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51. Iran's successful transnational network: Iranian foreign policy utilizes partners

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In Western and Middle Eastern capitals there is growing concern over the growth of Iran’s transnational network. In the last decade, Iran has exploited the weaknesses of other states to expand its influence through relationships with state and non-state actors in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, but what characterizes this network? Key take-aways: The group of state and non-state actors referred to as proxies of Iran is diverse, and important nuances are lost by approaching them all solely as proxies. Whereas sectarian affinity plays a role, Iran’s ability to portray itself as anti-imperialist and as fighting oppression transcends sectarian boundaries. Iran’s transnational network is multifaceted, pragmatic and diverse, as each relationship reflects each member’s capabilities, history and importance to Iran.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Sectarianism, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and United States of America

52. Implications of the Proposed China-Iran deal for India

Author:
Sruthi V.S.
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
The ambitious $400 billion deal between China and Iran has garnered worldwide attention. The 18-page draft proposal says that China will facilitate the infusion of about $280 billion to Iran. This major economic and security partnership between China and Iran has raised India’s concerns against the backdrop of its ongoing border conflict with China. According to the New York Times report, the proposed China-Iran deal talks about expanding China’s presence in Iran’s “banking, telecommunications, ports, railways and dozens of other projects”, and in return China will receive a steady supply of oil from Iran for the next 25 years at a discounted price. There are more than 100 projects listed in the draft that will see Chinese investments; these include building Free Trade Zones and several very significant ports. The Chinese will also help Iran build infrastructure for 5G networks and come up with an internet filter like the Great Firewall in China. The stronghold of China in Iran could also result in undermining US policy in the Middle East.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, India, and Asia

53. Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia: Scope and Implications

Author:
Mamuka Tsereteli, Margarita Assenova, Alex Vatanka, and Rauf Mammadov
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has entered its fourth week. The scope of the war has not been limited to the boundaries of the combat zone, resulting in human loss and destruction of civil infrastructure. The region’s important network of energy infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines, are not immune to this latest round of fighting. The military confrontation is taking place in proximity to the critical energy infrastructure that connects the Caspian basin with the European markets. Can the fighting cause disruption to oil and gas flows to the West? What could potential disruption mean for global markets? Can the Southern Gas Corridor be prevented from being launched by the end of this year as had been planned? What are the interests of regional stakeholders such as Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Iran and others that are either energy exporters, consumers or transit nations for Caspian hydrocarbons. And finally, what are the interests of the United States in this conflict and its impact on the energy markets?
Topic:
Energy Policy, Territorial Disputes, Infrastructure, Conflict, and Exports
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and United States of America

54. Iranian digital influence efforts: Guerrilla broadcasting for the twenty-first century

Author:
Emerson T. Brooking and Suzanne Kianpour
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Iran has invested significant resources and accumulated vast experience in the conduct of digital influence efforts. These clandestine propaganda efforts have been used to complement Iranian foreign policy operations for the better part of a decade. Nonetheless, Iranian influence capabilities have gone largely unstudied by the United States, and only came to widespread attention in August 2018 with the first public identification of an Iranian propaganda network. Following the US assassination of Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani and a sharp escalation in US-Iranian tensions, it is important to understand the perspective, methods, and intent of Iranian influence efforts. For Iran, information dominance represents a central focus of both foreign and domestic policy. Iran sees itself as engaged in a perennial information war: against Sunni Arab powers, against the forces of perceived Western neocolonialism, and particularly against the United States. Should the information conflict be lost, many Iranian officials believe the collapse of the state will soon follow. Accordingly, Iran has prioritized the development of digital broadcast capabilities that cannot be easily targeted by the United States or its allies. Iran has also prioritized information control. Although Iran boasts roughly fifty-six million Internet users, these users must navigate a culture of censorship and frequent state intimidation. Following the 2009 Green Movement, the Iranian government came to see social media activism as enabling an existential threat. Authorities created special cyber-police units, built a new legal framework for Internet regulation, and outlawed most Western digital platforms. They also began to develop systems to remove Iranian users from the global Internet entirely. In pursuit of foreign and domestic information dominance, Iran began operating Facebook and Twitter sockpuppets as early as 2010. As the United States and Iran entered into a period of rapprochement and negotiation, the number of accounts grew exponentially. These accounts have been used to launder Iranian state propaganda to unsuspecting audiences, often under the guise of local media reports. To date, Facebook has identified approximately 2,200 assets directly affecting six million users. Twitter has identified eight thousand accounts responsible for roughly 8.5 million messages. Much of this Iranian content cannot be characterized as “disinformation.” In sharp contrast to the information operations of Russia, which routinely disseminate false stories with the aim of polluting the information environment, Iran makes less use of obvious falsehood. Instead, Iran advances a distorted truth: one that exaggerates Iran’s moral authority while minimizing Iran’s repression of its citizens and the steep human cost of its own imperial adventures in the wider Middle East. As a whole, Iran’s digital influence operations represent a continuation of public diplomacy, albeit conducted through misleading websites and social media sockpuppets. Iran broadcasts a fairly consistent message to many different audiences: in Africa, in Southeast Asia, in Europe, in North America, and, most notably, in Latin America and the Middle East. The aim of these efforts is to “tell Iran’s story,” the same as any Western government broadcaster might strive to do. The difference is that, as an international pariah, Iran must pursue this work through more clandestine means. Global observers have long learned to doubt the truthfulness and sincerity of Iranian-branded media. As the United States considers policies to safeguard its elections and confront Iranian influence activities, three conclusions can be drawn about the nature of Iran’s modern propaganda apparatus. Iran’s digital influence efforts involve centralized goals and disparate agents. Different elements of Iran’s digital propaganda apparatus evidence the involvement of different government agencies. It is not clear how, or if, these agencies coordinate their operations. These goals are closely tied to Iran’s geopolitical interests. Nearly all content spread by Iran’s digital influence efforts relates directly to its worldview or specific foreign policy objectives. Consequently, it is easier to identify the operations of Iran than those of other actors like Russia, whose content is more likely to be politically agnostic. Iran may attempt direct electoral interference in 2020 and beyond. To date, there is little evidence that Iran has sought to affect the outcome of a US election. This does not, however, preclude future such campaigns based on Iranian interest in achieving rapprochement with the United States.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Media, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

55. The Urgent Need for a U.S.-Iran Hotline

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Naval incidents in the Gulf have spotlighted the danger that a U.S.-Iranian skirmish could blow up into war. The two sides have little ability to communicate at present. They should hasten to design a military-to-military channel to lower the chances of inadvertent conflagration. What’s new? Tensions between the U.S. and Iran have repeatedly brought the two sides to the brink of open conflict. While neither government seeks a full-fledged war, a string of dangerous tit-for-tat exchanges amid mounting hostile rhetoric underscores the potential for a bigger military clash. Why does it matter? Due to limited communication channels between Tehran and Washington, an inadvertent or accidental interaction between the two sides could quickly escalate into a broader confrontation. The risk is especially high in the Gulf, where U.S. and Iranian military vessels operate close to one another. What should be done? The U.S. and Iran should open a military de-escalation channel that fills the gap between ad hoc naval communications and high-level diplomacy at moments of acute crisis. A mechanism facilitated by a third party might contain the risk of conflict due to misread signals and miscalculation.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

56. US-Iran tensions: East Asian Perspectives

Author:
Scott Edwards
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
On the 3rd of January 2020, the United States signalled its intent to escalate tensions with Iran, through the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Quds forces, in Iraq. Following attacks from Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militia on the American embassy in Baghdad, the escalation took place on a backdrop of worsening US-Iranian relations, focused on the US withdrawal of the Iranian nuclear deal (and Iran’s subsequent rollback of key commitments), the reinstatement of economic sanctions against Iran, and increasing tensions in the Straits of Hormuz. Such tensions have been met with concern in East Asia, particularly among countries that have been steadily expanding their relationships with Iran. Responses, however, reflect a continuation of business as normal rather than any great change. While Malaysia, for example, has condemned the assassination in line with their growing closeness to Iran, there has been no tangible change of policy. Indonesia, who has developed a relationship but emphasised their desire to remain neutral in the Iran-Saudi tensions, have avoided making overt statements in support of Iran or condemning US action. For the most part, therefore, Southeast Asian states have been unwilling and unable to abandon their relationship with the US and other key states such as Saudi Arabia, or isolate themselves by supporting Iran overtly. For other East Asian states, overtly supporting Iran runs the risks of encouraging the escalation of the conflict and the damaging of their interests, such as is the case with China. As such, this paper will argue that while the perception surrounding Soleimani’s assassination among East Asia is for the most part negative, this will not fundamentally impact on their relationship with the US or spur a further shift to Iran. Instead, in the face of continuing US pressure on Iran, Iran’s relationships within East Asia have begun to ultimately suffer. This paper will begin by analysing the expansion of Iran’s relationship with East Asian states before going on to argue how these are likely to decline in future despite these countries’ concerns of US actions as well as actions of other important states such as Saudi Arabia. While Iran has expanded its relationship with a number of partners in East Asia, this paper will focus on relationships Iran finds particularly important. Primarily, this is Malaysia and Indonesia, who, as countries with Muslim majority populations, have seen their involvement with Iran growing at a faster pace than others but in relationships mired in complexity. It will also consider China’s perspective; a relationship that has taken on importance for different reasons.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, Conflict, Qassem Soleimani, and Militias
Political Geography:
Iran, Malaysia, Middle East, East Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

57. The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier

Author:
Harith Hasan and Kheder Khaddour
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Over the past nearly two decades, the presence of a variety of state and nonstate military and security forces has transformed the Syrian border district of Bukamal and the neighboring Iraqi district of Qa’im. Following the end of the self-proclaimed Islamic State’s caliphate, Iranian-backed militias began to play a major role in the area, turning it into a flashpoint between Iran and its allies on the one side and the United States and Israel on the other. The strain of tensions and the threat of instability are liable to ensure that this heavily securitized part of the border will remain a magnet for conflict for years to come.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Islamic State, Conflict, and Borders
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

58. Iraq’s Power Sector: Problems and Prospects

Author:
Sujata Ashwarya
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Abstract:
Despite substantial efforts and investments in rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the country is still struggling to deliver on public services. Years of destruction in conflict, as well as alleged mismanagement and neglect, have taken a heavy toll on the country’s power infrastructure. Severe power cuts and rolling blackouts are endemic in Iraq today. Between 2014 and 2018, Islamic State terrorism inflicted billions of dollars in damage on the already dilapidated electricity infrastructure, causing a cumulative potential and actual loss of a whopping 7GW in generation and transmission capacities.
Topic:
Economics, Energy Policy, Infrastructure, Business, Conflict, Services, and Electricity
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

59. Does Soleimani’s Death Matter? Findings from a 2019 Workshop

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Last year’s Washington Institute forum on post-Soleimani succession suggested that the IRGC would lose a unique coordinating capability and its most important totem once he left the scene. Last April, The Washington Institute held a closed-door roundtable to discuss the potential impact if Qassem Soleimani no longer commanded the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force. Governed by the Chatham House rule, participants discussed how succession might work in the Qods Force and what Iran would lose if Soleimani became permanently unavailable, reaching consensus on many key issues. Now that the commander is indeed gone, their conclusions can help policymakers navigate the stormy seas ahead, though some aspects of his importance remain a matter of heated debate.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Qassem Soleimani
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

60. Idlib and Its Environs: Narrowing Prospects for a Rebel Holdout

Author:
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
During the war years in Syria, the northwest, specifically Idlib, has become a site of heavy internal displacement. Observers on the ground recognize the green buses traveling to Idlib carrying migrants who have refused reconciliation agreements with the Damascus regime. Since around 2014, a range of jihadist, Islamist, and Salafi actors have wielded control in the area, the most recent being the al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which has ruled—ineffectively and brutally—through its so-called Syrian Salvation Government. But the group's reign is unlikely to last long if current trends persist. The regime's recent move against the town of Maarat al-Numan suggests plans for a broader takeover in the northwest, aided by Russian firepower and other allies such as Iran. In this Policy Note filled with local insights, jihadism expert Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi presents the current scene in and around Idlib province, the last Syrian outpost still run by independent rebels. Absent an intervention by Turkey, the Assad regime will likely prevail in a campaign that quashes the insurgency at a high humanitarian cost.
Topic:
Al Qaeda, Displacement, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib