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Begin New Search Political Geography Ireland Publication Year within 25 Years

31. Selections from the Press

Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
This section includes articles and news items, mainly from Israeli but also from international press sources, that provide insightful or illuminating perspectives on events, developments, or trends in Israel and the occupied territories not readily available in the mainstream U.S. media.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and Islam
Political Geography:
United States and Ireland

32. Why Ireland's Luck Ran Out and What This Means for the Eurozone

Author:
Shalendra D. Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Given its impressive economic performance over the past two decades, Ireland earned the title, the 'Celtic Tiger'. However, as the contagion from the subprime-induced global financial crisis spread, Ireland's boom went bust. In short order, Ireland (like Greece before it), had to seek financial assistance from the EU and the IMF to stave off sovereign default and national humiliation. How did Dublin and the eurozone respond to the crisis and what lessons can be learned from Ireland's experience? While Ireland grapples with its huge public debt, the EU needs to instill confidence in the markets before the current rolling debt crisis becomes a systemic threat to the eurozone.
Topic:
Debt and Economics
Political Geography:
Ireland and Dublin

33. How to Save the Euro - and the EU

Author:
Henry Farrell and John Quiggin
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The European Union is in danger of compounding its ongoing economic crisis with a political crisis of its own making. Over the last year, crises of confidence have hit the 17 EU members that in the years since 1998 have given up their own currencies to adopt the euro. For the first decade of this century, markets behaved as though the debt of peripheral EU countries, such as Greece and Ireland, was as safe as that of core EU countries, such as Germany. But when bond investors realized that Greece had been cooking its books and that Ireland's fiscal posture was unsustainable, they ran for the door. The EU has stopped the contagion from spreading -- for now -- by creating the European Financial Stability Facility, which can issue bonds and raise money to help eurozone states. Together with the International Monetary Fund, the European Financial Stability Facility has already lent Greece and Ireland enough money to cover their short-term needs. But such bailouts are only stop-gap measures. Portugal and Spain, and to a lesser extent Belgium and Italy, remain vulnerable to pressure from bondholders. Portugal is likely to receive 50-100 billion euros over the next few months. But should Spain also need a bailout -- which could cost as much as 600 billion euros -- the 750 billion euro European Financial Stability Facility would soon be exhausted. In that event, the main euro creditors, primarily British, French, and German banks, might have to accept so-called haircuts, substantial cuts in the principals of their loans. (The banks' tax-avoidance strategies might inflate this total, but the Bank for International Settlements has estimated that the exposure of British, French, and German banks to the group of vulnerable debtor states referred to as the PIGS -- Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain -- amounted to more than $1 trillion in mid-2010.) Encouraged by Germany, some of the states in difficulty have sought to placate bond markets by making ruthless cuts in government spending. But as many economists have pointed out, these measures are hindering growth without satisfying bondholders that their money is safe; bondholders worry that these measures are not politically sustainable. In fact, they are likely to undermine Europe's political union.
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, Germany, Belgium, and Ireland

34. Inward FDI in Portugal and its policy context, 2011

Author:
Vitor Corado Simões and Rui Manuel Cartaxo
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
Portugal's performance in attracting inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) during the economic and financial crisis in 2009 was poor, below the low figures that it had already recorded in the previous couple of years, although Portugal did not record negative FDI inflows like competing countries such as Ireland (in 2008) and Hungary (in 2009). The country's difficulties in attracting IFDI are, however, structural. The “golden” years of the early 1990s, when Portugal emerged as an attractive and fashionable location, are past. The country's IFDI performance throughout the first decade of the 21st century was, in general, weak. In 2009, Spain, France and Brazil were the main sources of I FDI in Portugal. In spite of the Government's commitment to attracting IFDI, policy design and implementation have fallen short in the increasingly fierce competition for international investment.
Topic:
Economics and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Hungary, Portugal, and Ireland

35. Adjustment Difficulties and Debt Overhangs in the Eurozone Periphery

Author:
Daniel Gros and Cinzia Alcidi
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
This paper describes four key drivers behind the adjustment difficulties in the periphery of the eurozone: The adjustment will be particularly difficult for Greece and Portugal, as two relatively closed economies with low savings rates. Both of these countries combine high external debt levels with low growth rates, which suggest they are facing a solvency problem. In both countries fiscal adjustment is a necessary condition for overall sustainability, but it not sufficient by itself. A sharp cut in domestic consumption (or an unrealistically large jump in exports) is required to quickly establish external sustainability. An internal devaluation (a cut in nominal wages in the private sector) is unavoidable in the longer run. Without such this adjustment in the private sector, even continuing large-scale provision of official funding will not stave off default. Ireland's problems are different. They stem from the exceptionally large losses in the Irish banks, which were taken on by the national government, leading to an explosion of government debt. However, the Irish sovereign should be solvent because the country has little net foreign debt. Spain faces a similar problem as Ireland, although its foreign debt is somewhat higher but its construction bubble has been less extreme. The government should thus also be solvent, although further losses in the banking system seem unavoidable. Italy seems to have a better starting position on almost on all accounts. But its domestic savings rate has deteriorated substantially over the last decade.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Spain and Ireland

36. Britain, Ireland and Schengen: Time for a smarter bargain on visas

Author:
Michael Emerson
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
For the present UK government, full accession to the Schengen area, a passport- free travel area covering most of Europe, is a red line that it will not cross. Ireland shares a common travel area and land border with the UK and is also bound by this decision. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that the UK, along with Ireland, is suffering serious economic and reputational costs as a result of its separate visa and border management policies.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Britain, United Kingdom, Europe, and Ireland

37. Re-presenting Ireland: tourism, branding and national identity in Ireland

Author:
Michael Clancy
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Relations and Development
Institution:
Central and East European International Studies Association
Abstract:
This article examines sources of national identity formation under rapidly changing social and economic conditions. Specifically, it links constructivist notions of national identity formation and reformulation to the growing practice of nation branding. Following a discussion of the contributions of constructivism to the literature on national identity, the article summarises the emergence of nation branding as a contemporary strategy to promote a particular image of the nation to a specific audience. While that audience was once confined to political and economic elites, it has broadened in recent years to include potential tourists, diaspora communities and even one's own citizens. The case study of tourism branding in Ireland demonstrates that while the branding message often differs from reality, its content constitutes a powerful tool for the state in reinforcing a particular notion of national identity.
Topic:
Economics
Political Geography:
Ireland

38. Europe on the Brink

Author:
Simon Johnson and Peter Boone
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Attempts to resolve the problems in Europe are failing, and the crisis is spreading from Greece, Ireland, and Portugal to larger nations. Europe's financial system relies on moral hazard, i.e., a “no defaults” policy, to attract the funding needed to roll over large amounts of short–term bank and sovereign debt. Now that politicians in creditor nations are calling for private sector burden sharing, investors are demanding higher interest rates to hold these debts. But higher rates may tip banks and nations toward bankruptcy. Europe's banks and financial system are highly integrated across countries. Rising expectations of default in some countries could lead to large-scale capital flight into “safe” countries. This shift will raise concerns regarding solvency and liquidity of many financial institutions. The payments system of the euro area is serving as an opaque bailout mechanism that is currently preventing the euro area from falling apart at this time. If the number of nations in trouble spreads beyond Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, this bailout system will be stressed because of the potential size of accumulated funding. The European Central Bank (ECB) could soon see a vocal debate between inflationist and hawkish (anti–inflation) members. Inflationists will call for large–scale interventions, including bond buybacks and emergency loans, while the hawks will attempt to close loopholes in the payments system that effectively permit each troubled nation to create money needed to finance capital flight and budget deficits. At this stage in the debate, we see little chance that Europe can avoid ending the “moral hazard” regime, in which case it needs to plan for widespread sovereign and bank debt restructurings.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Regional Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, and Ireland

39. Legal order free of pillars: European Courts' jurisdiction in the post-Treaty of Lisbon setting

Author:
Janne Salminen
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
From the legal point of view, the most important change ushered in by the Treaty of Lisbon concerns the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union. This was widened due to the dismantling of the pillar structure. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the European Courts now covers previous third pillar matters as well, namely criminal law and police co-operation. The dismantling of the pillar structure did not, however, affect the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Union Courts still do not have jurisdiction in this area. This rule has two important exceptions. Although the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is communitarised and more coherent than before, the previous limits in its territorial scope, namely the opt-outs of the UK, Ireland and Denmark, did not disappear, so limits in the Courts' jurisdiction remain. The Treaty of Lisbon amendments did not change the fundamentals of the judicial doctrines, such as the direct effect and primacy of European Union law. Importantly, the application of these doctrines was widened instead, owing to the depillarisation. The Treaty of Lisbon amendments meant that the decisions of the European Council and European Union bodies, offices and agencies can be reviewed under the preliminary ruling procedure. The Treaty of Lisbon changed the much-debated criteria for the standing of non-privileged applicants in actions to review the legality of the European Union acts.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, and Law
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Denmark, Lisbon, and Ireland

40. Can Europe's Divided House Stand?

Author:
Hugo Nixon
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Conventional wisdom has it that the eurozone cannot have a monetary union without also having a fiscal union. Euro-enthusiasts see the single currency as the first steppingstone toward a broader economic union, which is their dream. Euroskeptics do, too, but they see that endgame as hell -- and would prefer the single currency to be dismantled. The euro crisis has, for many observers, validated these notions. Both camps argue that the eurozone countries' lopsided efforts to construct a monetary union without a fiscal counterpart explain why the union has become such a mess. Many of the enthusiasts say that the way forward is for the 17 eurozone countries to issue euro bonds, which they would all guarantee (one of several variations on the fiscal-union theme). Even the German government, which is reluctant to bail out economies weaker than its own, thinks that some sort of pooling of budgets may be needed once the current debt problems have been solved. A fiscal union would not come anytime soon, and certainly not soon enough to solve the current crisis. It would require a new treaty, and that would require unanimous approval. It is difficult to imagine how such an agreement could be reached quickly given the fierce opposition from politicians and the public in the eurozone's relatively healthy economies (led by Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands) to repeated bailouts of their weaker brethren (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Moreover, once the crisis is solved, the enthusiasm for a fiscal union may wane. Even if Germany is still prepared to pool some budgetary functions, it will insist on imposing strict discipline on what other countries can spend and borrow. The weaker countries, meanwhile, may not wish to submit to a Teutonic straitjacket once the immediate fear of going bust has passed.
Topic:
Economics and Government
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, Greece, Germany, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Ireland