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1. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

2. NATO’s new Defence Plans

Author:
Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

3. Defensive lawfare and deterrence: Analysis of Latvia’s approach to legal bases in the context of hybrid warfare (2014-2022)

Author:
Valerijs Bodnieks
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Following the ‘hybrid form’ of Russian aggression in Ukraine that emerged in 2014, the period after February 24th, 2022 is referred to as the ‘new reality’. Hence, the question that needs to be addressed is how to deter and prevent Russian aggression of this kind. The national legal framework against the aggressor is a part of the deterrence policy and can be construed as defensive lawfare. Focusing on Latvia, the aim of the paper is to analyse defensive lawfare and deterrence in the context of hybrid warfare. The following research question has been identified: What is Latvia’s approach to establishing defensive lawfare in terms of hybrid warfare? For the empirical analysis, the chronological framework has been set from 2014 to 2022. To complete the empirical analysis of the present paper, both qualitative and quantitative research has been implemented comprising document analysis and semi-structured interviews, as well as content analysis, respectively. The improvement of a regulatory base and the development of deterrence, whilst using regulatory acts, is an element of deterrence and a way to act legally. The law can be used as a weapon. Lawfare, a concept with three definitions, has two forms: defensive a nd offensive. Latvia’s legal base includes a regulation to overcome hybrid threats and to implement a broad-spectrum of defence measures. Latvia’s regulatory framework is designed for defence purposes, whilst also being a way of promoting deterrence. Decision makers must be able to manoeuvre with the powers assigned to them.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Hybrid Warfare, Lawfare, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Latvia, and Baltic States

4. Baltic States’ Expectations Regarding Germany’s Role in Baltic Security

Author:
Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
ICDS is introducing a series of policy briefs “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States”. In the first brief, introducing the series, Toms Rostoks sets out in broad terms what Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would like Germany to contribute to Baltic security and assesses the prospects for achieving this. Germany plays a major role in the security of the Baltic region and, especially, of the Baltic states. Although the Baltic states would favour Germany taking an even more prominent role, there are obstacles to this due to its very different views on issues such as military power, Russia and European defence integration. Germany’s military power is, by policy choice, limited. Its willingness to use that power, even for the purposes of deterring Russia, is still more limited. More broadly, Germany seems to assume that the worst excesses of Russia’s behaviour can be tamed through dialogue and interdependence. European defence cooperation, however, offers an opportunity for Germany to build a stronger military without raising concerns about its actions. In the long term, the Baltic states expect Germany to play a robust role in the region and to more efficiently counter Russia’s policy, but in the short-term their objective would be to ensure that Germany’s commitments to their security do not decrease.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

5. Georgia and the Baltics: Relations Amidst the War in Ukraine

Author:
Nino Chanadiri
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Georgia and the Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – have a history of friendship that is strengthened through the common Soviet past and shared experiences of Russian influence and violence as well as by the common vision of the contemporary Russian threat towards Eastern Europe. All of this creates the shared desire in these countries to put themselves as far from the Russian sphere of influence as possible. The Baltic states along with Ukraine (and Belarus) are neighbors of Russia and the touch point between Europe and Russia1 while Georgia is located between Russia and Turkey and performs a significant role in linking them. The partnership between Georgia and the Baltic states in terms of decreasing Russian influence in Eastern Europe, as one of the joint aims, requires the cooperation to be on the highest of levels in order for it to be successful. The partnership not only stands on the common past of the four countries but also on their common security visions and shared values which can ultimately contribute to making the partnership stable and long lasting.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Regional Cooperation, and War
Political Geography:
Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Baltic States

6. European Union common security and defence policy and Latvian involvement in EU battlegroups

Author:
Valerijs Bodnieks
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
In this article, the author analyses types of Europeanisation: top-down, bottom-up, horizontal, circular, and looks at Latvian involvement in the EU CSDP capability project - EU Battlegroups. Additionally, the author analyses the EU CSDP strategies in 2003 and 2016 with emphasis on key threats and key directions of action for the security of the EU. If it is necessary, EU Battlegroups can become involved to secure the EU. In the article, the author examines Latvian involvement in EU Battlegroups and changes in political planning documents and legal acts regarding EU Battlegroups. The author shows that for the future, it is necessary to involve an EU Battlegroup in real action in the area of operations, and that it is necessary to initiate discussions on a possible review and evaluation of the format of the EU Battlegroup.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe and Latvia

7. Connecting the Baltic States to Europe’s Gas Market

Author:
Emmet Tuohy and Metthew Bryza
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
More than two decades after the end of the Soviet occupation, and eight years after they joined NATO and the European Union, the Baltic republics remain disintegrated from the rest of Europe in one crucial way: their natural gas infrastructure isolates them into “energy islands.” But, for the first time in their histories, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania now have a chance to secure their energy independence by connecting their natural gas systems with those of their European allies and evolving them into market-based trading systems. This will require the Baltic republics to work with their EU Allies to develop physical and regulatory infrastructure required for liquid trading hubs and spot-market pricing of natural gas to emerge in the Baltic region. By achieving these objectives, these three small countries on the EU’s periphery will help the EU achieve two key strategic goals: to establish a single European energy market; and to complete the full integration of the EU’s easternmost member states into a Europe that is whole and free.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Energy Policy, Markets, and Gas
Political Geography:
Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

8. Conflict Prevention in the Baltic States: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

Author:
Rob Zaagman
Publication Date:
01-1999
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI)
Abstract:
The importance of national minority questions has long been recognised by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and this organisation has dealt with them extensively. Initially overshadowed by the East-West stand-off, minority issues were framed exclusively in terms of individual human rights, in particular the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. In “post-Wall” Europe, however, the explosive potential of many of them —e.g., in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus—became all too apparent. It also became clear that in this new era international violence would be mainly a consequence of domestic conflicts. Moreover, soon after the break-up of the Soviet Union the issue of the ethnic Russians outside the Russian Federation became an important factor in international relations in the OSCE area. As a result, minority issues are now mainly seen from the angle of conflict prevention, although this does include the continued pursuit of the implementation of human rights. The importance the OSCE attaches to minority issues as problems of peace and security is reflected most prominently in the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) which was established in 1992 to prevent violent ethnic conflict. Equally, it finds its reflection in the mandates of most, if not all, of the long-term missions the OSCE has established over the years, of which inter-ethnic issues are the main and sometimes exclusive component. These developments fit in the increased emphasis the OSCE has been putting on conflict prevention, playing the role of an impartial, non-coercive third party. Against this background, the tense inter-ethnic relations in Estonia and Latvia were addressed early on by the OSCE. Even though no inter-ethnic violence had taken place, a number of factors made for a volatile mix in both Baltic states: firstly, the existence of domestic tensions between a large minority of mainly Russians without citizenship who had to get used to postSoviet realities and a majority determined to preserve and strengthen its own identity; and secondly, increasing international tensions because of the active interest which neighbouring Russia, mainly for geopolitical reasons, was taking in the condition of its kinfolk in Estonia and Latvia. By contrast, these factors were absent in the third Baltic state, Lithuania. As analysed in the following, the situations in Estonia and Latvia were typically cases for which the OSCE High Commissioner had been established. They demonstrate the extent to which international involvement can keep domestic conflicts tractable—by helping the parties to devise policies and positions which avoid an escalation of disputes and possibly irreconcilable differences—and thus at the same time prevent the build-up of international conflict potential. They are also showcases for the specific approach the OSCE High Commissioner has developed in dealing with tense inter-ethnic situations. Although for reasons of space the main emphasis of this paper will be on Estonia, it should be realised that many similar issues are at stake in Latvia.
Topic:
Security, Minorities, Conflict, and Identity
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States