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431. Segment and rule: Modern censorship in authoritarian regimes

Author:
Kun Heo and Antoine Zerbini
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
We analyze the incentives of authoritarian regimes to segment access to censored content tthrough technology. Citizens choose whether to pay to access censored online content at a cost fixed by the regime: the firewall. A low firewall segments access and generates more compliance than full censorship – a high firewall – ever could. Regime opponents self-select into consuming censored content, and comply conditional on positive independent reporting. Regime supporters exclusively consume state propaganda, which secures their compliance. This segment-and-rule strategy can be engineered by making local news outlets uninformative, or by affecting the intrinsic benefit from access.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Internet, and Censorship
Political Geography:
Global Focus

432. Theory of developmental dictatorship

Author:
Hyungmin Park
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
This article studies the developmental motives of a dictator under the modernisation hypothesis. He faces a trade-off between pursuing higher future gains with growing threats from the rise of the middle class and accepting lower gains for a more stable regime. I show that his optimal strategy is to invest in an underdeveloped economy for higher future returns. As the economy matures, investment declines as the focus shifts toward maintaining the regime. Without this threat, the economy regresses or fully develops depending on the profitability of investment and regime stability. My framework helps explain empirical puzzles about why some underdeveloped autocracies achieve faster economic growth. I also analyse how steady state varies by the length of future horizon under consideration. Contrary to Olson (1993)’s traditional theory that longer horizon concern makes high development, I find that a farsighted decision-making leads to a lower steady state.
Topic:
Economy, Dictatorship, Modernization, Decision-Making, and Regime Durability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

433. Falsedades y mitos en los estudios sobre migraciones: consecuencias para las Relaciones Internacionales

Author:
José Miguel Bravo and Pablo Rey-García
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
La reproducción de nociones falsas y mitos en los estudios sobre migración disminuye la credibilidad en su conexión con las Relaciones Internacionales y la Seguridad. Para evitar eso, proponemos la utilización del escepticismo creativo como herramienta académica. De esta manera, valoramos el área de estudios sobre migración analizando su desarrollo institucional y la calidad de sus resultados de investigación. Como segundo paso, describimos los seis mitos más persistentes en los estudios sobre migración en las siguientes áreas: en el del Derecho; en el de las Políticas Públicas; en el de la Demografía; en el de la Economía; en el de la Cooperación y el desarrollo y, en el de la Cultura, por la importancia que para estas investigaciones tienen las distintas etnias y religiones. Concluye el artículo con ejemplos de las implicaciones que el uso de mitos tiene para las relaciones internacionales entre Estados miembros de la Unión Europea.
Topic:
International Relations, Migration, Immigration, Myths, and Pseudoscience
Political Geography:
Global Focus

434. AI and the Evolution of Biological National Security Risks: Capabilities, Thresholds, and Interventions

Author:
Bill Drexel and Caleb Withers
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Not long after COVID-19 gave the world a glimpse of the catastrophic potential of biological events, experts began warning that rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) could augur a world of bioterrorism, unprecedented superviruses, and novel targeted bioweapons. These dire warnings have risen to the highest levels of industry and government, from the CEOs of the world's leading AI labs raising alarms about new technical capabilities for would-be bioterrorists, to Vice President Kamala Harris’s concern that AI-enabled bioweapons “could endanger the very existence of humanity.”1 If true, such developments would expose the United States to unprecedented catastrophic threats well beyond COVID-19’s scope of destruction. But assessing the degree to which these concerns are warranted—and what to do about them—requires weighing a range of complex factors, including: The history and current state of American biosecurity The diverse ways in which AI could alter existing biosecurity risks Which emerging technical AI capabilities would impact these risks Where interventions today are needed This report considers these factors to provide policymakers with a broad understanding of the evolving intersection of AI and biotechnology, along with actionable recommendations to curb the worst risks to national security from biological threats. The sources of catastrophic biological risks are varied. Historically, policymakers have underappreciated the risks posed by the routine activities of well-intentioned scientists, even as the number of high-risk biosecurity labs and the frequency of dangerous incidents—perhaps including COVID-19 itself—continue to grow. State actors have traditionally been a source of considerable biosecurity risk, not least the Soviet Union’s shockingly large bioweapons program. But the unwieldiness and imprecision of bioweapons has meant that states remain unlikely to field large-scale biological attacks in the near term, even though the U.S. State Department expresses concerns about the potential bioweapons capabilities of North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China. On the other hand, nonstate actors—including lone wolves, terrorists, and apocalyptic groups—have an unnerving track record of attempting biological attacks, but with limited success due to the intrinsic complexity of building and wielding such delicate capabilities. Today, fast-moving advancements in biotechnology—independent of AI developments—are changing many of these risks. A combination of new gene editing techniques, gene sequencing methods, and DNA synthesis tools is opening a new world of possibilities in synthetic biology for greater precision in genetic manipulation and, with it, a new world of risks from the development of powerful bioweapons and biological accidents alike. Cloud labs, which conduct experiments on others’ behalf, could enable nonstate actors by allowing them to outsource some of the experimental expertise that has historically acted as a barrier to dangerous uses. Though most cloud labs screen orders for malicious activity, not all do, and the constellation of existing bioweapons norms, conventions, and safeguards leaves open a range of pathways for bad actors to make significant progress in acquiring viable bioweapons. But experts’ opinions on the overall state of U.S. biosecurity range widely, especially with regard to fears of nonstate actors fielding bioweapons. Those less concerned contend that even if viable paths to building bioweapons exist, the practicalities of constructing, storing, and disseminating them are far more complex than most realize, with numerous potential points of failure that concerned parties either fail to recognize or underemphasize. They also point to a lack of a major bioattacks in recent decades, despite chronic warnings. A more pessimistic camp points to experiments that have demonstrated the seeming ease of successfully constructing powerful viruses using commercially available inputs, and seemingly diminishing barriers to the knowledge and technical capabilities needed to create bioweapons. Less controversial is the insufficiency of U.S. biodefenses to adequately address large-scale biological threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate. Despite COVID-19’s demonstration of the U.S. government’s inability to contain the effects of a major outbreak, the nation has made limited progress in mitigating the likelihood and potential harm of another, more dangerous biological catastrophe. New AI capabilities may reshape the risk landscape for biothreats in several ways. AI is enabling new capabilities that might, in theory, allow advanced actors to optimize bioweapons for more precise effects, such as targeting specific genetic groups or geographies. Though such capabilities remain speculative, if realized they would dramatically alter states’ incentives to use bioweapons for strategic ends. Instead of risking their own militaries’ or populations’ health with the unwieldy weapons, states could sabotage other nations’ food security or incapacitate enemies with public health crises from which they would be unlikely to rebound. Relatedly, the same techniques could create superviruses optimized for transmissibility and lethality, which may considerably expand the destructive potential of bioweapons. Tempering these fears, however, are several technical challenges that scientists would need to overcome—if they can be solved at all. The most pressing concern for biological risks related to AI stems from tools that may soon be able to accelerate the procurement of biological agents by nonstate actors. Recent studies have suggested that foundation models may soon be able to help accelerate bad actors’ ability to acquire weaponizable biological agents, even if the degree to which these AI tools can currently help them remains marginal.2 Of particular concern are AI systems’ budding abilities to help troubleshoot where experiments have gone wrong, speeding the design-build-test-learn feedback loop that is essential to developing working biological agents. If made more effective, emerging AI tools could provide a boon to would-be bioweapons creators by more dynamically providing some of the knowledge needed to produce and use bioweapons, though such actors would still face other significant hurdles to bioweapons development that are often underappreciated. AI could also impact biological risks in other ways. Technical faults in AI tools could fail to constrain foundation models from relaying hazardous biological information to potential bad actors, or inadvertently encourage researchers to pursue promising medicinal agents with unexpected negative side effects. Using AI to create more advanced automated labs could expose these labs to many of the risks of automation that have historically plagued other complex automated systems, and make it easier for nonspecialists to concoct biological agents (depending upon the safety mechanisms that automated labs institute). Finally, heavy investment in companies and nations seeking to capitalize on AI’s potential for biotechnology could be creating competition dynamics that prioritize speed over safety. These risks are particularly acute in relation to China, where a variety of other factors shaping the country’s biotech ecosystem also further escalate risks of costly accidents.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Biosecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

435. Starr Forum: The 2024 US presidential election: The world is watching

Author:
Katrina Burgess, John Githongo, Prerna Singh, Daniel Ziblatt, and Evan Lieberman
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Starr Forum: The 2024 US presidential election: The world is watching: Wednesday, October 2nd, 2024. Experts weigh-in on how citizens and leaders from other world regions are viewing the November 5th US election. What do they believe is at stake for their countries and regions? Is America still seen as a model for democracy? How do they view the candidates? SPEAKERS: Katrina Burgess on Latin America. Katrina Burgess is professor of political economy and director of the Henry J Leir Institute of Migration and Human Security at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. Her research areas include Latin America, political economy of development, comparative politics, and migration and diasporas. She is the writer and producer of Waylaid in Tijuana, a documentary film that explores US immigration policies. "Courting Migrants: How States Make Diasporas and Diasporas Make State," is one of her award-winning books. John Githongo on Africa. John Githongo hails from Kenya, where he was a journalist and became a leading light in the international Transparency movement. He has held a variety of government, non-government and academic appointments, and was recognized by Foreign Policy magazine as one of the world’s 100 top global thinkers. Among his many posts, he serves as a senior advisor to the Office of the President of South Sudan on governance. He currently resides at the MIT Center for International Studies as its prestigious Robert E Wilhelm fellow. Prerna Singh on Asia. Prerna Singh is the Mahatma Gandhi Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Brown University. Her research interests include the comparative political economy of development; identity politics; and the politics of South Asia and East Asia. Her book, "How Solidarity Works for Welfare: Subnationalism and Social Development in India," analyzes the causes of variations in social welfare institutions and development by focusing on the dramatic divergences in social policies and outcomes across Indian provinces. Daniel Ziblatt on Europe. Daniel Ziblatt is the director of Harvard University's Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies where he is also Eaton Professor of Government at Harvard University. His research focuses on Europe and the comparative study of democracy. His recent book, "Tyranny of the Minority: Why American Democracy Reached the Breaking Point," co-authored with Steve Levitsky, provides an analysis of American democracy in comparative perspective. Moderator: Evan Lieberman is the Total Professor of Political Science and Contemporary Africa and the director of the MIT Center for International Studies. He conducts research on the political-economy of development, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. He studies the democratic politics of governing ethnically and racially diverse societies, including the challenges of public health, climate adaptation, and ensuring respect for human dignity. Lieberman is the author, most recently, of "Until We Have Won Our Liberty: South Africa after Apartheid."
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democracy, Domestic Politics, Donald Trump, Presidential Elections, and Kamala Harris
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

436. Strengthening Reintegration Support to Boys Formerly Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups Who Are Victims/Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

Author:
Barbara Buckinx and Charu Lata Hogg
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
This policy report summarizes insights from a workshop held in Bogotá, Colombia, on December 4, 2023, titled, “Strengthening Reintegration Support to Boys Formerly Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups Who Are Victims/Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.” The workshop was organized by the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD), All Survivors Project (ASP), and the UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (OSRSG CAAC).
Topic:
Armed Forces, Children, Sexual Violence, Armed Conflict, and Reintegration
Political Geography:
Colombia and Global Focus

437. The Olympics: Arenas of Contention

Author:
Jung Woo Lee
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Political tensions simmered under the facade of international communion at the Paris 2024 Games as countries competed both on and off the stage
Topic:
Politics, Sports, Olympics, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
France and Global Focus

438. Feminist Technology Diplomacy: An FFP Approach to Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Elise Stephenson and Isobel Barry
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
Abstract:
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has rapidly gained global momentum, with technological developments spurred on by generative AI and increased automation across military, medical, humanitarian, and educational domains, hastening the need to prioritise good international governance. To realise the gains whilst mitigating the risks of AI, robust governance frameworks are required to which feminist foreign policy (FFP) approaches are relevant. AI regulation that focuses on mitigating harms toward minoritised groups, particularly women, should be a critical priority for governments and international organisations. Failing to address these issues risks disenfranchising half the global population, ultimately leading to missed opportunities for gains in productivity and efficiency driven by AI advancements.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Women, Feminism, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

439. A Feminist Foreign Policy Approach to Counter-terrorism

Author:
Shannon Zimmerman
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
Abstract:
This brief explores what a feminist foreign policy approach to counter-terrorism might look like. A key role of foreign policy is to ensure a state’s national security. However, the field of national security in most countries is deeply gendered. State approaches to addressing terrorism and violent extremism are no exception to this, despite clear evidence that gender-sensitive approaches to counter-terrorism and preventing/countering violence extremism are more effective. This brief highlights the value added by including feminist approaches to counter-terrorism and explores what such an approach might entail. Last, it describes how Australia might apply a feminist approach to its current counter-terrorism activities to ensure initiatives are more comprehensive, effective and sustainable.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, and Feminism
Political Geography:
Australia and Global Focus

440. Populist opposition is threatening progress on climate change

Author:
Edoardo Campanella and Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Driven by the push to decarbonize the world and achieve net zero emissions by 2050, a new anti-elite revolt is in the making in developed economies: If mainstream parties ignore the losers of the green transition as they did with globalization, climate populism not only will slow the adoption of climate policies but could also shake Western democracies. Climate policies are a perfect target for populist rhetoric: They rely on expert knowledge, entail globalist thinking and action, and the counterfactual nature of their benefits—avoiding disasters that would otherwise happen—gives ample fodder for conspiracy theories. And their costs are unevenly shared, hitting those at the bottom of the income distribution significantly harder than those at the top. Climate populism is particularly a problem on the far right, where doubts about science and opposition to international cooperation are strongest. Policies need to deal with this rising political opposition. Given the depth of their grievances, and as it is often the case with populism, it is unlikely that voters antagonistic to climate policies will be persuaded by rational arguments. What will change their behavior are economic incentives. If green technologies are cheaper than fossil fuel ones, they will be adopted to save money rather than the planet. Thus the costs of the green transition need to be reduced through more open trade in the short run and more innovation in the long run. In addition, those who support climate policies need to be mobilized through more engaging political strategies, more emotional narratives, and more bottom-up policy approaches.
Topic:
Climate Change, Populism, Decarbonization, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus