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Begin New Search Topic Weapons of Mass Destruction Political Geography Europe

11. Stay on Target: Will the UK fight the battle for tough arms controls?

Author:
Edmund Cairns
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
A robust global Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is desperately needed to stop the irresponsible transfer of arms that fuels: Atrocities – like those in Syria, where more than 8,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed since the crackdown on protests began in early 2011;Armed violence and conflicts – which is estimated to cost Africa alone $18bn a year; Corruption in the. defence industry – which costs $20bn a year, and which undermines the competitiveness of UK exporters.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Trade and Finance, Non-Governmental Organization, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Africa, United Kingdom, Europe, and Syria

12. Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The most threatening form of US and Iranian competition takes place in the military and security arena. The areas where this competition now gets primary attention are the nuclear and missile arena, and Iranian threats to “close the Gulf.” US and Iranian tensions over Iran's nuclear program have grown steadily over the years. They now threaten to reach the crisis point as Iran produces highly enriched uranium and develops all of the technology necessary to produce nuclear weapons, and as US, European, and UN sanctions become steadily stronger.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Oil, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United Nations

13. Nuclear Notes

Author:
Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia is experiencing the most significant level of public dissatisfaction with Vladimir Putin since he assumed power a decade ago. While the sizeable street protests in Russia may well signal a political and social watershed moment for the country, a more minor political event a few months ago provided a telling sign regarding one of the regime's most important projects—a massive program for military modernization.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

14. Setting a Standard for stakeholdership. Industry Contribution to a strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Author:
Jean Pascal Zanders (Ed.)
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, more commonly known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), was opened for signature on 10 April 1972. Upon entering into force on 26 March 1975, it was the first treaty ever to ban completely a whole category of weapons. Together with the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the BTWC forms one of the pillars through which the international community deals with weapons of mass destruction.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Peace Studies, Treaties and Agreements, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe

15. A new Geography of European power?

Author:
James Rogers
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The naval historian and geostrategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, understood the utility of military power perhaps better than anyone before or since. In an article called The Place of Force in International Relations – penned two years before his death in 1914 – he claimed: 'Force is never more operative then when it is known to exist but is not brandished' (1912). If Mahan's point was valid then, it is perhaps even more pertinent now. The rise of new powers around the world has contributed to the emergence of an increasingly unpredictable and multipolar international system. Making the use of force progressively more dangerous and politically challenging, this phenomenon is merging with a new phase in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, many European governments are increasingly reluctant – perhaps even unable – to intervene militarily in foreign lands. The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that when armed force is used actively in support of foreign policy, it can go awry; far from re-affirming strength and determination on the part of its beholder, it can actually reveal weakness and a lack of resolve. Half-hearted military operations – of the kind frequently undertaken by democratic European states – tend not to go particularly well, especially when there is little by way of a political strategy or the financial resources needed to support them. A political community's accumulation of a military reputation, which can take decades, if not centuries, can then be rapidly squandered through a series of unsuccessful combat operations, which dent its confidence and give encouragement to its opponents or enemies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Violence, Arms Control and Proliferation, War, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Europe

16. Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control

Author:
Alexei Arbatov
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The pursuit of nuclear arms control has enjoyed something of a renaissance recently, with the signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in spring 2010 in Prague. Whether that momentum will dissipate after New START or lead to further nuclear arms control agreements depends on several factors: The new U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines. While there is always some distance between a state's declared policy and that policy's implementation, both documents show that, behind their more ambitious disarmament rhetoric, the United States and Russia maintain conservative nuclear policies that make radical nuclear disarmament unlikely—to say nothing of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The peculiarities of the recently signed and ratified New START agreement. Among these are the modest cuts stipulated by the treaty relative to its predecessors; the acrimonious ratification debates in both the U.S. and Russian legislatures; and the dim prospects for a follow-on agreement (in sharp contrast to the mood prevailing after past START agreements). The dynamics of obsolescence and modernization of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces. The United States should have little problem cutting its forces to get below New START's limits. Russia, however, will have problems, not in reducing its numbers, but in raising them to treaty ceilings, due to their removal of obsolete weapons from service and slow deployment of new systems. Either Russia can negotiate a New START follow-on treaty with even lower ceilings or it can accelerate the development and deployment of new systems. While the former is obviously a more attractive alternative, it would require the United States and Russia to resolve many thorny arms control issues, such as ballistic missile defense, conventional strategic weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defense. President Obama's decision to modify the Bush administration's ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe opened the way for New START and eased Russian concerns, even if they could never have been allayed entirely. Moscow believes that U.S. ballistic missile defense programs are ultimately designed to degrade Russia's nuclear deterrent, and it is far from clear that U.S. proposals to jointly develop such capabilities with Russia would allay those concerns—or that the idea even makes any sense. Russia's perceptions of U.S. conventional strategic weapons. Russian officials are especially concerned about the U.S. Prompt Global Strike concept and do not trust American assurances that such capabilities are only directed at terrorists and rogue states. There has already been some progress made in dealing with these weapons in negotiations, and future progress on this issue will likely depend on legal agreements and confidence-building measures to scale U.S. capabilities in ways that would threaten Russia's (or China's) strategic deterrent. Joint development of ballistic missile defenses with Russia. This issue could seriously complicate Washington's and Moscow's strategic relations with China and India. Officials on both sides would do well to start small and proceed step-by-step, using incremental successes to build the momentum necessary to work through more difficult issues. Non-strategic—that is, tactical—nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, the United States and Europe relied on tactical nuclear weapons to counterbalance Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces in Europe; today, the situation is reversed, with Moscow relying on tactical nuclear weapons as a counterbalance not only to NATO conventional superiority but also to U.S. strategic nuclear superiority and long-range precision-guided weapons. No one now knows which weapons systems should be categorized as non-strategic, and how limits across regions could be accounted for and verified. In addition, reviving the moribund Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is essential to dealing with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Washington, and Moscow

17. Implementing an Arms Trade Treaty: Lessons on Reporting and Monitoring from Existing Mechanisms

Author:
Mark Bromley and Paul Holtom
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The aims, scope and coverage of an arms trade treaty (ATT) will determine the format and types of information to be provided to an ATT reporting mechanism. It is expected that one of the obligations under the mechanism will be for states parties to provide information on their arms transfers and transfer control systems. A key consideration when designing an ATT reporting mechanism is its future interaction with existing reporting mechanisms. In this context, voluntary reporting of information on arms transfers to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and of information on transfer control systems to the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in A ll Its Aspects (POA) and the UN Exchange of National Legislation on Transfer of Arms, Military Equipment and Dual-use Goods and Technology (UN Legislation Exchange) are particularly relevant. Other UN instruments that provide potential lessons and areas of potential over- lap, include UN Security Council resolutions imposing arms embargoes and UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which obligate states to provide information on aspects of national transfer controls. At the regional level, member states of the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are requested to provide information on transfer controls and international arms transfers, while members of the Organization of American States (OAS) are required to provide information on arms acquisitions. It is inevitable that the reporting requirements under an ATT will overlap with some of these instruments, particularly the voluntary UN reporting mechanisms. If an ATT is to increase transparency, then existing obligations should serve as the baseline for reporting under the new treaty.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe

18. Reinforcing Disarmament: Combating Illicit Trade in Weapons and Materials

Author:
Marc Finaud and Philipp Annawitt
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Illicit trade in weapons and materials poses serious challenges to states and disarmament regimes. Although small arms and light weapons (SALW) are quite different from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), both categories are in increasing demand by violent non-state actors, often in relation to organized crime and terrorist activities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe

19. Beyond Geopolitics: Common Challenges, Joint Solutions?

Author:
Gustav Lindstrom
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The 2010 Gstaad Process meeting was held in Switzerland from 16-18 September. Entitled “Beyond Geopolitics – Common Challenges, Joint Solutions?”, the event was organised by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) with the financial support of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). Additional partners and contributors were the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies in Monterey (California) and the PIR Center (Moscow).
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

20. Dealing with Maritime Security in the Mediterranean Basin: The EU as a Multilateral Actor

Author:
Stefania Panebianco
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Global terrorism, irregular migration, proliferation of WMDs and piracy are all issues currently included in the EU's Mediterranean maritime security agenda. Due to the peculiar nature of these threats, the European Security Strategy claims that multilateral action is the most effective way to deal with these security threats. The involvement of regional and non-regional influential actors - both state and nonstate actors - is deemed crucial. Therefore, this analysis illustrates Mediterranean institutionalised security cooperation within many regional fora: EMP/UfM, NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, the Western Mediterranean Dialogue. Finally, some concrete actions are suggested for the EU to play an effective role.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Maritime Commerce, and Piracy
Political Geography:
Europe