Number of results to display per page
Search Results
62. The Union for the Mediterranean Ten Years After Its Foundation - How to Overcome the Frustrated Ambitions
- Author:
- Inès Abdel Razek and Claudia Del Prado Sartorius
- Publication Date:
- 02-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Fundación Alternativas
- Abstract:
- It is a busy diplomatic period among the Heads of State and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Union and the Mediterranean countries. On the 24 and 25 February 2019, the EU and the League of Arab States (LAS) are set to hold their very first Euro-Arab Summit at the level of heads of state. The two regional blocks are meant to focus on “stability” and “migration”, going back to prioritising the security and stability agenda over the promotion of democracy and human rights. The aim is also to forge a new European-African Alliance, where Arab countries must play a necessary bridging role. This goal already questions whether the centre of gravity of EU-Arab cooperation is moving away from the Mediterranean to Africa. A few months back, the Conference of Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs – that includes all EU countries and 10 Arab countries – marking the tenth anniversary of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), was held on the 8th of October 2018. However, it passed almost unnoticed on mainstream media. The event could be considered as an achievement in itself given that it gathered the 43 UfM countries, with their divergent and sometimes antagonistic geopolitical agendas – including Israel, Turkey, alongside the European and Arab countries – and allowed to reaffirm a rhetorical commitment to this regional partnership that focuses more on the socioeconomic issues. The Conference did not manage to produce a formal conclusive document, but just a mere declaration signed by the co-presidents1 . The UfM Conference was followed more recently by the Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the 5+5 dialogue (Western Mediterranean Forum2 ) on 18 and 19 January 2019, where parties adopted a declaration focused on reinforcing western Mediterranean ties focusing on “sustainable development, youth, migration and mobility”3 . The more “Mediterranean” format of this dialogue only composed of riparian states in the western part of the Mediterranean is attractive to its member countries as more manageable than the UfM, composed of 43 countries, including countries that are remote from the Mediterranean itself. 1 https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Conclusions-of-the-Co-Presidency.pdf 2 Malta, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania, 3 http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2019-01-18/local-news/5-5-Western-MediterraneanDialogue-Foreign-Ministers-meeting-held-in-Malta-6736202278 Memorandum Opex Nº 239/2019. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) ten years after its foundation - How to overcome the frustrated ambitions 2 In that regard, France is pushing for its initiative of the “Summit of the two shores”, announced by President Macron, that will take place on the 24th of June 2019 in Marseille. It aims to revive the 5+5 Dialogue format, with 10 of the 43 countries of the UfM, while making it more inclusive and less government-driven, including civil society and all actors of the “voices of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue”. It proposes a new “Mediterranean policy”, hinting on the existing failures of the UfM formula4 . In this paper, the authors zoom in the UfM, today considered, within the Mediterranean countries political and diplomatic circles, as a positive forum for formal political dialogue among its 43 member-states. However, throughout the past ten years, none have passed without analysts or politicians asking for revitalisation and necessary changes in the partnership, which lacks depth and vision. If you address the 43 capitals of the UfM, you are likely to find at least 20 different interpretations of the value and meaning of this somehow forgotten partnership. The EU, on a discursive level, presents the UfM as a model for regional integration complementing its Neighbourhood policy. Southern Mediterranean countries, on their end, continue to maintain low profiles, showing their moderate interest in an organisation which has failed to become a partnership based on equal footing – one country, one vote- that would increase regional economic integration with the EU. Critical security and geopolitical issues are put on the discussion table outside the UfM’s realm, through the League of Arab States or 5+5 Dialogue. The partnership’s lack of coherence and articulation with the other forums and partnerships (Neighbourhood Policy, 5+5, EU-Arab League) contributes to its weakening. At a time when multilateralism is vilified all around the world, when the EU is internally divided and marked by the rise of nationalist populist forces and securitydriven agendas; at a time when the Arab world, all the more divided, stands far from the short-lived optimism brought by the Arab Springs, is the Mediterranean agenda going to be central to its member states’ international cooperation? Will the UfM hold a central place in the Mediterranean agenda and more broadly EU-Arab relations, or just be one of many actors? Despite all its shortfalls, the authors believe in the added value of the UfM forum to advance people-centred socioeconomic models. We argue for reinforcing its 4 Foreign Policy Speech at the « conférence des Ambassadeurs » http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discoursdu-president-de-la-republique-a-la-conference-des-ambassadeurs/ Memorandum Opex Nº 239/2019. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) ten years after its foundation - How to overcome the frustrated ambitions 3 existing institutions in order for all Mediterranean countries to advance a progressive socio-economic agenda, whether in the North or the South.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Migration, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Political stability
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Mediterranean, and Southern Europe
63. Sub-Surface Competition in the Euro-Atlantic Area: The Challenge to Western Dominance
- Author:
- Lee Willett
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s Syrian campaign has demonstrated the returning challenge the West faces in the underwater domain. Combat operations in Syria have been an opportunity for Russia’s military forces to prove on operations a new generation of capabilities, just as Operation ‘Desert Storm’ in 1991 saw the United States demonstrate its own new generation of military technology. One of the first weapons fired in ‘Desert Storm’ was a Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), launched on the first day from several surface combatants. Two days later, a Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) became the first submarine to fire Tomahawk in combat.[1] The USN’s re-roling of its SSNs as primary power projection platforms in the 1990s/early 2000s underlined the shift in Western focus in the underwater battlespace away from the primary Cold War task of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) to counter Soviet naval activity. Simply, the strategic collapse of the Soviet Union saw what was a significant submarine threat disappear almost overnight, and with it – for that moment, at least – the Western requirement for ASW capability. Today, the underwater threat is back. Since 2008 – which saw both Russian naval forces engaged in the Georgia campaign and the re-emergence of regular deployments by Russian submarines (and surface ships) south of the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap – naval power has been central to Russia’s strategic resurgence.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Maritime
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Middle East, Syria, and Mediterranean
64. Making a Case over Greco-Turkish Rivalry: Major Power Linkages and Rivalry Strength
- Author:
- Deniz Sert and Konstantinos Travlos
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Uluslararasi Iliskiler
- Institution:
- International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
- Abstract:
- The goal of the paper is to explore how the intensity of the Greco-Turkish rivalry (in the 19th and 20th centuries) was affected by variation in the intensity of rivalries between major powers that have political and military connections to Greece and Turkey. By comparing the effect of relevant major power rivalries with a battery of alternative domestic, dyadic, military, and political variables, the article serves as a deductive evaluation to see how important, if at all, variation in the volatility of intensity of the relevant major power rivalries is on the Greek-Turkish rivalry intensity volatility.
- Topic:
- History, Power Politics, Geopolitics, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- Turkey, Greece, and Mediterranean
65. The New-Old Elites and their Relations with the EU: The Cases of Egypt and Tunisia
- Author:
- Cengiz Günay
- Publication Date:
- 04-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Tunisia and Egypt are two countries that have experienced the fall of longstanding authoritarian leaders. Transitions in both countries then took entirely different directions. This paper deals with the question of whether and how political change in the two countries has affected their foreign policy-making towards the European Union (EU). Building on a liberal international relations (IR) perspective and elite theory, the paper focuses on the politically relevant elites (PRE). PRE shape discourses and influence decision-making processes. Building on the assumption that the composition and discourses of the PRE influence policies and positions towards the EU, the paper analyses the structure of the elites and their disputes over power resources.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Democratization, European Union, and Elites
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, and Mediterranean
66. Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Democratization and the Role of Civil Society
- Author:
- Cengiz Günay
- Publication Date:
- 12-2019
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Many documents, programs and strategies of the European Union highlight the importance of civil society as an element of democracy promotion. In this short article I deal with the question of what civil society actually is and whether the idea of civil society as a motor of democratization is still a valid presumption. Civil society is an often mentioned but essentially contested concept. As the term is characterized by a plurality of different meanings that depend on the historical, cultural and legal context, there is no single, generally accepted concept that defines civil society. It remains rather unclear whether civil society includes any form of non-governmental organiza-tion (NGO), such as business people’s associations, syndicates or trade unions. Is the media part of civil society or does the concept refer exclusively to NGOs that address specific societal issues? Does the concept only refer to institutionalized and licensed organizations and associations or are social movements, thematic platforms, informal networks and other un-institutionalized forma-tions also part of civil society? After all, they do often fulfill the same functions as civil society organizations (CSOs). And how about religious organizations, are they also part of civil society?
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Democratization, and NGOs
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Mediterranean
67. Who Owns What? – Free Trade Policies, Migration Management and the Ambiguity of “Joint Ownership”
- Author:
- Sherin Gharib
- Publication Date:
- 12-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- The concept of joint ownership has become a buzzword since the 1990s not only in strategies of international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), the WorldBank (WB) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but also in European Union (EU)foreign policy (Ejdus, 2017). Since the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) in 2004 joint ownership has been defined as one of its main principles.Accordingly, the EU states that “joint ownership of the process, based on the awareness of shared values and common interests, is essential. The EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners” (European Commission, 2004, p.8). It continues by holding that there “can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities. These will be defined by common consent and will thus vary from country to country. The endorsement of these plans by the highest instance of the agreements in place will give added weight to the agreed priorities for action” (European Commission, 2004, p. 8). Thus, EU policies should be set within a partnership relation between the EU, and its counterparts and priorities should be defined by common consent. The EU aims to engage “governments and all leading local stakeholders, including national parliaments” (European Commission, 2010c cited in Jonasson, 2013, p. 47). The importance of joint ownership was reconfirmed within the revised ENP in 2015,where the EU has declared that “differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP, recognising that not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards, and reflecting the wishes of each country concerning the nature and focus ofits partnership with the EU” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2). The goal, as the EUhas claimed, is to increase cooperation with neighbouring countries to an eye-to-eye level and to follow an approach based on “both partners’ needs and EU interests”(European Commission, 2017). The revised ENP again acknowledges the importance of involving relevant members of civil society as well as social partners in consultations(European Commission, 2015a, p. 3). Despite the appearance of joint ownership in several EU documents and its use as an example of an inclusive approach, the definition offered remains quite vague. Thus, it is unclear to what extent governments, local stakeholders, civil society and social partners should co-own certain policies. Whose considerations should count and should joint ownership be operationalised within the decision-making or implementation process?How can the operationalisation of the concept be evaluated? This policy paper critically investigates the EU’s concept of joint ownership. Drawing on two case studies, namely free trade policies and migration management, the paper 7PAPERSIEMed. Who Owns What? – Free Trade Policies, Migration Management and the Ambiguity of “Joint Ownership” analyses the implications and limitations of the EU’s partnership relation with its southern neighbourhood. The paper focuses mainly on the Egyptian, Tunisian and Moroccan cases. Due to the vague definition of “joint ownership” and in order to be able to analyse the two case studies, the paper suggests, based on EU documents, two types of ownership: 1) governmental ownership and 2) societal ownership. Using this conceptualisation, the paper analyses the involvement of different stakeholders and the main beneficiaries of EU free trade policies and migration management. It argues that there is a lack of governmental as well as societal ownership within the two EU tools, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) and Mobility Partnerships (MP) as it is mainly the EU that sets priorities, norms and standards to be adopted by partner countries. Government representatives and civil society actors from Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) perceive their relationship with the EUas asymmetric rather than based on an eye-to-eye level (personal communication with Tunisian and Egyptian officials and civil society actors, 2016-2017). The perceived reluctance to fully engage MPCs – government officials and social actors – in the implementation of EU policies has led to their growing mistrust of the EU. If ownership is applied at all, then it is often reduced to a state-centric approach even though the EU is rhetorically attached to the inclusion of actors going beyond the government. The lack of “societal” ownership becomes evident as consultative mechanisms suggested and applied by the EU to include grassroots organisations have in most cases no implications for policy-drafting processes. Thus, there seems to be a gap between what the EU refers to in official documents and the implementation on the ground. In this case, both MPs and free trade policies might exclusively serve the interests of the government and linked elites in the region – this depends on their ability to “own” certain policies rather than addressing the needs at the grassroots, such as poverty reduction or the creation of job opportunities. In this respect, the legitimacy and sustainability of EU policies is at risk (Ejdus, 2017;Dworkin & Wesslau, 2015). The paper proceeds as follows: the first part investigates the concept of ownership,illustrates several dimensions of its ambiguity, and analyses the EU’s operationalisation of the concept. Subsequently, the paper sheds light on the limits of ownership in the realm of free trade policies in general and DCFTAs in particular.The following section investigates the concept of migration management and MPs. The analysis is based on primary and secondary literature review as well as interviews conducted by the author with Egyptian and Tunisian officials and civil society actors, as well as with EU representatives in 2016 and 2017.
- Topic:
- Migration, Regional Cooperation, and Free Trade
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Tunisia, and Mediterranean
68. Global Forums: Are They Must or Waste for the Global Governance?
- Author:
- Gülen Derya Zayim
- Publication Date:
- 02-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Global Political Trends Center
- Abstract:
- The age of globalization has brought about interdependency between the nation-states in all aspects of life while uncovering challenges for the sovereignty of the nations. Therefore, how an integrated world system involving multiple actors can efficiently be governed remain a subject of serious discussions. This study briefly explains the historical background of G7/8 along with its evolution to G20 and discusses their effectiveness and legitimacy in the context of global governance. It is worthy to discuss the issue since these global forums’ legitimacy and effectiveness subject to both critics and praises. Although the lessons from the global financial crisis consolidates the idea of global coherence, integrity and compliance, diverging political and economic conflict of interest of nations still make the international forums’ existence and future position in global governance open to discussions. Additionally, the last part of the study draws conclusion about Turkey and its place in global governance.
- Topic:
- Sovereignty, Financial Crisis, Governance, and G20
- Political Geography:
- Turkey, Middle East, Global Focus, and Mediterranean
69. Climate Security in the Sahel and the Mediterranean: Local and Regional Responses
- Author:
- A. Bassou, A. Chielewska, and X. Ruiz-Campillo
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- IEMed/EuroMeSCo
- Abstract:
- The Mediterranean connects Europe to Africa. The Mediterranean basin is thus an area of interaction between the two continents. However, there is a perception that limits the Mediterranean basin to its strictest geographical sense, that is to say the countries of southern Europe and those of North Africa, which border the Mediterranean. This traditional conception ignores the geopolitical context, which broadens the vision of the Mediterranean basin by including all the spaces that impact it. Some human phenomena, such as migration, show that Mediterranean relations do not only concern the states bordering this sea, but a much larger area including the whole European Union, on the one hand, and North African, Sahelian and Sub-Saharan countries, on the other hand. The present study takes into account the broader conception of the Mediterranean. In this sense, it not only deals with the effects of climate change on the countries bordering the Mediterranean, but extends its analysis to the whole European Union (EU), to the Maghreb and especially to the Sahel. Due to its geography, climate, demography, proliferation of conflicts or its precarious level of industrialization, the Sahel region is the most threatened in the world by climate change. Any deterioration of the situation in the Sahel countries undoubtedly has repercussions on Europe and its relations with Africa. The four authors of the study examine the impact of climate change on the stability of the Sahel and the effects that the instability of this region could have on the Mediterranean space. The authors question the potential links between climate change and security. They outline the positions and frameworks of European actions as well as the different initiatives taken by EU institutions. Finally, they put forward some recommendations on how to effectively address this phenomenon.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Political stability, and Industrialization
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, Sahel, and Mediterranean
70. The Eastern Mediterranean in the New Era of Major-Power Competition: Prospects for U.S.-Israeli Cooperation
- Author:
- Douglas J. Feith and Seth Cropsey
- Publication Date:
- 09-2019
- Content Type:
- Case Study
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- This is a study of Eastern Mediterranean security and how the United States and Israel can improve cooperation to protect their common interests. The study’s particular focus is the maritime domain. Few things in world affairs survive for millennia. It’s also true that few are ever really new. In the Eastern Mediterranean, what has endured for thousands of years is the strategic attention of great powers. The region retains it today, commanding interest not only from local and regional actors, but also from global players. As Iran works to extend its reach to the Mediterranean, Russia, as it has for centuries, strives to exert its influence across the Middle East. The United States, on the other hand, has been signaling a desire to reduce its involvement in the region. Remarkably, China too has become a player. Its increasing presence in the Middle East reflects commercial and strategic motives and signifies its rise as a force competing for global economic and military predominance. China is at once a security challenge and a close economic partner. It is the world’s major rising and disruptive power and plays a huge role in global trade and investment.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Spending, Maritime, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, Israel, United States of America, and Mediterranean