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401. Development of Operational Thinking in the German Army in the World War Era

Author:
Gerhard Gross
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Historians and military figures, especially British and American individuals, again and again raise the question of why the German army was - at least for a time - so successful in battle in the world war era despite its inferiority in materiel and personnel. In addition to tactical capabilities, the explanations given often include the operational capabilities of the German land forces. While Geoffrey P. Megargee and Shimon Nahev are critical in their assessment of the Wehrmacht's operational achievements because of specific German command and control problems and Naveh points out that there is no coherent theory behind Germany's operational thinking, others emphasize the outstanding operational capabilities of the German army. Edward N. Luttwak describes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as follows: “In fact it was an operation very much in the German style: elegant, full of risks, and most profitable.” Robert M. Citino goes even further. He draws a direct line from the Schlieffen Plan to Desert Storm, the most successful American military operation since World War II. The key to success lay in the decision to wage a war of maneuver, which was well-planned and thought-out, as well as the establishment of clear points of main effort - a fact any German officer is aware of. Both writers suggest that the Germans had a timeless art of command and control, the main factors of which – the establishment of points of main effort, risk awareness, speed and maneuver – were broadly adopted by American and Soviet officers. In this paper, I will present a short outline of the development of operational thinking in the German army in the world war era.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Germany

402. "Military Doomsday Machine"? The Decisions for War 1914

Author:
Holger Herwig
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
On 28 June 1914 the heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne was assassinated. The Austrian government alleged official Serbian involvement, issued an ultimatum, and, rejecting negotiation, began hostilities on 29 July with a bombardment of Belgrade. In a linked series of decisions, four other major European powers—Germany, Russia, France, and Britain—joined the struggle. Ultimately, twenty-nine nations, including Japan and the Ottoman Empire, would be involved. In all instances, the decision makers recognized the inherent hazards. They knew their choices could enlarge the conflict and significantly escalate the dimensions of the struggle.
Political Geography:
Britain, Russia, Europe, France, and Germany

403. Politics by other means: Canadian "Strategy" and the Italian Campaign, 1943

Author:
Christine Leppard
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In 1939 Canada entered World War Two with a tiny military and obsolete kit. Four years later, Canada had raised a five division, two corps army that was defending the shores of Dover, although the immediate threat of German invasion had long since passed. Instead of joining the Allied war in North Africa the Canadian army remained, in the words of Army Commander Andrew McNaughton, the “dagger pointed at the heart of Berlin,” ready and waiting to go ashore in North-West Europe whenever the long-awaited invasion finally came. This posture pleased the Canadian public, who well versed in the laurels won by Arthur Currie and the Canadian Corps in the Great War, anticipated a similar role for the entire Canadian army in the liberation of Europe. Plus, Canada's expected role in the main invasion would bolster its esteem among its more powerful allies, Britain and the United States. Although Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King was speaking about Canadian public opinion when he told one of his cabinet minister's that “he laughed best who laughed last,” it surely also applied to Mackenzie King's view of what Canada's post-war role would be: one with a newly minted role for Canada as an independent ally, neither wholly British nor wholly American, standing independent and tall within the British Commonwealth and the United Nations.
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Canada, Germany, and United Nations

404. The Evolution of Strategic Thinking in World War I: A Case Study of the Second Battle of the Marne

Author:
Michael Neiberg
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In his often-cited but infrequently read classic, On War, Carl von Clausewitz famously observed that war is an extension of politics by other means. Exactly what that now ubiquitous phrase means remains a topic of considerable scholarly debate. Generally speaking, however, a consensus has emerged that Clausewitz was urging policy makers to tie their use of military force to the political ends they wished to achieve. By keeping ends and means in harmony, political leaders can mitigate risk and avoid dangers like the phenomenon we now call mission creep. This consensus also cites nineteenth-century Prussia as a model for how to achieve Clausewitz's vision; Otto von Bismarck, the wily Prussian/German chancellor, kept his war aims limited to the abilities of the Prussian army while taking great care not to involve his state in a long war that he feared it might not win. He therefore had an appropriate understanding of what military force could achieve, and, maybe more importantly, what it could not achieve. As a result, he formed the unified Germany under Prussian dominance that was his strategic goal at an appropriate cost to his state's resources.
Political Geography:
Germany and Prussia

405. Strategy "in a microcosm": Processes of tactical learning in a WWI German Infantry Division

Author:
Christian Stachelbeck
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Despite the defeat of 1918, the tactical warfare of German forces on the battlefields against a superior enemy coalition was often very effective. The heavy losses suffered by the allies until well into the last months of the war are evidence of this. The tactical level of military action comprises the field of direct battle with forces up to division size. Tactics – according to Clausewitz, the “theory of the use of military forces in combat” – is the art of commanding troops and their organized interaction in combined arms combat in the types of combat which characterized the world war era – attack, defense and delaying engagement.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Germany

406. The German Army and the Defense of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle 1918-1939.

Author:
Matt Bucholtz
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For decades historical research dedicated to the study of the German army, or Reichswehr, before the Second World War has been dominated by a single overriding question: How did the German army create Blitzkrieg? Studies, both popular and academic, have focused on German offensive doctrine and the leading figures responsible for its creation, in an attempt to understand the stunning German victories of the first half of the Second World War. While this has led to a fuller appreciation of the various characteristics of combined arms warfare, it has also generated a skewed vision of the German army that does not accurately portray its operation, activities, strategic outlook, and doctrinal breadth. Matthias Strohn's work, The German Army and the Defense of the Reich provides a much-needed counter-weight to the existing 'Blitzkrieg' centric historiography of the Reichswehr between the First and Second World Wars.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Germany

407. Minorities and Green Political Thought: Normative challenges to an ideal ethics?

Author:
Tove H. Malloy
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues
Abstract:
What does Green minority action do to our traditional views of minorities as conflict-prone, rights claiming entities that defy definition and pose constant tension in normative political theory? Normally concerned with justification of such issues as the right to existence, the right of self-determination, the protection of culture and language, and steeped in discourses of politics and struggles for recognition as well as of identity and difference, and multiculturalism versus egalitarianism, political theory has confined itself to addressing minority issues in terms of normative accommodation. The arrival on the scene of Green political thought has not c hanged this (as yet) but the empirical facts may force normative political theorists to engage with Green theory as well as impel Green political thought to address normative minority accommodation. It is the possibility of the latter that I will explore in this paper.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, and Minorities
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, Denmark, Latin America, North America, and Mexico

408. The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II

Author:
Yoko Iwama
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Institution:
Japan Association of International Relations
Abstract:
Yinan He adds yet another book on the subject of post-war reconciliation. The aim of her book is to examine the validity of two theories, that of standard realist theory of international relations, and that of 'national mythmaking theory', in explaining the process and outcome of reconciliation between countries. For this purpose, she examines two post-World War II cases, Sino-Japanese and (West) German-Polish relations. In the end, Yinan He wishes to establish why reconciliation is achieved in some cases and not in others.
Topic:
International Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Germany, and Tokyo

409. Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan

Author:
Michael W. Donnelly
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Institution:
Japan Association of International Relations
Abstract:
How the welfare state and capitalism coexist is an enduring and highly contentious research question. According to Margarita Estevez-Abe, Japan's welfare state is not easily classified in standard, comparative ways. Despite relatively modest government social spending and benefit levels, for decades the country achieved an egalitarian form of capitalism. Existing theories have been unable to explain the Japan puzzle, we are warned, the odd combination of equality, meager redistributive social spending, and extensive protection from market risk without heavy taxes and massive government expenditures. Yet, recent shifts in welfare policies make explanation all the more urgent.
Topic:
Government
Political Geography:
China and Germany

410. Berlin Reportedly Mulling New Approach To Stagnancy of Bosnia

Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
European Affairs
Institution:
The European Institute
Abstract:
In a succinct up-date report on Bosnia, the geo-political analysis website, Stratfor, predicts a German-led initiative on the Western Balkans. Here is an excerpt on Bosnia from the larger Stratfor analysis of the Balkans.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Bosnia and Germany