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211. Framing of ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ and Saudi e-press

Author:
Nasser N. Alotaibi and Abida Eijaz
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The Saudi e-press coverage and treatment of the Operation Decisive Storm is examined through an analysis of media frames for the type of coverage, paths of persuasion, lexical choices, referential frameworks, framing strategies, and policy patterns for the Operation Decisive Storm campaign. Through content analysis of the op-ed pages of Al-Riyadh, Al-Madina, and Al-Youm, for the period from 26/03/2015 to 22/04/2015, the study concludes the following: political aspects formed a large proportion (90.3%) of the editorials covered in the Saudi e-newspapers, followed by the military developments, and the support for the legitimate Yemeni government. The supportive coverage reached (93.5%), indicating that the editorial policies of Saudi e-newspapers are in line with the policy of the leadership of Saudi Arabia. The results also revealed that fear/danger is commonly used as a strategy and Iran is used to create danger/fear not only for Yemen but for the entire Gulf region.
Topic:
Media, Leadership, Conflict, and The Press
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

212. The Gulf Scramble for Africa: GCC states’ foreign policy laboratory

Author:
Will Todman
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
When the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia descended into bloody conflict in 1998, few could have predicted where a peace agreement would be signed some 20 years later. On September 16, 2018, the Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders sat at desks facing one another in the middle of a lavish hall in the Peace Palace in Jeddah. A huge portrait of Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia’s first king, loomed over them. King Salman bin Abdulaziz sat underneath, with Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and the secretary general of the United Nations Antonio Guterres on either side. The optics were clear: It was under Saudi sponsorship that decades of conflict ended. The deal would be known as the “Jeddah Peace Agreement.”1 The Jeddah Peace Agreement is the latest example of Arab Gulf states’ increasingly assertive interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. Although the Arabian Peninsula shares historic religious, economic, and linguistic links with parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have rapidly deepened their economic and security ties across the African continent in the last decade, and a growing diplomatic role has followed. Gulf states are seeking to demonstrate their status on the world stage by acting as powerbrokers in African conflicts, and they have also attempted to secure the backing of African states in their own disputes. As they prepare to play a more significant role on the world stage, GCC states have come to view sub-Saharan Africa as a laboratory in which they can test more assertive international interventions.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Strategic Stability, Foreign Interference, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Africa, Gulf Nations, and Sub-Saharan Africa

213. The Arab Gulf States and Iran: Military Spending, Modernization, and the Shifting Military Balance

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas Harrington
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The military balance between Iran, its Arab neighbors, and the United States has been a critical military issue in the Middle East since at least the rise of Nasser in the 1950s. The risks this arms race presents in terms of a future conflict have not diminished with time, and many elements of the regional arms race have accelerated sharply in recent years. Clashes with Iran in the Gulf, struggles for influence in Iraq and Syria, and the war in Yemen all act as warnings that new rounds of conflict are possible. The Iranian reactions to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA nuclear agreement, the growing tensions between the Arab Gulf states, the boycott of Qatar, and the unstable outcome of the fight against ISIS, and the Syrian civil war all contribute to an increasingly fragile and dangerous security environment.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

214. After the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi: Muhammad bin Salman and the Future of Saudi-U.S. Relations

Author:
F. Gregory Gause III
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
On October 24, 2017, Muhammad bin Salman (MBS), the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, welcomed over 3,500 of the world’s financial elites to a conference center adjoining the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Riyadh for an “economic coming-out party.”1 The crown prince was selling investors and government officials on his plans for the transformation of the country, not just its economy but also its society. His Vision 2030 plan to lessen the economy’s dependence on oil and increase the role of the private sector required investment, both from at home and abroad.2 It was a glittering show, featuring plans for a new city on the Red Sea coast, Neom, which would be staffed at least in part by robots. Within a few weeks of this impressive gathering, hundreds of the Kingdom’s economic and political elites were prisoners in that same Ritz Carlton. One year after the conference, self-exiled Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed by agents of the Saudi government in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. When the crown prince convened a second investment conference in Riyadh, a “Davos in the desert” as some billed it, in October 2018, the guest list was much reduced. A number of high-profile political leaders and CEO’s backed out, including the U.S. treasury secretary, the president of the World Bank, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the CEOs of JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, Credit Suisse, BNP Paribas, and the London Stock Exchange.3 While $50 billion in investment deals were announced, over $30 billion were with Saudi Aramco, the state oil company.4 In the year between the two conferences, the crown prince suffered a number of setbacks that called into question both his judgment and his political capacity. The killing of Jamal Khashoggi was simply the most recent in that line. Whether the killing was directly ordered by the crown prince or the work of close aides who believed they were carrying out his wishes, the ultimate responsibility rests with him. Some of those setbacks can be attributed to MBS’s own decisions; others simply reinforced the fact that there are considerable obstacles confronting his ambitious plans. His regional foreign policy initiatives, in particular, have not worked out as he had hoped. But these setbacks do not mean that the crown prince’s days are numbered in the Saudi leadership. He has successfully consolidated power in his own hands in a way that is unprecedented in recent Saudi history. The Trump administration, which hitched its wagon to MBS in an imprudent and counter-productive way, now has to decide how to use the fallout from this crisis to change MBS’s behavior, avoiding the extremes of a purely symbolic reaction that has no effect on Saudi policy and the unrealistic goal of declaring, as Trump ally Senator Lindsey Graham did, that the crown prince “has got to go.”5
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Authoritarianism, and Assassination
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

215. Stockholm Declaration: Re-producing the Houthis in Yemen Under the Auspices of the UN

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Although the first round of Sweden talks led to soaring expectations that a change will take place in the course of the Yemeni crisis from the path of war to that of negotiation, its outcome is limited to the settlement of the humanitarian crisis, which the UN envoy underlined in his statement to the Security Council following the negotiations. The issues pertaining to the crux of the conflict will likely be addressed in the second round, scheduled at the end of next January, which should include the comprehensive framework for the settlement, as a road-map for shaping Yemen’s post-war future, and solving political and security issues. The outcome of the first round sought to neutralize the manifestations of the Houthi “militiation”, not to end it. It can also be argued that the outcome equates between the parties to the crisis in terms of tasks, implementation mechanisms and the formed committees under the auspices of the UN, a key indicator that risks transforming the Houthi movement into a major party in the Yemeni scene under the aegis of the UN.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Conflict, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

216. Turbulent Times: Possible Repercussions of the Attack in Ahvaz on Iran

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The attack in the city of Ahvaz which targeted the military parade organized by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the Iranian army on September 22, 2018, on the occasion of the so-called “Sacred Defense Week”, indicates that Iran is set to experience tough times on more than one front. This is the case given the fact that the attack coincides with the continued internal protests over deteriorating living conditions, due to the government’s failure to contain the various economic woes, and the growing pressure of the US sanctions, as the strongest batch, on November 4, looms large on the horizon.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Violence, Donald Trump, Hassan Rouhani, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Gulf Nations

217. Gulf Powers: Maritime Rivalry in the Western Indian Ocean

Author:
Eleanore Ardemagni
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The Western Indian Ocean (the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian/Persian Gulf) is the new Gulf powers’ battlefield. Saudi Arabia and Iran, as already in the Middle East, are vying for hegemony in this sub-region: the Gulf monarchies also compete for influence, especially after the 2017 Qatari crisis and Doha’s boycott by neighbours. Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman but also Turkey, struggle to acquire geopolitical leverage in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO). Nowadays, the multipolar system which shapes International Relations maximizes the geostrategic relevance of WIO, at the crossroads between Eastern Africa, the Gulf, and Southern Asia. In these waterways, regional and international players share security and energy interests (as freedom of navigation), but they also compete, more and more, for local alliances, commercial ports, and/or military agreements and bases. In the WIO, China and India are designing rival nodes of influence: the Chinese “One Belt, One Road” initiative (OBOR), which adapted the previous “string of pearls” strategy, pushed New Delhi to counterbalance Beijing’s plans with a policy of connectivity in the sub-region. For the Gulf powers, maritime politics enters a new protagonist season: WIO is its basin. The Gulf “pivoted to East” since the 2010s, in terms of energy export, trade and market routes, investments, and infrastructures. Gulf monarchies’ strategies of economic diversification, as the Saudi “Vision 2030”, have further enhanced this trend: would-be post-oil economies need Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and partners for infrastructural projects. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pursue a new interventionist and military-driven foreign policy: this pro-active posture has to be supported by maritime power and sea expertise, as demonstrated by the military operation in Yemen. On the other shore of the Gulf, Iran seeks economic modernization and recovery after years of international sanctions: Iranian port throughput increased after 2015. Asian markets can boost trade and investments in Teheran, helping the Islamic Republic to develop a new set of alliances since Iran also aims to upgrade its naval power. Gulf powers’ maritime competition in the WIO crafts fresh alignments with Asian and Eastern African players, adding to the traditional map of rivalries in the Indian Ocean (India vs Pakistan; China vs India). This intra-Gulf competition can be traced along three vectors of geostrategic influence: commercial ports, military agreements and bases, and choke-points.
Topic:
Power Politics, Geopolitics, Economy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Indian Ocean, and Gulf Nations

218. The Evolution of Energy Fluxes and Cooperation Models in the Middle East

Author:
Robin Mills
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Despite its dominance as the world’s key exporting region of hydrocarbons, energy connectivity within the Middle East, in the form of cross-border oil and gas pipelines, electricity grids and related institutions, is lagging. There has been limited progress in the Eastern Mediterranean area and with Turkey. But so far unfavourable commercial conditions, persisting subsidies, and regional political suspicions and disputes, have hampered progress. Key changes in the world energy market – a period of lower oil prices, with the expansion of US shale production, the globalisation of natural gas trade, the rise of renewable energy, and growing action on climate change – should encourage more intra-regional links. To realise the prize of 25 billion to more than 100 billion US dollars of savings available from greater energy trade, regional states will have to liberalise energy markets, establish multilateral institutional frameworks, and make the most of support from international energy corporations and influential political players, notably the US, China, EU and Russia. Paper prepared in the framework of the IAI-Eni Strategic Partnership, December 2018.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Natural Resources, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Middle East and Gulf Nations

219. Assessing the JCPOA from a Historical Perspective

Author:
Christian Koch, Marc Finaud, and Bernd W. Kubbig
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This Policy Forum issue analyses the 2004-2006 initiative to establish a sub-regional zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Gulf (GWMDFZ) as a tool to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-weapon state. The initiative’s gradual approach which aimed at the ultimate goal of encompassing the entire Middle East (including Israel) was innovative, and the assertive role of some smaller Gulf states in expressing their security concerns/interests and verification standards that Tehran would have had to meet was unprecedented. But the entire sub-regional idea remained confined to the declaratory level. In contrast, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or greement/accord) – endangered as it currently is – struck between the E3/EU+3 and Iran exceeds some of the concerns of the earlier initiative, yet misses others. We conclude that new – and ultimately sustainable – regional forums as communication mechanisms are needed to tackle these issues without touching on the JCPOA. The challenges go beyond Iran and include the nuclear activities of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and even more so of Saudi Arabia. Our Cooperative Idea emphasises that moving beyond the purely declaratory policy of the GWMDFZ initiative could also help to overcome the current stalemate regarding a zonal disarmament arrangement for the whole Middle East/Gulf region.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

220. A New Egyptian Track II Approach to the WMD/DVs-free Zone in the Middle East/Gulf

Author:
Mona Ahmed Saleh
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This Policy Forum issue revisits the stalemate in the negotiations of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (WMD/ DVs-Free Zone) in the Middle East/Gulf, which has been negatively impacted by several regional developments. It starts by highlighting the basic gap in the different conceptions of such a zone by the Egyptian-led Arab states, in addition to Iran, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other. Arguing from a comprehensive security perspective in the region, this Policy Forum issue presents a new Track II Cooperative Idea by viewing the establishment of the WMD/DVs-Free Zone as an incremental, multi-stage, long-term process that should take place on different tracks and should combine the traditionally incompatible calls for “Disarmament First!” and “Peace/Recognition First!” of the respective negotiating parties. While emphasizing how important it is to keep (in-)formal talks going – and to be patient – a Preparatory Commission for a WMD/DVs Treaty is proposed whose mandate would include special assignments for Track II actors.
Topic:
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Egypt, and Gulf Nations