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81. Defending Europe with less America

Author:
Camille Grand
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has revealed the sorry state of European militaries and defence industries after decades of peace dividends, as well as their deep reliance on the US. A second Trump presidency could drastically reduce US defence support for Europe. But regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election, the degradation of the European security environment and the shifting priorities of the US mean that Europe needs to be prepared to take more responsibility for its own defence. Europeans require a sustained plan over the next decade that combines immediate efforts to support Ukraine and rebuild readiness, and longer-term goals to develop a “full force package”, including the combat support capabilities and key enablers that are currently provided primarily by the US. Paradoxically, such a deliberate approach to overcoming institutional challenges and strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities may be the best way to preserve a strong transatlantic relationship and a degree of US commitment.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

82. Beyond the counter-offensive: Attrition, stalemate, and the future of the war in Ukraine

Author:
Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia and Ukraine are engaged in a war of attrition – which on current projections Russia is set to win. Ukraine can only achieve its war aims if it moves to a war of manoeuvre; without this, it cannot regain its lost territory. Western supplies and efforts at defence-industrial consolidation are failing to provide Ukraine with the replacement armaments it needs to survive the war of attrition, let along switch to manoeuvre warfare. The West and Europeans in particular need to overhaul their financial regulations and create economies of scale to radically stimulate the production of drones, ammunition, armoured fighting vehicles, and more. Only if they carefully absorb the lessons learned from this war will Europeans be ready for the types of great power confrontation that are becoming more likely in the 21st century
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

83. Wars and elections: How European leaders can maintain public support for Ukraine

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
As Russia’s war on Ukraine approaches its second anniversary, the European Parliament and US presidential elections are also on the horizon. Against this backdrop, Vladimir Putin is banking on war fatigue in the West to help achieve a Russian victory. European public opinion can inform Europe’s leaders about how best to make the case to continue support for Ukraine in this difficult environment. Europeans seem pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances of winning the war, while a plurality think it will end in some kind of settlement. But most Europeans are not in the mood for appeasement either. They would be disappointed if Donald Trump were to be re-elected, and many believe his victory could also be a win for Putin. In most member states, a plurality would want Europe to maintain its current support or increase it in the event of the US scaling down its aid. Leaders in Ukraine and Europe need to adjust their language and define the meaning of a ‘durable peace’ to prevent Putin taking advantage of war fatigue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

84. Energising eastern Europe: How the EU can enhance energy sovereignty through cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova

Author:
Szymon Kardas
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has made strengthening energy sovereignty – its own and that of its eastern neighbours – a strategic priority. Along with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU has created an elaborate legal and institutional framework that provides a platform for energy cooperation. Through this framework and other measures, the EU and member states have helped significantly strengthen the energy sovereignty of Moldova and Ukraine, in particular helping them to diversify away from Russian fossil fuels and synchronising their electricity grids with that of the EU. But when it comes to the cleanness and efficiency of their energy, Moldova and Ukraine are still underperforming, despite their potential for green energy generation. Improving the cleanness of their energy would also help strengthen the EU’s energy sovereignty, increasing the mutual benefits of closer energy cooperation. Ukraine’s vast gas reserves and extensive gas infrastructure, along with its potential for green hydrogen production and the significant development of renewable energy sources in both countries offer opportunities for cooperation with the EU, which could enhance both its energy security and decarbonisation efforts.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Sovereignty, European Union, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova

85. EU-Pacific Talks | Charting the course for Ukraine: Reassessment of the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Zuzana Augustova
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
During the next debate in the EU-Pacific Talks series organised by EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, participants engaged in a lively debate covering various aspects of the Russian attack on Ukraine. They also discussed the potential impact on the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region and the ability of allies and partners to navigate their Indo-Pacific commitments. Read what our guests discussed in this report by Zuzana Augustova.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Indo-Pacific

86. Czech-Russian Relations. Russian Disinformation Campaign

Author:
Andrzej Jacuch
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
After the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the Czech Republic became fully aware of the threats posed by the Kremlin despite President Zeman has denied the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine and has criticised the EU sanctions against Russia. Czechia belongs to the group of countries through which Russia influences the EU, to gradually and deliberately erode its structures. Russia exerts a strong influence on the Czech Republic by non-military means, including disinformation and propaganda, the activities of secret services, and penetration of its economy and specifically its energy sector. The article aims to answer the question about the role of Russian disinformation and propaganda in the context of Russian influence in the Czech Republic. The role of Russian disinformation and propaganda and how Russia influences Czechia is extensively analysed. The main hypothesis is that Russia treats the Czech Republic as a key state for espionage and disinformation activities and as a zone of influence, undermining the sovereignty of the Czech Republic and the role of NATO and the EU.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Resilience, Disinformation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Czech Republic

87. Rebuild, Decarbonize, and Integrate: Ukraine, the EU, and the Road to a Net-Zero Energy Sector

Author:
Jacob Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022. Reconstruction is already underway, but to meet EU accession requirements, Ukraine will have to rapidly decarbonize as it rebuilds. As the frontline situation points to a longer war than was projected early on, uncertainties about Ukraine’s long-term economic path and prospects have inevitably increased. At the same time, noticeable political progress has been made given the EU’s agreement to start negotiations for full Ukrainian membership. This step provides the fighting Ukrainian people with a long-term perspective and a destination point as a prosperous, democratic, European market economy. Anchoring Ukraine’s economic future in the EU will have transformative implications for the country’s economy, not least its energy sector. That sector, which is still exposed to Russian military attacks, is now compelled to assimilate into the rapidly decarbonizing EU. More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022 or is situated on territory now controlled by Russia. The Net Zero World Initiative (2023) estimated that 43% of nuclear, 68% of coal-fired, and 33% of combined heat and power generation was lost to the war as of mid-2023. Despite continuing attacks, more than two gigawatts (GW) of electricity production capacity were restored during 2023. Reconstruction of the Ukrainian energy sector is already underway despite the war. With it, the country’s energy transformation has begun. Yet, in March 2024, Russia returned to large- scale saturation missile attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including its large hydropower plants and thermal power stations, inflicting further long-term damage. Putin seeks to exploit the apparent drop in Ukrainian air defense efficiency as Western supplies of air interceptor missiles have grown scarcer. Military risk consequently continues to cloud the outlook for Ukraine’s energy production. It also reduces the interest of foreign and domestic investors in committing resources to the sector. Uncertainty plagues the prospects for Western public support for Ukraine, too. Despite the recent passage of a funding package, future US funding will remain hostage to domestic politics. In Europe, various veto players—led by Hungary—as well as other internal divisions pose an ongoing political challenge to the EU’s financial support for Kyiv. The scarcity of public and private investment funding sources for Ukraine stands in stark contrast to the level of ambition for the energy- sector transition inherent in Ukraine’s EU accession process. One of the major energy- sector challenges facing Ukraine will be the expectation in Brussels that Ukraine will either enter fully into the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) or implement an ETS-aligned national carbon-pricing system of similar ambition. It will not be possible for the Ukrainian economy to be granted a prolonged transition period here, and—for instance—enjoy free carbon-emission credits for affected industries, when these same industries will have been partially or fully phased out in the rest of the EU at the time of Ukraine’s EU accession. While the EU ETS price is currently adjusting to the new post-2022 energy shock demand level (for example, prices have declined so far in 2024 to around €60–65/ton), the ETS auction price forward curve slopes upward. This indicates that carbon market participants continue to believe that EU carbon prices will rise during Ukraine’s EU accession process. Adapting the economy to the EU’s carbon price level will require urgent action on the part of the Ukrainian government as it prepares the long-term National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) that will lay out the country’s energy strategy for the rest of the 2020s. Certainly, Ukraine’s Environmental Protection Minister, Ruslan Strilets, displayed the necessary ambition when he spoke after the UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai in late 2023. He reiterated earlier government statements from 2021 and committed Ukraine to launching a pilot emissions trading system in 2025 with a full launch in 2026. This would enable Ukraine’s entry into the ETS, and thus avoid negative effects of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for Ukrainian exports. This is a timetable that necessitates immediate and sizable climate investments in Ukraine. Ukraine has further committed itself in recent months to a significant scaling up of its already large nuclear power-generation capacity. The Ukrainian government has signed memoranda of understanding aiming at the construction of up to nine new power units using Westinghouse AP1000 technology. Just as the accelerated introduction of carbon pricing in Ukraine will be costly, construction of new nuclear power units, even if located at one of Ukraine’s existing nuclear plant facilities, will require large sums of capital investment upfront. The issue of upfront costs will similarly weigh on the broader issue of reconstruction of Ukraine, as more energy- efficient buildings will only gradually earn back the higher building and materials costs through lower long-term energy consumption. Ukraine must be applauded for aiming to seize the opportunity to rebuild its energy sector and integrate it with the EU as quickly as possible. This follows the recommendations of several expert groups, including GMF’s earlier (2023) report on this issue, which called for rapid Ukrainian adoption of carbon pricing and highlighted the need to phase in EU-level building codes expeditiously. This paper will focus on the implications for both Ukraine and the EU of the Ukrainian government’s recent energy-sector choices. What do these plans require institutionally and financially to succeed, and how will they alter not only the Ukrainian but the entire EU energy sector in the process?
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Decarbonization, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

88. Ukraine’s Long Path toward NATO

Author:
Steven Pifer
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
For some 20 years after regaining its independence in 1991, Ukraine wavered in how far to take its relationship with NATO. That changed following Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea and engagement in fighting in Donbas in 2014. Ukraine’s leaders and people increasingly came to view the alliance as the best answer for their country’s security needs. A growing number of NATO allies support Ukraine’s membership as important for Europe’s security and are ready to extend Kyiv an invitation to join. Other allies, however, are reluctant to take that step now, particularly while Ukraine remains at war with Russia. Division within NATO over this issue broke into the open in the run-up to the alliance’s July 2023 summit in Vilnius. Allies seemed determined to avoid a repeat at the July 2024 summit in Washington. That summit described Ukraine’s path to membership as “irreversible,” and NATO decisions focused on providing Kyiv the military wherewithal to defend itself against Russia’s continuing assaults. The “when” of Ukraine’s membership remains a question for the future.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and North America

89. NATO Bolsters Its Eastern Flank

Author:
William Courtney
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
The 75th anniversary summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), celebrated in July in Washington, dwelt on bolstering its eastern flank and supporting Ukraine. The eastern flank has long been at the center of the alliance’s exertions. NATO emerged in 1949 in great part because of the 1948 Berlin crisis and the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia. Chief among the alliance’s original purposes was deterring Soviet aggression. Reinvigorated in large part because of Russian aggression against Ukraine, NATO is stronger now than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Modern Russia has never been more repressive at home, or more aggressive abroad, than now. As long as Russia uses force to pursue imperial, revanchist goals, ensuring allied security against its threats may require greater exertions and acceptance of higher risks.
Topic:
Security, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

90. Putin verbatim: Ukraine’s Use of NATO Deep Strike Missiles Would Put West at War with Russia

Author:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Pres. Putin says that Ukraine’s use of Western long-range high-precision weapons to strike deep inside Russia would require Western satellite guidance and personnel support to “assign flight missions to these missile systems.” Thus, as he sees it, the West would be directly involved in such strikes, and this would put “NATO countries… at war with Russia.” Contains full official statement.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine