Search

Begin New Search Topic Tax Systems Political Geography Global Focus

1. Revenue Collection and Social Policies: Their Underestimated Contribution to Social Cohesion

Author:
Francesco Burchi, Christoph Strupat, and Armin von Schiller
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Development Institute (DIE)
Abstract:
Social cohesion is an important precondition for peaceful and economically successful societies. The question of how societies hold together and which policies enhance social cohesion has become a relevant topic on both national and international agendas. This Briefing Paper stresses the contribution of revenue collection and social policies, and in particular the interlinkages between the two. It is evident that revenue mobilisation and social policies are intrinsically intertwined. It is impossible to think carefully about either independently of the other. In particular, revenue is needed to finance more ambitious social policies and allow countries to reach goals, such as those included in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Similarly, better social policies can increase the acceptance of higher taxes and fees. Furthermore, and often underestimated, a better understanding of the interlinkages between revenue generation and social policies can provide a significant contribution to strengthening social cohesion – in particular, concerning state–citizen relationships. In order to shed light on these interlinkages, it is useful to have a closer look at the concept of the “fiscal contract”, which is based on the core idea that governments exchange public services for revenue. Fiscal contracts can be characterised along two dimensions: (i) level of endorsement, that is, the number of actors and groups that at least accept, and ideally proactively support, the fiscal contract, and (ii) level of involvement, that is, the share of the population that is involved as taxpayer, as beneficiary of social policies or both. In many developing countries, either because of incapacity or biased state action towards elite groups, the level of involvement is rather low. Given the common perception that policies are unjust and inefficient, in many developing countries the level of endorsement is also low. It is precisely in these contexts that interventions on either side of the public budget are crucial and can have a significant societal effect beyond the fiscal realm. We argue that development programmes need to be especially aware of the potential impacts (negative and positive) that work on revenue collection and social policies can have on the fiscal contract and beyond, and we call on donors and policy-makers alike to recognise these areas as relevant for social cohesion. We specifically identify three key mechanisms connecting social policies and revenue collection through which policy-makers could strengthen the fiscal contract and, thereby, enhance social cohesion: 1. Increasing the effectiveness and/or coverage of public social policies. These interventions could improve the perceptions that people – and not only the direct beneficiaries – have of the state, raising their willingness to pay taxes and, with that, improving revenues. 2. Broadening the tax base. This is likely to generate new revenue that can finance new policies, but more importantly it will increase the level of involvement, which will have other effects, such as increasing government responsiveness and accountability in the use of public resources. 3. Enhancing transparency. This can stimulate public debate and affect people’s perceptions of the fiscal system. In order to obtain this result, government campaigns aimed at diffusing information about the main features of policies realised are particularly useful, as are interventions to improve the monitoring and evaluation system.
Topic:
Development, Finance, Economic growth, Tax Systems, Transparency, and Social Cohesion
Political Geography:
Germany and Global Focus

2. Beneath the Surface: The Case for Oversight of Extractive Industry Suppliers

Author:
Robert Pitman and Kaisa Toroskainen
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Large oil, gas and mining projects are usually associated with a few big names such as Shell, Exxon, Rio Tinto, Gazprom and Codelco. These are rights holders—companies that receive licenses from host governments to extract resources. Typically, however, lower-profile companies do much of the work to take natural resources out of the ground. These are suppliers—companies that provide the goods and services that make extraction happen. They range in size from multibillion-dollar international conglomerates to specialized or local firms that may only have a handful of employees. This report makes the case for greater oversight of extractive industry suppliers. It explains the economic significance of extractive industry suppliers and identifies the main stakeholders involved in supplier governance. It considers policy areas where the impacts of poor supplier governance play out and reviews how governments, rights holders, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and suppliers are beginning to share information on the economic impacts of suppliers, how these disclosures feature in global transparency and reporting initiatives and what more can be done.
Topic:
Corruption, Natural Resources, Tax Systems, Coronavirus, Industry, COVID-19, and Revenue Management
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. A Race to the Bottom and Back to the Top: Taxing Oil and Gas During and After the Pandemic

Author:
David Manley, David Mihalyi, and Colin Fleming
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Earlier this year as people around the world responded to the coronavirus pandemic, their demand for oil tumbled. At the same time, OPEC and Russia initially failed to agree to coordinate supply cuts. Consequently, the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil fell from $60 in December 2019 to $20 in April 2020. As of this publication, the price is $43. If the price stays low, and if oil executives expect the price to remain low, companies may lobby governments to reduce taxes and other costly regulations. Payments to governments are often larger than costs for a company, so there is pressure on governments to reduce taxes to keep projects viable. This briefing considers the following key questions: Where will the oil price go next? What is the impact on currently operating projects, undeveloped projects, and those that are yet to be discovered? How should governments respond in changing oil and gas taxes? Will governments try to “race to the bottom,” but then lose a race back to the top? Key messages: There’s no certainty over future prices. Some rise is likely in the next few years, even if an energy transition results in a structural decline in the oil price in the longer-term. Governments must consider this uncertainty and probable rise when taxing oil and gas. Tax breaks on most currently operating projects are likely a waste of public money. Some governments may be pressured into reducing tax on projects awaiting development. But they must identify which projects would become viable with lower taxes, and which do not need a tax break. If in doubt, governments should consider whether a project that needs a tax incentive really will provide value for the country. For most countries, relative to total oil and gas produced, the production from projects that could be delayed or cancelled is small. But not so for the “new producer” countries like Senegal and Guyana. Changing taxes to make a country more attractive has the most impact before companies have invested – e.g., in attracting investment in licensing rounds. But setting low taxes now could force a government to raise taxes later if prices rise again. If a tax break is unavoidable, governments could use a “sunset clause” to limit the duration of the tax break. Ideally, governments should set progressive tax regimes that respond to changes in profit. But as many taxing authorities struggle to measure profit, governments could set simpler tax regimes based on sales revenue or prices – but must prepare to change tax rates in the future, and be prepared for the repercussion for a government’s credibility with investors. Governments should disclose contract terms detailing tax changes, tax exemptions, incentives and estimated break-even prices of projects to help government auditors, local think tanks, and the public check and support tax policy decisions.
Topic:
Oil, Natural Resources, Gas, Tax Systems, Commodities, Coronavirus, and Revenue Management
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. The Rising Importance of Non-tariff Measures and their use in Free Trade Agreements Impact Assessments

Author:
Monica Hernandez
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University
Abstract:
This research examines non-tariff measures (NTMs) and their use in impact assessments of free trade agreements (FTAs) based on computable general equilibrium models (CGE) as well as its implications. We show that projected gains related to FTAs tend to rely on removing ‘actionable’ NTMs and that, usually, impact assessments and empirical studies that provide this recommendation lack case-specific explanations behind actionability as well as of the channels and the way NTM elimination is supposed to improve welfare. We also find that the estimated economic gains from FTAs based on CGE models tend to be small and based on a high percentage of NTM elimination, which underestimates the social significance of these measures. Since NTMs comprise measures that target not only economic aspects but also social and environmental ones, indiscriminate NTM elimination suggests that small gains may come at a high cost.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Tax Systems, Free Trade, and Non-Tariff Measures
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion

Author:
Timothy Besley, Anders Jensen, and Torsten Persson
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and is the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in 1990 of a poll tax to fund local government in the UK, which led to widespread evasion. The evidence is consistent with the model’s main predictions on the dynamics of evasion.
Topic:
Political Economy, Economy, Financial Crimes, and Tax Systems
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Global Focus

6. Tax Audits as Scarecrows: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment

Author:
Ricardo Perez Truglia, Matias Giaccobasso, Guillermo Cruces, Rodrigo Ceni, and Marcelo Bergolo
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:
The canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by optimally trading off between the costs and benefits of evasion. However, there is no direct evidence that firms react to audits in this way. We conducted a large-scale field experiment in collaboration with Uruguay’s tax authority to address this question. We sent letters to 20,440 small- and medium-sized firms that collectively paid more than 200 million dollars in taxes per year. Our letters provided exogenous yet nondeceptive signals about key inputs for their evasion decisions, such as audit probabilities and penalty rates. We measured the effect of these signals on their subsequent perceptions about the auditing process, based on survey data, as well as on the actual taxes paid, based on administrative data. We find that providing information about audits had a significant effect on tax compliance but in a manner that was inconsistent with Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Our findings are consistent with an alternative model, risk-as-feelings, in which messages about audits generate fear and induce probability neglect. According to this model, audits may deter tax evasion in the same way that scarecrows frighten off birds.
Topic:
Economics, Global Political Economy, Tax Systems, Economic Policy, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
United States, Argentina, and Global Focus

7. Taxing multinational corporations in the 21st century

Author:
Gabriel Zucman
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP)
Abstract:
Globalization and the rise of intangible capital have increased tax avoidance opportunities for large firms dramatically. 40% of multinational profits are shifted to tax havens each year globally and the United States loses about 15% of its corporate income tax revenue because of this shifting. I discuss the evidence on the redistributive effects of international tax competition. I then present a proposal to reform the corporate tax that would remove any incentive for firms to shift profits or move real activity to lowtax places. Contrary to a widespread view, it is possible to tax multinational companies (potentially at high rates) in a globalized world, even in the absence of international policy coordination.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, Regulation, Multinational Corporations, Tax Systems, Economic Policy, and Economic Theory
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8. Tax Smoothing in Frictional Labor Markets

Author:
David M. Arseneau and Sanjay K. Chugh
Publication Date:
01-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
We re-examine the optimality of tax smoothing from the point of view of frictional labor markets. Our central result is that whether or not this cornerstone optimal fiscal policy pre- scription carries over to an environment with labor market frictions depends crucially on the cyclical nature of labor force participation. If the participation rate is exogenous at business- cycle frequencies — as is typically assumed in the literature — we show it is not optimal to smooth tax rates on labor income in the face of business-cycle shocks. However, if households do optimize at the participation margin, then tax-smoothing is optimal despite the presence of matching frictions. To understand these results, we develop a concept of general-equilibrium efficiency in search-based environments, which builds on existing (partial-equilibrium) search- efficiency conditions. Using this concept, we develop a notion of search-based labor-market wedges that allows us to trace the source of the sharply-contrasting fiscal policy prescriptions to the value of adjusting participation rates. Our results demonstrate that policy prescriptions can be very sensitive to the cyclical nature of labor-force participation in search-based environments.
Topic:
Markets, Labor Issues, and Tax Systems
Political Geography:
Global Focus