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1. Vulnerabilities and Resilience of Electrical Grids in Wartime: Lessons from Ukraine

Author:
Volodymyr Kudrytskyi and Mariana Budjeryn
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Vulnerabilities and Resilience of Electrical Grids in Wartime: Lessons from Ukraine: Tuesday, March 11, 2025. The Russian assault on Ukraine’s electrical generating capacity and transmission grid as part of its full-scale war against Ukraine, is unprecedented in the history of warfare. Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, the former CEO of Ukraine’s electric grid operator Ukrenergo, discussed the challenges of securing Ukraine’s energy system throughout the war, lessons for mitigating grid vulnerabilities, and prospects for rebuilding a more resilient energy system in Ukraine and Europe. Speaker: Volodymyr Kudrytskyi served as the CEO and Chairman of the Management Board of the Ukrainian Transmission System Operator Ukrenergo from February 2020 until September 2024. Under his leadership, Ukraine’s electrical grid has undergone preparations for synchronization with the power system of Continental Europe ENTSO-E and emergency synchronization with ENTSO-E in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. From February 24, 2022, Mr. Kudrytskyi and his team at Ukrenergo managed the Ukrainian power grid through unprecedented Russian attacks against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. Previously, Mr. Kudrytskyi held leadership roles in key Ukrainian energy sector companies, including Naftogaz and Ukrtransnafta. Mr. Kudrytskyi holds a degree in international finance from Kyiv National Economic University. Moderator: Mariana Budjeryn is the author of Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023) and a winner of the 2024 William E. Colby Military Writers’ Award, the first female in the award’s 25-year history. Dr. Budjeryn is a member of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academies of Sciences and a senior nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Topic:
Electricity, Resilience, Vulnerability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. How can Europe’s nuclear deterrence trilemma be resolved?

Author:
Andrea Gilli and Francesco Nicoli
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The United States under President Donald Trump has adopted an ambiguous position on European security. Although no immediate risk of abandonment is apparent, European countries are rethinking their defence strategies in case the US declines to support them, or provides only partial support, in a crisis. This discussion is particularly sensitive in relation to nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent, for which European countries depend extensively on the United States. We argue that a possible future US withdrawal from European nuclear security will force European countries to face a policy trilemma. If they stick to the existing policy framework of no proliferation and no joint deterrence, they expose themselves to nuclear blackmail, should the US withdraw its external guarantee. If they want to protect themselves from nuclear blackmail, they must choose how to provide nuclear security: either collective nuclear security, which would compromise some national sovereignty, or independent provision by individual countries, leading to nuclear proliferation in Europe. Having established that uncontrolled proliferation is an inferior outcome to some form of joint deterrence, we identify four main alternatives: an extension of the Franco-British nuclear deterrent; an extension complemented by a jointly financed expansion of existing deterrence; the absorption of the French (and perhaps British) nuclear arsenals into a European arsenal; and the construction of a separate European submarine deterrent (with Europe using French or British technology or developing new technology). We also discuss briefly forms of non-nuclear deterrence, which however would likely be a complementary rather than a substitute for a nuclear deterrent. We compare these options using a set of parameters: strategic autonomy and credibility, changes to treaties (including non-proliferation), costs, capabilities and readiness. Our analysis shows that all options have advantages and disadvantages, but some are politically, financially and militarily more feasible.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Macroeconomics, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

3. Estimating the vulnerability of industrial network infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe

Author:
Mateusz Gzegorz Twardawa, Marek Smolik, Franciszek Rakowski, Jakub Kwiatkowski, and Norbert Meyer
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Industrial infrastructure has suffered an unprecedented number of attacks in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). This situation can be attributed to many geopolitical factors, including hybrid military conflicts and criminal activity. Industrial networks belonging to the countries that were once under Soviet influence suffer from an elevated risk of cyberattacks. The goal of this work is to propose an easy way to estimate the vulnerabilities of industrial networks to cyber threats on a national level. Since analysis of the industrial vulnerability landscape is difficult, this study proposes an assessment based on the popularity of vulnerable technologies—VPc. This metric is composed of search volume data on keywords related to industrial network technologies and reported security vulnerabilities associated with these words. Data on 116 keywords was analysed and a country-specific VPc index was calculated for twenty states in CEE. The analysis of the popularity of industrial technologies and vendors in CEE reveals interesting information about the industrial security and vulnerability landscape. The results show that some countries (e.g. Estonia) have more resilient industrial infrastructure than others (e.g. Belarus). The results presented in this study are not in conflict with other data and estimation attempts, including the National Cyber Security Index (NCSI). As new vulnerabilities are noted every day, the industrial security landscape changes rapidly. Therefore, a new easy-to-use metric (VPc) can be successfully used for general estimations. This work shows that the VPc score agrees with other estimates and analyses, but as with any other general estimation tool, it must be used with caution.
Topic:
International Security, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Industry, Vulnerability, and Network Security
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

4. Addressing Arctic Vulnerabilities: Lessons from Ukraine

Author:
Jonas Vidhammer Berge
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The Arctic is quickly becoming a theater of global competition—a development that has accelerated since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In order to protect critical undersea communications infrastructure, decrease intra-alliance dependency on U.S. space-based capabilities, and deter Russian gray-zone tactics, NATO-aligned Arctic states—the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—must enhance situational awareness of these vulnerabilities. By applying lessons learned from the war in Ukraine on how technological advancements can shape military strategy and the operational environment, specifically with regards to resilient space capabilities, cost-efficient unmanned systems, and rapid procurement processes for evolving technological capabilities, Arctic states can improve both deterrence and potential warfighting in the region.
Topic:
International Security, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Vulnerability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Arctic

5. Who controls the past controls the future * How Russia uses history for cognitive warfare

Author:
Daniel Shultz
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia views controlling perceptions about history as a strategic priority, for domestic regime security and external influence. Kinetic military operations, including the invasion of Ukraine, are designed to support this cognitive objective. Understanding adversary cognitive objectives provides strategic indicators and warnings of intent, and identifies critical cognitive vulnerabilities for allied joint targeting.
Topic:
NATO, History, Vulnerability, Russia-Ukraine War, and Cognitive Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe