Search

Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Weapons Political Geography Iran

111. Dealing with Iran: How can the EU achieve its strategic objectives?

Author:
Shirin Pakfar
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
Europe and Iran have had important political, cultural and commercial relations that date back several centuries, but these relations have been steadily strained since 2002 when the uncertainty with regard to Iran's nuclear program became an issue of international concern. In demonstrating its role as an important foreign-policy actor capable of taking the lead in resolving global crises, through the leadership of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the EU3) the EU has spearheaded efforts to obtain a solution to the deadlock between Tehran and the international community over Iran's nuclear program. This approach has not been fully successful in achieving its goal and has contributed to straining EU-Iran relations. The EU has yet to develop a unified, independent and long-term strategy vis-à-vis Iran that would enable it to maintain a constructive relationship with Tehran and achieve its strategic objectives without compromising its core values. The four strategies available to the EU are: a) use of force/military action; b) containment and deterrence; c) engagement; and d) non-entanglement. While the EU's short–term tactics represent a mixture of engagement and containment, this paper argues that, in the case of Iran, the two approaches cancel each other out. To increase its leverage on Iran on the nuclear issue and beyond, the EU must adopt a realpolitik strategy of détente, building confidence with the regime in Tehran and obtaining policy progress through non-controversial mutual areas of interest. The EU High Representative should also take a more active role in leading the EU's efforts.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe and Iran

112. Controversies over missile defense in Europe

Author:
Raimo Väyrynen
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The plan to deploy an anti-missile system in Central Europe has been one of the most controversial security policy issues in the past few years. The Bush Administration pushed hard for the deployment of the radar site in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland, largely because it would provide an additional layer in the global anti-ballistic missile defense of the United States. In both of these countries, public opinion has been against the deployments and the governments have had to negotiate between external and internal pressures pushing them in different policy directions. Russia has been adamantly opposed to the missile defense plan, issuing both threats and suggesting alternative ways to diminish the threat that the United States feels from Iran. The result has been a political stalemate that has further complicated otherwise tense relations between Moscow and Washington, D.C. With the arrival of the Obama Administration, there is a pause in the missile dispute, but no permanent resolution of the conflict is in sight.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Washington, Poland, Moscow, and Czech Republic

113. The Russian Handicap to U.S. Iran Policy

Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Abstract:
There are voices in the Obama Administration who believe that the Kremlin is able and willing to exert pressure on Iran to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, perceived geopolitical and economic benefits in the unstable Persian Gulf, in which American influence is on the wane, outweigh Russia's concerns about a nuclear-armed Iran. The Kremlin sees Iran not as a threat but as a partner or an ad-hoc ally to challenge U.S. influence. Today, both Russia and Iran favor a strategy of "multipolarity," both in the Middle East and worldwide. This strategy seeks to dilute American power, revise current international financial institutions, and weaken or neuter NATO and the OSCE, while forging a counterbalance to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Russian technological aid is evident throughout the Iranian missile and space programs. Russian scientists and expertise have played a direct and indirect role in these programs for years. According to some reports, Russian specialists are helping to develop the longer-range Shahab-5, and Russia has exported missile production facilities to Iran. Moscow has signed a contract to sell advanced long-range S-300 air-defense systems to Iran. Once Iran has air defenses to repel Israeli or American air strikes and nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles, it will possess the capacity to destroy Israel (an openly stated goal of the regime) and strike targets throughout the Middle East, in Europe, and the Indian subcontinent. Beyond that, if and when an ICBM capability is achieved, Tehran will be able to threaten the U.S. homeland directly. Given the substantial Russian interests and ambitions, any grand bargain would almost certainly require an excessively high price paid by the United States to the detriment of its friends and allies. Russia simply does not view the situation through the same lens as the U.S.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

114. U.S.-Iranian Engagement: The View from Tehran

Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
For perhaps the first time since Iran and the U.S. broke ties in 1980, there are real prospects for fundamental change. The new U.S. president, Barack Obama, stated willingness to talk unconditionally. Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, implicitly blessed dialogue, and presidential candidates are vying to prove they would be the most effective interlocutor. Yet, while U.S. objectives and tactics are relatively familiar, little is known of Iran's thinking, even as much is assumed. Western interaction with its opaque political system and decision-making has both shrivelled and been narrowly focused on the nuclear file. Under-standing Iran's perspective is critical if engagement is to succeed. This briefing, based on meetings with officials and analysts, seeks to shed light on what Tehran thinks about dialogue, its goals and visions of a future relationship. It concludes that while full normalisation might be out of reach for now, there is a chance to achieve a more realistic objective: the start of a long-term dialogue that minimises risks of confrontation and advances areas of mutual interest.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Tehran

115. Iran's Role and Power in the Region and the International System

Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD) at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Liechtenstein Institute in Vienna, Austria (LIVA) convened the colloquium, “Iran's Role and Power in the Region and the International System,” March 5-8, 2009 in Triesenberg, Liechtenstein. This colloquium was funded in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, by the SIBIL Foundation, Vaduz, and by the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein. It was organized by Miriam Schive, Resident Director of LIVA, and chaired by Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Director of LISD.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

116. Inside Iranian Politics and Nuclear Strategy: A G-20 Briefing

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji and Stephen P. Rosen
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Studying the behavior of states with nuclear weapons may give some insight into what Iran would do if it acquires nuclear weapons capabilities. Every state that has nuclear weapons, with the exception of India, has shared the technology and the know-how -- not the weapons -- with other states: the United States shared technology with Great Britain and then, in the 1950s, provided nuclear weapons for German fighter jets on German bases flown by German pilots; Israel and France shared nuclear energy technology in the 1960s;China assisted Pakistan; North Korea aided Syria; and Pakistan assisted many countries through the A. Q.Khan network. In short, states transfer nuclear technology because it is easy to accomplish, difficult to track, and returns very high rewards.
Topic:
Islam, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and North Korea

117. Breaking Stalemates on Iran and Syria at the IAEA

Author:
Gregory Schulte
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Mohamed ElBaradei will end his twelve years as director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in November. Absent a last-minute breakthrough, ElBaradei will leave incomplete the critical safeguards investigations of Iran and Syria. Earlier this month, ElBaradei reported to the IAEA Board of Governors little or no progress on either the six-year probe of Iran's nuclear activities or the more recent probe of Syria's clandestine cooperation with North Korea. ElBaradei reported that Tehran continues to enrich uranium, in violation of IAEA and UN Security Council requirements, and despite any obvious domestic energy demand. Tehran also continues to deny to IAEA inspectors access to information, people, and sites to verify the "peaceful" nature of Iran's nuclear activities.
Topic:
Islam, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North Korea, Arab Countries, and Syria

118. Quds Day in Iran: Velvet Revolution Trumps Nuclear Negotiations

Author:
Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
While the United States is concentrating on the G-20 summit and the October 1 meeting with the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Iranian attention has been focused on the potentially destabilizing protests planned for September 18, Quds Day. This critical difference of agenda -- with Iran focused more on its domestic turmoil than on simmering international issues -- will be a major complicating factor in negotiations between the international community and Iran in the coming weeks.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, International Cooperation, Islam, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

119. Broadening the U.S. Approach on Iran

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
With Iran's September 14 acceptance of a meeting with the P5+1 countries on October 1, the Obama administration finally appears poised to engage in direct talks with Iran. In entering these talks, Washington faces two obstacles: first, Iran's reputation for recalcitrance in negotiations and its stated refusal to discuss the nuclear issue, upon which American concerns center; and second, the perception that the administration is lending legitimacy to a regime fresh from violent repression of its political opponents.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Washington, and Middle East

120. Iran's Nuclear Program: Lessons from Pakistan

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Public anxiety about Iran's nuclear intentions is focused on the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, which in many respects -- in both the public debate and the policy discussion -- resembles the situation in the 1980s when there was growing concern about Pakistan's Kahuta enrichment plant. The lessons that can be draw from that experience are not encouraging. The comparison is particularly appropriate because Iran uses the same high-speed centrifuge technology to enrich uranium as does Pakistan. Photos of Iranian centrifuges show some of them as identical to Pakistani designs developed by the disgraced A.Q. Khan. Iran also claims to be operating more advanced centrifuges using its own modifications.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Iran, South Asia, and Middle East