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1681. Reconsidering the Greater Europe Concept in the Context of the Ukrainian Crisis

Author:
A. Kuznetsov
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The Ukrainian Storm of 2013-2014 pushed the world dangerously close to Cold War. The coup and the bloodshed which swept the country were caused by the refusal of the Yanukovich regime to draw closer to the EU no matter what rather than by the fairly acute social, economic and political disagreements inside the country. The consecutive packages of anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the European Union and coordinated, to a great extent, with the U.S. and several other non-european allies look very logical in the context of the stalled dialogue between the two key European players. it was in 2012-2013 that many of the expert community recognized an absence of a more or less noticeable progress in moving toward a visa-free regime between the EU and Russia and in settling other important bilateral issues for what it really was: the EU’s unwillingness to develop equal partnership with Russia rather than technical discrepancies (according to Brussels). Its attention was riveted to the Eastern Partnership program designed, among other things, to detach CIS countries from Russia and draw new dividing lines in Europe.
Topic:
Political Violence, Armed Struggle, Sanctions, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

1682. Strategic Insights: Guyana-Venezuela: The Essequibo Region Dispute

Author:
Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
While the rest of the world is concerned about the refugee crisis in Europe, the conflict in Syria, and the potential contenders in the U.S. presidential elections of 2016, there is a brewing dispute between Guyana and Venezuela in Latin America. As a result of this diverted attention, there are few reports regarding the instability of an already fragile region. The dispute between the two nations centers on the lands west of the Essequibo River of Guyana. This stretch of land covers 40 percent of Guyana’s sovereign territory and, according to experts, is rich in gold, bauxite, diamonds, and other natural resources. The dispute over control of the Essequibo region was initially settled by international arbitration in 1899, awarding the Guyana Government the region. However, the Venezuelan Government has rejected the final decision granting Guyana the Essequibo region; and, since the 19th century, it has been laying claim to this vast mineral rich area, alleging that the decision was fraudulent and therefore null (see map of Guyana)
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Natural Resources, Territorial Disputes, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe, Latin America, Venezuela, and Guyana

1683. The Hour of Truth: The Conflict in Ukraine–Implications for Europe’s Energy Security and the Lessons for the U.S. Army

Author:
Dr. Ariel Cohen and Ivan Benovic
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, a number of gas disputes between Russia and Central and Eastern European countries have unveiled the strategic dependence of Europe on Russian piped gas. The recent Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that Europe has a desperate need to improve the security of its gas supply. The United States is interested in the economic stability and growth of Europe, because the European Union (EU) is its principal and largest economic partner. The United States and the EU enjoy the largest trade and investment relationship in the world, which should not be jeopardized by disruptive, anti-status-quo powers. Europe’s energy independence is not only an economic interest of America, but also a political and security one. Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas undermines European unity and weakens the primary U.S. allies in their relations with Russia. U.S. Armed Forces in Europe and the U.S. Army in particular can and should play an important role in promoting energy security. This involvement includes: increased situational awareness; deployment to the sensitive areas; and enhanced training activities, including with the allies of the U.S. military in Central and Eastern Europe.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Military Affairs, and Gas
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Soviet Union

1684. A Russian View on Landpower

Author:
Keir Giles and Major General Aleksandr V Rogovoy
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Russia’s seizure of Crimea, and ongoing operations in eastern Ukraine, have refocused attention on the Russian military as a potential cause for concern in Europe. This Letort Paper, by an influential Russian general and military academic, lays out specifically Russian views on the essential nature of strong conventional land forces, and how they may be used. With an expert commentary providing essential context and interpretation, the Paper presents a valuable insight into Russian military thinking, at a potentially critical juncture for European security.
Topic:
Security, War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Crimea

1685. Ukraine’s relations with the EU and Russia: Why geopolitics and domestic reforms are linked

Author:
Iryna Solonenko
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
This paper discusses Ukraine’s choice between maintain relations with the EU and Russia, a choice that is not merely a foreign policy choice or a choice between two integration models. Rather, it represents a choice between two normative orders or two different value systems. If Ukraine succeeds in pursuing the European model and breaking away from its tradition of a “captured state,” Russian leverage in Ukraine will also diminish. Therefore, undertaking this transformation is of crucial – if not existential – importance for Ukraine. The very survival of Ukraine’s statehood will depend on it.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

1686. Strategic Bombing if Possible, but Possibly not Strategic Bombing: an examination of ends, ways, and means and the use of strategic airpower during the Great War

Author:
Dr. Randall Wakelam
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This paper is an offshoot of research conducted in preparation for the University of Calgary History conference of 2014 focussing on new perspectives of the Great War. My primary intent in that research was to explore the notion that air services were, using the recent educational concept of the Learning Organization, in fact precursors of this concept within a military context. One of the conclusions I came to is that this learning was not just happening within the air services but took place even at the national, or grand strategic, level where decisions had to be made both about how to use this new means of warfare and about the allocation of resources while continuing to support the needs of the army and navy. The former had to do with strategic bombing of enemy targets and the balance of this paper looks at how the concepts and practice of strategic bombing evolved in France, Germany and Britain.
Topic:
Military Strategy, World War I, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Britain, Europe, France, and Germany

1687. Revolution, Civil War, and the 'Long' First World War in Russia

Author:
Evan Mawdsley
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This essay has two related themes. The first is the causal link between the First World War and the Russian Revolution. The second is the periodization of Russia’s crisis; in particular the essay examines the ‘continuum’ between the First World War, the 1917 Revolution, and the Civil War of 1917-20 which formed, for Russia at least, a ‘long’ First World War. The link between war and revolution is important, especially as Imperial Russia was the only major participant in the Great War to fall victim to radical political overturn during the conflict, and the only one which continued to fight in 1917 after a drastic change of government. One of the most famous documents relating to the war-revolution link was a memorandum written by P. I. Durnovo to Emperor Nicholas II in February 1914, six months before the outbreak of the Great War. Durnovo had been Minister of the Interior during the 1905 Revolution; following his ministerial appointment he was one of the leaders of the State Council. The 1914 memorandum warned about the extreme danger of becoming involved in a war with Germany. [I]n the event of defeat, the possibility of which in a struggle with a foe like Germany cannot be overlooked, social revolution in its most extreme form is inevitable .... [I]t will start with the blaming of the government for all disasters. In the legislative institutions a bitter campaign against [the government] will begin, followed by revolutionary manifestations throughout the country, with socialist slogans, capable of arousing and rallying the masses, beginning with the complete division of the land and succeeded by a division of all valuables and property. The defeated army, having lost its most dependable men, and carried away by the tide of primitive peasant desire for land, will find itself too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. The legislative institutions and the opposition parties of the intelligentsia, lacking real authority in the eyes of the people, will be powerless of stem the popular tide, aroused in fact by themselves, and Russia will be flung into hopeless anarchy, the end-result of which cannot be foreseen.1 Durnovo died in 1915 and did not live to see how closely his fears would correspond to reality. However, since his Memorandum was published by the Soviet historians in 1922 it has been noted for its predictive quality; a recent Russian biography was published with the title ‘Russian Nostradamus’.2 Meanwhile, the notion of continuum has recently become an important theme in the study of early twentieth-century Russia, as the centenary of those events is reached. A major international research project, ‘Russia's Great War & Revolution’, is currently under development; it aims to ‘fundamentally transform understanding of Russia's “continuum of crisis” during the years 1914-1922’. The key phrase comes from the subtitle (Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921) of a 2002 book by Peter Holquist’s on the Don region.3 To make more sense of both the link between war and revolution and the continuum, the period 1914-1920 can be divided into four periods - 1914-1917, 1917, 1917-18, and 1918-20.
Topic:
Communism, World War I, Revolution, and Russian Revolution
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

1688. When the generation gap collides with military structure: The case of the Norwegian cyber officers

Author:
Hanne Eggen Roislien
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
As the military integrates cyber into its structures, gradually more nations are recruiting and educating personnel to serve as "cyber officers". Tech-savvy men and women from ‘Generation Y’ grew up in the post-modern era, recognized not only by its individualism and erosion of overarching, coherent maxims, but also by the fact that technology is taken for granted. Thus, in the situation of the cyber officer a particular generation gap occurs, one in which the characteristics of postmodernity, military command structures and the inter-disciplinarity of cyber pull in conflicting directions. This friction creates a peculiar situation as technology and cyber contribute to sharpen the generation gap that necessarily exists between the young generation of cyber officers, and their superiors in the military. I explore this quandary through an examination of cyber officers’ testimonies. In particular, I focus on the cyber officers’ conceptualization of “cyber” and how this resonates with that of their superiors’. The data is ethnographic, based on interviews with cyber officer students at the Norwegian Defence Cyber Academy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Europe, Norway, Northern Europe, and Scandinavia

1689. Russian Foreign Policy under Dmitry Medvedev’s Presidency (2008-2012)

Author:
Richard Rousseau
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Following the inauguration of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in May 2008, the Russian political scene was characterized by a new structure: the country was governed by a bicephalous system (which reflected the two-headed eagle of the national flag). Medvedev became President and Vladimir Putin assumed the position of Prime Minister. In this ostensibly tandem structure, the Chief Executive was subordinated to the President as was the case even before Russia first emerged as an independent country in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such a dual power sharing worked quite well during Medvedev’s term and with no serious fissures that could bring about competing circles of power around each of the heads of state. This was true even though the personalities of the two leaders were very different. Their priorities, however, seemed different, at least formally. During his presidency (2000-2008), Putin made every effort to recover Russia’s super power status and international respect. He did not hesitate to use the privileged position of Russia – main energy supplier to Europe, a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, a continuing influence over the post-Soviet space – to achieve his ambitious goal. For his part, Medvedev preferred to use foreign policy as an instrument to advance the process of economic modernization, while keeping Russian national interests in mind. When compared to Russia’s main partners and competitors, Medvedev was very much aware of the systemic disadvantages his country faced. These disadvantages, according to him, were factors that considerably weakened Russia as a major world power and economic player. The foundation of Putin’s domestic and foreign policy was the concept of “sovereign democracy,” which argues that Russia must follow its own democratization process. There was no need to emulate and copy Western models. In this view, if Russia’s political system had serious flaws, the same could be said of the political systems of Western countries. The West was no longer seen as being in a position to give lessons to Russia. Consequently, Russian foreign policy at the time gradually abandoned or even opposed some of the positions taken by Western countries. Such a tendency began with Putin’s speech at the annual Wehrkunde conference held in Munich in January 2007. Within a year serious tensions arose between Russia and their Western allies, for instance with the August 2008 armed conflict between Georgia and Russia. The origin of this conflict was the longstanding secession attempts by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two territories recognized as being part of Georgia. Especially glaring were Russia’s disagreements and confrontations with the U.S. over such issues as NATO expansion, European-based missile defense systems and U.S. attempts to expand its influence into what Russia considers its “near abroad”, the post-Soviet space. Under Putin, Russia once again seemed to be a rival of the West, not merely on an ideological basis as during the Cold War, but because of its own strong nationalistic tendencies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Soviet Union

1690. IN3 - Incubating a New Spain through the Promotion of Entrepreneurship

Author:
James Costos
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassador's Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
Helping entrepreneurs grow their businesses and achieve their full potential is in the interest of anyone who wants to foster prosperity worldwide—that’s why it’s an Obama administration priority. Growth anywhere does some good everywhere, and the fact is that entrepreneurs create jobs and drive economic growth both at home and abroad. In the United States, 40 percent of our $17 trillion economy is generated by companies that did not even exist 20 years ago. Two-thirds of our 65 months of consecutive job growth is driven by small businesses. The owners of those businesses—28 million and growing—employ over half of America’s workforce. As our missions work to expand the global economic recovery, one of the most effective tools we have at our disposal is the promotion of entrepreneurship—a quintessential American value. By deepening the connections between the entrepreneurial ecosystems of the United States and our partners overseas, we can grow our economies, create jobs, and support businesses that will have lasting impact and create prosperity. The good news is that this is easy to do, because the world is more interconnected than ever before. We benefit from unprecedented opportunities to help entrepreneurs access the capital, resources, and networks they need to succeed. We also have the strong support and leader­ship of President Obama, who is personally committed to promoting entrepreneurship worldwide. Spain is a country with a strong and growing entrepreneurial spirit, a plethora of talent, and solid business networks. Although it is starting to emerge from economic crisis, there is still much work to be done to ensure Spain’s continued recovery. The United States Mission is doing its part to consolidate the country’s economic progress by helping a new generation of entrepreneurs achieve their full potential, and generate jobs and eco­nomic growth. We have established a strong partnership with TeamLabs, an organization that teaches the concept of entrepreneurship and engages with thousands of high school students across all regions of Spain. We have produced animated videos for youth called You®Company which tell real life stories of Spanish and US entrepreneurs while exploring the values of motivation, innovation, corporate social responsibility, failure, and critical thinking. We have also organized an Alumni Mentoring Program that we use to link up business leaders, prominent entrepreneurs, and alumni of United States Embassy exchange programs to coach aspiring entrepreneurs and help them build their network of contacts. This past June, we took our entrepreneurship programs to a new level with the launch of IN3 (IN-cubed)—Innovators, Investors, and Institutions—in partnership with Google and Chamberi Valley, a Spanish entrepreneurship association. Aimed at promoting entre­preneur­ship and investment in Spain, IN3 was the first community event hosted at Campus Madrid, one of only a handful of Google spaces around the world where entrepre­neurs can learn, connect, and build companies that will change the world. In August 2015, the International Monetary Fund released a report stating that Spain has more obstacles to entrepreneurship than any other European country. IN3 directly addressed these challenges by bringing together Spanish and American innovators, investors, and institutions to discuss common challenges and solutions for scaling-up interna­tional companies. The event provided Spanish entrepreneurs the opportunity to hear from leading US counterparts and tech investors on how to overcome institutional and investment challenges that inhibit business growth. It also offered US entrepreneurs the chance to explore areas of potential collaboration with their Spanish counterparts and learn from their experiences expanding into other European and Latin American markets. It provided a forum where entrepreneurs and policymakers exchanged ideas on the best ways to promote the creation of new businesses and help successful companies grow. Finally, it allowed US and Spanish innovators the opportunity to discuss their experiences with senior Spanish government officials. Through these interactions, IN3 helped to equip entrepre­neurs with the tools they need to overcome the challenges of expanding their businesses—from finance, to mentorship, to regulations. I was honored to be joined at IN3 by the Administrator of the United States Small Business Administration Maria Contreras-Sweet, Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt, His Majesty King Felipe VI of Spain, and leaders from the Spanish government. With their support, we elevated the importance of entrepreneurship and the crucial role entrepreneurs play in driving growth and creating jobs in Spain. Our message reached an audience of 53 million people in Spain through local media exposure, another 3.25 million on Twitter, and became a top-trending topic on US social media. Not only did the conference promote entrepreneurship and bilateral investment opportunities to a diverse audience, but IN3 generated real investment and new business growth for Spanish and US firms. For example, Opinno, the consulting and events firm that produced IN3, established new ties with US design thinking firms and academic institutions and plans to partner with these organizations to propel their international expansion. Several new investments were made in small and medium-sized Spanish companies, totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars, and the Embassy continues to hear of additional business sparked by the conference.
Topic:
Economics, Entrepreneurship, Recovery, and IMF
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Spain, and North America