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11. Vulnerabilities and Resilience of Electrical Grids in Wartime: Lessons from Ukraine

Author:
Volodymyr Kudrytskyi and Mariana Budjeryn
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Vulnerabilities and Resilience of Electrical Grids in Wartime: Lessons from Ukraine: Tuesday, March 11, 2025. The Russian assault on Ukraine’s electrical generating capacity and transmission grid as part of its full-scale war against Ukraine, is unprecedented in the history of warfare. Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, the former CEO of Ukraine’s electric grid operator Ukrenergo, discussed the challenges of securing Ukraine’s energy system throughout the war, lessons for mitigating grid vulnerabilities, and prospects for rebuilding a more resilient energy system in Ukraine and Europe. Speaker: Volodymyr Kudrytskyi served as the CEO and Chairman of the Management Board of the Ukrainian Transmission System Operator Ukrenergo from February 2020 until September 2024. Under his leadership, Ukraine’s electrical grid has undergone preparations for synchronization with the power system of Continental Europe ENTSO-E and emergency synchronization with ENTSO-E in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. From February 24, 2022, Mr. Kudrytskyi and his team at Ukrenergo managed the Ukrainian power grid through unprecedented Russian attacks against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. Previously, Mr. Kudrytskyi held leadership roles in key Ukrainian energy sector companies, including Naftogaz and Ukrtransnafta. Mr. Kudrytskyi holds a degree in international finance from Kyiv National Economic University. Moderator: Mariana Budjeryn is the author of Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023) and a winner of the 2024 William E. Colby Military Writers’ Award, the first female in the award’s 25-year history. Dr. Budjeryn is a member of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academies of Sciences and a senior nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Topic:
Electricity, Resilience, Vulnerability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

12. Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

Author:
Ian Brzezinski
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Russia is the most direct and significant threat to the security of NATO member states—and since Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 this threat continues to grow. It now encompasses the war in Ukraine, the militarization of the Arctic, hybrid warfare, and violations of arms control treaties. While NATO holds a significant advantage over Russia in military and economic power, an effective and unified strategy is needed to counter Russia’s aggression and fully harness the Alliance’s collective capabilities. To effectively counter Russia, NATO must defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression against NATO allies and partners, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. That will require, among other actions, a significant increase of support and commitment to Ukraine’s defense against Russia, and a more robust Alliance force posture including the modernization of its nuclear deterrent, the permanent stationing of brigade elements along NATO’s eastern frontier and increased defense industrial capacities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Intelligence, International Organization, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

13. The 8 Percent Approach: A Big Bang in Resources and Capacity for Europe’s Economy and Defence

Author:
Andrea Dugo, Fredrik Erixon, and Ismail Abdi
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe has become a region of feeble economic performance and military frailty. Its share of the world economy is rapidly shrinking, and the region is struggling to keep up with economies at the modern technological frontier. Countries in the European Union have for decades talked about the importance of raising Research and Development (R&D) expenditure and allow greater space for an entrepreneurial business sector that is prospering on the back of innovation. However, the results are poor. R&D expenditures as a share of GDP have largely been stagnant, business investment and inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have tanked. Rates of new business formation and growth are paltry, partly as a result of gross overregulation. Productivity growth has continued its decades-long path of deceleration, and the EU is increasingly behind international leaders. Fortunately, Europe is beginning to wake up from its strategic slumber. Defence expenditures are now growing faster than in previous decades – and some countries, like Poland, are becoming serious powers. Yet, the region’s own military capacity remains poor. Europe must rebuild core conventional capacities at a time when defence modernisation requires substantial resources and focus. Russia may be bogged down by its war against Ukraine, but it is rebuilding its capacities fast and is increasingly aided by partnerships with other countries that want to break down what remains of a liberal world order. Many European NATO-members are now hitting the 2-percent spending target but must spend vastly more to acquire sufficient capacities to defend themselves and their interests.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Regional Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

14. CTC Sentinel: March 2025 Issue

Author:
Don Rassler, Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Julika Enslin, Aaron Y. Zelin, and Jake Dulligan
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The March issue focuses in particular on the drone threat. In the feature article, Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage examine the evolution of terrorist drone usage and forecast its future trajectory in light of the tactical and technological innovations emerging from the Russo-Ukrainian War. They write that “the conflict has become a critical ‘innovation hub’ for drone warfare, accelerating advancements in the scale, speed, and range of drone operations. These developments are not only transforming the modern battlefield but also creating new opportunities for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to enhance their operational capabilities.” They assess that “in particular, the war has normalized large-scale drone deployment, demonstrating the feasibility of launching coordinated drone swarms and phased attacks capable of overwhelming existing defenses” and note that the potential future pairing of high-speed First-Person View (FPV) drones with emerging technologies such as AI-assisted targeting “could significantly increase the precision and impact of future attacks.” In a similar vein, Jake Dulligan, Laura Freeman, Austin Phoenix, and Bradley Davis, in assessing the threat posed by commercial drones, write that the biggest concern “is that drone swarms could dramatically increase the impact of bad actor drone operations, be it kinetic strikes, ISR, or psychological warfare.” This month’s interview is with Dr. Christian Klos, the Director General of Public Security at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Interior and Community. He says that “when it comes to the external threat, I would agree with the assessment that ISIS-K is in Germany as well. What we observe from the intelligence side is that there are clear indications that the group intends to conduct attacks in Europe, and this can also include Germany and therefore we are very much aware of this threat, and we have seen also travel activities. So, it’s not just some minor indications.” Aaron Zelin assesses the new Syrian government’s efforts to counter the Islamic State, Hezbollah, and the captagon trade. He writes: “Unlike the Assad regime—which did little to fight the Islamic State, was closely aligned with Hezbollah, and produced captagon on an industrial scale—HTS in its guise as the new government of Syria is taking on these challenges assertively, and has a significant track record in doing so previously. Not only are these efforts a benefit to Syrian society and the security and stability of the country, but they also align with the interests of the United States and U.S. regional allies.” Alexandre Rodde and Justin Olmstead examine the evolution of vehicular ramming attacks and prevention efforts. They write that “when it comes to indicators and warnings of future attacks, the demonstration effect created by high-casualty vehicle-ramming attacks has in the past seemingly produced a surge in copycat attacks, which means the security agencies should be particularly vigilant given the recent uptick in high-profile attacks, including the New Orleans attack.”
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Weapons, Drones, Islamic State, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Public Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

15. Ukraine: European democracy’s affordable arsenal

Author:
Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
European NATO members must raise defence spending by enough to deter through strength an irredentist Russia. This must be done possibly without the United States and when ageing populations demand higher social spending. Raising defence spending to sufficient levels could result in a doubling of current primary deficits to just over 3 percent of GDP on average. This seems likely to be a fiscally unattainable goal for this group of countries. European NATO members, in addition to their quantitative defence spending challenge, face the qualitative challenge of significantly increasing their outlays on new modern military equipment, especially drones, to credibly deter Russia. This will require all European NATO members to significantly increase investments in their domestic and regional military-industrial capacities. While its armed forces are physically defending their country against Russia’s onslaught, Ukraine is transforming gradually into a very large, advanced and cost-competitive military equipment and weapons producer. Through the so-called ‘Danish Model’, individual European Union and NATO members are already actively funding Ukrainian defence production, helping it to help itself against Russia. Much more focus should be put on Ukraine’s ability, if fully integrated with the military-industrial sector in the rest of Europe, to produce much of the modern military equipment wanted by itself and the rest of Europe. This Policy Brief shows how Ukraine already produces drones and modern howitzers, arguably the two most important weapons in defensive warfare today, at prices well below those achieved by other Western military suppliers. The EU, with a fully integrated and funded Ukrainian military-industrial sector, will have the capacity to produce much of the cost-competitive military equipment it will need in future, while continuing to fund its welfare systems. To facilitate this development, the EU must in all defence and military-related matters begin treating Ukraine immediately as a full EU member.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Industrial Policy, Governance, European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

16. The governance and funding of European rearmament

Author:
Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs. European Union measures including the European Defence Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and ReArm Europe represent progress towards strengthening the supply of military goods but the incentives offered are too small to address the home bias in procurement or to coordinate the provision of ‘strategic enablers’ such as military satellites. To go further, the EU and its European allies have two options. First, the role of the European Defence Agency could be broadened, possibly in combination with a new lending instrument similar to the EU’s 2020-22 SURE programme. Second, a European Defence Mechanism (EDM) could be created: an institution similar to the European Stability Mechanism, based on an intergovernmental treaty. The EDM would undertake joint procurement and plan for the provision of strategic enablers in specified areas, with a capacity to fund these roles. It could own strategic enablers and charge usage fees to EDM members, reducing the budgetary impact of rearmament. EDM membership would entail prohibition of both state aid and procurement preferences that benefit national defence contractors at the expense of contractors from other EDM members. Of the two options, the second is preferable, as it would (1) create a defence industry single market among EDM members, (2) create a financing vehicle that might make large-scale projects fiscally feasible, and (3) include non-EU democracies such as the United Kingdom on an equal footing, while also giving an opt-out to EU countries that lack the political appetite for more defence integration, or that have national constitutional constraints.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Geopolitics, Weapons, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

17. A battle against time – and against Putin’s Russia

Author:
Erwan Fouéré
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
With Putin’s war against Ukraine about to enter its third year, the EU’s enlargement policy remains at the top of its foreign policy priorities, with the focus being on both Ukraine and Moldova. This is following the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with both countries. But where does this leave the countries of the Western Balkans and their very long journey towards the EU which began over 20 years ago? Will these countries’ hopes for much needed political momentum in their accession prospects be fulfilled during 2024, despite the repeated delays and the EU’s failure to respect its commitments to the region over the past few years? With elections taking place across Europe offering fertile ground for Russia to deploy its arsenal of disinformation tactics, time is not on the EU’s side. To counter Russian attempts to influence developments in the region, as well as to reverse the dangerous trend of backsliding in democratic and rule of law reforms, the EU will need to adopt a more robust, consistent and determined approach towards the Western Balkans. Without any further delay, it needs to set out a much needed geopolitical and security direction for its enlargement policies in the Western Balkans.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Rule of Law, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Balkans

18. Goodbye to Russia, Russia and Russia!1: Finland’s New NATO Chapter Within the Framework of Shelter Theory

Author:
Yeliz Kulali Martin
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Behavior, Russia-Ukraine War, Shelter Theory, Small States, and Hard Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Finland

19. Six Takeaways from Two Years of Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine from the North, East and South in order to control the whole country through direct military occupation and/or a proxy government. Moscow assumed a rapid collapse or surrender of the Ukrainian state and planned a relatively fast war of manoeuvre coupled with air assaults and/or amphibious operations to take over major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Ukraine – which had prepared to some extent for a Russian invasion since 2014 – resisted and rolled back invading forces from its major cities in 2022, including from Kherson despite its illegal annexation to the Russian Federation. In late spring 2023, Kyiv launched a counter-offensive aimed at liberating territories south of Zaporizhzhia, but unfortunately Russian forces were able to hold most of the ground previously gained. A high level of attrition has now been experienced by both sides for several months, with more than half a million troops deployed by belligerents. Over the last six months, the war has turned into a bloody stalemate. It witnesses continuous and indiscriminate air campaigns by Russia – including the use of bombs, missiles and drones –, tailored raids by Ukraine on the occupied territories and across the Black Sea, and above all fierce land battles over a highly fortified frontline with a systematic, mutual shelling and massive use of drones. Two years after the beginning of the invasion, Russian armed forces control the land corridor that connects the Crimea peninsula to Donbas – two areas already directly or indirectly under Moscow influence since 2014 – and the whole Azov Sea: a region accounting for slightly less than 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory. Still, Ukraine continues to access the Black Sea and export its goods. Such an occupation has cost so far dozens of thousands of military casualties in both countries, the lives of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, as well as huge numbers of injured people and millions of displaced citizens – plus the material destruction brought by the conflict. What does this dramatic watershed for Ukraine mean for Europe as a whole? At least six takeaways can be gained for the armed forces of European countries, NATO and EU defence initiatives, with a view to deterring Moscow from further aggressions and if necessary defending Europe from them.
Topic:
Defense Industry, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

20. NATO’s Posture vis-a-vis Russia: Features and Challenges

Author:
Elio Calcagno and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Russian war against Ukraine has had multiple impacts on NATO’s deterrence and defence stance vis-à-vis Moscow, which today presents a number of challenges to allies – particularly European ones. The 2022 Madrid summit and the resulting Strategic Concept signalled a substantial departure for the alliance in terms of focus and posture.[1] First, the new Concept represents an unequivocal return to a Russia policy based first and foremost on deterrence and defence, rather than calls for cooperation that had been typical between the end of the Cold War and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[2] The 2022 Concept stands in stark contrast with this period of détente and instead explicitly points to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.[3] This new focus on deterrence and defence is accompanied with an enhancement of NATO’s military presence along the northern and eastern flanks.[4]
Topic:
NATO, Deterrence, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine