, plus the heavy causalities and the collective punishment sustained over the past few months, has helped to radicalize Palestinian society.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Arab Countries

4400. Special Policy Forum Report: The Brink of Peace? And Inside Look from Camp David to Taba

Author:
Gilead Sher
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Yasir Arafat is responsible for the collapse of the peace process and for the extreme violence of the last seven months. In the year and a half of negotiations with the Palestinians under the leadership of former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, the objective was a permanent peace settlement: Israel would withdraw from a large part of the occupied territories, and, in return, there would be an official end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The intention was to fashion an alternative to occupation, since this situation was not only untenable, but was also a strategic burden to Israel. Arafat, however, would only accept an agreement in which all of his demands were met; failing this, he would and did resort to imposing an arrangement through violent confrontation. Consequently, the peace process collapsed. Arafat was never ready — mentally, personally, or historically, at Camp David or afterwards — to conclude a deal; he is a leader of a national movement and not a statesman.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arab Countries