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121. "A Capital City Will Always Be a Capital City”: Konya’s Rise Under the AKP’s Rule

Author:
Elisa Domingues dos Santos, Jules Liaud, and Dorothee Schmid
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
While the May 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections looked as a difficult test for the flagging Islamo-conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP), they eventually held on to power, demonstrating their remarkable foothold in the Turkish context. The party notably recorded one of its highest scores in Konya, confirming the massive and uninterrupted support of this two-million inhabitants central Anatolian city for Turkish political Islam. The phenomenon can be explained by the benefits that Konya has derived from its relationship with the Islamic movement for several decades. Long marginalized in a provincial space, little connected to Western Turkey’s centers of power, Konya, renowned for its history and religious heritage, became an “Anatolian tiger” under the AKP rule. The province’s economic development started from an agricultural base (Turkey’s cereal granary) enabling the emergence of a local agro-industry. It was driven by dynamic small and medium-sized enterprises, combining conservative values with entrepreneurial efficiency. Forging close ties with the AKP, Konya has benefited from territorial development policies that facilitated its rapid opening to the world. Thanks to its Anatolian identity, central geography, diversity of human flows and capacity to project its economic dynamism into increasingly distant markets (like Africa), Konya has become a showcase for the paradoxical modernity of the new Turkey.
Topic:
Elections, Entrepreneurship, Domestic Politics, and AKP
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Konya

122. Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Turkey has an energy dependence problem. For the past two decades, Ankara’s energy needs have been on the rise, and they are projected to continue on an upward trajectory until at least 2035. Yet, the country is not endowed with the proven natural resources to support its energy needs, and so it imports almost all of the energy it consumes. This reliance on energy imports creates economic and security constraints for Ankara. On the economic front, strategic decisions to diversify Turkey’s energy market impact the direction and pace of the country’s economic development. On the security front, dependence on foreign energy exposes Turkey to external shocks and creates vulnerabilities that affect the country’s international posture. To Turkish policymakers, this is hardly breaking news. For many decades, successive governments have been considering ways to diversify the country’s energy portfolio with the objective of ensuring access to affordable, reliable energy supplies. Domestically, this goal has translated into continued investments in locally produced power, such as the development of natural gas fields under the Black Sea and the opening of nuclear and coal-fired power plants across the country. Externally, the aim of diversification has led Ankara to forge a wide range of international partnerships and preserve relations with both Western purchasers of Turkish exports and key energy providers, including Russia and countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. What is more, Ankara pursues its energy diplomacy against the backdrop of a broader geopolitical strategy of bolstering Turkey’s status as a regional power based on its geographic position and connections. At the heart of this strategy is a grand plan to establish Turkey as a major natural gas hub that will put the country at the center of regional energy trade. This policy has ramifications for Ankara’s relations with its close and more distant neighbors. Turkey is surrounded by energy-rich countries, and one of its primary objectives when reaching out to them is to secure the conditions for a steady inflow of energy resources—typically, natural gas and oil. This objective can lead to the development of durable economic partnerships, such as with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran; but it can also spark conflicts of different degrees of intensity, such as with Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors and Iraq. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Ankara’s gas diplomacy is consequential for relations with Russia—with which Turkey has been strengthening its energy relations beyond hydrocarbons—and with Europe. On the demand side of Ankara’s natural gas market equation, European countries are thirsty for non-Russian hydrocarbons in the short and medium term and for green energy in the longer term. Turkey has the potential to provide both, as long as it comes up with strong policies that support these energy transitions. To do so, the Turkish government will need to shift its approaches not only to energy but also to geopolitics. Ankara will have to present itself as a reliable energy partner for Europe and ramp up its investment in clean energy technologies. Delinking Turkey’s economic development from its dependence on hydrocarbons will benefit Ankara financially while bringing it closer to its European allies. Building a long-lasting energy partnership with Europe remains one of Turkey’s greatest challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Egypt

123. Iraq’s Development Road: Geopolitics, Rentierism, and Border Connectivity

Author:
Harith Hasan
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Iraq’s Development Road project aims to create an Iraqi transborder transportation network connecting the Persian Gulf with Türkiye. This network would enhance Iraq’s geopolitical status as a trade corridor and provide financial returns, reducing the state’s reliance on hydrocarbons. However, the project faces obstacles, including challenges of financing and implementation, widespread corruption, the potential for insecurity and instability in Iraq, and the fact that rival transborder projects in the region mean countries may work against its success.
Topic:
Reform, Economy, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

124. Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The structure of international politics is changing in ways that are not fully appreciated in Washington. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. No single emerging power will have an impact tantamount to China’s, but they will have a significant impact collectively due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified in this report as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Nearly all have voiced concerns about Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine, even as they criticized Moscow’s invasion. Almost none would line up with the United States in a confrontation with China. Instead, they are likely to pursue highly self-interested foreign policies. Washington should expect that they will increasingly challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own agendas on the global stage. The emerging powers’ statecrafts are shaped in large part by their drive for economic security. But their geographies, different preferences for world order, domestic politics, and defense relationships also play a role. Concerns about the strength of democracy in other countries, which has played an animating role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, are a lower priority for them, no matter how democratic they are. It will be a mistake for the United States to frame its relations with these emerging powers primarily as part of a competition for influence with China and Russia, however tempting it may be to do so. These powers are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Most will resist any efforts to bring them into a U.S.-led camp as in the Cold War. Trying to make them do so would also risk strategic overreach by embroiling the United States too deeply in the emerging powers’ domestic politics or by expending its resources in pursuit of building ties that never materialize. A better approach for the United States would be to focus on negotiating interest-based deals with emerging powers while cordoning off areas of disagreement. These might include tailored market access and investment agreements, agreements on technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, efforts to combat deforestation, efforts to build public health infrastructure, and infrastructure investments. It would be wasteful of the United States to offer these countries security guarantees, but in some cases providing security assistance can serve its interests. Washington should accept that most of these countries will maintain close diplomatic, economic, and sometimes security relationships with China and probably Russia. Over the longer term, it will serve U.S. interests to strengthen the sovereignty of emerging powers when possible and cost-effective to do so. This will provide a bulwark against the undue expansion of China’s power and influence and help ensure that, even if they do not side with the United States, they are not drawn closely into the orbit of its major geopolitical competitors. Strengthening emerging powers’ sovereignty will also help boost their development as constructive powers with a stake in sustaining a peaceful world order conducive to global economic growth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

125. Update: US and UK Strikes on Yemen Escalate Tensions

Author:
Luca Nevola
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
On 12 January, United States and United Kingdom air forces claimed to have carried out strikes on over 60 Houthi targets at 16 locations in Yemen. The operation was supported by Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands, members of the naval task force Operation Prosperity Guardian. The spokesperson of the Houthi military forces acknowledged the attack, mentioning that 73 raids targeted the capital Sanaa and the governorates of al-Hudayda, Taizz, Hajja, and Saada, resulting in five fighters dead and six injured. The multi-national operation sought to eliminate Houthi strategic infrastructure, thereby diminishing the Houthis’ offensive capabilities, and to retaliate following the group’s 9 January direct attack on US warships. However, it is unlikely that the strikes completely eradicated Houthi military capacity to target objectives in the Red Sea.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Infrastructure
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

126. US Student Pro-Palestine Demonstrations Remain Overwhelmingly Peaceful | ACLED Brief

Author:
Bianca Ho and Kieran Doyle
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Student protests calling for divestment from Israel on university campuses around the United States are the latest sign of public discontent with the Israel-Palestine conflict. Some notable violent clashes have recently taken place, such as on the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) campus, where demonstrators and counter-demonstrators fought at a student encampment overnight on 30 April. However, between 7 October and 3 May, the overwhelming majority of student demonstrations — 97% — have remained peaceful. Demonstrations involving students now make up more than 40% of all US demonstration activity related to the conflict since it reignited in October 2023. Over 94% of the more than 1,360 student demonstrations held between 7 October 2023 and 3 May 2024 have shown support for Palestine.
Topic:
Political Movements, Students, Demonstrations, Divestment, and Universities
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, North America, and United States of America

127. Emile Bustani Middle East Seminar: Gaza: ‘Can Anyone Hear Us?’

Author:
Sara Roy
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The Emile Bustani Middle East Seminar: “Gaza: ‘Can Anyone Hear Us?’" Dr. Sara Roy, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University
Topic:
Human Rights and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

128. Is There Hope for Gaza Under International Law?

Author:
Abigail Flynn
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Why has international law failed to hold Israel responsible for its destruction of Gaza? It was built to enable the colonizer, not to protect the colonized, explains legal expert Jason Beckett.
Topic:
Genocide, International Law, United Nations, International Court of Justice (ICJ), Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

129. The EU’s Response to the Gaza War Is a Tale of Contradiction and Division

Author:
Martin Konečný
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Since the Hamas attacks on October 7 and the start of Israel’s retaliatory offensive in the Gaza Strip, European Union (EU) member states have broadly split into three camps. At one end are those who have professed to stand “on the side of Israel”, flying its flag on government buildings, backing its military campaign, and avoiding criticism even after the Israeli army flattened most of Gaza and killed thousands of Palestinian civilians. The Czech Republic, Austria, and Hungary stand out in this camp, followed by Germany. At the other end of the spectrum are governments that proclaim to stand “on the side of peace” and, while strongly condemning Hamas, have been calling for a ceasefire and openly criticizing Israel for violating international humanitarian law. Belgium, Spain, and Ireland are the most vocal members of this moderate camp, followed by France and several others. The third, middle camp, is made up of those who are somewhere in between the first two groups: siding with Israel but in less absolute terms than the first camp. It would be wrong to label the moderate camp as “pro-Palestinian”. The fact is that there is no pro-Palestinian camp at the level of EU governments: none of them has hoisted Palestinian flags or primarily condemned the Israeli occupation or its devastating Gaza offensive, as many countries in the so-called Global South have done. The only vocal exception may be Spain’s Deputy Prime Minister Yolanda Díaz of the leftwing Sumar party who has denounced “Israeli apartheid” and called for sanctions and an arms embargo against Israel. However, her statements do not represent the position of the government as a whole.
Topic:
European Union, Hamas, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

130. A Palestinian Gandhi or an Israeli de Gaulle? Why the Context of Violence Matters

Author:
Sharif Elmusa
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Questioning why there hasn’t been a Palestinian Gandhi or Mandela ignores the history and context in which Palestinian resistance occurs, especially the abiding violence visited on the Palestinians since 1917
Topic:
Colonialism, Violence, BDS, Mahmoud Abbas, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, Nelson Mandela, and Charles de Gaulle
Political Geography:
Middle East, India, Israel, South Africa, Palestine, and West Bank