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51. Lecciones para la PCSD tras la Guerra en Ucrania

Author:
Gracia Abad Quintanal
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
La evolución de la Unión Europea, lejos de ser lineal es, indudablemente una historia de avances loables y retrocesos sonoros. Esa evolución irregular es especialmente visible en el ámbito de la seguridad y defensa. Así, si por una parte al Tratado de Ámsterdam siguieron años de grandes avances como los que se materializaron en Saint Malo, Helsinki, Colonia, Santa María de Feira y Lisboa, con posterioridad, el triple choque resultante de la Guerra en Irak, la crisis financiera primero y la pandemia de COVID 19 se traduciría en un periodo de bloqueo y oscurecimiento sustancial del panorama. Sin embargo, esa situación no dudaría para siempre porque una nueva guerra, en Ucrania, percibida como un cambio estratégico fundamental que desafía los intereses y valores de la unión iba a propiciar el despertar de los europeos generando un nuevo impulso en lo que a la seguridad y la defensa se refiere permitiendo una búsqueda más decidida de una mayor autonomía estratégica con todo lo que ésta conlleva. Ese impulso se ve favorecido, además, porque los estados miembros más orientales de la Unión Europea, tradicionalmente más reticentes en este ámbito, siendo los más afectados por la renovada amenaza rusa, pueden empezar a serlo mucho menos. En esas condiciones se reabre, incluso, el debate de la ampliación, entreabriendo la puerta a estados que, de ser capaces de cumplir con los requisitos preceptivos para la adhesión podrían en algunos casos constituir un indudable activo para la seguridad y defensa de la UE en su conjunto.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Russia-Ukraine War, and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
Political Geography:
Europe

52. Conflicto en Ucrania. Cuando la estrategia híbrida no funciona

Author:
José M. Martínez Cortés
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
En 2014 las fuerzas armadas rusas invadieron, de forma exitosa, la península de Crimea sin pegar apenas un solo disparo. Supuestamente, las mismas fuerzas armadas invadieron Ucrania en febrero de 2022 con un resultado significativamente diferente. La reducida eficacia operativa demostrada por estas fuerzas armadas lleva a plantearse muchos interrogantes sobre cuáles han sido las causas de este fracaso. El presente artículo pretende entrar en dicho análisis, en lo que respecta fundamentalmente a lo realizado durante 2022, por ser ese período el de mayor interés a nuestros efectos, a la vez que profundiza en el poco difundido papel desempeñado por las fuerzas aéreas rusas.
Topic:
Russia-Ukraine War, Warfare, and Hybrid Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

53. Lecciones militares estratégicas de la Guerra de Ucrania

Author:
Yago Rodríguez
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
La mayor guerra europea desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial es una fuente natural de lecciones para cualquier ejército. En el siguiente estudio ofrecemos una tamización de las lecciones estratégicas estrictamente militares que nos ha dejado la guerra a partir de la disección de la historia militar de la misma.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

54. Repercussions of the end of the war in Ukraine for the United Nations Security System

Author:
Carlos Espaliú Berdud
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an extraordinarily serious violation of the prohibition on the use of force that was embodied in Article 2.4 of the UN Charter after a long historical process. The fact that it was perpetrated by one of the permanent members of the Security Council implies a breach of the consensus among the Allies in World War II that gave rise to the United Nations and the system of international peacekeeping and security that it brought with it. The final outcome of the war in Ukraine may mean that the blow to the system of collective security envisaged in the Charter may be fatal, should the outcome be favourable to Russian interests, or that, despite being badly damaged, it may continue to exist, should the final outcome of the conflict be favourable to Ukrainian interests.
Topic:
Security, United Nations, Peacekeeping, International Community, UN Security Council, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus

55. Strengthening the Political Credibility of NATO Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
Wannes Verstraete
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Due to Russian nuclear signaling during its war against Ukraine, there is renewed interest in strengthening nuclear deterrence in a Euro-Atlantic context. The changes in the agreed language in the new North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Strategic Concept, adopted on 29 June 2022 at the summit in Madrid, and the Vilnius Summit Communiqué from 11 June 2023, are examples of this interest. Subsequently, this policy brief focuses on one aspect of strengthening NATO’s extended nuclear deterrence (END), namely how can NATO adapt its nuclear policy and posture to mitigate the uncertainties related to the political credibility challenge of extended nuclear deterrence? Questions regarding the political will to use nuclear weapons by the guarantor to protect and reassure allies in an END relationship is a well-known evergreen that reappears from time to time. Therefore, the author argues that NATO should address this political credibility challenge by strengthening the role of European allies in the nuclear strategy of the Alliance.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

56. Europe as a Geopolitical Actor: Reforming the EU’s Narrative in North Africa

Author:
Zine Labidine Ghebouli
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
This paper will examine the gap between the promises and self-perception of the EU and its member states in North Africa, and the realities of implemented policies. It is true that the founding principle of the EU, i.e., to promote peace and prosperity, has never been more pivotal in policy frameworks. However, Europe on the level of both the EU and its member states is confronting complex post-COVID dynamics such as major life changes, further weakening of vulnerable economies, and deeper sociopolitical fractures. Added to this dangerous mix of challenges, the invasion of Ukraine is not only a violation of the latter’s territorial integrity and sovereignty but is also a symptom of an overall weakened security order both in Europe and abroad (De Clerck-Sachsse, 2022). At a time of multiple crises, it is imperative to reassess Europe’s partnerships in North Africa to develop a new narrative that is based on realistic advantages and limitations.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Reform, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and North Africa

57. Türkiye-EU Relations and the European Political Community in the Aftermath of Russian Invasion: Is the Transactional Turn Here to Stay?

Author:
Başak Alpan
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
Bilateral relations between Türkiye and the European Union (EU) acquired an EU conditionality dimension with the 1999 Helsinki decision, granting the country the EU candidacy status. Nevertheless, especially since the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, also known as Türkiye-EU Refugee Deal, what we see is a thorough shift in Türkiye-EU relations from a conditionality perspective to transactionalism, coupled with several domestic and international developments. In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the significance of geopolitics and the heightened relevance of realpolitik also contributed to a renewed focus on strategic and pragmatic issues, relegating normative concerns to the background within Türkiye-EU relations. All in all, the shift from a conditionality perspective to a security-based logic within the framework of Türkiye-EU relations was mainly determined and characterised by the so-called “transactional turn”. Within this very transactionalist paradigm, both the EU and Türkiye want to pursue their short-term interests at the expense of a long-term principled engagement for some time. The launch of the European Political Community (EPC) on 6 October 2022 with 44 European heads of state and government (including all 27 EU member states as well as Türkiye) also contributed to this transactional tide, which aimed to “emphasise European geopolitical cooperation in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; to remedy enlargement fatigue by providing an additional forum for exchange between EU candidates and member states; as well as create a forum for exchange with non-EU security actors” (Tcherneva, 2023). The EPC’s rather flexible structure and focus on mini-lateralism, which could provide greater freedom for leaders to focus on their immediate concerns, also raises eyebrows about whether the EPC would be attentive enough (and even have the mandate) to safeguard human rights, democracy, and the rule of law (Jurkovic, 2023). In light of these debates, the aims of this paper are twofold. First, it aims to explore how recent transactional initiatives between Türkiye and the EU in general and the EPC initiative in particular have unfolded and have been perceived by the Turkish diplomats and foreign policy experts. This endeavour to understand the Turkish perceptions of Türkiye-EU relations mainly focusing on recent transactionalism between the parties will be explored with a particular focus on three thematic layers, namely the foreign policy, migration and energy through semi-structured interviews with Turkish diplomats and foreign policy experts. The main rationale behind picking up these thematic layers is to identify, analyse and describe better the complex nature of Türkiye-EU relations with a particular focus on these policy fields (namely foreign policy, migration and energy), which recently witnessed the highest intensity of interactions between two parties. Second, the paper discusses the significance of the EPC within this very transactional turn and aims to understand whether the EPC is another repercussion of the increasing transactionalism. The final aim of the paper will be to understand whether the EU foreign policy, on the one hand, and the bilateral Türkiye-EU relations, on the other, would evolve in a completely transactional and security-based manner leaving no room for normativity amidst the current global uncertainties and challenges, as well as bringing together policy recommendations for the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Migration, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Middle East

58. No silver bullet: Aid is not a shortcut to victory for Ukraine

Author:
Michael DiMino
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Delayed or insufficient Western aid is often blamed for Ukraine’s lack of success on the battlefield. The truth is more complicated. There is no aid “silver bullet” for what ails Ukraine’s war effort. More aid alone is unlikely to make a decisive difference in the outcome of the war, especially if Ukraine’s structural disadvantages and strategic deficiencies remain unaddressed. More aid is unlikely to fundamentally change the conflict because Ukraine lacks the manpower necessary to use it to generate enough new combat power to retake lost territory. Moreover, the West does not currently possess the industrial capacity needed to fulsomely sustain an indefinite Ukrainian war effort. Russian adaptability and battlefield innovation have successfully blunted the effectiveness of several Western weapon systems. And Ukrainian doctrine and tactics remain suboptimal even in the third year of the war, meaning Kyiv has failed to employ the aid it does receive with maximal effectiveness. Neither Washington nor Kyiv has articulated a clear theory of victory for Ukraine. Western aid was always a stopgap to buy Ukraine time, not a regime-change project to bring about the dissolution of the Russian state. Instead of continuing to placate maximalist fantasies of total victory, the U.S. should advocate for a shift to a defensive strategy and openness to a negotiated settlement that ends the war, such that a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state can be preserved in the face of fighting to collapse.
Topic:
Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

59. A new NATO agenda: Less U.S., less dependency

Author:
Benjamin Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should aggressively reduce its force presence in Europe. This would be consistent with NATO’s original balancing purpose and U.S. expectations then that garrisoning Europe was a temporary expedient, not a permanent tool of U.S. dominance. The Russian threat, despite being energized by NATO expansion, is insufficient to demand the current defense effort devoted to it in Europe, whether it’s Americans or Europeans making that effort. The results of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underline this happy point: Russia has proven weaker than conventional wisdom held, and the advantages of defense evident in the war bode well for the territorial status quo NATO defends in Europe. A U.S. drawdown in Europe is unlikely to spark a European defense renaissance, but even so, the balance of power in Europe will remain intact, and the United States will be better off with the freed-up resources and reduced risks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, Dependency, Balance of Power, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

60. A defensive approach to Ukraine military aid

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The next administration is likely to continue U.S. military aid to Ukraine to some degree, yet thus far decisions about what aid to provide have been reactive and not connected to any strategy. The United States should use its military aid to push Ukraine to adopt a defensive strategy that will be more sustainable for the Ukrainians given manpower shortfalls and more responsible and fiscally feasible for the United States, while also reducing the risk of Russian escalation. This would be in line with America’s priorities in Ukraine, including preventing a Russian victory and preserving a sovereign Ukraine at lowest possible cost and without direct involvement in the war. This strategy would also put Ukraine in a good position for a settlement that trades some land for a ceasefire and supports Ukraine’s longer-term defense. A Ukraine aid framework centered on a defensive strategy would see the U.S. provide air defense, anti-tank mines, the material and equipment to build fortifications, short-range artillery and limited short-range missile variants, small uncrewed aerial systems, and some armored vehicles for transport. In many cases, however, quantities would be limited by the needs of U.S. forces or other U.S. partners. The U.S. would not provide most types of aircraft, long-range missiles, tanks, or other weapon systems that are primarily offensive in nature and could cross a redline for Vladimir Putin.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America