Search

Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Power Political Geography Global Focus

21. Security Concerns about Chinese Investments: Nuclear Power and Telecommunications

Author:
Yang Jiang, Aki Tonami, and Adam Moe Fejerskov
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
China actively seeks to expand its overseas investment in critical infrastructure. This involvement makes host countries uneasy especially in the West, even though financial benefits sometimes override broader national interests and security issues. China’s attempts to invest in overseas critical infra- structure, defined as infrastructure closely related to sovereignty and national security, has become a sensitive issue to host country governments parti- cularly in the West. They fear that Chinese investment in nuclear and telecommunications infrastructures entails consequences for nuclear security and safety and information security respectively. This policy brief provides an overview of how various countries have received Chinese interest in nuclear power and telecommunications.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Security, Nuclear Power, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China and Global Focus

22. Nuclear Energy Basics, Part 2: Reactors and Nuclear Fuel Making

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Many of the materials, facilities, and technologies used to produce nuclear energy can be used to create nuclear weapons material. In nearly all stages in the production of peaceful nuclear energy, it is difficult to differentiate between peaceful activities and those useful to produce explosive materials for nuclear weap- ons. The purpose of this primer is to inform the reader about the basic steps of the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear energy production, and to draw attention to those aspects of the fuel cycle that present the greatest nuclear weapons proliferation risks.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. Nuclear Energy Basics, Part 1: Fission, Fusion, and the Bomb

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), a 501(c)3 nonprofit organization, is a nonpartisan, educational organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists, and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

24. SERIOUS RULES FOR NUCLEAR POWER WITHOUT PROLIFERATION*

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski and Victor Gilinsky
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
In this chapter, we try to step back from the day-to- day struggles in Washington, DC, over nuclear non- proliferation policy to ask what measures we would need to have in place to be reasonably confident that expanding nuclear power globally will not increase the number of nuclear weapons-armed states. We recognize that, since the start of the Atoms for Peace Program in the mid-1950s, the United States has sup- ported worldwide use of nuclear power. It also has op- posed the spread of nuclear weapons and supported measures to control the nuclear weapons proliferation risks inherent in spreading nuclear technology for civilian purposes. The principal administrative ele- ments of this nonproliferation effort are the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the associated in- spection activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as various national and inter- national export controls.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

25. White House Narratives on the Iran Nuclear Deal

Author:
Michael Scott Doran
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, United States House of Representatives
Topic:
International Affairs and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

26. Should We Let The Bomb Spread

Author:
Henry Sokolski (ed)
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
In 1966, Leonard Beaton, a journalist and strategic scholar, published a short book that asked must the bomb spread.1 Mr. Beaton’s query reflected the profound alarm with which proliferation was viewed shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Today that alarm is all but absent: Now, not only is proliferation increasingly viewed as a given (more of a fact than a problem), but some security experts actually see advantages in nuclear weapons spreading or, at least, little harm. Cultivation of this latter view took time—nearly a half century— and considerable scholarship. In 1981, Kenneth Waltz popularized French and American finite deterrence thinking of the late 1950s by asking whether or not nuclear weapons in more hands might be better. His answer was yes. As nuclear weapons spread, he argued, adversaries would view war as being self-defeating and peace would become more certain.
Topic:
International Affairs and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

27. The Nuclear Terrorism Threat: How Real Is It?

Author:
Michael Brian Jenkins and John Lauder
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
NPEC Working Paper 1602, “The Nuclear Terrorism Threat: How Real Is It?” presents two opposed views on the threat of nuclear terrorism. Brian M. Jenkins, a Rand analyst and a leading expert on nuclear terrorism, argues that the threat is overblown. John Lauder, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Nonproliferation Center, argues the opposing case that the threat is growing and we need to be hedging against it now.
Topic:
Terrorism, International Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

28. How Dark Might East Asia’s Nuclear Future Be?

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
NPEC Working Paper 1601, “How Dark Might East Asia’s Nuclear Future Be?” contains detailed projections of what the future holds for a more nuclear-armed China, Japan, North Korea and South Korea. None are predictions. The volume’s purpose is to encourage deeper debate about the security implications of nuclear proliferation in East Asia.
Topic:
International Affairs and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

29. Alternative North Korean Nuclear Futures

Author:
Shane Smith
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
On February 12, 2013, North Korea’s state media announced that it had conducted a third nuclear test “of a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power…demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK's nuclear deterrence that has become diversified.”[1] Since then, there has been renewed debate and speculation over the nature and direction of North Korea’s nuclear program. Can it develop weapons using both plutonium and uranium? How far away is it from having a deliverable warhead and how capable are its delivery systems? How many and what kind of weapons is it looking to build? These are not easy questions to answer. North Korea remains one of the most notoriously secret nations, and details about its nuclear program are undoubtedly some of its most valued secrets. Yet, the answers to these questions have far reaching implications for U.S. and regional security.
Topic:
International Affairs and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

30. Improving the Security of All Nuclear Materials

Author:
Mark Fitzpatrick, Elena Sokova, Miles A. Pomper, Laura Rockwood, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, and Matthew Cottee
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
About four-fifths of the weapons-usable nuclear materials in the world are in non-civilian programmes. This means not only as the explosive core in active or reserve nuclear weapons, but also as fuel in naval and military research reactors, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium at production sites, in storage, or declared excess to military uses, but not yet transferred to other programmes or eliminated. Yet coordinated global efforts to enhance the security of nuclear materials have been almost exclusively concentrated on the estimated 17% of such nuclear materials in the civilian sector. Ideally, all HEU and plutonium of the same grade should have at least the same level of adequate security regardless of the possessor or purpose, since the materials pose the same threat. In practice, however, the security of materials can vary depending on whether they are used in the civilian or military sectors. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (CPPNMNF – as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was renamed after the 2005 amendment came into force in May 2016), as well as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) security guidelines such as INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, describe how civilian materials should be secured. No such explicit guidelines exist on how to secure materials outside of the civilian sector. Nor is there comprehensive public knowledge about the state of security of such materials in all countries with nuclear weapons programmes. It has often been asserted that nuclear materials in non-civilian use are well protected because they are under military control. However, the number of troubling security breaches involving nuclear material in military use, as well as some examples involving civilian nuclear facilities, belies this casual assumption, underscoring why the world should not simply accept the unsubstantiated ‘solemn word’ of authorities that security is as tight as needed. The list of incidents includes insider threats, peaceful incursions for demonstration purposes, theft, armed attack, and, most recently, over-flights by drones and computer hacking. Our report includes a number of examples of incidents at civilian facilities as well because they demonstrate areas of vulnerability that may also apply to the noncivilian sector. The record offers a compelling case for why security must be enhanced for all nuclear material.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus