21. The Strategic Implications of the Tashkent Conference
- Author:
- Urs Unkauf
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- This essay is devoted to a consideration of a matter of fundamental geopolitical importance that has gone largely unnoticed in the West, to its detriment. The trigger event, so to speak, was a remarkable conference that took place not in Washington, Brussels, or Moscow—but in Tashkent. On 15‑16 July 2021, Uzbekistan’s capital hosted delegations from nearly 50 countries, among them China, Russia, India, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and all the Central Asia countries, at the level of foreign ministers or above. To understand the issues at play and the consequences thereof, we will need to spend some time discussing what actually took place during the conference itself, which was entitled “Central and South Asia: Regional Connectivity: Challenges and Opportunities.” In addition to relating the explicit agenda of the conference, we will also examine its broader agenda (whether intended or not) and conclude with an examination of its potentially far‑reaching geostrategic implications. The Tashkent conference was geared not only to government officials, but also towards leading scholars, experts, and media representatives from all over the world who follow developments in at least one of these two regions. In his opening address, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev affirmed his country’s readiness to take up new leadership responsibilities in the region, which aligns with the domestic economic and social reform agenda he launched upon coming to power following the death of his predecessor, Islam Karimov, in September The Strategic Implications of the Tashkent Conference 2016. The host’s speech was followed by opening statements from Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan, whose delegations also exchanged informal views during the conference. Here a somewhat digressive remark is in order. When the conference was in its planning stage, the fall of the Ghani government in Afghanistan had not been anticipated. Still, one of the conference’s working group sessions was devoted to the devolving situation in Afghanistan. By that stage, the conference’s more astute participants were seeing the writing on the wall. Those who could not, of course, came to their senses less than a month later. Either way, the Taliban’s takeover of the country has put both Central and South Asia more firmly on the international geopolitical agenda— the recent events in Kazakhstan, which began as this issue of Baku Dialogues was being finalized, have also played a role in drawing attention back to the Silk Road region. But to come back to Mirziyoyev’s opening address. In the context of announcing a new, open foreign policy strategy for the country, Uzbekistan’s President made it clear that his country is centrally focused on strengthening regional connectivity. His announcement stressed that the focus would be on further deepening economic and cultural cooperation between Central Asia and South Asia—two regions that are linked historically as well as economically yet have not so far been able to transform this inherited potential towards proper policymaking in recent years. The Tashkent conference was advertised as being about enhancing regional interconnectivity, trade, and cooperation between Central Asia and South Asia—as well as presenting the host country’s new cross‑regional foreign policy strategy. But as Edward Lemon wrote in the Fall 2021 edition of Baku Dialogues, the conference also served to demonstrate that the emerging regionalism—a topic raised by the concerning countries themselves and not from outside—will be a leitmotif for future geostrategic developments in the Silk Road region.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Silk Road
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus