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1. How to strengthen Europe’s Policy Brief agenda on digital connectivity

Author:
Maaike Okano-Heijmans
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Connectivity is high on the EU’s agenda, but its digital dimension remains underdeveloped. The short paragraph on digital in the EU connectivity strategy is telling. The EU’s distinct approach to digital connectivity – with a focus on the internal market, rule-making and development – differs from similar strategies, particularly China and its Digital Silk Road. "Now is the time to act on digital connectivity's practical as well as strategic elements of hard infrastructure and business operations." Needed, now, is a comprehensive strategic vision that spurs action on all three practical elements of digital connectivity – namely, telecommunications infrastructure, business and regulation – and gives strategic guidance in the political and even securitized sense, and not only from a market perspective. Read the full Policy Brief by Senior Research Fellow Maaike Okano-Heijmans.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, and Digital Cooperation
Political Geography:
China and Europe

2. The Invisible Hand? Critical Information Infrastructures, Commercialisation and National Security

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro, Giampiero Giacomello, and Johan Eriksson
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Corporatisation of critical information infrastructure (CII) is rooted in the ‘privatisation wave’ of the 1980s-90s, when the ground was laid for outsourcing public utilities. Despite well-known risks relating to reliability, resilience, and accountability, commitment to efficiency imperatives have driven governments to outsource key public services and infrastructures. A recent illustrative case with enormous implications is the 2017 Swedish ICT scandal, where outsourcing of CII caused major security breaches. With the transfer of the Swedish Transport Agency’s ICT system to IBM and subcontractors, classified data and protected identities were made accessible to non-vetted foreign private employees – sensitive data could thus now be in anyone’s hands. This case clearly demonstrates accountability gaps that can arise in public-private governance of CII.
Topic:
Privatization, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Public Sector, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Europe, Sweden, and European Union

3. Building Confidence in the Cybersphere: A Path to Multilateral Progress

Author:
Nancy Gallagher and Theresa Hitchens
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
As use of the Internet has become critical to global economic development and international security, there is near-unanimous agreement on the need for more international cooperation to increase stability and security in cyberspace. Several multilateral initiatives over the last five years have begun to spell out cooperative measures, norms of behavior, and transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) that could help improve mutual cybersecurity. These efforts have been painstakingly slow, and some have stalled due to competing interests. Nonetheless, a United Nations (UN) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) have achieved some high-level agreement on principles, norms, and “rules of the road” for national Internet activities and transnational cyber interactions. Their agreements include commitments to share more information, improve national protective capacities, cooperate on incident response, and restrain certain destabilizing state practices. Voluntary international agreements are worth little, unless states implement their commitments. So far, implementation has been crippled by vague language, national security considerations, complex relations between public and private actors in cyberspace, and privacy concerns. This is particularly true regarding the upfront sharing of information on threats and the willingness of participants to cooperate on incident investigations, including identifying perpetrators. With multilateral forums struggling to find a way forward with norm-setting and implementation, alternate pathways are needed to protect and build on what has been accomplished so far. Different strategies can help advance implementation of measures in the UN and OSCE agreements. Some commitments, such as establishing and sharing information about national points of contact, are best handled unilaterally or through bilateral or regional inter-governmental cooperation. Other objectives, such as protecting the core architecture and functions of the Internet that support trans-border critical infrastructure and underpin the global financial system, require a multi-stakeholder approach that includes not only governments but also private sector service providers, academic experts, and nongovernmental organizations. This paper compares what the GGE and OSCE norm-building processes have achieved so far and what disagreements have impeded these efforts. It identifies several priorities for cooperation identified by participants in both forums. It also proposes three practical projects related to these priorities that members of regional or global organizations might be able to work on together despite political tensions and philosophical disputes. The first would help state and non-state actors share information and communicate about various types of cybersecurity threats using a flexible and intuitive effects-based taxonomy to categorize cyber activity. The second would develop a more sophisticated way for state and non-state actors to assess the risks of different types of cyber incidents and the potential benefits of cooperation. The third would identify aspects of the Internet that might be considered the core of a public utility, worthy of special protection in their own right and for their support of trans-border critical infrastructure.
Topic:
International Cooperation, United Nations, Infrastructure, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

4. Polish FDI in Central Asian Countries

Author:
Krystyna Gomółka
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Since gaining independence, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan gradually opened their markets to foreign investors. Before Poland’s acces- sion to the European Union, the activities of Polish investors in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ta- jikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were based on bilateral treaties concluded by Poland with those countries. Later, except Turkmenistan, they were governed by the partnership and cooperation agreements between the European Communities and their Member States. Despite the ample investment opportunities and favourable conditions for access to the mar- ket, the activity of Polish companies in these markets has not produced a significant effect. Poland invested with more considerable success on the markets in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz- stan. It made investment attempts in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, leaving out Turkmenistan. The reason why Poland has a weak position in these markets is the distance between the partners and inability of Polish companies to efficiently compete with large multinational companies which have been operating there for years. In the Kazakh market, good invest- ment prospects are available for waste management, petrochemical, mining and road con- struction companies. In Kyrgyzstan, there are cooperation possibilities in the area of modern agricultural and processing technologies and establishment of fruit and vegetable process- ing enterprises. In Tajikistan, enterprises can invest in petroleum and natural gas extraction and exploitation, the fuel market, processing of precious metals and construction of conven- tional and hydroelectric power plants. In Turkmenistan, Polish companies can compete for road, railway and housing construction contracts, whereas in Uzbekistan they can invest in businesses covered by government tax reductions.
Topic:
Markets, Infrastructure, Governance, and Investment
Political Geography:
Europe, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan

5. Petrol and Natural Gas Market of the Visegrád Group Countries 1993–2016: Current State and Prospects

Author:
Robert Klaczynski
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The paper addresses problems related to energy policies pursued by Central Eu- ropean countries. It identifies the amounts of energy resources in individual countries in the Visegrád Group as well as the transmission infrastructures they use for natural gas and crude oil. The author discusses projects aimed at diversifying energy supplies which are of key importance to V4 countries. The article also presents relations between those countries in both within the group and bilaterally. When outlining prospects of a V4 energy strategy, the account is taken of such vital aspects as relations with the Russian Federation and the contribution made by Visegrád countries to EU actions designed to develop a single energy market.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, Infrastructure, and Gas
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Europe, and Visegrad

6. Russia’s Asia Pivot: Engaging the Russian Far East, China and Southeast Asia

Author:
Bhavna Dave
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
Abstract:
The Russia-ASEAN summit being held in Sochi on 19-20 May 2016 to mark twenty years of Russia’s dialogue partnership with ASEAN is a further indicator of President Vladimir Putin’s ‘pivot to Asia’ policy, triggered also by its current confrontation with the west. Through this pivot, Moscow wants to assert Russia’s geopolitical status as a Euro-Pacific as well as Asia- Pacific power. It is a pragmatic response to the shifting of global power to Asia. It also builds on the growing Russo-Chinese relations to develop the Russian Far East, a resource-rich but underdeveloped region into the gateway for expansion of Russia into the Asia Pacific. At the same time, the growing asymmetry in achieving the economic and strategic goals of Russia and China has resulted in fears that the Russian Far East will turn into a raw materials appendage of China. Moscow lacks the financial resources to support Putin’s Asia pivot. Therefore, Russia needs to strengthen ties with other Asia-Pacific countries and ASEAN as a regional grouping so as to attract more diversified trade and investments into its Far East region. It is in this context that the Sochi summit takes on added significance. However, given Russia’s sporadic interest in Southeast Asia and its strategic role defined mainly by the limited potential of Russian energy and arms exports to ASEAN Member States, the PR diplomacy and summitry at Sochi may not deliver substantive outcomes for Russia. Nonetheless, Moscow aims to enhance its status in the east and seek business and strategic opportunities through the summit thereby compensating to some extent Russia’s loss following the sanctions imposed by the west over the annexation of Crimea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

7. The Train Journey: Transit, Captivity, and Witnessing in the Holocaust

Author:
Simone Gigliotti
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Berghahn Books
Abstract:
Deportations by train were critical in the Nazis’ genocidal vision of the “Final Solution of the Jewish Question.” Historians have estimated that between 1941 and 1944 up to three million Jews were transported to their deaths in concentration and extermination camps. In his writings on the “Final Solution,” Raul Hilberg pondered the role of trains: “How can railways be regarded as anything more than physical equipment that was used, when the time came, to transport the Jews from various cities to shooting grounds and gas chambers in Eastern Europe?” This book explores the question by analyzing the victims’ experiences at each stage of forced relocation: the round-ups and departures from the ghettos, the captivity in trains, and finally, the arrival at the camps. Utilizing a variety of published memoirs and unpublished testimonies, the book argues that victims experienced the train journeys as mobile chambers, comparable in importance to the more studied, fixed locations of persecution, such as ghettos and camps.
Topic:
Genocide, Infrastructure, Holocaust, World War II, and Anti-Semitism
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Poland, and Germany

8. Is Europe to Benefit from China's Belt and Road Initiative?

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
With the One Belt One Road (OBOR), arguably Beijing’s major diplomatic outreach in decades, a process towards greater Sino-European connectivity has been put in place. The implementation of the OBOR in Europe has focused so far on financing infrastructure projects, in particular railways in Southeast Europe and ports in the Mediterranean Sea. This has been complemented by growing monetary linkages between the People’s Bank of China and European central banks through the establishment of currency swap agreements and yuan bank clearing – so-called “offshore renminbi hubs” – with the aim of lowering transaction costs of Chinese investment and bolstering the use of the Chinese currency. While there are undoubtedly great economic opportunities, China’s OBOR initiative also presents the EU with a major political challenge. There is the risk, in fact, that a scramble for Chinese money could further divide EU member states and make it difficult for Brussels to fashion a common position vis-à-vis Beijing. Furthermore, China’s economic penetration into Europe may lead – if not properly managed – to a populist backlash as well as a strain in relations with Washington. All these elements should be taken into consideration by EU policymakers, as China’s OBOR makes inroads into the Old Continent.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
China and Europe
Publication Identifier:
978-88-98650-64-4
Publication Identifier Type:
DOI

9. Digital Single Market. SMEs and the Juncker Investment Plan for the European Union

Author:
Juan Antonio Pavón Losada
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
A few months ago (25/11/2014), the European Commission disclosed the mechanism for its much-heralded €315 billion investment plan, revealing how a a scarce €21 billion of initial public money is intended to lift fifteen times as much in capital. In March 2015, EU finance ministers agreed upon delivering on the commitment they took at the European Councils in October and December 2014, to wind-off Juncker's flagship investment plan. The idea was to create a new European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), with €5 billion coming from the European Investment Bank and an €8 billion guarantee from existing EU funds designed to secure a further contribution of 16 billion Euro from the institutions. The €8 billion guarantee will come over a three-year period from the Connecting Europe Facility (€3.3 billion); Europe’s research programme Horizon 2020 (€2.7 billion) and socalled “budget margin”, or unused funds, worth €2 billion. On the one hand, the EFSI plans to generate investments into the European economy of about €315 billion, by providing guarantees for higher-risk projects which aim at developing telecommunications and transport infrastructure, energy efficiency projects, research, education and innovation activities to finally generating about 240 billion in long-term investments, showing a timid responsiveness for the claims against austerity over the past years. On the other hand, the alternative purpose of the Fund is to provide financing to SMEs to enhance the viability of new venture capital injections, loan guarantees, securitisations and seed financing designed to offer micro-loans to SMEs, to fund start-ups or offer mid-cap companies venture capital, projected to generate €75 billion for those SMEs and mid-cap firms over the period 2015-2017. In addition, the Commission aims to attract private investors to the Fund. Nevertheless, private investors seem sceptical about investing and assuming greater risks when the returns are not guaranteed. In fact, the basis for most longterm infrastructure or energy efficiency projects will most likely remain public funding -his is especially true of the newer EU member states, where the private sector is not strong enough-. In fact, the EU executive believes that more financing can be provided by individual member states. Two ways are being discussed: Capital contributions, which are not limited to the respective Member State and may entail voting rights and a claim on the fund´s return (if any); and that participation in investment platforms that can be restricted to the Member State itself. As an incentive, this amount will be then discounted from the calculations of their deficits within the European Semester. There is a rising concern between Member States that the new fund will turn into a parallel EU budget -where voting rights could be purchased- not subject to enough democratic control, since this is fund is expected to be managed by Commission and the EIB and. In order to prevent such situation, the Commission has announced that the fund will not consider to make investments on the basis of geographical distribution, but rather based on quality and viability. This may convince member states who fear the introduction of a parallel budget, but it might also raise problems of transparency and for those countries who wish to contribute voluntarily to the EFSI. Several alternatives to the current functioning of the EFSI -that still need to pass the European Parliament filter- has been tabled: e.g. the possibility that the EFSI regulation could establish mandatory national contributions in order to increase the credibility of the ratio 1:15; also, transforming the fund into a permanent financing system with legal personality, so it could access financial markets for funding; and that but not least, turning the EIB's contribution to EFSI into a regularly one rather a one-off, as it has been agreed so far. In any case -often accused of relying on leverage private investment unrealistic projections, lacking ambition, means and clear goals- this Juncker's investment plan goes along with several batteries of measures seeking to facilitate a boost in business activity, removing the obstacles hampering private investment in Europe.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Budget, European Union, and Investment
Political Geography:
Europe and Brussels

10. Rethinking the Financial Design of the World Bank

Author:
Devesh Kapur and Arjun Raychaudhuri
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Since their inception, through 2012, the institutions comprising the World Bank group have been involved in lending nearly a trillion dollars. In this paper, we focus on the IBRD, which is the core of the World Bank. The IBRD has the potential to continue to grow and be an important player in official financial flows, supporting critical long-term development projects with large social returns, in sectors ranging from infrastructure, social sectors, or environment.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Environment, Foreign Aid, Infrastructure, and World Bank
Political Geography:
Europe