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Begin New Search Topic Biological Weapons Political Geography Global Focus

1. Horror or Hype: The Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism

Author:
Lasha Giorgidze and James K. Wither
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials attract the attention of terrorists motivated to inflict mass casualties and create mass panic. CBRN includes a wide array of materials, some of them very difficult to acquire, although others are of a dual-use nature. Dualuse materials can be used to construct CBRN weapons, but also have licit civilian applications. Though not all CBRN weapons are weapons of mass destruction, they can still cause massive disruption and fear in a targeted society. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the potential threat from terrorists’ use of CBRN weapons. It discusses the technical opportunities and constraints of each type of weapon and presents relevant historical and contemporary examples and case studies involving terrorist use of CBRN. The paper also assesses the contemporary threat. It examines how CBRN-related information is shared via terrorist propaganda on the internet and messaging applications, why terrorists might be motivated to use CBRN materials, and the constraints on their ambitions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Internet, Biological Weapons, Chemical Weapons, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Bio Plus X: Arms Control and the Convergence of Biology and Emerging Technologies

Author:
Kolja Brockmann, Sibylle Bauer, and Dr Vincent Boulanin
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Technological advances in the biological sciences have long presented a challenge to efforts to maintain biosecurity and prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. The convergence of developments in biotechnology with other, emerging technologies such as additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence and robotics has increased the possibilities for the development and use of biological weapons. This report, written by SIPRI experts on technology and arms control, provides a nuanced picture of the risks and challenges posed by this convergence. It analyses the extent to which concerns arising from new technological developments can be dealt with through existing governance mechanisms. Based on the limitations identified, the authors recommend the action that needs to be taken by national governments, international organizations, academia, the private sector and the DIY community.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Affairs, Arms Trade, Biological Weapons, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Revisiting Compliance in the Biological Weapons Convention

Author:
James Revill
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Since the collapse of negotiations around a protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 2001, states parties have begun to discuss several novel issues linked to the broader implementation of the BWC as part of a series of intersessional meetings. While initially fruitful, this approach has generated diminishing returns in the last five years. Moreover, in addressing these broader issues of implementation, biological disarmament diplomacy has largely neglected the thorny issue of compliance. Compliance with the BWC is more than a simple binary choice to sign a commitment not to develop or produce biological weapons. It requires the adherence to all the obligations, both negative and positive, undertaken by BWC states parties in signing and ratifying the convention. In the BWC context, this is complicated by the ambiguity surrounding certain obligations, changes in science and security, and the limited resource capacity of some states to fulfill their obligations. Under such circumstances, without episodically revisiting compliance, there remains the risk that BWC will become ever more fragmented, outmoded and poorly implemented. Although many states insist strengthening the convention can only be achieved through a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding verification protocol, this is not politically feasible for the foreseeable future. Nor is this necessarily true; an incremental approach to strengthening the convention could be pursued, dealing with mutually reinforcing components of the regime in a balanced manner and laying the foundations for future work, if and when it becomes politically expedient to proceed. This Occasional Paper proposes a number of activities that could be pursued as part of an incremental approach to revisiting compliance with the BWC.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Biological Weapons, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Biology’s Misuse Potential

Author:
Filippa Lentzos
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
The international community has laid down clear red lines about the use of biology to enhance national armaments. Advances in bioscience and biomedicine are, however, significantly eroding technological barriers to acquiring and using biological weapons. This article describes recent scientific trends and analyses their security implications. Three emerging fields of research that have particularly high potential for misuse are considered in more detail: potentially pandemic pathogens, synthetic biology and neurobiology. It is argued that continued efforts are required in multilateral, national and scientific spheres to strengthen the red lines and to foster responsible science.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Biological Weapons, Pandemic, Biology, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Biotechnology E-commerce: A Disruptive Challenge to Biological Arms Control

Author:
Raymond A. Zilinskas and Philippe Mauger
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Current approaches to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons rely heavily on the operation of export controls for equipment used in the production or dissemination of biological agents. Concerned that the emergence and growth of biotechnology e-commerce has significantly disrupted the effectiveness of such export controls, the British Commonwealth and Foreign Office funded a study in June 2014 for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) titled “The Internet as a Source for Dual-Use Technologies of Biological Weapons Concern: Policy Implications and Governance Options,” to research the biological arms-control problems presented by biotechnology dual-use products and technologies sold via the Internet (e-commerce), and to determine how these problems could be addressed.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Biological Weapons, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Alternatives to High-Risk Radiological Sources

Author:
Miles A. Pomper, Egle Murauskaite, and Tom Coppen
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
There is growing global awareness of the need to secure radiological sources in order to prevent terrorists from using such materials in a radiological weapon, such as a “dirty bomb.” A new CNS report calls for a move towards permanently reducing this threat by substituting non-isotopic alternatives for these sources in civil uses. As an initial step, the authors propose a move towards gradual phase-out of cesium chloride use in pre-transfusion blood irradiation on a global scale – a domain where non-isotopic alternatives are considered to be the most viable in the short-term. They urge United States to launch an international initiative involving the phase out of cesium-chloride and other high-risk radiological sources as a “gift basket” for the upcoming 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. Cesium chloride is one of the most commonly used radiological materials, despite being an IAEA Category 1 “extremely dangerous” source. Because cesium chloride is easily dispersible, water soluble, and relatively easy to handle, it is particularly suitable for terrorist purposes. The blood irradiators that use it as a source are located in many large hospitals and blood banks (inherently publicly accessible spaces), and the source is usually transported through regular civilian infrastructure at the beginning and the end of its lifecycle, giving more cause for concern. Cesium chloride based irradiators are used to treat blood and blood products prior to transfusion in order to prevent a rare but fatal Graft Versus Host Disease (GVHD). A growing number of non-isotopic alternatives are becoming available for that purpose, but there is a serious lack of awareness about the range of options and how they compare to current practices, both among the medical professionals and national regulators.
Topic:
Health, Biological Weapons, Radiological Weapons, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. Can Scientific Codes of Conduct Deter Bioweapons?

Author:
Jeanne Guillemin
Publication Date:
04-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
At least since the First World War, when the German army sabotaged the Allies’ pack animals with anthrax and glanders, worldwide concern about biological weapons has focused on how to improve legal restraints against biological weapons (BW). Over these same years, the major powers have vacillated in their willing- ness to promote international treaties and laws against BW programs. At the end of the Cold War, hopes were high for a global consensus to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), making it a standing organization comparable to that of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and an expanded man- date to ensure compliance. Instead, in the name of national security, the United States has recently promoted an emphasis on voluntary measures. One of these, the international adoption of biosecurity codes of conduct, puts the burden on elite scientists to solve a prob- lem of weapons proliferation that can be better addressed by effec- tive legal restraints.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Biological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus