Although it is possible that negotiations between the leading powers in the international community and Iran may produce a settlement to the vexing issue of Iran's nuclear program, it is more likely that those negotiations will fail. If that happens, U.S. policymakers face a set of highly imperfect options.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Anthony Bubalo, Mark P Thirlwell, and Dr. Michael Fullilove
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The Iranian nuclear issue has entered a critical phase. A draft UN Security Council resolution has been circulated that could pave the way for political and economic sanctions. Should these fail to change Iran's position, the likelihood of military action will grow towards the end of 2006 and into 2007. At the same time, high oil prices have bolstered Iran's ability to defy demands that it give up uranium enrichment and provide greater transparency with respect to its nuclear program. Given current supply, demand and price indicators, oil provides Iran with a very potent weapon with which to respond to punitive measures. However, the economic and political fallout produced by the use of the oil in this way makes it likely Tehran would use such a weapon cautiously.
Topic:
International Relations, Energy Policy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and Australia/Pacific
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
On January 13, Germany's new chancellor, Angela Merkel, will have her first official visit with US President George W. Bush. Washington, or at least the part of Washington that still pays attention to transatlantic issues, not just the Bush administration, will be glad to see her given that she is not her US-bashing predecessor Gerhard Schroeder. Though this change in atmosphere is welcome, no one should make too much of it. It is unlikely to make much difference on security issues, where Iran's own actions are forcing the United States and Germany to come together, where German public opinion will keep the governments apart on Iraq, and where neither country is prepared to make major changes to defense budgets and approaches. The Masri case will certainly limit Merkel's interest in appearing too chummy with Bush on security matters.
Topic:
Development and Economics
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Washington, and Germany
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
During an official visit to Washington DC on September 20th, 2005, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal proclaimed: “US policy in Iraq is widening sectarian divisions to the point of effectively handing the country to Iran…. We fought a war together to keep Iran out of Iraq, now we are handing the whole country over to Iran without reason…. Iraq is disintegrating.”
Topic:
International Relations
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Washington, Middle East, Arabia, and Maryland
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
There is no way to know what strategy Iran will choose in the future, or how the international community will respond. Iran's possible efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are an ongoing test of the entire process of arms control and the ability limit nuclear proliferation. At the same time, they raise critical issues about how Iran might use such weapons and the security of the Gulf region -- an area with more than 60% of the world's proven conventional oil reserves and some 37% of its gas.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
There is no simple or reliable way to characterize Iran's ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Iran is clearly attempting to acquire long-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, but it has never indicated that such weapons would have chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) warheads. Iran has never properly declared its holdings of chemical weapons, and the status of its biological weapons programs is unknown.
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
It is one thing to have nuclear weapons; it is another to deliver them. This depends on being able to build them small enough to fit current missile warheads or build new missile technology to carry such weapons. In the case of Iran, this depends on knowing the extent of its nuclear technology. For example, if its P-1 or P-2 designs were provided by AQ Khan—the same warhead that was sold to—then it is the Chinese design with 500 kg and 1 m diameter, which can fit Iran's current Shahab-3 missile.
Since March 2006 Brazil has been the ninth country to control the full nuclear fuel cycle. While the U.S. government bashes the uranium enrichment activities in Iran, it has come to an arrangement with the uranium enrichment in its backyard after transitional diplomatic tensions. As signer of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Brazil has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful use. This article focuses on the political motives and objectives connected with the domination of this key technology. Brasilia has been striving for regional leadership and participation in international decision making processes. In historical perspective the Brazilian enrichment procedure marks the liberation from the technological U.S. dependence. Brazil seems to be on the way to establish itself as a civil nuclear power in international relations.
In this interview, Karim Sadjadpour, the International Crisis Group's Iran analyst, discusses the possible outcome of the present impasse between the United States and Iran on the latter's nuclear aspirations. Mr Sadjadpour has written on Iranian society and politics, Iran's nuclear program, Iran-Iraq relations, and U.S.-Iran relations. He is a regular contributor to BBC World and National Public Radio, and has also published pieces in the Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, New Republic, and others. This interview was conducted the day after the Asia Society event "Understanding Iran's Nuclear Aspirations: Pragmatism or Brinkmanship?" on March 28, 2006.
Topic:
International Relations, Development, and Nuclear Weapons
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
In this paper, Ramesh Thakur examines the implications of the Iraq War for the UN, shows how the goals being pursued in Iraq have been undermined by the means, and argues that the liberation of the people from Saddam Hussein's brutal regime was a collateral benefit amidst much damage to principles, institutions and relations. His thesis is that the Iraq War has complicated the international community's efforts to fashion a robust collective response to the nuclear challenge posed by Iran. The war's legacies include diminished Western credibility in highlighting an Iran threat, narrower policy options in responding to the nuclear challenge, and an Iran that is simultaneously politically stronger in Iraq, richer due to rising oil prices, and more emboldened and motivated on national security.