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211. The Realignment of the Middle East

Author:
Lior Sternfeld
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
In the Middle East, reality can change in the blink of an eye. Misconceptions and misrepresentations that dominate the public discourse have it that the region has been embroiled in war since time immemorial. Still, even its most recognizable conflict—the Israel-Palestine dispute—has been going on for only a century. This report will not focus on the history of that conflict but instead will try to analyze the realignment of the key players in the region and beyond and point out several pathways to build on in securing peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the sole global superpower. The change in world politics and the demise of the Soviet Union did not end the perception of alliances as zero-sum games. The War on Terror, the debacle of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of movements such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the Arab Spring, and the collapse of old state structures, somehow fortified this approach over a more nuanced and pragmatic approach. Since the early 1990s, China entered as a secondary force and slowly gained a different status. This report examines the changes the Chinese doctrine might bring to the geopolitics in the region. Furthermore, it will examine the role China has played in the reshaping of the Middle East as a multipolar region, the transformation in the American role, and identify areas where the United States can take advantage of the new multipolarity in the region in light of Chinese activity.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, and Realignment
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and United States of America

212. The Nuclear Iran “Concept” Is Already Here: Time Is Short to Prevent Israel’s—and America’s—Next Calamitous Intelligence Failure

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Groupthink and unchallenged false assumptions about enemy capabilities and decision-making led to the disasters of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 2023 Hamas-led terrorist invasion of Israel. The lessons of these failures demand that Israel’s political and military leadership and their American counterparts immediately reconsider their assumptions about the Iranian nuclear threat to avoid an even costlier miscalculation.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, October 7, and 1973 War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

213. How the War in Ukraine Shapes Iran’s Strategic Gains and Ambitions

Author:
Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Russia-Ukraine War has strengthened military-industrial ties between Moscow and Tehran. Most concerning is their deepening collaboration in dual-use technologies and disruptive weapons systems. Moscow has provided technical assistance to Tehran in key areas, including its space program, which can help the Islamic Republic develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. Moreover, Iran’s interest in Russian anti-stealth radars and air-superiority fighters is worrying. Russia’s extensive use of Iranian-supplied drones has allowed the Iranian defense technological and industrial base to advance its drone warfare systems, collect large amounts of operational data, and improve its loitering munitions designs and production. A Russian victory in Ukraine would likely accelerate such cooperation, given the two countries’ geopolitical ambitions, among other factors. So far, the Islamic Republic has been the winner of the Russia-Ukraine War. Below are some key highlights from this policy memo: The Russian military’s reliance on using munitions from Iran to exhaust Ukraine’s combat capabilities has provided Tehran with unprecedented opportunities. In the absence of adequate deterrents in place, Iran has already become a combat drone supplier to the world’s second-largest arms exporter, the Russian Federation, turning the Islamic Republic into a menacing threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the alliance’s eastern and southern fronts. Open-source intelligence tracks a meaningful rise in the Russian military’s use of Iran-supplied Shahed baseline loitering munitions, indicating that the joint Russo-Iranian drone plant in Tatarstan, Russia, is capable of producing scores of kamikaze drones annually at low cost. Such facilities can soon mushroom across the Russian Federation. With Tehran demonstrating growing control over its airspace while the country moves closer to obtaining military-grade nuclear capabilities, Russia can help the Islamic Republic make its airspace more dangerous than ever. A combination of anti-stealth radar, the Su-35 air-superiority fighter squadrons protected by underground basing, and a large number of layered strategic air defenses can prove lethal even against fifth-generation, stealth combat aircraft. Accordingly, the Western intelligence community should remain vigilant over any cooperation between Moscow and Tehran involving anti-stealth radars and space program assets, keeping in mind that the latter can easily translate into intercontinental ballistic missiles. Finally, Iran is now investing in infrastructure within Russia—including dredging the Volga River and establishing shipping companies in the port city of Astrakhan—allowing the two countries to further expand the strategic route across the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

214. Empowering Local Authorities to Lead Economic Development in Yemen

Author:
Ali Al-Lakmah and Rafat Al-Akhali
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This policy brief outlines a set of recommendations aimed at empowering local authorities in Yemen to effectively provide services and lead local economic development. The aim is to analyze and draw lessons from three ongoing tracks that seek to empower local authorities in Yemen, while also addressing the challenges and opportunities associated with these efforts. The analysis concludes that building consensus between the central government and local authorities is of paramount importance for the successful empowerment of local authorities. It is imperative to address political concerns and achieve a minimum level of political consensus in order for these efforts to move forward. Furthermore, it is crucial to overcome challenges related to financing, enhance transparency and accountability, and build local capacity. The Development Champions Forum therefore recommends the importance of establishing clear and precise guiding principles for the distribution of powers and authorities between the center and local authorities. It also emphasizes leveraging the potential of the private sector to drive economic growth, create job opportunities, provide services, and invest in local communities. Lastly, it encourages partnerships between international organizations, donors, and local authorities towards empowering local authorities in providing services and local economic development.
Topic:
Governance, Accountability, Transparency, Economic Development, Private Sector, Empowerment, and Consensus
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

215. The Yemen Annual Review 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) dominated Yemeni politics over the last year. The negotiations began as backchannel discussions in October 2022 after the Houthis resisted UN pressure to renew a truce first agreed in April 2022 by making a series of eleventh-hour demands. The talks continued despite Houthi attacks on oil terminals in southern Yemen in late 2022 that effectively put the internationally recognized government under a form of economic blockade. As the months progressed, the government’s increasingly dire economic situation pressured it to accept the Saudi policy of seeking a settlement with Houthi authorities, seemingly at almost any price. The broad terms of a Saudi-Houthi agreement first became public in January, when international media reported that Saudi Arabia had agreed in principle to pay outstanding civil servant salaries in Houthi-run areas, including those of military and security personnel, and to remove restrictions on entry points, including the ports of Hudaydah and Sana’a airport. In return, Saudi Arabia wanted guarantees that there would be no more attacks on its territory and the creation of a buffer zone along the border, an end to the Houthi blockade of southern ports and the siege of Taiz, and for direct Yemeni-Yemeni talks to follow any deal. Within a few months, these proposals had morphed into a comprehensive roadmap for peace involving a six-month ceasefire, to be followed by three months of government-Houthi discussions on managing a transitional phase of two years, during which a final resolution of the conflict would be negotiated. A prisoner swap in April arranged by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Switzerland saw around 973 people released, including high-profile figures, and seemed to augur rapid progress. But Saudi Arabia appeared to overplay its hand when Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al-Jaber led a delegation on a much-feted trip to Sana’a in April. The Houthis again raised their demands, arguing that an agreement must be signed first with Riyadh alone as a party to the conflict, and that Saudi Arabia should agree to pay compensation for war damage and finance postwar reconstruction. Al-Jaber left Sana’a without an agreement, but the basic terms of a formal de-escalation and path toward a resolution of the conflict were nevertheless laid down. Saudi Arabia’s problem now was how to manage resistance from the government’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Ultimately, it was kept in the dark about the details of the proposed arrangement for most of the year, even its chairman Rashad al-Alimi, who was expected to sign off at the end of the process. A Houthi delegation met Saudi officials during a hajj pilgrimage trip in June – posing for photos with Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman – sending the signal that a formal agreement normalizing Saudi-Houthi ties and initiating a Yemeni-Yemeni peace process had become a question not of if, but when. A complication that emerged early on was US reservations about a peace deal following the Saudi-Iran rapprochement brokered by China in March. This seemed to mark China’s arrival as a diplomatic player in the region, putting the Americans on notice that another global superpower was interested in challenging its role in the Middle East, including, perhaps, in Yemen. There was an irony here, in that rising criticism of Saudi Arabia’s conduct during the war in the US Congress, and threats to halt arms sales, played a role in bringing the Saudi leadership around the idea of getting out of Yemen and ending a foreign military adventure that had damaged its global standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Investment, Houthis, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

216. The Yemen Review Quarterly: January-March 2024

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Yemen’s political and economic situation worsened in the first months of the year as the impacts of the Red Sea crisis, which began in November, began to manifest themselves. Peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) were effectively placed on hold, and the United States broadened its response to the Houthi attacks, launching strikes alongside the UK against Houthi targets inside Yemen and designating the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group (SDGT), which came into effect on February 16. The designation could impact not only Houthi military and economic activities but also risks a further stranglehold on international humanitarian work in Houthi-run territories, as banks and exchange firms stop dealing with Sana’a-based entities. In late March, Houthi authorities issued a 100-rial coin to replace dilapidated notes, escalating the economic warfare between the two rival central banks. Denouncing the move as illegal, the Aden central bank branch prohibited the coins’ circulation, but the real fear is that this is a trial balloon for a series of currency roll-outs that will end with Sana’a printing its own banknotes, possibly with foreign help, as rebel authorities did in Libya in 2019. Prime Minister Maeen Abdelmalek Saeed finally stepped down, succeeded by Foreign Minister Ahmed Awadh bin Mubarak on February 5. Yemen’s ambassador in Riyadh, Shaya al-Zindani, was belatedly appointed to the vacant foreign minister post on March 26. Neither man is popular with the PLC. Combined with the government’s strained finances, this could hamper their effectiveness. Houthi attacks on foreign shipping and US-UK attacks continued more or less unabated, causing in one case the sinking of a ship carrying fertilizer and diesel fuel. US-UK airstrikes have killed at least 37 on the Houthi side, and reportedly some Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers. After talks with Omani officials in Muscat in early April, the US Yemen envoy appeared to hold out hope of a resolution, suggesting the sanctions would be lifted if the attacks stopped – as tensions rose again between Iran and Israel, with possible implications for Yemen. Tensions also rose on frontlines inside Yemen as Houthi and government-aligned forces reinforced their military presence in several areas, including Hudaydah and Marib. The US-UK strikes also heightened the repressive atmosphere in Sana’a and elsewhere, as Houthi authorities cracked down in areas near mobile launch sites and introduced a new law against support for Israel that is already being used as another cudgel to crush dissent. Al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch announced the loss of its leader Khaled Batarfi in March, who died after several months of illness. He was replaced by Saad al-Awlaqi, a senior Yemeni figure with strong tribal ties in Shabwa who is popular among younger members of the group but whose ties with Iran-based Saif al-Adel, the de facto leader of the global organization, appear to be tense. Al-Qaeda also lost Saif al-Adel’s son, known as Ibn al-Madani, reportedly as a result of a fire in the place where he was staying in Marib, and the group’s lead drone expert Khaled al-Sana’ani also died in an apparent traffic incident – incidents that have raised speculation of possible internal skulduggery as Al-Awlaqi settles into his new role.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Politics, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

217. The Yemen Review Quarterly: April-June 2024

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Houthi intelligence arrested dozens of local and international aid workers and UN and non-government organization (NGO) staff in early June, alleging they were part of a US-Israeli conspiracy to undermine Yemeni society. The detainees were paraded on television and forced to give scripted confessions. The Houthis seem to have targeted monitoring and evaluation workers, perhaps to better control information on the economic and humanitarian situation. While the group continues to enjoy public support for its Red Sea attacks, pressure has been mounting over unpaid salaries, a deteriorating economic situation, and new banking restrictions. The detentions likely serve both to intimidate and to afford leverage vis-à-vis international institutions: a week before the arrests, 44 people were sentenced to death on similar charges of espionage.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Economy, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

218. The Yemen Review Quarterly: July-September 2024

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
On July 19, a Houthi drone reached Tel Aviv, killing one person and wounding ten, the first time the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) has inflicted casualties in an attack against Israel. Israel responded the next day with airstrikes on the port of Hudaydah, destroying infrastructure and fuel stores and killing six workers. Dozens of others were hospitalized with severe burns. The Houthis unsuccessfully targeted Tel Aviv again on September 15, and Israel undertook further airstrikes on port and power facilities in Hudaydah governorate two weeks later, killing four and injuring 40. There is concern that the strikes will interrupt the flow of humanitarian aid through Hudaydah and that the loss of fuel reserves could lead to shortages in Houthi-held areas.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Natural Disasters, Economy, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Red Sea

219. Beyond proxies: Iran’s deeper strategy in Syria and Lebanon

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi and Julien Barnes-Dacey
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The war in Gaza is pushing the shadow conflict between Iran and Israel out into the open. There is a grave risk that this escalates further in Lebanon and Syria – where Iran wields powerful influence – and spirals into a full-blown regional war. The intensifying conflict in Syria and Lebanon is the result of Israel’s escalating response since Hamas’s attacks on 7 October and Iran’s “forward-defence” strategy, which aims to confront potential threats before they come close to Iranian borders. Iran’s strategy is underpinned by a decades-long effort to embed its influence in Lebanon and Syria. Western governments will not find this easy to dislodge, and an intensified coercive strategy to push Iran out of the Levant would likely be counterproductive. But Iran’s focus on preserving its influence and deterrence capability – which trumps its ideological commitment to supporting Palestinians and fighting Israel – offers opportunities to prevent a wider war. Europeans should now focus on de-escalating tensions in Lebanon and Syria; increasing conditional support for actors in both countries to advance local stabilisation goals; and intensifying their backing for structural reform that can slowly dilute Iran’s dominance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transnational Actors, Regional Power, and October 7
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria

220. Value for money: Why and how Europeans should support the failing economies of Egypt and Tunisia

Author:
Anthony Dworkin, Camille Lons, and Tarek Megerisi
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The economies of Egypt and Tunisia are characterised by weak private sectors, insiderism, and the dominance of key constituencies that maintain regime leaders in power. The severe weaknesses of these economies have provoked recurrent crises and cause hardship for their populations, which threatens social and political instability as well as greater migration towards Europe. The EU wants to ensure that the financial assistance it provides contributes to promoting fundamental reform. But Egyptian and Tunisian leaders have resisted policy change for political and ideological reasons, relying in part on support from Gulf countries. Europeans need to ground their economic assistance in a better understanding of political dynamics and regional trends to ensure that they gain the greatest possible influence for the funding they provide. Europeans should adopt more achievable, more targeted policy requests for economic and financial reforms in each country, and work as closely as possible with Gulf partners, which are already making greater demands of Cairo and Tunis in return for the support they give.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Migration, Foreign Aid, and Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, North Africa, Egypt, and Tunisia