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22. Video-recorded Decapitations: A seemingly perfect terrorist tactic that did not spread
- Author:
- Martin Harrow
- Publication Date:
- 05-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies
- Abstract:
- Video-recorded decapitations have an enormous impact, they are cheap and easy, and they allow the terrorists to exploit the potential of the Internet. With these advantages, the tactic would have been expected to quickly spread across the globe as a favored tactic. Yet, years after its invention in 2002, this has not happened. This paper using evolutionary theory finds that video-recorded decapitations have not caught on for locally specific reasons: in the West because the tactic is less accessible than one might expect; in Iraq because of the unwillingness to be associated with Zarqawi, and in the Afghan context, it has not spread because it is mainly relevant for mobilizing resources from abroad, which is not a priority for the Taliban. These are however situational variables, and just as suicide bombings took years to spread, there may be campaigns of video-recorded decapitations as conditions change.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Iraq, Middle East, and Taliban
23. Policing and COIN Operations: Lessons Learned, Strategies and Future Directions
- Author:
- Samuel Musa, John Morgan, and Matt Keegan
- Publication Date:
- 01-2011
- Content Type:
- Book
- Abstract:
- At the time of this writing, the United States and the other members of the International Security Assistance Forces are completing nearly a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. What started as more conventional or traditional fights has degenerated over time into insurgency warfare, something U.S. Forces have had to re-learn and re-build to fight. Re-learn and re-build are key elements as U.S. Forces have fought insurgencies in the past, but consistently maintained forces to fight more conventional warfare. Counterinsurgency (COIN) is very different from armored vehicles rolling through the Fulda Gap, or the race to Baghdad. It is a fight not against a Government as much as it is a fight for control of the mind-set of the population by non-state actors in a race to gain popular support. It is a grassroots battle that not only requires military force, but security established at the local level through everyday police presence that represents the Rule of Law, the national Government, and safety and stability locally. It is against this backdrop that the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) and the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) came together to look at Policing and COIN and the ways, methods, and techniques that could be shared to help overcome the insurgencies Coalition forces face. The efforts of the CTNSP at the National Defense University (NDU) and the CTTSO culminated in a one-day workshop held on September 29, 2010, on Policing and COIN Operations: Lessons Learned, Strategies, and Future Directions.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia
24. Civilianising warfare: ways of war and peace in modern counterinsurgency
- Author:
- Colleen Bell
- Publication Date:
- 07-2011
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of International Relations and Development
- Institution:
- Central and East European International Studies Association
- Abstract:
- This article examines the emergence of counterinsurgency doctrine in Coalition interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. While counterinsurgency is complimentary to the tenets forwarded by its classical military predecessors in several respects, the article shows that it is also more than a refashioning of conventional military practice. Counterinsurgency is intimately tied to institutional practices that shape global liberal governance. It can be traced to dominant trends in international humanitarian, development and peace interventionism since the end of the Cold War and it deepens the links between the social development of war-affected populations and the politics of international security. Rather than simply a shift in military practice, counterinsurgency is distinguished by its investment in civilian modes of warfare. Counterinsurgency retells the narrative of intervention as part of the evolution of political and economic liberalisation, marking a passage from interventionary force to post-interventionary governance. Modern counterinsurgency, it is concluded, exposes the widening indistinction between contemporary modes of peace and those of war in international relations.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Cold War, Economics, War, Counterinsurgency, and Governance
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and Iraq
25. Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: what now for British counterinsurgency?
- Author:
- Robert Egnell
- Publication Date:
- 03-2011
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Institution:
- Chatham House
- Abstract:
- This article analyses the conduct of British operations in Helmand between 2006 and 2010 and discusses the implications for the legacy and future of British counterinsurgency. A number of lessons stand out: first, competence in the field of counterinsurgency is neither natural nor innate through regimental tradition or historical experience. The slow adaptation in Helmand—despite the opportunity to allow the Basra experience to be a leading example of the need for serious changes in training and mindset—is an indication that the expertise British forces developed in past operations is but a distant folktale within the British Armed Forces. Substantially changed training, painful relearning of counterinsurgency principles and changed mindsets are therefore necessary to avoid repeated early failures in the future. Moreover, despite eventually adapting tactically to the situation and task in Helmand, the British Armed Forces proved inadequate in dealing with the task assigned to them for two key reasons. First, the resources of the British military are simply too small for dealing with large-scale complex engagements such as those in Helmand or southern Iraq. Second, the over-arching comprehensive approach, and especially the civilian lines of operations that underpinned Britain's historical successes with counterinsurgency, are today missing.
- Topic:
- Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Britain, Afghanistan, and Iraq
26. Iraq, Afghanistan and the future of British military doctrine: from counterinsurgency to Stabilization
- Author:
- Stuart Griffin
- Publication Date:
- 03-2011
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Institution:
- Chatham House
- Abstract:
- The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have had profound effects on both the British and US militaries. Among the most important is the way in which they have challenged traditional assumptions about the character of unconventional conflict and the role of the military within comprehensive strategies for encouraging sustainable peace. In the UK, the most important doctrinal response has been JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: the military contribution. Security and Stabilisation is an ambitious attempt to synthesize elements of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state-building within a single doctrine that reflects the lessons learned from recent British operational experience. This article examines the purpose, impact and potential value of this important innovation in British doctrine. To do so, the article explores the genesis of Stabilization; analyses its impact upon extant British doctrine for counterinsurgency and peace support; discusses its relationship with the most important related US doctrines, FM 3-24: the counterinsurgency field manual and FM 3-07: the stability operations field manual; and debates the function of doctrine more broadly. It concludes by summarizing the primary challenges Security and Stabilisation must overcome if it is to make a serious contribution to the theory and practice of such complex interventions.
- Topic:
- Security and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and United Kingdom
27. Iraq and US Strategy in the Gulf: Shaping and Communicating US plans for the Future in a Time of Region-Wide Change and Instability
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 09-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- During the coming months, the US must reshape its strategy and force posture relative to Iraq and the Gulf States. It must take account of its withdrawal of most of its forces from Iraq, and whether or not it can give real meaning to the USIraqi Strategic Framework Agreement. It must deal with steadily increasing strategic competition with Iran, it must restructure its post-Iraq War posture in the Southern Gulf and Turkey, and define new goals for strategic partnerships with the Gulf states and its advisory and arms sales activity. It must decide how to best contain Iran, and to work with regional friends and allies in doing so. In the process, it must also reshape its strategy for dealing with key states like Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, Turkey, Yemen, Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan
28. Lessons from Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq
- Author:
- John K. Naland
- Publication Date:
- 10-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- Embedded provincial reconstruction teams (ePRTs) were small State Department- led units inserted into U.S. combat brigades in Iraq from 2007 to 2010 to support military counterinsurgency efforts at the local level. During major combat operations in 2007 and into 2008, ePRTs provided important support to military counterinsurgency efforts. As U.S. combat units wound down these efforts and withdrew from towns and cities, ePRTs did useful-but harder to quantify-work in mentoring local officials. Combat brigades and ePRTs generally worked well together. However, some units were unsure of how best to employ civilians. The military and civilians also sometimes had differing views on issues of short-term versus long-term goals. Despite problems, ePRT veterans believe that they had a positive effect in both supporting military counterinsurgency efforts and helping local Iraqi officials prepare for self-reliance. Interviewees identified a variety of operational problems that detracted from ePRT mission accomplishment. The Iraq ePRTs are now history, but as the United States continues to use civil-military teams in Afghanistan, these observed lessons need to be learned and acted upon.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, War, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Arabia
29. Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation
- Author:
- Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing
- Publication Date:
- 03-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Abstract:
- This study argues that interagency teams were a major catalyst in turning around the Iraq War, and that they will disappear from America's arsenal unless the knowledge base supporting the innovation can be secured. Most explanations credit the dramatic reduction in violence in Iraq between 2007 and 2008 to new U.S. leadership, the surge in U.S. forces, and/or U.S. financial support to Sunni tribal leaders. In contrast, we argue that the United States employed an underappreciated organizational innovation—interagency teams—to put insurgent clandestine organizations on the defensive and give population security measures a chance to take effect.
- Topic:
- Intelligence, Terrorism, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Population
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, and America
30. Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact
- Author:
- T.X. Hammes
- Publication Date:
- 10-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Abstract:
- In Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of contractors reached a level unprecedented in U.S. military operations. As of March 31, 2010, the United States deployed 175,000 troops and 207,000 contractors in the war zones. Contractors represented 50 percent of the Department of Defense (DOD) workforce in Iraq and 59 percent in Afghanistan. These numbers include both armed and unarmed contractors. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the term contractor includes both armed and unarmed personnel unless otherwise specified. The presence of contractors on the battlefield is obviously not a new phenomenon but has dramatically increased from the ratio of 1 contractor to 55 military personnel in Vietnam to 1:1 in the Iraq and 1.43:1 in Afghanistan.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Privatization, War, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq