Search

Begin New Search Topic Uranium Political Geography Global Focus

1. Dual Use in the DPRK

Author:
Margaret Croy
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Several states have succeeded in extracting “yellowcake” uranium from phosphoric acid as part of the phosphate fertilizer production process. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has both the means and motivation to undertake such work, thus significantly altering existing open-source assessments of how much yellowcake uranium North Korea could produce annually, which in turn affects estimates of how many nuclear warheads DPRK can make. There is ample rationale for the DPRK to pursue this method of uranium extraction. The dual usage of existing infrastructure would both conceal the activity and make it more difficult for international audiences to positively identify and condemn. The DPRK certainly needs fertilizer, and the information on how to extract uranium from its production is readily available. Lastly, this method of yellowcake production embodies the policy of byungjin—parallel nuclear-weapon development and economic expansion—a hallmark of Kim Jong Un’s strategy. Given these factors, the rationale for the pursuit of this method is clear. The evidence is even more so. The first section of the paper explains the science behind uranium extraction from phosphoric acid produced as an intermediary in the production of fertilizer from phosphate rock. The second section highlights some of the historical cases of states using this method to obtain uranium. The third section elucidates the reasoning and rationale for using this method in the DPRK, and the fourth section examines the open-source evidence available indicating that this method of obtaining uranium—however uncommon—is in use in the DPRK today, and is likely to continue and expand in scale.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Mining, Manufacturing, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Eyes on U: Opportunities, Challenges, and Limits of Remote Sensing for Monitoring Uranium Mining and Milling

Author:
Grace Liu, Joseph Rodgers, Scott Milne, Margaret Rowland, Ben McIntosh, Mackenzie Best, Octave Lepinard, and Melissa Hanham
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The mining and milling of uranium does not generally receive the attention that the subject deserves. Yet this overlooked aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle can offer analysts important clues about a country’s fissile-material production. This, in turn, helps inform highly sensitive inquiries, such as estimates of arsenal size and potential for growth. Geospatial technology is uniquely helpful as a discovery and verification tool. The production of fissile material is often a closely held state secret; even for states that report production levels to the International Atomic Energy Agency, these numbers can be difficult to verify. Remote-sensing technology, such as satellite imagery paired with change-detection algorithms, can help pierce the veil of state secrecy and overcome physical barriers to inform analysts about this vital first step in the nuclear fuel cycle. Occasional Paper #44—the final installment in a four-part series that uses open-source remote-sensing data to identify and monitor uranium mining and milling activities—examines these new tools and technologies in detail to demonstrate how analysts use them to detect, estimate, or verify uranium production. It explores different remote-sensing techniques and their various advantages, including traditional optical imagery, multispectral and hyperspectral images, and thermal and near-infrared images. It also discusses machine-learning algorithms as another tool for analysts examining large quantities of geospatial information in a relatively short amount of time. Though these technologies hold great promise for WMD analysts, there are limitations to their use. CNS Occasional Paper #44 discusses these current and future limits, and concludes by calling for increased collaboration between the commercial satellite industry and analytical organizations and verification regimes alike, as a way f
Topic:
Natural Resources, Mining, Minerals, Uranium, and Milling
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Open-Source Monitoring of Uranium Mining and Milling for Nuclear Nonproliferation Applications

Author:
Jeffrey Lewis, Melissa Hanham, Joshua Pollack, Catherine Dill, and Raymond Wang
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Uranium mines and mills offer an important focus for the analysis of fissile-material production. It is possible to combine traditional research techniques with new tools and technologies to estimate the production of yellowcake uranium. Such estimates can, in turn, be used to roughly estimate the throughput of a country’s nuclear fuel cycle. In some cases, this may help researchers to determine whether undeclared fuel cycle facilities exist and to estimate their capacity. This CNS Occasional Paper is the first in a series of papers funded by the MacArthur Foundation. It deals primarily with how researchers can use open-source information to monitor uranium mining and milling in the service of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation goals. Additional monographs will provide regional cases studies in North Korea, China, India, and Pakistan to demonstrate what these methods can reveal—and what they cannot. The final monographs look at the emerging, and potentially revolutionary, role of remote sensing for this application and gives policy recommendations.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Mining, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. The Case for Highly Enriched Uranium Free Zones

Author:
Andrew Bieniawski, Miles A. Pomper, and Elena Sokova
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Highly enriched uranium (HEU)—one of the key ingredients for nuclear weapons—is one of the most dangerous materials on the planet. Significant progress has been made over the past several years to eliminate all HEU from 26 countries and Taiwan. The creation of regional HEU-Free Zones would help cement a global norm against civilian HEU use in much the same way that Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones have strengthened global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. In many cases, only one or two countries in each proposed regional HEU-Free Zone have small amounts of remaining HEU, presenting an opportunity for countries to take action prior to the Nuclear Security Summit in 2016. This concept paper was developed by a working group on “The Elimination of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications,” a project of the Fissile Materials Working Group, a coalition of eighty civil society organizations committed to improving fissile materials security. Initial work on the concept was also funded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus