Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Iraq

1671. Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath

Publication Date:
10-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
This background report reviews the mechanics of Saddam Hussein's rule, looks at the political dynamics that govern relations between religious and ethnic entities, and describes the various opposition groups and their potential role. It does not seek to predict the course of events in Iraq or to argue for any particular course of action. This is the first in a series of reports and briefing papers that ICG intends to issue on the challenges posed by Iraq, including the state of the country more than a decade after the Gulf War; regional attitudes toward a possible U.S. military offensive; the status of Iraqi Kurdistan; and Iran's posture toward a U.S.-led war and Iraq after Saddam Hussein.
Topic:
Government and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Arab Countries, and Kurdistan

1672. Global Economic Prospects

Author:
Michael Mussa
Publication Date:
09-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The global economic recovery is continuing but at a somewhat slower pace than was anticipated six months ago. Specifically, using the country weights from the IMF's World Economic Outlook, the forecast for real GDP growth in the world economy during 2002 (i.e., on a fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter basis) is cut by about half a percentage point to 3 percent—a pace that is slightly below my estimate of the potential growth rate for world GDP. This downward revision reflects primarily slower growth than earlier expected during the first half of 2002 in most industrial countries and the expectation that growth will remain somewhat more sluggish than earlier expected at least through year-end. For 2003, the forecast for global economic growth is also cut by about half a percentage point—to 4 percent—reflecting both general factors suggesting slightly weaker performance in many industrial and developing countries and the particular economic risks arising from possible military action against Iraq and from potential credit events affecting key developing countries. Despite these downward revisions, however, there is little doubt that the world economy will see significant improvement this year from the 1 percent growth recorded in 2001, and it is still reasonable to expect further improvement to a growth rate modestly above global potential during 2003.
Topic:
Economics
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Europe, Israel, Asia, South America, Latin America, and North America

1673. The Defense Monitor: Victory At An Unknown Cost

Author:
Stephen H. Baker
Publication Date:
12-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
Throughout the spring, summer and fall of this year thousands of U.S. military planners have worked on the various contingencies and strategies concerning a possible invasion of Iraq.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and Iraq

1674. The Defense Monitor: Nuclear Time Warp

Author:
Dr. Bruce G. Blair
Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
President george W. Bush's new Nuclear Posture Review harks back to the stone age, or at least to the 1950s, when America's most beautiful minds struggled to devise a strategy to deal with the original rogue state — the Soviet Union. The latest exercise to devise a nuclear strategy to neutralize threats of weapons of mass destruction wielded by the 2002-class of rogue states such as Iraq and North Korea is proof that time folds over on itself, and that higher-order nuclear intelligence is as elusive as table-top fusion. This repetition of history isn't funny, but it is dangerous.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iraq and North Korea

1675. Proliferation in the "Axis of Evil": North Korea, Iran, and Iraq

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Despite the June 2000 summit meeting and meetings between high level U.S. and North Korean officials on the one hand, and economic turmoil and continued food shortages on the other, we believe North Korea remains committed to maintaining strong military forces. These forces continue to be deployed close to the border with South Korea in an offensively oriented posture, and North Korea's NBC and missile programs likely remain key components of its overall security strategy. The most likely large- scale regional war scenario over the near term, which would involve the United States, would be on the Korean peninsula. In recent years, North Korea has continued to pose a complex security challenge to the United States and its allies. Prior to the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea is believed to have produced and diverted sufficient plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. In addition, although North Korea froze the production of plutonium in 1994, there are concerns that North Korea is continuing with some elements of a nuclear weapons program. North Korea also possesses stockpiles of chemical weapons, which could be used in the event of renewed hostilities on the peninsula. Research and development into biological agents and toxins suggest North Korea may have a biological weapons capability. North Korea has hundreds of ballistic missiles available for use against targets on the peninsula, some of which are capable of reaching tar-gets in Japan. Its missile capabilities are increasing at a steady pace, and it has progressed to producing medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). North Korea also has continued development of even longer-range missiles that would be able to threaten areas well beyond the region, including portions of the continental United States. As a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts, however, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has maintained a moratorium on launches of long-range missiles for over one year.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, and Korea

1676. Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq

Author:
Frank G. Wisner and Edward P. Djerejian
Publication Date:
12-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Today's Iraq debate is understandably focused on the run-up to possible military action. However, the question of how the United States and the international community should manage post-conflict Iraq is even more consequential, as it will determine the long-term condition of Iraq and the entire Middle East. If Washington does not clearly define its goals for Iraq and build support for them domestically and with its allies and partners, future difficulties are bound to quickly overshadow any initial military success. Put simply, the United States may lose the peace, even if it wins the war.
Topic:
International Relations and Security
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, Arabia, and Arab Countries

1677. If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and The Conventional Military Balance

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf. It still has an army of around 375,000 men, and an inventory of some 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons. It also has over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status. At the same time, Iraq has lacked the funds, spare parts, and production capabilities to sustain the quality of its consolidated forces. Iraq has not been able to restructure its overall force structure to compensate as effectively as possible for its prior dependence on an average of $3 billion a year in arms deliveries. It has not been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure, and about two-thirds of its remaining inventory of armor and aircraft is obsolescent by Western standards. Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to produce any major equipment -- with the possible exception of limited numbers of Magic “dogfight” air-to-air missiles. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has taken delivery on over $66 billion worth of new arms since 1991, Kuwait has received $7.6 billion, Iran $4.3 billion, Bahrain $700 million, Oman $1.4 billion, Qatar $1.7 billion, and the UAE $7.9 billion, Equally important, the US has made major upgrades in virtually every aspect of its fighter avionics, attack munitions, cruise missile capabilities, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. Iraq's inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces means that much of its large order of battle is no obsolescent or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat. It also raises serious questions about the ability of its forces to conduct long-range movements or maneuvers and then sustain coherent operations. Iraq has demonstrated that it can still carry out significant ground force exercises and fly relatively high sortie rates. It has not, however, demonstrated training patterns that show its army has consistent levels of training, can make effective use of combined arms above the level of some individual brigades, or has much capability for joint land-air operations. It has not demonstrated that it can use surface-to-air missiles in a well-organized way as a maneuvering force to cover its deployed land forces. Iran remains a major threat to Iraq. Iran lost 40-60% of its major land force equipment during the climactic battles of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. It has, however, largely recovered from its defeat by Iraq and now has comparatively large forces. Iran now has an army of around 450,000 men – including roughly 125,000 Revolutionary Guards, and an inventory of some 1,600 main battle tanks, 1,500 other armored vehicles, and 3,200 major artillery weapons. It also has over 280 combat aircraft with potential operational status. Iran has been able to make major improvements in its ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Gulf, and to conduct unconventional warfare. Iran has also begun to acquire modern Soviet combat aircraft and has significant numbers of the export version of the T-72 and BMP. Iran has not, however, been able to offset the obsolescence and wear of its overall inventory of armor, ships, and aircraft. Iran has not been able to modernize key aspects of its military capabilities such as airborne sensors and C4I/BM, electronic warfare, land-based air defense integration, beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat, night warfare capabilities, stand-off attack capability, armored sensors and fire control systems, artillery mobility and battle management, combat ship systems integration, etc. In contrast, no Southern Gulf state has built up significant ground forces since the Gulf War, and only Saudi Arabia has built up a significant air force. Only two Southern Gulf forces – those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – have a significant defense capability against Iraq. Saudi Arabia has made real progress in improving its 75,000 man National Guard. Its army, however, lacks effective leadership, training, and organization. It now has an army of around 75,000 men –, and an inventory of some 1,055 main battle tanks, 4,800 other armored vehicles, and 500 major artillery weapons. It also has around 350 combat aircraft with potential operational status. The army has made little overall progress in training since the Gulf War, can probably only fight about half of its equipment holdings in the Iraqi border area (and it would take 4-6 weeks to deploy and prepare this strength), and has declined in combined arms capability since the Gulf War. It has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have experienced a growing readiness crisis since the mid-1990s. It has lacked cohesive leadership as a fighting force since that time and cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management.. Kuwait now has an army of only around 11,000 men, and an active inventory of some 293 main battle tanks, 466 other armored vehicles, and 17 major artillery weapons. Only its 218 M-1A2s are really operational and only a portion of these are in combat effective forces. It has only 82 combat aircraft and 20 armed helicopters with potential operational status, and only 40 are modern F-18s. It is making progress in training, but has not shown it can make effective use of combined arms above the battalion level, and has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have moderate readiness, but cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management. There has been little progress in standardization and interoperability; advances in some areas like ammunition have been offset by the failure to integrate increasingly advanced weapons systems. Showpiece exercises and purchases disguise an essentially static approach to force improvement which is heavily weapons oriented, and usually shows little real-world appreciation of the lessons of the Gulf War, the “revolution in military affairs,” and the need for sustainability. Current arms deliveries are making only token progress in correcting the qualitative defects in Southern Gulf forces, and no meaningful progress in being made towards integrating the Southern Gulf countries under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

1678. Iraq: The Transatlantic Debate

Author:
Philip H. Gordon
Publication Date:
12-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Most Americans see the regime of Saddam Hussein as a major threat to regional and international security that must be thwarted, even if that means threatening or even using military force. If Saddam were to acquire nuclear weapons, they fear, he would seek to use them to dominate the Middle East, possibly invading his neighbours as he has in the past and perhaps deterring the United States from stopping him. His nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, moreover, might end up in the hands of Islamic terrorists who would show no compunction about using them against the United States, or Saddam himself might do so out of a thirst for vengeance. Whereas failure to act in Iraq would make a mockery of the United Nations Security Council and international law, a decisive action to topple Saddam would liberate the Iraqi people, allow the United States to lift sanctions on Iraq and withdraw its forces from Saudi Arabia, and perhaps make progress toward a freer and more democratic Middle East.
Topic:
Security and NATO
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Europe, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and United Nations

1679. Iraq: A European Point of View

Author:
Martin Ortega
Publication Date:
12-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
UNSC Resolution 1441 has given the Iraqi regime a last opportunity to abandon any WMD programmes. If Iraq does not comply fully with the resolution or if inspections show that Iraq is indeed hiding WMD, the Security Council will have to consider the situation and decide what measures must be taken to maintain international peace and security.
Topic:
Security and NATO
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, and Middle East

1680. Sanctions, Inspections, and Containment: Viable Policy Options in Iraq

Author:
David Cortright, Alistair Millar, and George A. Lopez
Publication Date:
06-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
Concerns are growing that Iraq may be rebuilding its capacity to develop and use weapons of mass destruction. After more than three years without UN inspections, the uncertainties and risks associated with Iraq's weapons programs have increased. The urgency of these issues has prompted widespread calls for the resumption of UN weapons inspections, and has led U.S. officials to threaten military attack. The U.S. threats are also motivated by a desire to overthrow the government of Iraq. Pundits in the United States have raised a chorus of calls for military action to topple Saddam Hussein. Many leaders in the region support the goal of disarming Iraq, but as U.S. vice president Dick Cheney learned during his March trip to the Middle East, most of these same leaders oppose U.S. military action against Iraq. States in the region fear the consequences of a U.S.-led war, especially in light of the profound security crisis in the Middle East. These realities suggest the need for viable alternative strategies to resolve the Iraq crisis and protect regional security. This report presents policy options available to the United States for addressing security concerns in Iraq. It examines the issues associated with the threat of weapons development in the region and offers a series of policy options for reducing and containing that threat without resort to military force. The report does not dwell on the uncertainties and risks of waging war on Iraq without international consent. These have been amply examined in other articles and commentaries. The paper concentrates instead on robust alternatives to the use of force. The policy options outlined here include: Reforming UN sanctions to tighten controls on oil revenues and military-related goods while further easing restrictions on civilian economic activity; Facilitating the return of UN weapons inspectors to complete the UN disarmament mandate and reestablish an Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) system; and Creating an "enhanced containment" system of externally based border monitoring and control if Iraq refuses to allow the resumption of weapons inspections. The report begins with an assessment of Iraq's capacity for developing weapons of mass destruction. It then examines options for controlling Iraq's weapons potential through economic statecraft, United Nations weapons inspections and diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East