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21. London 2030: How Will the Capital's Economy Change

Author:
Oxford Economics
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
London’s economy is growing strongly, easily outpacing both the UK and its nearest European rivals such as Paris and Frankfurt. Significant investments in public infrastructure, office buildings, retailing, and homes all point to widespread optimism that the growth will continue, not just for the next year or two but for many years to come. But how confident should we be about London’s growth trajectory? London 2030 analyses the trajectory and magnitude of change that is likely to confront London’s economy in the decade and a half from 2015 up to 2030. The study is the result of analysis by our specialist cities forecasting team, and provides unrivalled forecast data sets and in-depth analysis of what trends imply for the scale and structure of the capital’s economy over the next fifteen years, as well as assessment of other factors that might influence growth. The full research programme is now available for purchase, and is comprised of five research papers: - Our baseline forecasts for London’s economy, population growth and employment to 2030 - A forecast comparison between our data and The London Plan - Analysis of housing trends: will a shortage of housing constrain London’s growth? - Assessment of the impact of alternate scenarios, such as a Eurozone crisis, or a stronger performance -Possible drivers of change such as the impact of new technology, or the UK leaving the EU
Topic:
Economy, Economic growth, and Investment
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and London

22. The Economic Impact of Huawei in the UK

Author:
Oxford Economics
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
In September 2012, Huawei commited to spending £1.3 billion in the UK. Almost three years later, the global information and communications leader is well on its way to doing just that—and with vast social and economic significance. In this report, Oxford Economics explores the contribution of Huawei to the UK economy over the three years 2012-2014, and assesses the company’s recent UK expenditure record over the five years 2013-2017, split equally between investment and procurement.
Topic:
Economics, Communications, and Investment
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

23. Digital Single Market. SMEs and the Juncker Investment Plan for the European Union

Author:
Juan Antonio Pavón Losada
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
A few months ago (25/11/2014), the European Commission disclosed the mechanism for its much-heralded €315 billion investment plan, revealing how a a scarce €21 billion of initial public money is intended to lift fifteen times as much in capital. In March 2015, EU finance ministers agreed upon delivering on the commitment they took at the European Councils in October and December 2014, to wind-off Juncker's flagship investment plan. The idea was to create a new European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), with €5 billion coming from the European Investment Bank and an €8 billion guarantee from existing EU funds designed to secure a further contribution of 16 billion Euro from the institutions. The €8 billion guarantee will come over a three-year period from the Connecting Europe Facility (€3.3 billion); Europe’s research programme Horizon 2020 (€2.7 billion) and socalled “budget margin”, or unused funds, worth €2 billion. On the one hand, the EFSI plans to generate investments into the European economy of about €315 billion, by providing guarantees for higher-risk projects which aim at developing telecommunications and transport infrastructure, energy efficiency projects, research, education and innovation activities to finally generating about 240 billion in long-term investments, showing a timid responsiveness for the claims against austerity over the past years. On the other hand, the alternative purpose of the Fund is to provide financing to SMEs to enhance the viability of new venture capital injections, loan guarantees, securitisations and seed financing designed to offer micro-loans to SMEs, to fund start-ups or offer mid-cap companies venture capital, projected to generate €75 billion for those SMEs and mid-cap firms over the period 2015-2017. In addition, the Commission aims to attract private investors to the Fund. Nevertheless, private investors seem sceptical about investing and assuming greater risks when the returns are not guaranteed. In fact, the basis for most longterm infrastructure or energy efficiency projects will most likely remain public funding -his is especially true of the newer EU member states, where the private sector is not strong enough-. In fact, the EU executive believes that more financing can be provided by individual member states. Two ways are being discussed: Capital contributions, which are not limited to the respective Member State and may entail voting rights and a claim on the fund´s return (if any); and that participation in investment platforms that can be restricted to the Member State itself. As an incentive, this amount will be then discounted from the calculations of their deficits within the European Semester. There is a rising concern between Member States that the new fund will turn into a parallel EU budget -where voting rights could be purchased- not subject to enough democratic control, since this is fund is expected to be managed by Commission and the EIB and. In order to prevent such situation, the Commission has announced that the fund will not consider to make investments on the basis of geographical distribution, but rather based on quality and viability. This may convince member states who fear the introduction of a parallel budget, but it might also raise problems of transparency and for those countries who wish to contribute voluntarily to the EFSI. Several alternatives to the current functioning of the EFSI -that still need to pass the European Parliament filter- has been tabled: e.g. the possibility that the EFSI regulation could establish mandatory national contributions in order to increase the credibility of the ratio 1:15; also, transforming the fund into a permanent financing system with legal personality, so it could access financial markets for funding; and that but not least, turning the EIB's contribution to EFSI into a regularly one rather a one-off, as it has been agreed so far. In any case -often accused of relying on leverage private investment unrealistic projections, lacking ambition, means and clear goals- this Juncker's investment plan goes along with several batteries of measures seeking to facilitate a boost in business activity, removing the obstacles hampering private investment in Europe.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Budget, European Union, and Investment
Political Geography:
Europe and Brussels

24. Alternative Investment Regimes for Direct Foreign and Domestic Investments in Russian Subsoil

Author:
Andrei Konoplyanik
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
This paper examines the evolution of the Russian investment regime in the subsoil in its both key – legal and tax - components starting from the very beginning of post-Soviet Russia in early 1990s up to the present day. We will discuss what are the prospects of its further development on a “slightly different” (or alternative) basis compared to the one that exists today.
Topic:
Foreign Direct Investment, Legal Theory, Tax Systems, and Investment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

25. Assessing the Potential for Further Foreign Demand for U.S. Assets: Has Financing U.S. Current Account Deficits Made Foreign Investors Overweight in U.S. Securities?

Author:
Carol C. Bertaut
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
Since 2001, foreign investors have acquired roughly $5 trillion in U.S. securities – more than doubling their holdings of U.S. equities and bonds – as both official and private inflows have financed record U.S. current account deficits. Although the rapid growth of foreign holdings of U.S. securities raises concerns that foreign investors may have become too heavily weighted in U.S. assets, foreign investors have not in fact materially changed the relative allocations between U.S. and other foreign securities in their portfolios in recent years. Based on data from the most recent comprehensive surveys of foreign portfolio investment, the 2006 IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Surveys (CPIS), most foreign investors remain relatively more underweight in both U.S. equities and bonds than they do in foreign securities in general. Although the underweight position suggests that there remains potential for foreign investors to continue to acquire U.S. securities, econometric evidence indicates that the underweight position itself reflects a preference by foreign investors for securities of countries with which they have strong economic or cultural ties, consistent with recent research that suggests “location” or “information” preferences in both domestic and international portfolios. As securities markets abroad continue to deepen, such factors are likely to continue to attract investment from “nearby” markets, especially from European investors.
Topic:
Investment, Securities, Bonds, and International Portfolios
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and North America