Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Greece

171. The Greek “Rescue”: Where Did the Money Go?

Author:
Pablo Gabriel Bortz
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
This paper analyses the financial assistance provided to Greece in the first two rescue packages granted by the Troika (European Union, European Central Bank and IMF). It looks particularly carefully at claims by Sinn that a third of the public credit granted to Greece financed its current account deficit, while another third funded capital flight by Greek nationals, with only the remaining third used to pay creditors. The paper shows that Sinn inflates the assistance given to Greece by mixing several different concepts in the total. It also critically reviews the claim that the assistance was used to finance the current account deficit or capital flight by Greek citizens. Realistic accounting shows that 54% of the financial assistance provided to Greece was used to repay (foreign) debt, while another 21% was used to recapitalize Greek banks (some of which were owned by foreign institutions). Other claims about the rescue package are also analysed in relation to the treatment of Greek and foreign banking exposure to sovereign debt.
Topic:
Economics, Finance, Banking, and Development Assistance
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

172. Laid Low: The IMF, The Eurozone and the First Rescue of Greece

Author:
Paul Blustein
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
As Greece descended into a financial maelstrom in the spring of 2010, a small group of staffers at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) held top-secret talks with officials from the German and French finance ministries to discuss the idea of restructuring Greece’s debt. Many independent analysts believed a restructuring was inevitable because the country’s debt burden appeared unsustainable. But instead, the “Troika” — the tripartite group of lenders that included the IMF, the European Commission and European Central Bank — attempted to resolve the crisis by giving Athens bailout loans of unprecedented magnitude, piling debt atop debt. The idea considered in those secret talks would come to fruition only much later, in March 2012, when Greece received the largest debt relief in history. In the meantime, the rescue effort would go terribly awry, with consequences that continue to reverberate today as the euro area struggles with weak growth and a rekindled crisis in Greece. This paper tells the story of the first Greek rescue, focusing on the role played by the IMF. A detailed look back at this drama elucidates significant concerns about the Fund’s governance and its management of future crises. The Fund has come under attack for yielding to the clout of European policy makers and lending its credibility to a rescue that some of its senior staffers viewed with grave misgivings. The result, critics lament, tarnished the Fund’s reputation for technocratic judgment, rendering it less effective at promoting international stability. The 2010 rescue enabled Greece to avoid default at that point, which might well have sparked a global conflagration akin to the 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. European banks holding Greek bonds continued receiving payments of interest and principal for quite a long time thereafter, from the money lent by the Troika. But the interests of the Greek people were arguably sacrificed, and among economists there is widespread agreement that the country’s debt should have been restructured much sooner. In addition to shedding new light on what happened, this chronicle of events highlights the importance of the IMF’s acceptance, as a condition of its participation in the rescue, of a “junior partner” role in the Troika. This step is judged in the concluding section as being particularly ill-boding for the IMF’s ability to manage future crises, and policy recommendations are offered for alleviating the harm.
Topic:
Debt, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Fiscal Policy, Eurozone, and IMF
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

173. Fragile States Index 2015 – Annual Report

Author:
J. J. Messner, Nate Haken, Patricia Taft, Kendall Lawrence, Felipe Umana, Sebastian Pavlou, and Hannah Blyth
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Fund for Peace
Abstract:
The Fragile States Index, produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, The Fragile States Index—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.
Topic:
Reform, Ebola, Democracy, Fragile States, Domestic Politics, Sustainability, Health Crisis, Instability, and Uprising
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, Finland, Eastern Europe, Greece, Libya, Cuba, North Africa, Lebanon, West Africa, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Global Focus, and United States of America

174. Three Myths Behind the Case for Grexit: A Destructive Analysis

Author:
Photis Lysandrou
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
City Political Economy Research Centre (CITYPERC), University of London
Abstract:
Greece faces a stark choice: either to compromise on the terms laid down by its international creditors and thereby remain in the eurozone or reject any compromise on the terms and exit the eurozone. The Syriza government was elected in January, 2015, on the double promise that it would tear up the deeply unpopular memorandum imposed by the Troika while at the same keeping the euro. It was a promise that it could not keep. After several months of tough negotiations it has become clear that Greece's creditors, led by the German government, have no intention of accepting a renegotiated deal that substantively lightens Greece's debt burden and thus the need for the type of harsh austerity measures contained in the memorandum.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Government, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

175. Protest Diffusion and Cultural Resonance in the 2011 Protest Wave

Author:
Paulo Gerbaudo
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The 2011 protest wave, encompassing the Arab Spring revolutions, the Indignados movement in Spain and Greece, and the Occupy Wall Street movement has often been described as a new global protest cycle. However, the dynamics of diffusion suggest a more complex picture. Transmission of protest frames and repertoires from one country and cultural region to another was quite slow and tortuous. Moreover, adoption of the new ideas and practices of protest spawned by the protest wave of 2011 involved laborious dynamics of cultural translation and domestication. This situation points to the continuing importance of local protest cultures and cultural contexts, in addition to channels of transmission, even in an era of instantaneous communication technologies.
Topic:
Communications
Political Geography:
Greece and Arabia

176. 'Broken and Can't Be Fixed': The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Greek Party System

Author:
Susannah Verney
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Greek election of May 2012 failed to produce a government, resulting in repeat elections six weeks later. This shock outcome was a symptom of a broader delegitimation of the national political system. Over the past decade Eurobarometer data show a much more extensive loss of confidence in political institutions in Greece than in the European Union as a whole. In a first phase, rising political discontent was managed within the traditional political framework through alternation in power between the two major parties. In contrast, the second phase, following the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, led to the dramatic fragmentation of the party system and changed the mode of government formation. This process is not reversible and entails serious democratic dangers.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, and Government
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

177. Insecticide Resistance and Malaria A Threat Decades in the Making

Author:
William G. Brogdon, Anthony Fiore, S.P. Kachur, Laurence Slutsker, and Robert A. Wirtz
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Insecticide (DDT) use to control malaria was first employed successfully in the antimalaria program in Greece in 1947. By 1951, DDT success in controlling malaria was reported in 22 countries. However, that year also saw the first report of DDT resistance, in Anopheles sacharovi in Greece. By 1954, resistance to DDT among mosquitos was known to be a global problem, documented in Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Asia. The World Health Organization–led Global Malaria Eradication Program (GMEP) began in 1955, when resistance was already pronounced worldwide. Scientists did not identify the underlying biochemical mechanism contributing to insecticide resistance until 1958. By then, insecticide resistance was recognized by many to be a major contributor to the ultimate dismantling of GMEP, given the limited capabilities and knowledge of the time. Consequently, the global focus shifted from malaria “eradication” to malaria “control” in the late 1960s.
Topic:
Environment, Health, and Infectious Diseases
Political Geography:
Africa, Greece, and Asia

178. Sovereign Debt Crisis Management: Lessons from the 2012 Greek Debt Restructuring

Author:
Miranda Xafa
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
The 2012 Greek debt exchange was a watershed event in the euro area debt crisis. It generated fears of contagion and was viewed as a threat to the euro itself. Although it achieved historically unprecedented debt relief, amounting to €106 billion (55 percent of GDP), it was “too little, too late” in terms of restoring Greece's debt sustainability. There is a heated debate as to whether the debt restructuring should have taken place sooner, when Greece's adjustment program was agreed to in May 2010. This paper argues that a deep haircut up front, under threat of legislative action, would have been seen as unnecessary and deeply coercive. But delaying the restructuring beyond mid-2011, when it became clear that Greece's debt was unsustainable, was unjustified. The delay reduced the stock of privately held debt subject to a haircut, possibly making an official debt restructuring inevitable down the road. Initial fears that the Greek debt restructuring would pose a serious threat to the euro area's financial stability proved to be exaggerated. On the contrary, it demonstrated that an orderly default involving a pre-emptive debt restructuring is possible in a monetary union, provided appropriate firewalls are in place to limit contagion risks. With crisis management institutions and procedures now in place in the euro area, and with much stricter fiscal surveillance, the Greek experience is likely to remain unique in the history of debt restructurings; however, some lessons can be learned from its specific features.
Topic:
Debt and Governance
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

179. Staying on side: how to stop match-fixing

Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Transparency International
Abstract:
Transparency International, the Association of European Professional Football Leagues (EPFL) and the German Football League (DFL) came together to share experiences on how to reach our common goal: to raise awareness about match-fixing and develop educational materials and approaches to help prevent it. The project, which was co-funded by the European Commission, included representatives from Transparency International chapters and professional football leagues in Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal and the United Kingdom, and participation by leagues in Norway and Poland.
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Norway, Greece, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Italy, and Portugal

180. The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy

Author:
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch, and Mitu Gulati
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 stands out in the history of sovereign defaults. It achieved very large debt relief— over 50 percent of 2012 GDP—with minimal financial disruption, using a combination of new legal techniques, exceptionally large cash incentives, and official sector pressure on key creditors. But it did so at a cost. The timing and design of the restructuring left money on the table from the perspective of Greece, created a large risk for European taxpayers, and set precedents—particularly in its very generous treatment of holdout creditors—that are likely to make future debt restructurings in Europe more difficult.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece