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11. Revitalizing the 3+3 Platform: A Formula for a New Regional Security Order?

Author:
Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
On 23 October 2023, the second meeting of the 3+3 Consultative Regional Platform took place in Tehran, Iran. This platform is built upon the idea of bringing together Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia ‘plus’ Iran, Russia, and Türkiye for regional cooperation had been introduced by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Türkiye after the Second Karabakh War. Georgia, owing to its ongoing territorial conflict with Russia, refused to participate in the platform, though its leaders signaled that they might reconsider this position in the future. The initiative, even in the 2+3 format (i.e., without Georgia), has faced several challenges, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and Iran’s mercurial policies in the region. The first meeting within this initiative (without Georgia’s participation) was held in Moscow on 10 December 2021 at the level of deputy foreign ministers. At that inaugural meeting, each side expressed optimism regarding the future of this framework. However, this optimism did not materialize for a long time. While Moscow and Tehran remained supportive of the 3+3 initiative, it mostly lost its relevance and importance for the other actors, including Azerbaijan. Despite repeated announcements by Russian and Iranian officials regarding preparations for the second meeting in this format, it took nearly two years for the meeting to actually occur. According to Russia’s leadership, the West was undermining this initiative
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and South Caucasus

12. Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Turkey has an energy dependence problem. For the past two decades, Ankara’s energy needs have been on the rise, and they are projected to continue on an upward trajectory until at least 2035. Yet, the country is not endowed with the proven natural resources to support its energy needs, and so it imports almost all of the energy it consumes. This reliance on energy imports creates economic and security constraints for Ankara. On the economic front, strategic decisions to diversify Turkey’s energy market impact the direction and pace of the country’s economic development. On the security front, dependence on foreign energy exposes Turkey to external shocks and creates vulnerabilities that affect the country’s international posture. To Turkish policymakers, this is hardly breaking news. For many decades, successive governments have been considering ways to diversify the country’s energy portfolio with the objective of ensuring access to affordable, reliable energy supplies. Domestically, this goal has translated into continued investments in locally produced power, such as the development of natural gas fields under the Black Sea and the opening of nuclear and coal-fired power plants across the country. Externally, the aim of diversification has led Ankara to forge a wide range of international partnerships and preserve relations with both Western purchasers of Turkish exports and key energy providers, including Russia and countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. What is more, Ankara pursues its energy diplomacy against the backdrop of a broader geopolitical strategy of bolstering Turkey’s status as a regional power based on its geographic position and connections. At the heart of this strategy is a grand plan to establish Turkey as a major natural gas hub that will put the country at the center of regional energy trade. This policy has ramifications for Ankara’s relations with its close and more distant neighbors. Turkey is surrounded by energy-rich countries, and one of its primary objectives when reaching out to them is to secure the conditions for a steady inflow of energy resources—typically, natural gas and oil. This objective can lead to the development of durable economic partnerships, such as with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran; but it can also spark conflicts of different degrees of intensity, such as with Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors and Iraq. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Ankara’s gas diplomacy is consequential for relations with Russia—with which Turkey has been strengthening its energy relations beyond hydrocarbons—and with Europe. On the demand side of Ankara’s natural gas market equation, European countries are thirsty for non-Russian hydrocarbons in the short and medium term and for green energy in the longer term. Turkey has the potential to provide both, as long as it comes up with strong policies that support these energy transitions. To do so, the Turkish government will need to shift its approaches not only to energy but also to geopolitics. Ankara will have to present itself as a reliable energy partner for Europe and ramp up its investment in clean energy technologies. Delinking Turkey’s economic development from its dependence on hydrocarbons will benefit Ankara financially while bringing it closer to its European allies. Building a long-lasting energy partnership with Europe remains one of Turkey’s greatest challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Egypt

13. South Africa’s Cyber Strategy Under Ramaphosa: Limited Progress, Low Priority

Author:
Joe Devanny and Russell Buchan
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
During the decades of apartheid, South Africa was an international pariah. Since the country transitioned to majority rule in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has dominated politics, and the ANC has itself transitioned from a national liberation movement to a party of government. Domestically, South African cyber strategy should be seen as part of the ANC’s wider political challenge of trying to deliver economic growth, development, and prosperity. Over thirty years, the ANC has struggled to deliver on this agenda in a profoundly unequal society with infrastructure and institutions that have weakened particularly over the past fifteen years. Alongside confronting domestic challenges, the ANC has also tried to reshape South Africa’s global role. This was perhaps most visible under its first president, Nelson Mandela (1994–1999), but it was arguably pursued most systematically under Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008). This reorientation of South Africa in the world was an ambitious and complex project, the foundations of which were the country’s leading role in its region and continent as well as its ties within the wider Global South. The project entailed tensions between the progressive promotion of human rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and the cultivation of instrumental relations with authoritarian and repressive states, on the other. These tensions continue to affect South African foreign policy, including its cyber diplomacy. South Africa identifies cybersecurity as a key national priority and has to this end adopted a national cybersecurity strategy and established a military Cyber Command. The reality, however, is that other issues have been consistently ranked above cybersecurity, such as addressing corruption, poverty, racial and social injustice, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Cybersecurity has therefore not been seen as a high priority by successive South African governments. This has left Cyber Command underresourced and unmotivated. This deprioritization means that South Africa is unlikely to emerge as a prominent military or intelligence cyber power anytime soon. The wider lack of national prioritization will also make it harder for so-called like-minded states—which are bound together by a mutual respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—to form an effective partnership with South Africa on the topic of cybersecurity. South Africa’s approach to international cyber governance debates has been cautious and noncommittal, reflecting cyber diplomacy’s relatively low priority in its national strategy. What position South Africa takes in cyber debates is, however, of keen interest to the international community. An important question is whether South Africa will support the existing multistakeholder approach to cyber governance that is championed by like-minded states or join China and Russia in their efforts to recalibrate this approach and push for greater state control over cyberspace. Indeed, under President Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa has not yet published its national position explaining how international law applies to cyberspace. A related question is whether South Africa will join like-minded states in elaborating how existing international law applies to cyberspace or side with China and Russia to campaign for new, bespoke international law (for example, treaties) to regulate this domain. When examining these questions, it is important to recognize the context of the ANC’s long-standing ties with Russia, both during its thirty years in government and in its previous decades struggling for national liberation. This is helpful for understanding South Africa’s interactions with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (which form the BRICS bloc with South Africa) and forecasting its future positions in cyber governance debates. For example, South Africa has been reluctant to unambiguously condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and it appears to have supported Moscow by covertly supplying it with weapons. In the longer term, South Africa’s positions in cyber diplomacy debates will likely be shaped by trends in both domestic politics—such as the ANC’s waning electoral performance—and the success of digital development. In this context, it is perhaps advisable for like-minded states, such as the United States, to focus on cyber capacity-building assistance and ensure that these efforts play into the wider development agenda in South Africa.
Topic:
Corruption, Poverty, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, and Racial Justice
Political Geography:
Africa, Iran, and South Africa

14. Constraining Iran’s Nuclear Potential in the Absence of the JCPOA

Author:
Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Since 2019, Iran has significantly expanded its sensitive nuclear activities, which has irreversibly altered the pathways available to Iran if the decision were made to develop nuclear weapons. The proliferation risk posed by Iran’s nuclear advances is amplified by the monitoring gaps that Tehran created by reducing IAEA access and monitoring. Iranian officials have long denied any interest in nuclear weapons but there are new signs that Iran may rethink the prohibition on nuclear weapons if security conditions change. Iran’s technical expertise cannot be reversed, and its nuclear infrastructure is less vulnerable to attack. As a result, military strikes against Iran would set back the program, but only temporarily, and risk driving Tehran to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran has signaled its willingness to de-escalate tensions, including on its nuclear program. Leaders in Washington should seize this opportunity to incentivize Tehran to take steps that increase monitoring of its nuclear program and reduce proliferation risk. The experience of the 2015 nuclear deal demonstrated the limitations of transactional bargaining. The regional nuclear environment also has shifted since 2015 and there is an increased risk that additional states will seek to match Iran’s capabilities. The United States should be thinking now about alternative frameworks for negotiating a longer-term nuclear deal, or series of deals, that take into account Iran’s nuclear advances and mitigate regional proliferation risks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, JCPOA, and Monitoring
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

15. The Aras Corridor: Azerbaijan's Rationale Behind the Deal with Iran

Author:
Rahim Rahimov
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Since the 2020 Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia and its subsequent push for the Zangezur Corridor, Baku, and Tehran have been embroiled in fierce waves of escalation. With the launch of construction works for the Aras Corridor as the purported replacement to the Zangezur Corridor, the two nations appear to have made a breakthrough, and a thaw can be seen in current bilateral relations. In lieu of Baku’s strong push for the Zangezur Corridor over the last three years, the change in direction triggers the immediate question as to why Azerbaijan agreed to the Aras Corridor deal with Tehran. In order to properly address this question, it is essential to distinguish Azerbaijan’s Zangezur Corridor project from its Zangezur discourse, which can otherwise lead to misunderstandings. The main reason for Baku’s concession to the Aras Corridor deal with Tehran and backtracking from the Zangezur Corridor is that Baku has achieved its objectives in the Zangezur discourse. Having achieved those objectives, the Zangezur Corridor alone, without the discourse, is of mere local importance to Azerbaijan. Yet the hype around it still persists, with the subsequent international reactions having made the topic somewhat toxic for Azerbaijan.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

16. The BRICS Expansion: Prerequisits and Anticipated Threats

Author:
Mariam Macharashvili
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On January 1st, 2024, BRICS officially expanded. Initially, it was expected that six new states would become members of this club representing the “Global South” - Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Argentina. However, Argentina changed its mind at the last minute due to the election of Javier Milei as president. Unlike his predecessor, Alberto Fernandez, Milei is changing the vector of the country’s foreign policy from the «South» to the «West». Despite predictions of its breakup due to heterogeneity, the BRICS bloc has lasted longer than anticipated. During its time, the number of BRICS members has doubled, and there are still many countries interested in joining. As the BRICS countries strengthen their massive economy and even bigger goals, their ability to influence the world order increases, which may ultimately pose a threat to the entire Western free world. This paper will seek to provide brief answers to the following questions within the frame of expert opinion: 1. What is BRICS? 2. What events led to its expansion? and 3. What threats should we expect from the strengthening of the bloc?
Topic:
Alliance, BRICS, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Iran, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

17. Israel against Iran: regional conflict scenarios in 2024

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Four scenarios capture the main dynamics of conflict between Israel and the US on the one hand, and Iran and the axis of resistance on the other. They are: ‘a fight for the status quo’, ‘shifting red lines’, ‘limited war’ and ‘total war’. The first two scenarios amount to muddling through under the permanent threat of escalation, which could happen due to unintended yet possibly catastrophic incidents. The more warlike scenarios signify a shift to high-intensity war across large parts, or all, of the region. As 7 October 2023 created tighter linkages between the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and the regional conflict between Israel/US and Iran, the violent dynamics of either issue can trigger each scenario. Meanwhile, scenario pathways lie so close to each other that tipping points can swiftly transform one scenario into another. Together, the scenarios point to the need to develop conflict prevention measures between Israel, the US and Iran – such as hotlines, protocols that spell out red lines and tolerable action/reaction bandwidths or even demilitarised zones – between now and the US presidential elections in November. The core strategic objectives of the conflict parties suggest that progress is possible. Israel seeks to restore the security of its northern border without an all-out war against Hezbollah or Iran. It also intends to continue occupation. It does not care enough about normalisation with Saudi Arabia to discontinue annexation, which means it will not alter the regional security order to an extent that could truly threaten Iran. Tehran, in turn, seeks good relations with the Persian Gulf states, recognition as a regional power and the isolation of Israel. The US wishes to uphold Israel’s security by reducing the risk of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, but without triggering a region-wide, high-intensity conflict. A precarious balance might be achieved, for example if Israel halts the in-your-face elements of its expanding occupation, a reinforced UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) takes up position on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border, US sanction enforcement against Iran is somewhat loosened and the axis of resistance, including Iran, observes a longer-term ceasefire regarding Israel.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Regional Politics, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

18. The Gaza War: Military Quagmire, Political Labyrinth

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
As the Israeli conflict in Gaza marks its third month, Israel has been unable to achieve military decisiveness. The resolution of the hostage issue and the administration of the Strip remain uncertain. Russia and Iran have taken advantage of the situation to strengthen their positions, leading to an expansion in the circle of those opposing Israel.
Topic:
Hamas, Armed Conflict, Hostage Crisis, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

19. The G7’s Geoeconomic Future: Insights from Conflicts with Russia, China, and Iran

Author:
Claudia Schmucker, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Avi Shapiro
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
In an increasingly conflictual global environment, the G7 has become a more and more important geoeconomic actor. Yet looking at the case studies of Russia, Iran, and China reveals that the geoeconomic role the G7 plays has been mixed. For the G7 countries to improve their geoeconomic impact, they need to align their interests and risk perceptions, as well as improve their ability to propose and enact geoeconomic measures. In addition, the G7 should bolster its partnerships with other democracies and like-minded countries.
Topic:
Partnerships, G7, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

20. The War on Gaza and Middle East Political Science

Author:
Marc Lynch, Ibrahim S. I. Rabaia, Fiona B. Adamson, and Alexei Abrams
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:
This special issue of POMEPS Studies offers a platform for scholars to think through what feels like a moment of rupture for the Middle East, for Middle East Studies, and for long-standing assumptions about the region’s politics. This POMEPS collection originated as an open call for papers for scholars affected by or invested in these urgent issues, in an initial effort to give a platform and a voice to those in our network who have grappled with these trends. We kept the call intentionally broad, asking potential authors to reflect on the effects of October 7 and the Gaza War on politics or scholarship. As it turned out, most of the contributors wanted to talk about academic freedoms and the conditions of public discourse in their countries – perhaps because of how profoundly they felt this crisis, perhaps because of the availability of other platforms to discuss the war itself. The issues confronting our field have never been more urgent and the need for academic networks and institutions to rise up to defend it has never been greater.
Topic:
Civil Society, Diplomacy, Education, Genocide, Political Science, Institutions, Academia, Houthis, Forced Migration, Activism, October 7, 2023 Gaza War, and Frantz Fanon
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, Gaza, Germany, Jordan, Czech Republic, and Gulf Nations