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101. Daesh: The archetype of hybrid terrorist organizations

Author:
Triandafyllos Karatrantos
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The rise and evolution of Daesh (al-Dawlah al-Islamīyah fī l-ʻIrāq wa-sh-Shām) marked a new and very interesting debate about the labeling of violent groups that are not traditional terrorist organizations and they are also acting with different roles and using alternate tactics and modus operandi, such as insurgency, within civil and regional conflicts. Furthermore, the establishment of the so called “Caliphate” includes a new parameter in the scientific debate, the quasi state dimension. Daesh is a modern archetype of this vivid scientific debate, but the difficulties in labeling, especially in cases were terrorist groups are taking part in civil conflicts, is not new. Labeling is not only a matter of “name and blame”, is important in order to design an effective and holistic counter terrorism strategy. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the different approaches about labeling nontraditional terrorist groups and to present the terrorist activity of Daesh.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Non State Actors, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Europe and Middle East

102. Situation and Trends of Terrorist Acts Within the European Union

Author:
Ice Ilijevski, Kire Babanoski, and Zlate Dimovski
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The main subject of interest of this paper is the current situation and the trend of international terrorism in the European Union explained thorough security analysis of the committed terrorist attacks and their influence on the European security and stability. Also, it will be shown the measures and the activities of the anti and contrary terroristic fight against the risks and the threats from terrorism as a result of the recent terroristic attacks. Even though on the international level there isn’t a common definition of terrorism as a criminal act, the European Union and the Council of Europe through their most important documents set the concept for terrorism which has helped in the process of creating national security systems for the fight against the terrorism. This paper will go through the circumstances of terrorist attacks (failed, foiled, and completed) in the European Union Member States, as well as the conditions of the criminal acts through analysis of the statistical data about the court proceedings and the verdicts.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, European Union, Counter-terrorism, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Europe

103. Back to the Russia-U.S.-China “Triangle”?

Author:
S. Trush
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
FOr SeVeral MONThS, the world expert community has been actively discussing the obvious resurgence of the russia-the U.S.-China “triangle.” This happens every time when the key, or even “sacral,” prob- lem of international interaction – the problem of security – comes to the fore. The high level of confrontation inside two of the three sides of the “triangle” – the U.S. vs. russia and China vs. the U.S. – predetermined this resurgence against the background of donald Trump’s non-orthodox and unyielding foreign policy. he brought to the white house his “no-nonsense” approach to add more prominence to the traditional efforts of american pragmatists to keep russia and China apart. his obvious preference for Moscow and his clear intention to rely on it to oppose China were defused by an unprece- dented attack launched against him by the anti-Trump opposition inside the United States. due to the internal balance of power, russia was cho- sen as the potentially most promising target with the best foreign policy dividends perfectly suited to the task of either pushing the president out of the white house or at least, narrowing down his political leeway. This attack and the fairly painful Korean issue created a pause in the america-China relations obvious in the first year of the new administra- tion that ended late in 2017 by the “tough and realistic” description in the National Security Strategy of the United States of “revisionist powers of russia and China.... that challenge american power.” This launched an aggressive trade war with China; today, it has become abundantly clear that it is part of the exacerbated systemic confrontation with China over economic, technological and military leadership.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

104. Strategic Stability in the Early 21st Century

Author:
A. Orlov
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
one hunDReD YeaRs ago, mankind entered the 20th century as the “golden age” of realized ideals of freedom and humanism. Reality proved to be different: this was the cruelest and the bloodiest period in the histo- ry of modern civilization. The new generation of political dreamers, with anglo-saxon roots in the first place, expected the 21st century to become a period of a more or less stable development of the world led by the united states with the help of its closest satellites. In his The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Zbigniew Brzezinski (who together with henry Kissinger can be described as a “classic” of the contemporary geopoliti- cal thought) wrote that since the end of the Cold War the united states “assumed the unique global security role” and “america’s global socio- cultural celebrity makes it the world’s center of attention.”1 he arrived here at a fairly debatable (as later developments showed) conclusion that “america’s role in ensuring the security of its allies ... justifies it in seek- ing more security for itself than is predictably attainable by other states.”2 This trend of military-political thinking that dominated across the ocean in the 1990s and early 2000s has not changed in fifteen years that elapsed since the time when the maître of american political science wrote the lines quoted above. Formally a Democrat and President Jimmy Carter's national security advisor in the latter half of the 1970s, he nur- tured the ideas that differ but little from those of the present master of the White house, a conservative Republican determined to “make america great again,” that is, to restore its role of the unquestioned world leader in all trends and in all hypostases. nothing what President Trump has said so far clarifies when, in his opinion, america lost its greatness. It seems that he piles the accusations on Democrat obama whom he called a “softy” and who allegedly allowed the adversaries to push america into a tight corner from which the country is scrambling out under his guid- ance. let’s go several decades back. The end of the Cold War, the victory in which Washington arrogant- ly “appropriated” and its rise, at least in its own eyes, became a watershed of sorts in american understanding of the contemporary realities and of certain basic postulates that for a long time remained the cornerstone of the perception of the world by Washington and Moscow. This relates, first and foremost, to the strategic security concept. Brzezinski admitted: “It was until the late 1950s and perhaps not even until the Cuban Missile Crisis that america was jarred into recognition that modern technology has made vulnerable a thing of the past.”3 “The intense national debate on these issues [in the united states] eventually led to a consensus that a relationship of stable deterrence with the soviet union was attainable only through mutual restraint.”4 henry Kissinger fully agrees with the above. In his World Order, he has written: “strategic stability was defined as a balance in which neither side would use its weapons of mass destruction because the adversary was always able to inflict an unacceptable level of destruction in retalia- tion.”5 This adds special importance to what anatoly Dobrynin, soviet ambassador to the u.s., had to say in his book In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents about his talk to Robert Mcnamara, united states secretary of Defense, in april 1967: “Mcnamara explained that u.s. nuclear doctrine was grounded in the idea that the united states should be ready to absorb a surprise nuclear- missile strike while preserving its capability to hit back and cause irreparable damage to the enemy. as far as he could understand, Mcnamara said, the soviet military doctrine was based on the same prin- ciple. he was convinced that both sides possessed such capability. It was precisely this factor that in a peculiar way provided the stability and ade- quately guaranteed that neither of the two great powers would attack the other, because each well knew that an attack on the other meant suicide.”6 Colonel-general Yury Baluyevsky, a prominent soviet and Russian military theoretician who served as Chief of the general staff of the armed Forces of the Russian Federation, has pointed out the fol- lowing: “[The] term strategic stability has been used for a fairly long time to assess the situation in the world. at first it was limited to the relations between the two superpowers – the soviet union and the united states – and described them as the mutually assured destruction of the sides and the rest of the world in a global nuclear war.... This stability is a product of nuclear arms race that resulted in the parity of strategic offensive armaments of the ussR and the u.s. and the situation of the so-called nuclear stalemate.”
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

105. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Great Power Competition

Author:
Christopher C. Harmon, T. J. Linzy, Jack Vahram Kalpakian, Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Ryan Burke, Jahara "Franky" Matisek, Zsofia Budai, Kevin Johnston, Blagovest Tashev, Michael Purcell, David McLaughlin, Kashish Parpiani, Daniel De Wit, and Timothy Chess
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
In this issue of MCU Journal, the authors discuss various concepts of power and great power competition. For generations, scholars have debated changes in power and how that evolution could potentially impact the United States, its allies, and those hovering on the edge of greatness in whatever form that may take. The concept of power has taken on many meanings as the character of warfare has adapted to the time—hard power, soft power, sea power, airpower, space power, great power, combat power, etc. So how do we define such an abstract concept as power? The Department of Defense (DOD) defines combat power as “the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.” Clearly, power must be projected; and for our purposes, that means an entity has the “ability . . . to apply all or some of its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.”
Topic:
Security, NATO, Climate Change, International Cooperation, Migration, History, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Navy, Populism, Grand Strategy, Alliance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Strategic Competition, Geography, Ottoman Empire, Information Technology, and Clash of Civilizations
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Europe, Sudan, India, Norway, Asia, France, North America, Egypt, Arctic, United States of America, and Antarctica

106. Turkey and the European Union: Conflicting Policies and Opportunities for Cohesion and Cooperation In Iraq and Syria

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, Susan Cersosimo, and Kamaran Palani
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
There are major security events, issues and trends within Iraq since 2003 and Syria since 2011, that have influenced and impacted Turkey-European Union (EU) relations. In this policy paper we deconstruct the causal mechanisms that act as the primary drivers impacting bilateral relations. We then compare and contrast Ankara’s and Brussels’ current security interests, priorities and perceptions toward security threats originating in this troubled neighbourhood. Finally, we classify opportunities as culminating in three possible discrete or combined security policy scenarios: conflict, cooperation and/or convergence and make recommendations to improve Turkey-EU relations. To address how Iraq’s and Syria’s security environment evolved to its current state and predict the subsequent outcomes and impacts on EU-Turkey relations, we look back and critically analyse Ankara’s and Brussels’ views on the following key events, issues and trends: security and political dynamics following the second term of al-Maliki, the withdrawal of the US forces in 2011, the 2011 Syrian revolution, the war against the Islamic state (IS), The Global Coalition against Daesh (GCD) backing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northern Syria, the rise of Kurdish nationalism and aspirations for statehood in Iraq and autonomy in Syria, the enhanced influence of Iran in Iraq and the growth of IS with subsequent mass displacement of person across both Iraq and Syria. Iraq is now largely free of IS reign, yet is still threatened by terrorism, mass population displacement and weak governance, among other ills. In parallel, now that the Syrian civil war enters its seventh bloody year, generating large numbers of casualties and millions of displaced persons, Brussels and Ankara are strongly incented to converge and/or cooperate on security policies which mitigate the escalating humanitarian crisis and ease the path to a durable peace agreement. However, finding durable solutions to address high value, high impact problems stemming from Iraq and Syria requires identifying and mitigating the causes vs symptoms of these countries’ instability and insecurity affecting Ankara’s and Brussels’ own security interests, priorities and threat perceptions. Central security priorities for the EU in post-IS Iraq include stabilization, the return of internally displaced people and refugees and eliminating violent jihadist organizations and ideologies. While Turkey shares these objectives in principle, Ankara’s security interests concentrate primarily on neutralizing the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and its affiliates’ presence and influence. Since 2014, Ankara and Brussels have mostly bifurcated on how they perceive security threats in Syria. Turkey-EU leaders continue to disagree on the Kurd’s role in the Syrian war and how Turkey should control its borders to cut flows of foreign fighters into Syria. As the IS invaded parts of Iraq and Syria in 2014, European states began providing PKK affiliated Kurdish groups in Syria with both intelligence and military support. Alternately, since the Kurdistan Region of Iraq held its referendum for independence on 25 September 2017, EU and Turkish leaders have mostly converged on how they perceive security threats in Iraq with both staunchly supporting the country’s territorial integrity, thus, both refused to recognize the referendum’s legitimacy. We consider the issue of terrorism as a highly relevant driver of EU and Turkish security policies, perceptions and priorities. Though we see both countries as highly concerned with this issue, they diverge on which organizations pose the greatest threat. Ankara places the PKK at the top of its terrorist list – both within its borders and across the region – while Brussels prioritizes neutralizing jihadi terrorist threats on its soil, thus, the probability of convergence and cooperation and positive impact on EU-Turkey relations is moderate for this issue. Moreover, the IS is not given the same degree of priority by the two sides in the neighbourhood, including Iraq and Syria. Unlike the EU, Turkey considers the threat posed by the IS equal to the one posed by the PKK, but not as strategic. Here, the two sides diverge. In sum, dissent between Brussels and Ankara is highly likely given the Turkish Armed Forces’ broad kinetic engagement in both Iraq and Syria which negatively impacts EU and US efforts to roll back terrorism, stabilise the region, deliver humanitarian aid and help displaced persons return to their homes. Thus, regardless of whether Baghdad and/or Damascus formally grant Ankara permission to launch assaults, the EU views these actions as bellicose destabilizers competing with its own interests, thus, degrades EU-Turkey relations. Ultimately, this study calls for the EU and Turkey to prioritize mending cracks and fissures in their relationship and focus on the gains to be made through rapprochement on security issues originating in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, the EU can use its tremendous mediating capacity as an honest broker to settle entrenched disputes between warring parties in Iraq and Syria and for Turkey restart the peace process at home. More than ever, both must develop a long-term strategic security framework to ensure that bilateral security interests, priorities and interventions do not derail current stabilisation and reconstruction procedures in Iraq and/or progress toward a durable peace in Syria.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and Syria

107. PeSCo – Anything There for European Defence?

Author:
Sandro Knezović
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The European strategic landscape has changed dramatically over the course of the last decade. The post-Cold War mantra about the obsolescence of conventional threats in the wider European space proved to be short-sighted with developments at its eastern �lanks, while security dysfunctions in the MENA region and their immanent consequences for the safety of European citizens have loaded a heavy burden on compromise-building and decision-making in the �ield of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU. Furthermore, the approach of the new US administration to European security and the strategic consequences of Brexit have changed the wider framework in which security of 'the Old Continent' is to be determined, hence stimulating European leaders to rethink European security in a strive for strategic autonomy of their own. The very ambitiously phrased EU Global Strategy that came out in June 2016, served as both catalyst and umbrella document for such an endeavour. However, in order to achieve measurable progress in responding to contemporary security challenges, it was clear that the EU needs to develop a structural way for member states to do jointly what they were not capable of doing at the national level. This is so especially in the environment in which China, Russia and Saudi Arabia are championing the defence spending, right after the US, while European states are signi�icantly trailing behind. The fact that the EU collectively is the second largest military investor and yet far from being among the dominant military powers only emphasises the burning issue of ef�iciency of military spending and the level of interoperability among member states’ armies. High-level fragmentation of the European defence market and the fact that defence industries are kept in national clusters is clearly contributing to that. The reality on the ground is obviously challenging traditional methods of co-operation that operate mainly in ‘national boxes’ and calling for a paradigm change in the wider policy context of CSDP. However, it remains to be seen to which extent will this new security environment actually be able to push the European defence policy context over the strict national boundaries.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

108. Prisons and Radicalization: Breaking the Cycle through Rehabilitation

Author:
Francesca Capano
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Concerns over migration, economic growth and the rise of populism seemed to overshadow the threat of terrorism in many European countries during 2018. While the number of attacks and alleged plots in Europe have declined considerably compared to previous years, experts have long warned that measuring the terrorism threat on the basis of successful attacks was a “mistake”.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Prisons/Penal Systems, and Radicalization
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy

109. The Return of Political Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy outline a U.S. shift from counterterrorism to inter-state competition with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for much of this competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs of conventional and nuclear war would likely be catastrophic. U.S. strategy is evolving from a post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism against groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State to competition between state adversaries. As the National Defense Strategy notes, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”1 This shift has significant implications for the U.S. military, since it indicates a need to improve U.S. capabilities to fight—and win—possible wars against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea if deterrence fails. Though it is prudent to prepare for conventional—and even nuclear—war, the risks of conflict are likely to be staggering. Numerous war games and analyses of U.S. conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and North Korea on the Korean peninsula suggest the possibility of at least tens of thousands of dead and billions of dollars in economic damages. In addition, these conflicts could escalate to nuclear war, which might raise the number of dead to hundreds of thousands or even millions. According to one analysis, for example, a U.S. war with China could reduce China’s gross domestic product (GDP) by between 25 and 35 percent and the United States’ GDP by between 5 and 10 percent. The study also assessed that both countries could suffer substantial military losses to bases, air forces, surface naval forces, and submarines; significant political upheaval at home and abroad; and huge numbers of civilian deaths.2 These costs and risks will likely give Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and even Pyongyang pause, raising several questions. Will these high costs deter the possibility of conventional and nuclear war? If so, what are the implications for the United States as it plans for a rise in inter-state competition? The Cold War offers a useful historical lens. NATO planners prepared for a possible Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The U.S. military, for example, deployed forces to the Fulda Gap, roughly 60 miles outside of Frankfurt, Germany, as one of several possible invasion routes by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. NATO also planned for nuclear war. The United States built up its nuclear arsenal and adopted strategies like mutually assured destruction (MAD). The concept of MAD assumed that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. The threat of such heavy costs deterred conflict, despite some close calls. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers nearly went to war after a U.S. U-2 aircraft took pictures of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. But Washington and Moscow ultimately assessed that direct conflict was too costly. Deterrence held. Instead, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in intense security competition at the unconventional level across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Both countries backed substate groups and states to expand their power and influence. Under the Reagan Doctrine, for example, the United States provided overt and covert assistance to anticommunist governments and resistance movements to roll back communist supporters. The Soviets did the same and supported states and substate actors across the globe. In addition, the Soviets adopted an aggressive, unconventional approach best captured in the phrase “active measures” or aktivnyye meropriatia. As used by the KGB, active measures included a wide range of activities designed to influence populations across the globe. The KGB established front groups, covertly broadcast radio and other programs, orchestrated disinformation campaigns, and conducted targeted assassinations. The Soviets used active measures as an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy to extend Moscow’s influence and power throughout the world, including in Europe. Unlike the Cold War, the United States confronts multiple state adversaries today—not one. As the National Defense Strategy argues, the United States is situated in “a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory” where “the central challenges to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.” But based on the likely costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, much of the competition will likely be unconventional—and include what former U.S. State Department diplomat George Kennan referred to as “political warfare.” The term political warfare refers to the employment of military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other means—short of conventional war—to achieve national objectives. It can include overt operations like public broadcasting and covert operations like psychological warfare and support to underground resistance groups.3 The United States’ adversaries today are already engaged in political warfare. Russia, for instance, utilizes a range of means to pursue its interests, such as technologically sophisticated offensive cyber programs, covert action, and psychological operations. Moscow has conducted overt operations like the use of RT and Sputnik, as well as semitransparent and covert efforts. It has also become increasingly active in supporting state and substate actors in countries like Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya to expand its influence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and even North Africa. Finally, Russia is attempting to exploit European and transatlantic fissures and support populist movements to undermine European Union and NATO cohesion, thwart economic sanctions, justify or obscure Russian actions, and weaken the attraction of Western institutions for countries on Russia’s periphery. Iran is using political warfare tools like propaganda, cyber attacks, and aid to substate proxies to support its security priorities, influence events and foreign perceptions, and counter threats. Tehran is also assisting state and substate actors in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. Iran supports Shia militia groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the South China Sea, China is pouring millions of tons of sand and concrete onto reefs, creating artificial islands. It is also conducting a sophisticated propaganda campaign, utilizing economic coercion, and using fleets of fishing vessels to solidify its assertion of territorial and resource rights throughout the Pacific. Finally, Beijing is targeting the U.S. government, its allies, and U.S. companies as part of a cyber-espionage campaign. With political warfare already alive and well with the United States’ state adversaries, there are several implications for U.S. defense strategy. First, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for significant inter-state competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war may be prohibitively high. This should involve thinking through trade-offs regarding force posture, procurement, acquisition, and modernization. A U.S. military that predominantly focuses on preparing for conventional or nuclear war with state competitors—by modernizing the nuclear triad, building more resilient space capabilities, acquiring more effective counter-space systems, equipping U.S. forces with high-technology weapons, and emphasizing professional military education (PME) to fight conventional wars—may undermine U.S. unconventional readiness and capabilities. Second, even organizations that already engage in some types of political warfare—such as U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. intelligence community—will need to continue shifting some of their focus from counterterrorism to political warfare against state adversaries. This might include, for example, providing more aid to the Baltic States to conduct an effective resistance campaign against unconventional action by Moscow. Or it might involve aiding proxies in countries like Syria and Yemen to counter Iranian-backed organizations. It could also include improving the border security capabilities and effectiveness of Ukrainian military and police units against Russian-backed rebels. Third, the United States should invest in resources and capabilities that allow the military and other U.S. government agencies to more effectively engage in political warfare—and to provide agencies with sufficient authorities to conduct political warfare. One example is improving capabilities to conduct aggressive, offensive cyber operations. Other examples might include advanced electronic attack capabilities, psychological warfare units, security force assistance brigades, and precision munitions. Recognizing that other powers routinely conduct political warfare, George Kennan encouraged U.S. leaders to disabuse themselves of the “handicap” of the “concept of a basic difference between peace and war” and to wake up to “the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.” Kennan’s advice may be even more relevant today in such a competitive world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

110. Enhanced Deterrence in the North A 21st Century European Engagement Strategy

Author:
Heather A Conley
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Twenty-five years of relative calm and predictability in relations between Russia and the West enabled European governments largely to neglect their military capabilities for territorial defense and dramatically redraw Northern Europe’s multilateral, regional, and bilateral boundaries, stimulating new institutional and cooperative developments and arrangements. These cooperative patterns of behavior occurred amid a benign security environment, a situation that no longer obtains. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its military incursion into eastern Ukraine, its substantial military modernization efforts, heightened undersea activity in the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea, and its repeated air violations, the region’s security environment has dramatically worsened. The Baltic Sea and North Atlantic region have returned as a geostrategic focal point. It is vital, therefore, that the United States rethink its security approach to the region—what the authors describe as Enhanced Deterrence in the North.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Modernization
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, North Atlantic, Northern Europe, Crimea, and Baltic Sea